💪 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - 24 Hour Fitness Inc. 💪

24 Hour Fitness Inc.

June 15, 2020

California-based 24 Hour Fitness Inc. (along with ten affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware after it became apparent that it’s hard to sustain a fitness business when, as a practical matter, you’re really 0 Hour Fitness Inc. When you have 3.4mm customers across 445 (leased) locations across the United States, it’s awfully hard for a business that typically does $1.5b in revenue and $191 in adjusted EBITDA to make money when a pandemic rips through the nation and shuts down business entirely. This, ladies and gentlemen, like the few airlines who have filed for bankruptcy to date, is as pure-play a COVID-19 story as they come these days.

Now, that’s to not to suggest that everything was copacetic prior to the quarantine. The business had some pimples on it. The debtors’ CRO cites the selling/operating model’s negative impact on financial performance. But the biggest and scariest pimples are the debtors’ balance sheet and lease portfolio. The former includes $1.4b of funded debt; the latter, 445 locations leased across the country, of which 135 have already been deemed unnecessary and are the subject of a first day executory contract rejection motion (PETITION Note: the debtors denote this as “a first wave.”). When revenues stop coming into the coffers, these tremendous amounts become quite an overhang and a liquidity drain.

The filing, among other things, helps solve for the liquidity issue. The debtors have obtained a commitment for a $250mm new-money senior secured DIP facility from an ad hoc group of lenders. While there is no restructuring support agreement in place here, the ad hoc group is comprised of 63.3% of the aggregate principal amount outstanding under the prepetition credit facility and approximately 73.9% of the face amount of the $500mm in senior unsecured notes. In other words, there’s a solid amount of support here but not enough yet to command the senior class of debt.

Luckily, the debtors gave themselves a form of pre-DIP. Wait. Huh? What are we referring to?

…the Debtors were obliged to close all of their fitness clubs nationwide on March 16, 2020, in response to this national emergency. As a result, the Debtors were no longer able to generate new sources of revenue (by winning new members) and, on or about April 15, 2020, the Debtors suspended billing on account of monthly membership dues.fn

In the footnote, the debtors note:

To date, litigation has been commenced in connection with the Debtors’ monthly billing on a post-March 16 basis, notwithstanding, among other things, the Debtors’ rights under their various membership agreements. The Debtors reserve all rights, claims, and defenses in this regard.

Uh, apparently, 0 Hour Fitness Inc. = 30 Days of Payment Inc. We’ll see whether this short-term liquidity grab created long term customer retention issues.*

Moreover, the fact that they apparently laid off thousands of employees via conference call probably won’t amount to a whole lot of goodwill. Just sayin’.

Now it’s wait and see. The debtors have reopened approximately 20 locations in Texas and hope to have the majority of their other non-rejected clubs open by the end of June. We’ll see if the uptick in COVID cases in certain states throws a wrench in that plan. To combat any COVID-related perception risk, the debtors are instituting some new measures:

…the Debtors have taken an innovative approach to the reopening of their clubs, instituting market-leading strategies to keep their members and employees safe, including an app-based reservation system to ensure that their clubs remain in compliance with applicable social distancing guidelines, a touchless check-in system to limit members’ and employees’ contact with surfaces, and cleaning schedules that ensure that entire clubs are sanitized every hour. (emphasis added)

Gosh. We see sh*t like this — the airlines are also making similar statements about newly implemented cleanliness standards — and it really makes us wonder: what the bloody hell were these cesspools doing pre-COVID?!?!? Clearly not enough.

And, yet, otherwise, we have some sympathy for these businesses. This is a brand new paradigm. The debtors indicate that they’re implementing a reservation-based system where people are locked into an hour-max workout after which the gym will be closed for 30 minutes for a “deep clean.” That is not exactly a seamless and frictionless user experience. Moreover, what kind of chemicals are going to be dumped all over the facility every 60 minutes? These are tough issues.

As far as social distancing:

…the Debtors are utilizing space in their clubs in creative ways in order to continue to offer members a range of amenities and services. For example, the Debtors are utilizing their basketball courts to hold group exercise classes, including by relocating stationary bike equipment to continue to offer indoor cycling classes, so that members and equipment can be properly spaced to comply with social distancing guidelines.

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

No offense but does THIS really worth going to the gym for? You can use apps for a fraction of the cost and do this at home…mask-less.

So what now?

The DIP financing will buy the debtors some time to evaluate new trends. Will those people who paid for a month when the gym was closed come back? Will the news about employee treatment effect the “brand”? Will all of those people who bought home gyms or learned to run need to go to a gym? The re-opening notwithstanding, all of these questions will directly impact valuation. Indeed, how do you value this business with so many massive question marks? Well, luckily, we have the debt to get a sense of what that answer might be. And considering that, at the time of this writing, the term loan is bid in the high 20s and the unsecured notes are bid around 3 — that’s right, 3 — it’s pretty clear who is getting (generally) wiped out in this scenario and where the market thinks the value breaks.

*Honestly, this was a dirty move but from the debtors’ perspective, it also totally makes sense.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $95.2mm ‘23 RCF, $835.1mm ‘25 Term Loan, $500mm 8% ‘22 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Kevin Bostel, Kyle Satterfield, Ramsey Scofield, Jackson Que Alldredge, Jacob Mezei, Alexander Cohen, Sarah Schnorrenberg) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns, Peter Keane)

    • Directors: Marc Beilinson, Stephen Hare, Roland Smith

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Daniel Hugo)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: O’Melveny & Myers LLP (John Rapisardi, Adam Rogoff, Daniel Shamah, Diana Perez, Adam Haberkorn) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, David Queroli)

    • Prepetition Agent: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Alfred Xue)

    • DIP Agent: Wilmington Trust

      • Legal: Covington & Burling (Ronald Hewitt)

    • Senior Notes Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Luke Sizemore, Mark Eckard)

    • Large equityholders: AEA, Fitness Capital Partners LP, 2411967 Ontario Limited

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - J.C. Penney Company Inc. ($JCP)

J.C. Penney Company Inc.

May 15, 2020

Let’s be clear about something right off the bat. Encino Man, Captain America and Austin Powers could all suddenly surface from being entombed in ice for decades and even THEY wouldn’t be surprised that Texas-based J.C. Penney Company Inc. (and 17 affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

There are a couple of ways to look at this one.

First, there’s the debtors’ way. Not one to squander a solid opportunity, the debtors dive under “COVID Cover”:

Before the pandemic, the Company had a substantial liquidity cushion, was improving its operations, and was proactively engaging with creditors to deleverage its capital structure and extend its debt maturities to build a healthier balance sheet. Unfortunately, that progress was wiped out with the onset of COVID-19. And now, the Company is unable to maintain its upward trajectory through its “Plan for Renewal.” Moreover, following the temporary shutdown of its 846 brick-and-mortar stores, the Company is unable to responsibly pay the upcoming debt service on its over-burdened capital structure.

The debtors note that since Jill Soltau became CEO on October 2, 2018, the debtors have been off to the races with their “Plan for Renewal” strategy. This strategy was focused on getting back to JCP’s fundamentals. It emphasized (a) offering compelling merchandise, (b) delivering an engaging experience, (c) driving traffic online and to stores (including providing buy online, pickup in store or curbside pickup — the latest in retail technology that literally everyone is doing), (d) fueling growth, and (e) developing a results-minded culture. The debtors are quick to point out that all of this smoky verbiage is leading to “meaningful progress” — something they define as “…having just achieved comparable store sales improvement in six of eight merchandise divisions in the second half of 2019 over the first half, and successfully meeting or exceeding guidance on all key financial objectives for the 2019 fiscal year.” The debtors further highlight:

The five financial objectives were: (a) Comparable stores sales were expected to be down between 7-8% (stores sales were down 7.7%); (b) adjusted comparable store sales, which excludes the impact of the Company’s exit from major appliances and in-store furniture categories were expected to be down in a range of 5-6% (adjusted comparable store sales down 5.6%); (c) cost of goods sold, as a rate of net sales was expected to decrease 150-200 basis points (decreased approximately 210 basis points over prior year, which resulted in improved gross margin); (d) adjusted EBITDA was $583 million (a 2.6% improvement over prior year); and (e) free cash flow for fiscal year 2019 was $145 million, beating the target of positive.

Not exactly the highest bar in certain respects but, sure, progress nonetheless we suppose. The debtors point out, on multiple occasions, that prior to COVID-19, its “…projections showed sufficient liquidity to maintain operations without any restructuring transaction.” Maintain being the operative word. Everyone knows the company is in the midst of a slow death.

To prolong life, the focus has been on and remains on high-margin goods (which explains the company getting out of low-margin furniture and appliances and a renewed focus on private label), reducing inventory, and developing a new look for JCP’s stores which, interestingly, appears to focus on the “experiential” element that everyone has ballyhooed over the last several years which is now, in a COVID world, somewhat tenuous.

Which gets us to the way the market has looked at this. The numbers paint an ugly picture. Total revenues went from $12.87b in fiscal year ‘18 to $12b in ‘19. Gross margin also declined from 36% to 34%. In the LTM as of 2/1/20 (pre-COVID), revenue was looking like $11.1b. Curious. But, yeah, sure COGs decreased as has SG&A. People still aren’t walking through the doors and buying sh*t though. A fact reflected by the stock price which has done nothing aside from slowly slide downward since new management onboarded:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 10.14.19 AM.png

All of this performance has also obviously called into question the debtors’ ability to grow into its capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 11.54.57 AM.png

Here’s a more detailed look at the breakdown of unsecured funded debt:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.57.22 PM.png

And yet, prior to COVID, the debt stack has more or less held up. Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘23 5.875% $500mm senior secured first lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.01.41 PM.png

Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘25 8.624% $400mm second lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.04.49 PM.png

And here is our absolute favorite: JCP’s ‘97 7.625% $500mm senior unsecured notes:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.06.37 PM.png

The fact that these notes were in the 20s mere months ago is mind-boggling.

We talk a lot about how bankruptcy filings are a way to tell a story. And, here, the debtors, while not trying to hide their stretched balance sheet nor the pains of brick-and-mortar department stores with a 846-store footprint, are certainly trying to spin a positive story about management and the new strategic direction — all while highlighting that there are pockets of value here. For instance, of those 846 stores, 387 of them are owned, including 110 operating on ground leases. The private brand portfolio — acquired over decades — represents 46% of total merchandise sales. The debtors also own six of their 11 distribution centers and warehouses.

With that in mind, prior to COVID, management and their advisors were trying to be proactive about the balance sheet — primarily the term loans and first lien secured notes maturing in 2023. In Q3 ‘19, the debtors engaged with their first lien noteholders, term lenders and second lien noteholders on proposals that would, among other things, address those maturities, promote liquidity, and reduce interest expense. According to the debtors, they came close. A distressed investor was poised to purchase more than $750mm of the term loans and, in connection with a new $360mm FILO facility, launch the first step of a broader process that would have kicked maturities out a few years. In exchange, the debtors would lien up unencumbered collateral (real estate). Enter COVID. The deal went up in smoke.

There’s a new “deal” in its stead. A restructuring support agreement filed along with the bankruptcy papers contemplates a new post-reorg operating company (“New JCP”) and a new REIT which will issue new common stock and new interests, respectively. Beyond that, not much is clear from the filing: the term sheet has a ton of blanks in it:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.42.42 PM.png
Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.42.53 PM.png

There’s clearly a lot of work to do here. There’s also the “Market Test” element which entails, among other things, running new financing processes, pursuing potential sale/leaseback transactions, and pursuing a sale of the all or part of the debtors’ assets. If the debtors don’t have a business plan by July 14 and binding commitments for third-party financing by August 15, the debtors are required to immediately cease pursuing a plan and must instead pursue a 363 of all of their assets. Said another way, if the economy continues to decline, consumer spending doesn’t recover, and credit markets tighten up, there’s a very good chance that JCP could liquidate. Remember: retail sales sunk to a record low in April. Is that peak pain? Or will things get worse as the unemployment rate takes root? Will people shop at JC Penney if they even shop at all? There are numerous challenges here.

The debtors will use cash collateral for now and later seek approval of a $900mm DIP credit facility of which $450mm will be new money (L+11.75% continues the trend of expensive retail DIPs). It matures in 180 days, giving the debtors 6 months to get this all done.

*****

A few more notes as there are definitely clear winners and losers here.

Let’s start with the losers:

  1. The Malls. It’s one thing when one department store files for bankruptcy and sheds stores. It’s an entirely different story when several of them go bankrupt at the same time and shed stores. This is going to be a bloodbath. Already, the debtors have a motion on file seeking to reject 20 leases.

  2. Nike Inc. ($NKE) & Adidas ($ADDYY). Perhaps they’re covered by 503(b)(9) status or maybe they can slickster their way into critical vendor status (all for which the debtors seek $15.1mm on an interim basis and $49.6mm on a final basis). Regardless, showing up among the top creditors in both the Stage Stores Inc. bankruptcy and now the J.C. Penney bankruptcy makes for a horrible week.

  3. The Geniuses Who Invested in JCP Debt that Matures in 2097. As CNBC’s Michael Santoli noted, “This JC Penney issue fell only 77 years short of maturing money-good.

  4. Bill Ackman & Ron Johnson. This.

And here are the winners:

  1. The New York Times. Imperfect as it may be, their digitalization efforts allow us all to read and marvel about the life of James Cash Penney, a name that so befitting of a Quentin Tarantino movie that you can easily imagine JC chillin with Jack Dalton on some crazy Hollywood adventure. We read it with sadness as he boasts of the Golden Rule and profit-sharing. Profits alone would be nice, let alone sharing.

  2. Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Seriously. These guys are smoking it and have just OWNED retail. In the past eight days alone the firm has filed Stage Stores Inc., Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC and now JCP. It’s a department store hat trick. Zoom out from retail and add in Ultra Petroleum Corp. and Intelsat SA and these folks are lucky they’re working from home. They can’t afford to waste any billable minutes on a commute at this point.

  3. Management. They’re getting what they paid for AND, consequently, they’re getting paid. No doubt Kirkland marched in there months ago and pitched/promised management that they’d secure lucrative pay packages for them if hired and … BOOM! $7.5mm to four members of management!


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Christopher Marcus, Aparna Yenamandra, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Allyson Smith Weinhouse, Jake William Gordon) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

    • OpCo (JC Penney Corporation Inc.) Independent Directors: Alan Carr, Steven Panagos

      • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Steven Reisman)

    • PropCo (JCP Real Estate Holdings LLC & JC Penney Properties LLC) Independent Directors: William Transier, Heather Summerfield

      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (James Mesterharm, Deb Reiger-Paganis)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke, Michael Weitz)

    • Store Closing Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

    • Real Estate Consultants: B. Riley Real Estate LLC & Cushman & Wakefield US Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: GLAS USA LLC

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer

    • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC & Bracewell LLP (William Wood)

      • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners (Mo Meghli)

    • TL Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Ad Hoc Group of Certain Term Loan Lenders & First Lien Noteholders & DIP Lenders (H/2 Capital Partners, Ares Capital Management, Silver Point Capital, KKR, Whitebox Advisors, Sculptor Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management, Apollo, Owl Creek Asset Management LP, Sixth Street Partners)

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Thomas Kreller, Brian Kinney) & Porter Hedges LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian)

    • Second Lien Noteholders (GoldenTree Asset Management, Carlson, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Littlejohn & Co.)

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kris Hansen) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Kelli Norfleet, Charles Beckham)

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

    • Large equityholder: BlackRock Inc. (13.85%)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

May 7, 2020

Dallas-based Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, Bergdorf Goodman Inc. and 22 other debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas late this week. If anyone is seeking an explanation as to why that may be outside the obvious pandemic-related narrative, look no farther than this monstrosity:

Screen Shot 2020-05-08 at 4.51.32 PM.png

A quick reality check: that $5b capital structure isn’t attached to an international enterprise with hundreds or thousands of stores. You know, like Forever21. Rather, that horror show backs a 68 store business (43 Neiman Marcus, 2 Bergdorf, 22 Last Call). Ah….gotta love the good ol’ $5b leveraged buyout.

This case is all about “BIG.”

Big capital structure stemming from a big LBO by two big PE funds, Ares Capital Management and CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

Big brands with big price tags. PETITION Note: top unsecured creditors include Chanel Inc., Gucci America, Dolce and Gabbana USA Inc., Stuart Weitzman Inc., Theory LLC, Christian Louboutin, Yves Saint Laurent America Inc., Burberry USA, and more. There is also a big amount allocated towards critical vendors: $42.5mm. Nobody messes with Gucci, folks. Here’s a live shot of a representative walking out of court confident that they’ll get their money:

Gucci.gif

Big fees. More on this below.

Big, complicated — and controversial — multi-year re-designation and asset stripping transactions that were part of the debtors’ (and now non-debtors’) elaborate strategy to restructure out-of-court by kicking the can down the road. This is undoubtedly going to stir a big fight in the case. More on this below too.

Big value destruction.

Here is what will happen to the pre-petition capital structure under the proposed term sheet and restructuring support agreement filed along with the chapter 11 papers — a deal that has the support of 78% of the term lenders, 78% of the debentures, 99% of the second lien notes, 70% of the third lien notes, and 100% of the private equity sponsors:

Screen Shot 2020-05-08 at 4.51.32 PM.JPG

The Asset-Based Revolving Credit Facility and FILO Facility will get out at par. There’ll be a $750mm exit facility. Beyond that? All that red constitutes heaps and heaps of value that’s now essentially an option. It’s a bet that there is a place in the future for brick-and-mortar luxury department stores. Pursuant to the deal, the “Extended Term Loans” will get the lion’s share of equity (87.5%, subject to dilution). The rest of the capital structure will get small slivers of reorganized equity. General unsecured creditors will get “their pro rata share of a cash pool.” The private equity sponsors will get wiped out but for their hoped-for liability releases.

Back to those big fees. The biggest issue for this week was the debtors’ proposed $675mm new money DIP credit facility (that comes in junior to the existing ABL in priority…in other words, no roll-up here). The DIP is essentially 13% paper chock full of fees (including a backstop fee payable in “NewCo equity” at 30% discount to plan value). One disgruntled party, Mudrick Capital Management, a holder of $144mm of the term loan, appears to have beef with Pimco and other DIP backstop parties — saying that the backstop agreement is inappropriate and the DIP fees are outrageous, likening the fee grab to a COVID hoarding mentality — and therefore felt compelled to cross-examine the debtors’ banker as to the reasonableness of it all. If you’ve ever imagined a kid suing other kids for not picking him for their dodgeball team, it would look something like this did.

And so Lazard’s testimony basically boiled down to this:

“Uh, yeah, dude, nobody knows when the economy will fully open up. The company only has $100mm of cash on the petition date. And IT’S NOT OPERATING. That money is enough for maybe 3 weeks of cash burn given that the debtors intend to continue paying rent (unlike most other retailers that have filed for bankruptcy lately). Damn pesky high-end landlords. Anyway, so we’ll burn approximately $300mm between now and when stores are projected to reopen in July/August. No operating cash flow + meaningful cash burn = risky AF lending environment. It’s unprecedented to lend into a situation with a cash burn that, while it pales in comparison to something like Uber, is pretty damn extreme. Look at the J.Crew DIP: it ain’t exactly cheap to lend in this market. There are no unencumbered assets; there certainly isn’t a way to get junior financing. And a priming fight makes no sense here given the impossibility of showing an equity cushion. So stop being an entitled little brat. There’s no obligation on anyone to cut you into the deal. And if you’re going to cry over spilled milk, take up your beef with Pimco and f*ck right off. Alternatively, you can subscribe to your pro rata portion of the DIP and enjoy all of the fees other than the backstop fee.”

The Judge was convinced that the above rationale constituted good business judgment and approved the DIP on an interim basis.

The hearing also foreshadowed another contentious issue in the case: the myTheresa situation. See, the Debtors’ position is the following: “The ‘17 MyTheresa designation as unrestricted subs + the ‘18 distribution of the myTheresa operating companies to non-debtor Neiman Marcus Group Inc. (a/k/a the “asset stripping” transaction) + a ‘19 wholesale amend-and-extend + cost-saving initiatives + comparable same store sales growth for 7 of 10 quarters + “significantly expanded margins” during the holiday period = rocket ship future growth but for the damn pandemic. On the flip side, Marble Ridge Capital LP takes the position that:

…the Debtors’ financial troubles were entirely foreseeable well before recent events. The Company has operated at leverage multiples more than twice its peers since at least 2018 (prior to the fraudulent transfers described herein). And last year’s debt restructuring increased the Company’s already unsustainable annual interest expense by more than $100 million while only reducing the Company’s debt load by $250 million leaving a fraction of adjusted EBITDA for any capital expenditures, principal repayment, taxes or one-time charges. Sadly, the Debtors’ financial distress will come as no surprise to anyone.

This ain’t gonna be pretty. Marble Ridge has already had one suit for fraudulent transfer dismissed with prejudice at the pleading stage. Now there are defamation and other claims AGAINST Marble Ridge outstanding. And subsequent suits in the NY Supreme Court. Have no fear, though, folks. There are independent managers in the mix now to perform an “independent” investigation into these transactions.

The debtors intend to have a plan on file by early June with confirmation in September. Until then, pop your popcorn folks. You can socially distance AND watch these fireworks.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Anup Sathy, Chad Husnick, Matthew Fagen, Austin Klar, Gregory Hesse, Dan Latona, Gavin Campbell, Gary Kavarsky, Mark McKane, Jeffrey Goldfine, Josh Greenblatt, Maya Ben Meir) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

    • Independent Managers of NMG LTD LLC: Marc Beilinson, Scott Vogel

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon, Todd Cosenza, Jennifer Hardy, Joseph Davis, Alexander Cheney)

      • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Dennis Stogsdill)

    • Independent Manager of Mariposa Intermediate Holdings LLC: Anthony Horton

      • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

    • Neiman Marcus Inc.

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Jeffrey Bjork)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinstein, Kyle Richter, Marissa Light)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Andrew Zatz, Rashida Adams) & Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner, Paul Moak, Lydia Webb)

    • FILO Agent: TPG Specialty Lending Inc.

      • Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Abbey Walsh, G. Scott Leonard) & Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz, Christopher Kelly) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham, Martha Wyrick)

    • Second Lien Note Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

    • Third Lien Note Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: UMB Bank NA

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer)

    • 2028 Debentures Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Ad Hoc Term Loan Lender Group (Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Sixth Street Partners LLC)

      • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus) & Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Kiran Vakamudi, Paul Heath, Matthew Moran, Katherine Drell Grissel)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Ad Hoc Secured Noteholder Committee

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Belisle Eaton, Claudia Tobler, Diane Meyers, Neal Donnelly, Patricia Walsh, Jeffrey Recher) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Large Creditor: Chanel Inc.

      • Legal: Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (Justin Bernbrock, Michael Driscoll)

    • Large Creditor: Louis Vuitton USA Inc.

      • Legal: Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP (Nathan Rugg)

    • Large Creditor: Moncler USA Inc.

      • Legal: Morrison Cohen LLP (Joseph Moldovan, David Kozlowski)

    • Marble Ridge Capital LP & Marble Ridge Master Fund LP

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Edward Weisfelner, Sigmund Wissner-Gross, Jessica Meyers, Uchechi Egeonuigwe)

    • Mudrick Capital Management LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Michael Rosenthal, Mitchell Karlan, David Feldman, Keith Martorana, Jonathan Fortney)

    • Sponsor: CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Jasmine Ball, Erica Weisgerber) & Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Hugh Ray, William Hotze, Jason Sharp)

    • Sponsor: Ares Capital Management

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Thomas Kreller)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski) & Cole Schotz PC (Daniel Rosenberg)

      • Financial Advisor: M-III Advisory Partners LP (Mohsin Meghji)

      • Valuation Expert: The Michel-Shaked Group (Israel Shaked)

👕 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew) 👕

Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew)

May 4, 2020

If you’re looking for a snapshot of the pre-trade war and pre-COVID US economy look no farther than J.Crew’s list of top 30 unsecured creditors attached to its chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On the one hand there is the LONG list of sourcers, manufacturers and other middlemen who form the crux of J.Crew’s sh*tty product line: this includes, among others, 12 Hong Kong-based, three India-based, three South Korea-based, two Taiwan-based, and two Vietnam-based companies. In total, 87% of their product is sourced in Asia (45% from mainland China and 16% from Vietnam). On the other hand, there are the US-based companies. There’s Deloitte Consulting — owed a vicious $22.7mm — the poster child here for the services-dependent US economy. There’s the United Parcel Services Inc. ($UPS)…okay, whatever. You’ve gotta ship product. We get that. And then there’s Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as the debtors’ pre-petition term loan agent, and Eaton Vance Management as a debtholder and litigant. Because nothing says the US-of-f*cking-A like debt and debtholder driven litigation. ‘Merica! F*ck Yeah!!

Chinos Holdings Inc. (aka J.Crew) and seventeen affiliated debtors (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy early Monday morning with a prearranged deal that is dramatically different from the deal the debtors (and especially the lenders) thought they had at the tail end of 2019. That’s right: while the debtors have obviously had fundamental issues for years, it was on the brink of a transaction that would have kept it out of court. Call it “The Petsmart Effect.” (PETITION Note: long story but after some savage asset-stripping the Chewy IPO basically dug out Petsmart from underneath its massive debt load; J.Crew’s ‘19 deal intended to do the same by separating out the various businesses from the Chino’s holding company and using Madewell IPO proceeds to fund payments to lenders).

Here is the debtors’ capital structure. It is key to understanding what (i) the 2019 deal was supposed to accomplish and (ii) the ownership of J.Crew will look like going forward:

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.38.16 PM.png

Late last year, the debtors and their lenders entered into a Transaction Support Agreement (“TSA”) with certain pre-petition lenders and their equity sponsors, TPG Capital LP and Leonard Green & Partners LP, that would have (a) swapped the $1.33b of term loans for $420mm of new term loans + cash and (b) left general unsecured creditors unimpaired (100% recovery of amounts owed). As noted above, the cash needed to make (a) and (b) happen would have come from a much-ballyhooed IPO of Madewell Inc.

Then COVID-19 happened.

Suffice it to say, IPO’ing a brick-and-mortar based retailer — even if there were any kind of IPO window — is a tall order when there’s, like, a pandemic shutting down all brick-and-mortar business. Indeed, the debtors indicate that they expect a $900mm revenue decline due to COVID. That’s the equivalent of taking Madewell — which earned $602m of revenue in ‘19 after $614mm in ‘18 — and blowing it to smithereens. Only then to go back and blow up the remnants a second time for good measure.* Source of funds exit stage left!

The post-COVID deal is obviously much different. The term lenders aren’t getting a paydown from Madewell proceeds any longer; rather, they are effectively getting Madewell itself by converting their term loan claims and secured note claims into approximately 82% of the reorganized equity. Some other highlights:

  • Those term loan holders who are members of the Ad Hoc Committee will backstop a $400mm DIP credit facility (50% minimum commitment) that will convert into $400mm of new term loans post-effective date. The entire plan is premised upon a $1.75b enterprise value which is…uh…interesting. Is it modest considering it represents a $1b haircut off the original take-private enterprise value nine years ago? Or is it ambitious considering the company’s obvious struggles, its limited brand equity, the recession, brick-and-mortar’s continued decline, Madewell’s deceleration, and so forth and so on? Time will tell.

  • Syndication of the DIP will be available to holders of term loans and IPCo Notes (more on these below), provided, however, that they are accredited institutional investors.

  • The extra juice for putting in for a DIP allocation is that, again, they convert to new term loans and, for their trouble, lenders of the new term loans will get 15% additional reorganized equity plus warrants. So an institution that’s in it to win it and has a full-on crush for Madewell (and the ghost of JCrew-past) will get a substantial chunk of the post-reorg equity (subject to dilution).

Query whether, if asked a mere six months ago, they were interested in owning this enterprise, the term lenders would’ve said ‘yes.’ Call us crazy but we suspect not. 😎

General unsecured creditors’ new deal ain’t so hot in comparison either. They went from being unimpaired to getting a $50mm pool with a 50% cap on claims. That is to say, maybe…maybe…they’ll get 50 cents on the dollar.

That is, unless they’re one of the debtors’ 140 landlords owed, in the aggregate, approximately $23mm in monthly lease obligations.** The debtors propose to treat them differently from other unsecured creditors and give them a “death trap” option: if they accept the TSA’s terms and get access to a $3mm pool or reject and get only $1mm with a 50% cap on claims. We can’t imagine this will sit well. We imagine that the debtors choice of venue selection has something to do with this proposed course of action. 🤔

We’re not going to get into the asset stripping transaction at the heart of the IPCo Note issuance. This has been widely-covered (and litigated) but we suspect it may get a new breath of life here (only to be squashed again, more likely than not). In anticipation thereof, the debtors have appointed special committees to investigate the validity of any claims related to the transaction. They may want to take up any dividends to their sponsors while they’re at it.

The debtors hope to have this deal wrapped up in a bow within 130 days. We cannot even imagine what the retail landscape will look like that far from now but, suffice it to say, the ratings agencies aren’t exactly painting a calming picture.

*****

*Curiously, there are some discrepancies here in the numbers. In the first day papers, the debtors indicate that 2018 revenue for Madewell was $529.2mm. With $602mm in ‘19 revenue, one certainly walks away with the picture that Madewell is a source of growth (13.8%) while the J.Crew side of the business continues to decline (-4%). This graph is included in the First Day Declaration:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

The Madewell S-1, however, indicates that 2018 revenue was $614mm.

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.58.35 PM.png

With $268mm of the ‘18 revenue coming in the first half, this would imply that second half ‘18 revenue was $346mm. With ‘19 revenue coming in at $602mm and $333mm attributable to 1H, this would indicate that the business is declining rather than growing. In the second half, in particular, revenue for fiscal ‘19 was $269mm, a precipitous dropoff from $333mm in ‘18. Even if you take the full year fiscal year ‘18 numbers from the first day declaration (529.2 - 268) you get $261mm of second half growth in ‘18 compared to the $269mm in ‘19. While this would reflect some growth, it doesn’t exactly move the needle. This is cause for concern.

**To make matters worse for landlords, the debtors are also seeking authority to shirk post-petition rent obligations for 60 days while they evaluate whether to shed their leases. We get that the debtors were nearing a deal that COVID threw into flux, but this bit is puzzling: “Beginning in early April 2020, after several weeks of government mandated store closures and uncertainty as to the duration and resulting impact of the pandemic, the Debtors began to evaluate their lease portfolio to, among other things, quantify and realize the potential for lease savings.” Beginning in early April!?!?


  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $311mm ABL (Bank of America NA), $1.34b ‘21 term loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $347.6 IPCo Notes (U.S. Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Candace Arthur, Daniel Gwen) & Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry P Long III, Nathan Kramer)

    • JCrew Opco Special Committee: D.J. (Jan) Baker, Chat Leat, Richard Feintuch, Seth Farbman

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co.

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, G. Mark Edgarton) & McGuireWoods LLP (Douglas Foley, Sarah Boehm)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan & DIP Agent ($400mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP

    • Ad Hoc Committee

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Andrew LeBlanc, Matthew Brod) & Tavenner & Beran PLC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners Inc.

    • Large common and Series B preferred stock holders: TPG Capital LP (55% and 66.2%) & Leonard Green & Partners LP (20.7% and 24.8%)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jacob Adlerstein, Eugene Park, Irene Blumberg) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge Jr., Corey Booker)

    • Large Series A preferred stock holders: Anchorage Capital Group LLC (25.6%), GSO Capital Partners LP (26.1%), Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (15.5%)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. ($DO)⛽️

Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc.

April 26, 2020

Houston-based Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. and 14 affiliates (the “debtors”), a contract drilling services provider to the oil and gas industry filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. The company has 15 offshore drilling rigs: 11 semi-submersibles and four ultra-deepwater drillships deployed around the world (primarily in the Gulf of Mexico, Australia, Brazil and UK). Offshore drilling was already challenged due to excess supply of rigs — and has been since 2014. Recent events have made matters much much worse.

Thanks MBS. Thanks Putin. Thanks…uh…debilitating pandemic. The left-right combination of the Saudi/OPEC/Russia oil price war and COVID-19 has the entire oil and gas industry wobbling against the ropes. The pre-existing reality for offshore services companies “worsened precipitously” because of all of this. And so many companies will fall. The question is at what count and at what strength will they be able to get back on their feet. Given that this is a free-fall into bankruptcy with no pre-negotiated deal with lenders, it seems that nobody knows the answer. How could they? More on this below.

Unfortunately, the services segment the debtors play in is particularly at risk. “Almost all” of the debtors’ customers have requested some form of concessions on $1.4b of aggregate contract backlog. One customer, Beach Energy Ltd. ($BEPTF), “recently sought to formally terminate its agreement with the Company” (an action that is now the subject of an adversary proceeding filed in the bankruptcy cases). The debtors have been immersed in negotiations with their contract counter-parties to navigate these extraordinary times. It doesn’t help when business is so concentrated. Hess Corporation ($HES) is 30% of annual revenue; Occidental Petroleum Corporation ($OXY) is 21%; and Petrobras ($PBR) is 20%. BP PLC ($BP) and Royal Dutch Shell ($RDS.A) are other big customers.

With the writing on the wall, the debtors smartly drew down on their revolving credit facility — pulling $436mm out from under Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC). WFC must’ve loved that. Times like these really give phrases like “relationship banking” entirely new meaning. The debtors also elected to forgo a $14mm interest payment on its 2039 senior notes. Yep, you read that right: the company previously issued senior notes that weren’t set to mature until 2039. Not exactly Argentina but holy f*ck that expresses some real optimism (and froth) in the markets (and that issuance isn’t even the longest dated maturity but let’s not nitpick here)!

Yeah, so about that capital structure. In total, the debtors have $2.4b in funded debt. In addition to their $442mm of drawing under their revolving credit facility, the debtors have:

  • $500mm of 5.7% ‘39 senior unsecured notes;

  • $250mm of 3.45% ‘23 senior unsecured notes;

  • $750mm of 4.875% ‘43 senior unsecured notes; and

  • $500mm of 7.785% ‘25 senor unsecured notes.

As we’ve said time and time again: exploration and production is a wildly capital intensive business.

So now what? As we said above, there’s no deal here. The debtors note:

The Debtors determined to commence these Chapter 11 Cases to preserve their valuable contract backlog, and preserve their approximately $434.9 million in unrestricted cash on hand while avoiding annual interest expense of approximately $140.1 million under the Revolving Credit Facility and the Senior Notes, and to stabilize operations while proactively restructuring their balance sheet to successfully compete in the changing global energy markets. The Debtors and their Advisors believe cash on hand provides adequate funding at the outset of these cases. The Debtors are well-positioned to successfully emerge from bankruptcy with a highly marketable fleet, a solid backlog of activity, a strong balance sheet and liquidity position, and a differentiated approach and set of capabilities. Despite the volatile and current uncertain market conditions, the Debtors remain confident in the need for their industry, its importance around the world, and the critical services they provide.

We suspect the debtors will hang out in bankruptcy for a bit. After all, placing a value on how “critical” these services are in the current environment is going to be a challenge (though the relatively simple capital structure makes that calculation significantly easier…assuming the value extends beyond WFC). One thing seems certain: Loews Corporation ($L) is gonna have to write-down the entirety of its investment here.

*****

We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight that, similar to Whiting Petroleum’s execs, the debtors’ executives here got paid nice bonuses just prior to the bankruptcy filing. PETITION Note: We don’t have data to back this up but there appeared to be a much bigger uproar in Whiting’s case about this than here. Which is not to say that people aren’t angry — totally factually incorrect — but angry:

Because equity-based comp doesn’t exactly serve as “incentive” when the equity is worth bupkis, the debtors paid $3.55mm to employees a week before the filing and intend to file a motion to seek bankruptcy court approval of their go-forward employee programs.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: $442mm RCF (inclusive of LOC)(Wells Fargo Bank NA). See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Christopher Hopkins, Shamara James, Alice Nofzinger, Jacqueline Rubin, Andrew Gordon, Jorge Gonzalez-Corona) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson, Genevieve Graham)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Nicholas Grossi)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Bracewell LLP

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting

    • Indenture Trustee: The Bank of New York Mellon

    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

    • Major Equityholder: Loews Corporation

      • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (James Bromley)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA, National Oilwell Varco LP, Deep Sea Mooring, Crane Worldwide Logistics LLC, Kiswire Trading Inc., Parker Hannifin Corporation, SafeKick Americas LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss, Marty Brimmage, Kevin Eide, Patrick Chen, Matthew Breen)

      • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Christopher Kearns)

      • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners LP (Alexander Tracy)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Pioneer Energy Services Corp. ($PESX)⛽️

Pioneer Energy Services Corp.

March 1, 2019

San Antonio-based oilfield services provider Pioneer Energy Services Corp. and several affiliates (the “debtors”) filed “straddle” prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases on Sunday in what amounts to a true balance sheet restructuring. Will this kickoff a new slate of oil and gas related bankruptcy filings? 🤔

The debtors provide well servicing, wireline and coiled tubing services to producers in Texas and the Mid-Continent and Rocky Mountain regions; they also provide contract land drilling services to operators in Texas, Appalachia, and the Rocky Mountain region. International operations in Colombia are not part of the bankruptcy cases. Due to the…shall we say…unpleasant…atmosphere for oil and gas these last few years — which, clearly undermined demand for their services and, obviously, revenue generation — the debtors determined that they couldn’t continue to service their existing capital structure. Alas, bankruptcy.

Hold on: not so fast. We previously wrote in “⛽️Storm Clouds Forming Over Oil & Gas⛽️,” the following:

And so it’s no wonder that, despite a relative dearth of oil and gas bankruptcy filings in 2020 thus far, most people think that (a) the E&P and OFS companies that avoided a bankruptcy in the 2015 downturn are unlikely to avoid it again and (b) many of the E&P and OFS companies that didn’t avoid a bankruptcy in the 2015 downturn are unlikely to avoid the dreaded Scarlet 22….

Sure, Pioneer hasn’t filed for bankruptcy before. But it has been in a constant state of restructuring ever since 2015. Per the debtors:

…in 2015 and 2016, Pioneer reduced its total headcount by over 50%, reduced wage rates for its operations personnel, reduced incentive compensation and eliminated certain employment benefits. In 2016, the Company closed ten field offices to reduce overhead and associated lease payments. At the same time, the Company lowered its capital expenditures by 77% to primarily routine expenditures that were necessary to maintain its equipment and deferred discretionary upgrades and additions (except those that it had previously committed to make during the 2014 market slowdown).

And:

Since the beginning of 2015 through the end of 2018, the Company has liquidated nonstrategic or non-core assets. Specifically, Pioneer has sold thirty-nine (39) non-AC domestic drill rigs, thirty-three (33) older wireline units, seven (7) smaller diameter coiled tubing units and various other drilling and coiled tubing equipment for aggregate net proceeds of over $75 million. As of September 30, 2019, the Company reported another $6.2 million in assets remaining held for sale, including the fair value of buildings and yards for one domestic drilling yard and two closed wireline locations, one domestic SCR drilling rig, two coiled tubing units and spare support equipment.

Annd:

In the first quarter of 2019, the Company continued its cost-reduction initiatives and operational adjustments by expanding the roles and related responsibilities of several of its executive leaders to further leverage their existing talents to the entire organization.

In other words, these guys have been gasping for air for five years.

Relatively speaking, the debtors capital structure isn’t even that intense:

  1. $175mm Term Loan (Wilmington Trust NA)

  2. $300mm 6.125% ‘22 senior unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

Yet with oil and gas getting smoked the way it has, it was still too much. So what now?

The prepackaged plan would give the term lenders cash (from a rights offering) and $78.125mm in new secured bonds (PETITION Note: we’re betting there are a bunch of CLOs here). The unsecured noteholders will get either all of the equity or 94.25% of the equity depending upon what the interest holders do; they’ll also get rights to participate in the rights offering. If the interest holders vote to accept the plan, they’ll get 5.75% of the equity and rights to participate in the rights offering; if they reject the plan, they’ll get bupkis and the noteholders will get 100% of the equity (subject to dilution). General unsecured claimants will get paid in full. Management will put in money as part of the rights offering and an ad hoc group of the unsecured noteholders (Ascribe Capital, DW Partners LP, Intermarket Corporation, New York Life Investments, Strategic Income Management LLC, and Whitebox Advisors LLC) agreed to backstop substantially all of the rights offering (and will receive an 8% premium for their commitment). The cases will be supported by a $75mm DIP. This thing is pretty buttoned up. Confirmation is expected within 45 days.

The end result? The debtors will emerge with $153mm of debt on balance sheet (the $78.125mm in new secured bonds and a $75mm exit ABL). Time will tell whether or not this remains too much.*

*The risk factors here are particularly interesting because all of them are very real. If the oil patch does suffer, as expected, the debtors’ concentration of business among their top three clients (66% of revenue) could be especially troubling — depending on who those clients are.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Elizabeth McColm, Brian Bolin, William Clareman, Eugene Park, Grace Hotz, Sarah Harnett) & Norton Rose Fulbrights US LLP (William Greendyke, Jason Boland, Robert Bruner, Julie Goodrich Harrison)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender ($75mm): PNC Bank NA

      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (James Grogan, Broocks Wilson)

    • Prepetition Term Loan Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP

    • Ad Hoc Group of Prepetition Term Loan Lenders

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (David Meyer, Paul Heath, Harry Perrin, Steven Zundell, Zachary Paiva)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Unsecured Noteholders: Ascribe Capital, DW Partners LP, Intermarket Corporation, New York Life Investments, Strategic Income Management LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Natasha Tsiouris, Erik Jerrard, Xu Pang) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey

New Chapter 11 Filing - GCX Limited

GCX Limited

September 15, 2019

GCX Limited and 15 affiliated debtors filed a prepackaged bankruptcy this week in pursuit of a dual-track restructuring that will, either through a debt-for-equity swap or a sale, extinguish over $150mm of debt. In the swap scenario, the company will hand the keys over to senior secured noteholders; in the sale scenario, the noteholders will gladly take their cash payout and get the f*ck out of dodge. Either way, the company will be under new ownership with a significantly deleveraged capital structure. Certain consenting senior secured noteholders will provide $54.5mm in DIP financing.

The debtors are a global data communications provider; they operate one of the world’s largest fiber networks (PETITION Note: we’re old enough to remember when fiber was the future!). They provide undersea and terrestrial cables and landing stations and provide managed network services all across the globe. In English, this means they help power, among other things, major telecomms companies and streaming media.

Unfortunately, the debtors have declining revenues. Among other reasons for that sad state of affairs, the debtors cite (i) newly developed and planned cable systems along the debtors’ existing and planned network routes, (ii) financial distress at the parent level, (iii) ongoing disputes with banks that have applied setoff rights against the debtors’ cash, and (iv) high fixed costs and less certain recurring revenue due to clients newfound refusal to enter into long-term arrangements. For all of these reasons, the debtors have been unable to refinance their senior secured notes and the notes matured on July 31. Obviously — considering this thing is now in bankruptcy court — the debtors’ issues prevented them from paying off the debt as it became due. Instead, the debtors have operated under a forbearance agreement since July, during which time it formulated its go-forward plan and solicited the support, via a restructuring support agreement, of a meaningful amount of senior unsecured noteholders. The forbearance expired on the filing date.

Now the bankers, Lazard & Co., will have their work cut out for them. The debtors hope to run an expedited sales process (though, in the bankers’ favor is the fact that the pool of interested parties for assets like these is likely limited) and conduct an auction within 42 days of the filing. Absent that, the debtors will proceed with the debt-for-equity swap with an eye towards confirmation within 75 days and going effective before the end of the year (subject to requisite regulatory approvals, i.e., FCC and CFIUS).

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure: $365.8mm 7% ‘19 senior secured notes (The Bank of New York Mellon)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Chris Dickerson, Brendan Gage, Robert Dixon Jr., Todd Schwartz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Jaime Luton Chapman)

    • Board of Directors: Rodney Riley, Donald Mallon, Alan Carr

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Katzenstein, Don Harer)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard & Co. (Ken Ziman)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Duane Morris LLP (Christopher Winter, Jarret Hitchings)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Secured Noteholders

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Brian Pfeiffer, William Guerrieri, Varoon Sachdev) & Farnan LLP (Brian Farnan, Michael Farnan)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Weatherford International Plc⛽️

Weatherford International Plc

July 1, 2019

There hasn’t been a MASSIVE bankruptcy filing in a while. Windstream Holdings Inc. filed back in late February and while there’s been plenty of chapter 11 activity since, there hasn’t been anything quite as large in the last several months. There is now. Enter Weatherford International Plc.

Late on Friday, Weatherford, an Irish public limited company, filed an 8-K with the SEC with a proposed plan of reorganization and disclosure statement; it and several affiliated debtors intend to file prepackaged chapter 11 cases in the Southern District of Texas on Monday, July 1.* The timing is appropriate: nothing screams “Independence!” like a massive chapter 11 bankruptcy filing that has the effect of eliminating six billion tyrannical dollars from the balance sheet. YEE HAW. G-D BLESS AMERICA.

Here is a snapshot of Weatherford’s pre and post-bankruptcy capital structure:**

Screen Shot 2019-06-29 at 5.15.48 AM.png

And all of the action is at the pre-petition notes level of the cap stack.*** The holders of the $7.4b of pre-petition notes**** will walk away with 99% of the equity in the reorganized company (subject to various means of dilution) — a 63% recovery based on the offered valuation of the company. They will also receive up to $1.25b of new tranche b senior unsecured convertible notes and the right to participate in new tranche a senior unsecured notes. Every other class — but for existing equity (which will get wiped out) — will ride through as if this shabang ain’t even happening.

You must be wondering: how in bloody hell does a company rack up over $8b of debt? $8 BILLION!! That’s just oil and gas, darling.

Weatherford is a provider of equipment and services used in the drilling, evaluation, completion, production, and intervention of oil and natural gas wells; it operates in over 80 countries worldwide and has service and sales locations in nearly all of the oil and natural gas producing regions in the world. It operates in a highly commoditized industry and so the company dedicates millions each year to research and development in an effort to separate itself from the pack and provide value to end users that is unmatched in the market.

Which, by its own admission, it fails to do. All of that R&D notwithstanding, Weatherford nevertheless provide a commoditized product in a tough macro environment. And while all of that debt should have helped position the company to crush less-capitalized competitors, it ultimately proved to be an albatross.

To service this debt, the debtors require stability in the oil and natural gas markets at prices that catalyze E&P companies to drill, baby, drill. An oil field services company like Weatherford can only make money if there are oil operations to service. With oil and natural gas trading at low levels for years…well, you see the issue. Per the company’s 8-K:

The sustained drop in oil and gas prices has impacted companies throughout the oil and gas industry including Weatherford and the majority of its customers. As spending on exploration, development, and production of oil and natural gas has decreased so has demand for Weatherford’s services and products. The decline in spending by oil and gas companies has had a significant effect on the Debtors’ financial health. To illustrate, on a consolidated basis, the Company’s cash flows from operating activities have been negative $304 million, negative $388 million, and negative $242 million in fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively.

While not quite at Uber Inc. ($UBER) levels, this company is practically lighting money on fire.

Relating to the competition:

The oilfield services and equipment industry is saturated with competition from various companies that operate in the same sector and the same regions of the world as Weatherford. The primary competitive factors include safety, performance, price, quality, and breadth of products and services. Weatherford also faces competition from regional suppliers in some of the sectors in which it operates as these suppliers offer limited equipment and services that are specifically tailored to the relevant local market. Some of the Company’s competitors have better financial and technical resources, which allows them to pursue more vigorous marketing and expansion activities. This heavily competitive market has impacted the Company’s ability to maintain its market share and defend or maintain the pricing for its products and services. Heavy competition has also impacted the Company’s ability to negotiate contract terms with its customers and suppliers, which has resulted in the Company accepting suboptimal terms.

The squeeze is on, ladies and gentlemen. As E&P companies look to cut costs in the face of increased pressure from investors to lean out, they are putting companies like Weatherford through the ringer. You bet your a$$ they’re getting “suboptimal terms.”

Compounding matters, of course, is the government:

…operations are also subject to extensive federal, international, state and local laws and regulations relating to environmental production, waste management and cleanup of hazardous materials, and other matters. Compliance with the various requirements imposed by these laws and regulations has also resulted in increased capital expenditures as companies in these sectors have had to make significant investments to ensure compliance.

Well GOSH DARN. If only Weatherford had unfettered ability to pollute the hell out of the countryside and our waters all of that debt could be paid off at par plus. Those gosh darn government hacks.

All of these factors combined to strain the debtors’ liquidity “for an extended period of time.” Accordingly, the company went into cost cutting mode.***** In Q4 ‘17, it eliminated 900 jobs to the tune of $114mm in annualized savings. In 2018, the company — with the assistance of McKinsey Restructuring & Transformation Services — continued with workforce reductions, facility consolidations, and other measures.

Yet, the squeeze continued. Per the company:

Despite implementing these efficient and strategic initiatives, the Company continued to face declining revenue and cash flow, as well as market challenges. Due to the Company’s increasingly tight liquidity, its key vendors began requiring shortened payment terms, including pay on delivery or prepayment for all supplies purchased by the Company. This contributed to additional pressure on liquidity that the Company could not sustain. Additionally, as discussed above, the highly competitive market that the Company operates in posed challenges for the Company in winning new bids, resulting in decreased revenue.

Weatherford was therefore forced to divest assets. YOU KNOW YOU’RE LEVERAGED TO THE HILT WHEN YOU SELL NEARLY $1B OF ASSETS AND IT BARELY MOVES THE NEEDLE. Sale proceeds were coming in just to go back out for debt service. The company had a leverage ratio of OVER 10X EBITDA. THIS IS AN UNMITIGATED F*CKING DISASTER. What’s actually astonishing is that the company notes that it retained Lazard Freres & Co LLC ($LZ) and Latham & Watkins LLP in December ‘18 and April ‘19, respectively. Taking them at their word (and we could have sworn Latham was in there much earlier than April), WHAT THE HELL WERE THEY WAITING FOR$600mm of annual interest payments, pending maturities, untenable leverage relative to competitors, AND squeezing vendors and the company only got its sh*t together in April? They couldn’t possibly have been THAT inept. Ah, who are we kidding? We’re talking about bankruptcy here.

Now, though, the company has a deal****** and so the upshot is that it is well-positioned for a quick trip into bankruptcy. Indeed, it seeks plan confirmation no later than September 15, 2019 — a nice not-as-speedy-as-other-recent-prepacks-but-speedy prepack. To finance the cases, the company will seek approval of up to $750mm DIP revolver and a $1b DIP term loan. And it is optimistic that it will be well-positioned for the future:

Screen Shot 2019-06-29 at 10.53.10 AM.png

We’ll see.

*The company will also push through Bermuda and Irish proceedings.

**JPMorgan Chase Bank NA ($JPM) is the agent on the prepetition term loan, the prepetition revolving credit agreement, and the A&R facility.

***Only three entities out of an organizational structure of 255 or so direct and indirect subsidiaries are on the hook for the prepetition notes, thereby limiting the number of actual debtor entities that will be subsumed by these cases.

****The pre-petition notes consist of 13 — yes, THIRTEEN — different issuances of notes with interest rates ranging from 4.5% to 9.875% and maturities ranging from 2020 through 2042.

*****Well, as it relates to certain peeps, of course. The debtors’ non-debtor affiliates still had money to make a May 2019 payout to participants in the Executive Bonus Plan.

******The ad hoc noteholder committee is represented by Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and Evercore Group LLC ($EVR).

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge )

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Keith Simon, David Hammerman, Annemarie Reilly, Lisa Lansio) & (local) Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Timothy Davidson, Ashley Harper)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Prepetition Noteholder Committee

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Michael Stamer, Meredith Lahaie, Kate Doorley)

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

    • DIP Agent: Citibank NA

      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Frederic Sosnick, Ned Schodek, Sara Coelho, Ian Roberts)

🏥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Insys Therapeutics Inc.🏥

Insys Therapeutics Inc.

June 10, 2019

Within a week of a massive settlement entered into with the United States Department of Justice, Insys Therapeutics Inc. ($INSY) and six affiliates have filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware.* The company is a specialty pharmaceutical company that commercializes drugs and drug delivery systems for targeted therapies (read: it manufactures opioids); it has two marked products. These products, if prescribed and used in the right way, aren’t in and of themselves evil (though former management is another story). Subsys is used for cancer patients and is delivered in the (non-invasive) form of an under-the-tongue spray. Syndros is used to treat loss of appetite and anorexia associated with weight loss in people with AIDS as well as nausea and vomiting caused by anti-cancer medicine. Not one to miss out on all the latest fads, the company also apparently has cannabinoid-based formulations in its pipeline. Because, like, to the extent the company wants to pursue a sale, nothing will get investor juices flowing like cannabinoid! Will its marketing get done via Snapchat and its sales conducted via the blockchain? Maybe it ought to package its formulations with fake meat. Lit!!

All in, the company owns 94 worldwide patents and 62 patent applications with expiration dates ranging between 2022 and 2039. In other words, it does have some potentially valuable intellectual property.

The company’s synopsis of why it is now in bankruptcy court reflects the world of opioid producers today:

…the Debtors are facing extensive litigation relating to their SUBSYS® product (“Subsys”), which is a prescription opioid. As of the Petition Date, one or more of the Debtors have been named in approximately one thousand lawsuits, and the Debtors anticipate that additional lawsuits may be commenced in the future. Some of the litigation they are facing is common to all opioid manufacturers, while other claims are based on particular alleged activities of the Debtors’ former executives, many of whom either pleaded guilty to or were convicted after trial of federal criminal activity relating to such activities. The expenses and settlement costs resulting from such litigation have been substantial, consuming large portions of the Debtors’ revenue and liquidity.

At the same time, over the last few years, the Debtors’ revenues from Subsys have been declining rapidly as a result of the increased national scrutiny of prescription of opioids by healthcare professionals, the resulting high-profile political and legal actions taken against manufacturers and distributors of opioids, and the specific news relating to the former executives’ criminal activity. Moreover, although the Debtors have promising products in the pipeline, those products are not yet approved for production, require significant additional investment to bring to market, and are not expected to generate revenue in the near term. As a smaller company than some other opioid manufacturers, with over 90% of its current revenue coming from the sale of opioids, Insys could not withstand the concurrent negative impact of massive litigation costs and significant opioid revenue deterioration. These factors have caused a substantial cash drain on the company to the point where, despite the Debtors’ best efforts, they risk running out of cash in 2019. (emphasis added)

We quoted that bit at length because it captures the risk that all opioid manufacturers face today given what appears to be pervasive sales and prescription practices across the country, subsuming countless companies all seeking sales and profits often in the name of shareholder value. Which is not to say that all companies and company management teams are equal: while the jury is still out in a variety of cases, here, we know that former company management engaged in some shady-a$$ methods to enrich themselves. Per Bloomberg:

In May, Insys founder and former Chief Executive Officer John Kapoor, 75, and four former executives were convicted of engaging in a racketeering conspiracy to bribe doctors to boost off-label prescriptions of Subsys, a fentanyl spray originally intended to treat cancer pain. The executives baited doctors with sham speaker fees, lavish dinners and nightclub outings, and then duped insurers into covering the prescriptions, prosecutors said. Kapoor and the others each face a maximum of 20 years in prison and will be sentenced in September.

A pandemic of addiction in Wyoming, Oklahoma and elsewhere, powered by some corrupt-AF executives and their bottles-and-models loving doctor homies.

seeeeeit.gif

The debtors filed their bankruptcy cases to (i) trigger the automatic stay, a statutorily imposed injunction that will, for the time being, halt ongoing litigation, (ii) pursue a sale of substantially all of their assets, and (iii) implement procedures designed to estimate categories of claims and impose distribution procedures via a plan of reorganization. Moreover, the debtors hope that a court-supervised proceeding in chapter 11 will provide the structure required to enter into additional settlements with other large groups of claimants.

As for current claims, there are lot (including a variety of professional services claims on account of indemnities and otherwise — a lot of lawyers are likely to have write-offs here). But the company has no funded debt and so the proceeds of any sale will, after professionals are paid, go to general unsecured creditors. First and foremost, the DOJ — on account of its allowed general unsecured claim ($243mm, but capped at a $195mm recovery inclusive of a $5mm prepetition payment). The DOJ will have to contend with, on an equal basis, other federal actions/settlements, state actions, municipal actions, and insurance, personal injury, securities and indemnity claimants. It’s a liability lovefest!

To address these liabilities, the debtors need asset value. To that end, the debtors are looking to establish a global sale process for their IP; they’re also looking at clawing back certain indemnification amounts they’ve paid over the years on behalf of their seemingly corrupt-AF former management; finally, they may pursue claims against their insurers for wrongful denial of coverage. All in, the debtors are seeking to maximize their estates for the purposes of broadening the potential pool for distribution to claimants. We’re all for that objective provided it can be done in a cost effective way — a rare accomplishment, these days, in bankruptcy.

*The stock, which had been trading at $1.31/share at market close on Friday, plummeted 51.45% on Monday upon the news of the bankruptcy filing. This prompted The Wall Street Journal’s Charley Grant to quip, “So much for efficient markets.” He continued:

Why the news took anyone by surprise, however, is more of a mystery. After all, Insys had given investors fair warning, just days after a federal jury convicted five former employees of engaging in a racketeering conspiracy to boost opioid sales. The company said in a report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission that “it may be necessary... to file a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in order to implement a restructuring.”

In case that hint was too subtle, investors got another one last week, when Insys agreed to settle criminal and civil claims with the Justice Department for $225 million.

He forgot to mention another sign. In March we wrote:

Opioids (Long Professional Retentions)Insys Therapeutics Inc. ($INSY) has JMP Securities pursuing a divestiture of its fentanyl sublinqual spray, Subsys. The company revealed this week that Lazard has now also been hired. Per Reuters, a company spokesperson stated:

“We engaged Lazard thereafter to advise us on our capital planning and strategic alternatives across the business. These are two independent efforts.”

What kind of independent effort? Color us suspicious.

“Color us suspicious” was not-so-subtle code for “this f*cker is going to file for bankruptcy, people.” So, to Mr. Grant’s point, it should have been abundantly clear what was going to happen to any market follower actually paying attention.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: No funded debt.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Ronit Berkovich, Candace Arthur, Olga Peshko, Brenda Funk, Ramsey Scofield, Peter Isakoff ) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Schapiro)

    • Board of Directors: John McKenna, Trudy Vanhove, Rohit Vishnoi, Vaseem Mahboob, Andrew Long, Elizabeth Bohlen

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Andrew Yearley)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (McKesson Corporation, Infirmary Health Hospitals Inc., Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana, LifePoint Health Inc., Deborah Fuller, Julie Kay, James Starling Jr., Angela Mistrulli-Cantone, Lisa Mencucci)

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, Mitchell Hurley, Arik Preis) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Erin Fay, Daniel Brogan)

    • MDL Plaintiffs

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (David Molton, Gerard Cicero, Kenneth Aulet, Chelsea Mullarney, Steven Pohl) & Blank Rome LLP (Stanley Tarr, Victoria Guilfoyle) & Gilbert LLP (Scott Gilbert, Craig Litherland, Kami Quinn, Jenna Hudson)

Update 7/7/19 #244

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jones Energy Inc.⛽️

Jones Energy Inc.

April 14, 2019

Austin-based independent oil and natural gas E&P company, Jones Energy Inc., filed a prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy to restructure its $1.009b of debt ($450mm senior secured first lien notes and $559mm unsecured notes across two tranches). In case you didn’t realize, oil and gas exploration and production is a capital intensive business.

The company operates primarily in the Anadarko Basin in Oklahoma and Texas. Its territory is the aggregation of acreage accumulated over the years, including the 2009 purchase of Crusader Energy Group Inc. out of bankruptcy for $240.5mm in cash.

We’re not going to belabor the point as to why this company is in bankruptcy: the narrative is no different than most other oil and gas companies that have found their way into bankruptcy court over the last several years. Indeed, this chart about sums things up nicely:

Screen Shot 2019-04-05 at 2.29.01 PM.png

It’s really just a miracle that it didn’t file sooner. Why hadn’t it? Per the company:

…the Debtors consummated a series of liquidity enhancing transactions, including equity raises, debt repurchases, strategic acquisitions, non-core asset sales, and modifications of their operations to reduce their workforce and drilling activities. This included a Company-wide headcount reduction in 2016 resulting in the termination of approximately 30% of the Debtors’ total workforce, as well as halting drilling activity spanning several months during the worst of the historic commodity downturn.

But…well…the debt. As in, there’s too much of it.

Screen Shot 2019-04-05 at 2.56.24 PM.png

And debt service costs were too damn high. In turn, the company’s securities traded too damn low:

Source: Disclosure Statement

Source: Disclosure Statement

What’s more interesting here is the process that unfolded. In February 2018, the company issued $450mm of 9.25% ‘23 senior secured first lien notes. The proceeds were used to repay the company’s senior secured reserve-based facility and eliminate the restrictive covenants contained therein. The company also hoped to use the proceeds to repurchase some of its senior unsecured notes at a meaningful discount to par. In a rare — yet increasingly common — show of unity, however, the company’s unsecured lenders thwarted these efforts by binding together pursuant to a “cooperation agreement” and telling the company to take its pathetic offer and pound sand. (PETITION Note: its amazing what lenders can achieve if they can solve for a collective action problem). This initiated a process that ultimately led to the transaction commemorated in the company’s announces restructuring support agreement.

So what now? The senior secured lenders will equitize their debt and come out with 96% of the common stock in the reorganized entity. Holders of unsecured debt will get 4% equity and warrants (exercisable for up to a 15% ownership stake in the reorganized company), both subject to dilution by equity issued to management under a “Management Incentive Plan.” The company has a commitment for $20mm of exit financing lined up (with the option for replacement financing of up to $150mm).

Hopefully the company will have better luck without the albatross of so much debt hanging over it.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge TBD)

  • Capital Structure: $450mm 9.25% ‘23 senior secured first lien notes (UMB Bank NA), $559mm 6.75% ‘22 and 9.25% ‘23 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Christopher Marcus, Brian Schartz, Anthony Grossi, Ana Rotman, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Mark McKane, Brett Newman, Kevin Chang) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)

    • Independent Directors: Tara Lewis, L. Spencer Wells

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Ryan Omohundro)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Daniel Aronson)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck, Michael Price) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, Genevieve Graham)

      • Financial Advisor: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Holders

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Benjamin Schak) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Charlie Beckham, Kelli Norfleet)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Metalmark Capital LLC

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Andrew Geppert, David Meyer, Jessica Peet, Michael Garza)

Updated 4/15/19 2:05 CT

💥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Sears Holdings Corporation💥

Sears Holdings Corporation

October 15, 2018

Finally.

Early this morning, Illinois-based Sears Holdings Corporation ($SHLD) and approximately 49 affiliated entities (including KMart) finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. The company lists a staggering $11.339 billion of total debts and $6.937 billion of assets.

The well-known company has 866 full-line and specialty stores as of August 4, 2018. In its chapter 11 petition, it boasts of its legacy as an “integrated retailer with significant physical and tangible assets, as well as virtual capabilities enabled through technology.” Yes, you read that correctly: they actually say “virtual capabilities enabled through technology.” That right there may help inform EVERYONE why this storied retailer has found its way into bankruptcy court. To the last, Sears stands out for its ability to appear out of touch.

The company appears to have a commitment for a $1.875 billion debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) asset-backed credit facility, including an increase of $300mm from its existing facility as well as an agreement over the use of the company’s lenders’ cash collateral. According to a company press release, the company is also negotiating an additional $300mm commitment from ESL Investments Inc. (“ESL”), the company’s largest shareholder and the investment vehicle of Eddie Lampert. The company intends to reorganize around a smaller store platform of “EBITDA-positive stores.” To this end, the company will close 142 stores near the end of the year adding to the previously announced 46 stores set to close in November 2018 — potentially further perpetuating the hurt put on U.S.-based malls over the last several years. Meanwhile, the company continues to negotiate an asset purchase agreement with ESL for “a large portion of the Company’s store base.” This would, obviously, keep the enterprise from liquidating and potentially help maintain thousands of jobs: Sears currently employs approximately 90k people.

While Eddie Lampert will remain Chairman of the Board, he has resigned as CEO of the company. Godspeed, Eddie.

The company’s top listed creditors at the time of filing include The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and various trustees under five different tranches of unsecured notes totaling over $3 billion in principal amount (BNY Midwest Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company NA, The Chase Manhattan Bank NA). Trade creditors include Whirlpool Corporation ($23.4mm), Frigidaire Company ($18.6mm), and Winia Daewoo Electronics America ($15.2mm).

We will update this post on Wednesday in our next briefing; we are particularly excited to see how the company spins the “factors” that led to its appearance in bankruptcy court. Here’s one explanation:

And here’s another — seemingly more-on-point — one:

Screen Shot 2018-10-15 at 6.33.14 AM.png
  • Jurisdiction: S.D.N.Y. (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $11.339b debt     

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Garrett Fail, Jacqueline Marcus, Sunny Singh)

    • CRO/Financial Advisor: M-III Partners, LP (Mohsin Meghji, Colin Adams, Brian Griffith, Christopher Good, Mary Korycki, Kevin Tanaka, Enrique Acevedo, Wesley Sima, Noah Zatzkin, Joseph Frantz, Nicholas Weber, Ravi Ramnani )

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Company

    • Restructuring Committee’s Independent Directors: William Transier, Alan Carr, Paul DePodesta, Ann Reese

    • Restructuring Sub-Committee (RSC): Alan Carr and William Transier

    • Legal to RSC: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Kelley Cornish, Lewis Clayton, Susanna Buergel, Robert Britton, Jonathan Hurwitz, Emma Carlson, Teresa Lii)

    • Financial Advisors to RSC: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Dennis Stogsdill, Nick Grossi, Brian Corio, Jonah Galaz, Andrew Gasbarra, Jonathan Bain, Jordan Kravette)

    • Investment Banker to RSC: Evercore Group LLC (Daniel Aronson, Jeremy Matican, Guy McCumber, Siddhesh Patkar, Jonathan Kamel, Ajith Sukumar)

    • Conflicts Counsel: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Rolin Bissell, Ryan Bartley, Travis Buchanan)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Large Shareholders: ESL Investments. Legal: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (James Bromley, Sean O’Neal, Andrew Weaver)

    • Prepetition RCF, Term Loans, FILO & DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA. Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard)

    • Citibank NA. Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Huebner, Eli Vonnegut)

    • Large Shareholder: Fairholme Capital Management LLC. Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, David Zylberberg)

    • PBGC. Legal: Locke Lord LLP (David Wirt)

    • Debtors’ IP/Ground Lease Term Loan Lender: SHLD Lendco LLC. Legal: Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Levitin, Richard Stieglitz Jr.)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Abid Quereshi, SARA Brauner)

      • Legal (Conflicts): Herrick Feinstein LLP (Sean O’Donnell, Stephen Selbst, Steven Smith)

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Matt Diaz, Conor Tully, Michael Berkin, Marshal Eisler, Kenny O’Trakoun, Morgan McCaskey, Samuel Star)

      • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian, Eric Siegert, Brad Geer, Surbhi Gupta, Greg Rinsky, Tom Hedus, Ross Rosenstein, Ryan Conroy, John Hartigan, Ahmed Mumtaz, Jack Foster, James Lai, Natalie Weelborg, Andrew Felman, Matthew Stadtmauer)

    • Cyrus Capital Partners LP

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Eric Reimer, Thomas Kreller, Craig Price)

    • Indenture Trustee to Medium Term Notes: The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.

      • Legal: Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP (James Gadsden, Leonardo Trivigno)

Updated 11/30/18


PETITION is a digital media company that provides analysis and commentary about restructuring and bankruptcy. We discuss disruption, from the vantage point of the disrupted via a twice-weekly newsletter. Our Wednesday newsletters are free. Become a Member here to receive our robust Members’-only Sunday newsletter and learn more about the events affecting — in fact, restructuring — our society every day.

New Chapter 11 Filing - Nine West Holdings Inc.

Nine West Holdings Inc.

April 6, 2018

Nine West Holdings Inc., the well-known footwear retailer, has finally filed for bankruptcy. The company will sell its Nine West and Bandolino brands to Authentic Brands Group and reorganize around its One Jeanswear Group, The Jewelry Group, the Kasper Group, and Anne Klein business segments. The company has a restructuring support agreement in hand to support this dual-process. 

More on the situation here

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Chapman)

  • Capital Structure: See below.

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, James Stempel, Joseph Graham, Angela Snell, Anna Rotman, Jamie Aycock, Justin Alphonse Mercurio, Alyssa Russell)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Ralph Schipani III, Julie Hertzberg, Holden Bixler, Amy Lee, Richard Niemerg, Theodore Langer, Stuart Loop, Thomas Koch, Michael Dvorak)

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Alexander Lees)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Ari Lefkovits, David Hales, Mike Weitz, Nikhil Angelo, Okan Kender, Abigail Gay, Drew Deaton) & Consensus Advisory Services LLC

    • Authorized Officers: Stefan Kaluzny, Peter Morrow, Harvey Tepner, Alan Miller

    • Legal to the Authorized Officers: Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Seth Goldman, Kevin Allred, Thomas Walper)

    • Financial Advisor to the Authorized Officers: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Jay Borow)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Stalking Horse Bidder/Buyer: Authentic Brands Group

      • Legal: DLA Piper LLP (Richard Chesley, Ann Lawrence, Rachel Ehrlich Albanese)

    • Prepetition ABL and FILO Agent: Wells Fargo NA

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Matthew Ziegler, Julia Frost-Davies, Amelia Joiner)

    • Administrative Agent for the prepetition secured and unsecured Term Loan Facilities: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

    • Indenture Trustee for 3 series of Unsecured Notes: US Bank NA

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (J. Christopher Shore, Philip Abelson) & Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Arlene Alves)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders (Farmstead Capital Management LLC, KKR Credit Advisors (US) LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Huebner, Darren Klein, Adam Shpeen)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Lenders (Alden Global Capital LLC, Carlson Capital LP, CVC Credit Partners LLC, Silvermine Capital Management LLC, Trimaran Advisors)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Michael Rupe, Jeffrey Pawlitz, Michael Handler, Bradley Giordano)

      • Financial Advisor: Guggenheim Securities LLC

    • Brigade Capital Management, LP

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Douglas Mannel, Rachael Ringer)

      • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Company

    • Ad Hoc Group of 2019 Unsecured Noteholders (Whitebox Advisors LLC, Scoggin Management LP, Old Bellows Partners LP, Wazee Street Opportunities Fund IV)

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Rachel Strickland)

    • Ad Hoc Group of 2034 Unsecured Noteholders

      • Legal: Jones Day

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey

    • Administrative Agent for $247.5mm DIP ABL Facility

    • Administrative Agent for $50mm DIP TL Facility

    • Sponsor: Sycamore Partners LP

      • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Mark Thomas, Peter Young, Michael Mervis, Jared Zajac, Chantel Febus, Alyse Stach)

    • KKR Asset Management

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc)

    • Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC and Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

      • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi, Gregg Weiner)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Aurelius Capital Master Ltd., GLAS Trust Company LLC, PBGC, Simon Property Group, Stella International Trading (Macao Commercial Offshore) Ltd., Surefield Limited, U.S. Bank NA)

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, David Zensky, Deborah Newman, Arik Preis, Jason Rubin, Anthony Loring, Michael Byun, Patrick Chen)

      • Legal Conflicts Counsel: Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP (David Rosner, Howard Schub)

      • Financial Advisor: Protiviti Inc. (Guy Davis, Suzanne Roski, Heather Williams, John Eldred, Justin Koehler, Brian Taylor, Russell Brooks, Matthew Smith, Blake Parker, Lee Slobodien, Omkar Vale, Lok Lam, Sean Sterling) & Province Inc. (Michael Atkinson, Jason Crockett, Eunice Min, Byron Groth)

      • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Saul Burian, Surbhi Gupta, Chris Khoury, Tejas Kullarwar, Matt Ender, Brendan Wu)

Updated 11/3/18 at 6:42 am CT

New Chapter 11 - Remington Outdoor Company

Remington Outdoor Company

3/25/18

Remington Outdoor Company, a gun manufacturer, has finally filed for bankruptcy - a day after Americans took to the streets to #MarchforourLives. Ah, bankruptcy irony. The company's operations are truly national in scope; it has manufacturing facilities in New York and Alabama and a primary ammunition plant in Arkansas. Its "principal customers are various mass market retail chains (e.g., Wal-Mart and Dick's Sporting Goods) and specialty retail stores (e.g., Bass Pro Shops and Cabela's) and wholesale distributors (e.g., Sports South)." Guns! #MAGA!!

Why did the company have to file for bankruptcy? We refer you to our mock "First Day Declaration" from February here. Much of it continues to apply. Indeed, our mockery of the change in tone from President Obama to President Trump was spot on: post Trump's election, the company's inventory supply far exceeded demand. The (fictional) threat of the government going house-to-house to collect guns is a major stimulant to demand, apparently. Here is the change in financial performance,

"At the conclusion of 2017, the Debtors had realized approximately $603.4 million in sales and an adjusted EBITDA of $33.6 million. In comparison, in 2015 and 2016, the Debtors had achieved approximately $808.9 million and $865.1 million in sales and $64 million and $119.8 million in adjusted EBITDA, respectively."

Thanks Trump. 

We'd be remiss, however, if we didn't also note that NOWHERE in the company's bankruptcy filings does it mention the backlash against guns or the company's involvement in shootings...namely, the one that occurred in Las Vegas. 

The company, therefore, negotiated with its various lenders and arrived at a restructuring support agreement. The agreement provides for debtor-in-possession credit ($193mm asset-backed DIP + $100mm term loan DIP + $45mm DIP, the latter of which is a roll-up of a bridge loan provided by lenders prior to the filing). Upon the effective date of a plan of reorganization, the third lien lenders and term lenders will own the reorganized company. 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
  • Capital Structure: $225mm ABL (Bank of America, $114.5mm funded), $550.5mm term loan (Ankura Trust Company LLC), $226mm 7.875% Senior Secured Notes due 2020 (Wilmington Trust NA), $12.5mm secured Huntsville Note     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Gregory Bray, Tyson Lomazow, Thomas Kreller, Haig Maghakian) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns, Joseph Mulvihill)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Joseph Sciametta)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard (Ari Lefkovits)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP ABL Agent ($193mm): Bank of America NA (DIP ABL Lenders: Bank of America NA, Wells Fargo Bank NA, Regions Bank, Branch Banking and Trust Company, Synovus Bank, Fifth Third Bank, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch)
      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, Jason Liberi, Cameron Fee)
    • Admin Agent to the DIP TL: Ankura Trust Company LLC
      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Darren Klein, Michele McGreal, Dylan Consla) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger LLP (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Joseph Barsalona)
    • Ad Hoc Group of TL Lenders 
      • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP (John Rapisardi, Andrew Parlen, Joseph Zujkowski, Amalia Sax-Bolder) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger LLP (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Joseph Barsalona)
    • Third Lien Noteholders
      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Rachel Strickland, Joseph Minias, Debra McElligott) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Allison Mielke)
    • Wells Fargo Bank NA
      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Andrew Kramer)
    • Cerberus Operations and Advisory Company, LLC
      • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (David Hillman)
    • Reorganized Board of Directors (Anthony Acitelli, Chris Brady, George W. Wurtz III, G.M. McCarroll, Gene Davis, Ron Coburn, Ken D'Arcy)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Fox Rothschild LLP (Michael Menkowitz, Paul Labov, Jason Manfrey, Jesse Harris, Seth Niederman)

Updated: 4/27/18

New Chapter 11 Filing - Claire's Stores Inc.

Claire's Stores Inc. 

3/19/18

Claire’s® Stores Inc. is the latest in a string of specialty "treasure hunt"-styled retailers to find its way into bankruptcy court. In this case, the debtors, together with their 33 non-debtor affiliates, sell jewelry, accessories, and beauty products to young women/teen/tweens/kids; it has a presence in 45 nations spread throughout 7,500 company-owned stores, concession stands, and franchises. The company proudly states that "[a] Claire's store is located in approximately 99% of major shopping malls through the United States." Moreover, "[e]ach of the Debtors' store locations are leased, and are typically located in traditional shopping malls with, on average, 1,000 square foot of selling space." PETITION NOTE: this explains a lot. Hashtag, retail apocalypse.

First Day Declarations are interesting in that they are the first opportunity for a debtor-company to tell its story to the public, to parties in interest, and, significantly, to the bankruptcy judge. And this declaration is particularly interesting because, unlike many of its bankrupt specialty retail predecessors, Claire’s® makes a concerted effort to delineate why its physical presence is so critical. So what is that critical piece? Apparently, it is ear piercing. Yup, you read that right. Ok, well that and the "treasure hunt" shopping atmosphere which "simply cannot be replicated online." The company boasts about solid operating margins. and notes that, at the time of filing, it only intends to shed 95 leases. 

The company notes that it has established trust with parents and the number of pierced ears is indicative of that; it estimates that it has pierced over 100 million ears worldwide (since 1978) and 3.5 million in fiscal year 2017. While that is gimmicky and cute, the company doesn't not note how much of the reported $212 million of EBITDA (on $1.3 billion of revenue) is related to this phenomenon. Moreover, all of the trust in the world cannot overcome a capital structure with $1.9 billion of funded debt (ex-$245 million more at the non-debtor affiliate level) and $162 million in cash interest expense (see chart below) - especially when $1.4 billion of that funded debt matures in Q1 '19. And particularly when fewer and fewer people tend to frequent the malls that Claire’s® dominate. Notably, the company says ONLY the following about e-commerce: "Finally, the Claire's Group operates a digital sales platform through which new and existing customers can purchase products directly through the Claire’s® and Icing® websites and mobile application." So, as the malls go, Claire’s® goes. Notably, the company makes a point that it "is growing, not shrinking, its business. The Company expects its concessions business to grow by more than 4,000 stores in 2018." Landlords take note: the company highlights its CONCESSIONS BUSINESS, which is essentially a "mini-footpring" utilizing the store-within-a-store model. In other words, this growth won't help the landlords much. 

In addition to its debt, the company notes - as a primary cause for its bankruptcy filing - that the "Debtors operate in a highly competitive market." PETITION NOTE: No effing sh*t. Mall traffic has declined 8% year-over-year and the debtors - ear-piercing demand notwithstanding - aren't impervious to this. Accordingly, revenue is down $200mm since 2014. 

To counteract these trends, the company engaged in exchange transactions back in 2016 that had the effect of stripping out intellectual property collateral, swapping out debt, and deleveraging the company by $400 million. Clearly that was a band-aid rather than a solution. 

Now the company purports to have a restructuring support agreement with the Ad Hoc First Lien Group which, in addition to 72% of the first lien debt, holds 8% of the second lien notes and 83% of the unsecured notes. The members of the Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Creditors have agreed to provide the Company with approximately $575 million of new capital, including financing commitments for a new $75 million asset-based lending facility, a new $250 million first lien term loan, and $250 million as a preferred equity investment. In addition, the company has lined up a Citibank-provided DIP credit facility of $75 million ABL (supported, seemingly, by the consenting ad hoc first lien group) and a $60 million "last out" term loan. Consequently, Claire's expects to complete the chapter 11 process in September 2018, emerge with over $150 million of liquidity, and reduce its overall indebtedness by approximately $1.9 billion. We'll believe it when we see it. 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)
  • Capital Structure: see below. 
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Matthew Barr, Ryan Dahl) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch, Brett Haywood)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC 
    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC 
    • Independent Director: Michael D'Appolonia 
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • PE Sponsor: Apollo Investment Fund VI, L.P. (owns 97.7% of Claire's Inc, the parent)
      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Jeffrey Saferstein)
    • DIP Agent: Citibank
      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP
    • Prepetition ABL Facility & Revolving Credit Facility Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch
    • Ad Hoc First Lien Group (Initial Consenting Creditors: Diameter Capital Partners LP, Elliott Management Corporation, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, The Cincinnati High Yield Desk of J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc., The Indianapolis High Yield Desk of J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc., and Venor Capital Management LP.)
      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Brian Lennon, Daniel Forman) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP
      • Financial Advisor: Millstein & Co. 
    • First Lien Note Agent: The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company N.A.
    • First Lien Term Loan Agent: Wilmington Trust NA
      • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Matthew Silverman)
    • Second Lien Note Agent: Bank of New York 
    • Unsecured Note Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York 
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Cooley LLP (Cathy Hershcopf, Seth Van Aalten, Summer McKee) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Erin Fay, Gregory Flasser)
      • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. 
Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

Updated 3/30/18

New Chapter 11 Filing - Tops Holding II Corporation

Tops Holding II Corporation

  • 2/21/18 Recap: When a company's "Overview" in its First Day Declaration basically leads with union metrics (12,300 unionized employees of 14,000 total employees) and collective bargaining agreement numbers (12 of them), you know there's gonna be a war with employees. The fact that the footprint is 169 stores-wide in three states almost seems like a footnote. As does the fact that the business started in the 1920s and seemingly thrived through 2007 when, naturally, private equity got involved and went on a debt-ridden acquisition spree. But hang on: we're getting ahead of our skis here. So, what happened here? Well, clearly, the company has to negotiate with its unions; it also seeks to deleverage its ballooning balance sheet and take care of some leases and supply agreements. The company has secured $265mm in DIP financing to fund the cases; it says that it "intend[s] to remain in chapter 11 for approximately six (6) months." We'll believe it when we see it. Anyway, WHY does it need to take all of these steps? Well, as we stated before: private equity, of course. "Despite the significant headwinds facing the grocery industry, over the past five years, the Company has experienced solid financial performance and has sustained stable market share. The vast majority of the Company’s supermarkets generate positive EBITDA and the Company generates strong operating cash flows. Transactions undertaken by previous private equity ownership, however, saddled the Company with an unsustainable amount of debt on its balance sheet. Specifically, the Company currently has approximately $715 million of prepetition funded indebtedness...." Ah, private equity = a better villain than even Amazon (though Amazon gets saddled with blame here too, for the record). But wait: don't forget about the pensions! "[T]he Company has been embroiled in a protracted and costly arbitration with the Teamsters Pension Fund concerning a withdrawal liability of in excess of $180 million allegedly arising from the Company’s acquisition of Debtor Erie Logistics LLC" from its biggest food supplier, C&S Wholesale Grocers Inc., the 10th largest private company in the US. Moreover, the company has been making monthly pension payments; nevertheless, the pension is underfunded by approximately $393mm. The company continues, "Utilizing the tools available to it under the Bankruptcy Code, the Company will endeavor to resolve all issues relating to the Teamsters Arbitration and address its pension obligations, and the Company will take reasonable steps to do so on a consensual basis." Oy. What a hot mess. We can't even read that without ominous music seemingly popping up out of nowhere. More to come.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York

  • Capital Structure: $112mm RCF (inclusive of a $10mm FILO and $34mm LCs, Bank of America NA), $560mm 8% '22 senior secured notes, $67.5mm 9% '21 opco unsecured notes, $8.6mm 8.75%/9.5% '18 holdco unsecured notes

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Stephen Karotkin, Sunny Singh)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Buenzow, Armen Emrikian, Paul Griffith, Ronnie Bedway, Andy Kopfensteiner)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore (David Ying, Stephen Goldstein, Jeremy Matican, Elliot Ross, Jonathan Kartus, Andrew Kilbourne)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL Agent & DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal Counsel: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Julia Frost-Davies, Amelia Joiner, Matthew Ziegler)

    • Indenture Trustee for Senior Notes due 2018, notes due 2021 and Senior Secured Notes: U.S. Bank NA

      • Legal: Thompson Hine LLP (Irving Apar, Elizabeth Frayer, Derek Wright)

    • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group & DIP TL Lenders (Column Park Asset Management LP, Fidelity Management & Research Company, HG Vora Capital Management LLC, Signature Global Asset Management, Silver Point Capital LP)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Diane Meyers, Lauren Shumejda)

      • Financial Advisor: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • DIP TL Agent: Cortland Capital Markets Services LLC

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Tyler Nurnberg, Alan Glantz)

    • Southpaw Asset Management LP

      • Legal: Cooley LLP (Jeffrey Cohen, Steven Siesser, Sheila Sadighi, Andrew Behlmann)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (PepsiCo, Inc., Valassis Direct Mail, Inc., Osterweis Strategic Income Fund, U.S. Bank N.A., the UFCW Local One Pension Fund, the Teamsters Local 264, and Benderson Development Company, LLC)

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Brett Miller, Dennis Jenkins, Jonathan Levine, Erica Richards)

      • Financial Advisor: Zolfo Cooper LLC

New Chapter 11 Filing - Expro Holdings US Inc.

Expro Holdings US Inc.

  • 12/18/17 Recap: Servicer to offshore, deepwater and other "technically challenging environments" filed a prepackaged bankruptcy to eliminate its entire $1.4b of debt (and attendant interest expense) via equity conversion in a balance sheet deleveraging transaction. Why did it file for bankruptcy? Private equity, of course. In 2008, the company turned down an acquisition offer from Halliburton in favor of a competing bid from a private equity group for $3.2b in cash, the largest LBO in the UK in 2008. Ok, so we're only half serious. Naturally, the oil and gas downturn led to a marked decline in demand for Expro's services. Psst: the PE-infused debt. The senior lenders will get the equity in the reorganized company while mezz loan holders and equity holders will get warrants. The company has lined up a $145mm DIP credit facility.
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $125mm RCF (HSBC Bank USA), $1.261b TL, $18mm Mezz Loan.      
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Alice Eaton, Sarah Harnett, Alexander Woolverton) & Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Julie Hertzberg, Jay Herriman)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. 
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Mezzanine Facility Agreement Agent: Bank of New York Mellon
    • Credit Agreement Admin Agent: HSBC Bank USA
    • RCF Lenders
      • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders
      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, James McClammy, Christopher Robertson) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Kelli Norfleet, Kelsey Zottnick)
      • Financial Advisor: Rothschild Inc.
    • Ad Hoc Group of Shareholders (Goldman Sachs, HPS Investment Partners LLC, KKR, Candover/Arle, Park Square)
      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP
      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA - Toys "R" Us Inc.

Toys "R" Us Inc.

  • 9/19/17 Recap: So. Much. To. Unpack. Here. We've previously discussed the run-up to this massive chapter 11 bankruptcy filing here and here. Still, suffice it to say that, unlike many of the other retailers that have predictably filed for bankruptcy thus far in 2017, this one was different. This one seemingly came out of nowhere - particularly given the proximity to the holiday shopping season. Before we note what this case is, lets briefly cover what it isn't and clear the noise that is pervasive on the likes of Twitter: this is NOT "RIP" Toys "R" Us. We don't get overly sentimental usually but the papers filed with the bankruptcy court were well-written and touching: this is a store, a brand, that means a lot to a lot of people. And it's not going anywhere (the company will have its challenges to assure people that this is the case). This is a financial restructuring not a liquidation: the company simply hasn't been able to evolve while paying $400mm in annual interest expense on over $5b of private equity infused debt. Plain and simple. Yes, there are other challenges (blah blah blah, Amazon), but with that debt overhang, it appears the company hasn't been able to confront them (PETITION side note: an ill-conceived deal with Amazon 18 years ago is mind-blowing when viewed from the perspective of Amazon's long game). With this filing, the company is signaling that the time for short term band-aids to address its capital structure is over. Now, "[t]he time for change, and reinvestment in operations, has come." Decisive. Management isn't messing around anymore. With a reduction in debt, the company will be unshackled and able to focus on "general upkeep and the condition of...stores, [its] inability to provide expedited shipping options, and [its] lack of a subscription-based delivery service." Indeed, the company intends to use a $3.1b debtor-in-possession credit facility to begin investing in modernization immediately.
  • Interesting Facts:
    • Toy Manufacturers: Mattel ($MAT)(approx $136mm), Hasbro ($HAB) (approx $59mm) & Lego (approx $31.5mm) are among the top general unsecured creditors of the company. Mattel and Hasbro's stock traded down quite a bit yesterday on the rampant news of this filing. Query whether any of the $325mm of requested critical vendor money will apply to these companies.
    • The Power of the Media (read: NOT "fake news"): This CNBC piece helped push the company into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy professionals were retained in July (or earlier in the case of Lazard) to pursue capital structure solutions. In August the company engaged with some of its lenders. But then "...a news story published on September 6, 2017, reporting that the Debtors were considering a chapter 11 filing, started a dangerous game of dominos: within a week of its publication, nearly 40 percent of the Company’s domestic and international product vendors refused to ship product without cash on delivery, cash in advance, or, in some cases, payment of all outstanding obligations. Further, many of the credit insurers and factoring parties that support critical Toys “R” Us vendors withdrew support. Given the Company’s historic average of 60-day trade terms, payment of cash on delivery would require the Debtors to immediately obtain a significant amount—over $1.0 billion—of new liquidity." 
    • Revenue. The company generates 40% of its annual revenue during the holiday season.
    • Footprint. The company has approximately 1,697 stores and 257 licensed stores in 38 countries, plus additional e-commerce sites in various countries. The company has been shedding burdensome above-market leases and combining its Babies and Toys shops under one roof; it intends to continue its review of its real estate portfolio. Read: there WILL be store closures.
    • Eff the Competition. Toys has some choice words for its competition embedded in its bankruptcy papers; it accuses Walmart ($WMT) and Target ($TGT)(the "big box retailers") of slashing prices on toys and using toys as a loss leader to get bodies in doors; it further notes that "retailers such as Amazon are not concerned with making a profit at this juncture, rendering their pricing model impossible to compete with..." ($AMZN). Yikes. 
    • Experiential Retail. The company intends to invest in the "shopping experience" which will include (i) interactive spaces with rooms to use for parties, (ii) live product demonstrations put on by trained employees, and (iii) the freedom for employees to remove product from boxes to let kids play with the latest toys. And...wait for it...AUGMENTED REALITY. Boom. Toysrus.ar and Toysrus.ai here we come. 
  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Phillips)
  • Capital Structure: see below     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jamie Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Edward Sassower, Chad Husnick, Joshua Sussberg, Robert Britton, Emily Geier) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael A. Condyles, 
      Peter J. Barrett, Jeremy S. Williams) & (Canadian counsel) Goodmans LLP
    • Legal to the Independent Board of Directors: Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Jonathan Goulding, Tom Behnke, Cari Turner, Jim Grover, Arjun Lal, Doug Lewandowski, Bobby Hoernschemeyer, Scott Safron, Kara Harmon, Nick Cherry, Adam Fialkowski)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (David Kurtz)
    • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Communications Consultant: Joele Frank Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
  • Other Parties in Interest:
  • ABL/FILO DIP Admin Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Brian Resnick, Eli Vonnegut, Veerle Roovers) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry (Toby) Long III, Justin Paget)
  • DIP Admin Agent (Toys DE Inc). NexBank SSB & Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders (Angelo Gordon & Co LP; Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Roystone Capital Management LP, and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP)
    • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus, Neil Chatani) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Bohm, Douglas Foley)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Taj Noteholders.
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Samuel Lovett, Kellie Cairns) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Jennifer Wuebker)
  • Steering Committee of B-2 and B-3 Lenders (American Money Management, Columbia Threadneedle Investments, Ellington Management Group LLC, First Trust Advisors L.P., MJX Asset Management LLC, Pacific Coast Bankers Bank, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, Sound Point Capital Management, Taconic Capital Advisors LP).
    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, D. Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Rosa Evergreen)
  • 12% ’21 Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust, National Association.
    • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, David Posner, Gianfranco Finizio) & (local) ThompsonMcMullan PC (David Ruby, William Prince IV)
  • Bank of America NA
      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
    • Private Equity Sponsors: Bain Capital Private Equity LP, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. ($KKR), and Vornado Realty Trust ($VNO)
  • Large Creditor: Mattel Inc.
    • Legal: Jones Day (Richard Wynne, Erin Brady, Aaron Gober-Sims) & (local) Michael Wilson PLC (Michael Wilson)
  • Large Creditor: LEGO Systems Inc.
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi) & (local) Walcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
  • Large Creditor: American Greetings Corporation.
    • Legal: Baker & Hosteler LLP (Benjamin Irwin, Eric Goodman)
  • Creditor: River Birch Capital
    • Legal: Andrews Kurth & Kenyon LLP (Paul Silverstein)
  • Creditor: Owl Creek Asset Management
    • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Samantha Martin)
  • TRU Trust 2016-TOYS, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-TOYS acting through Wells Fargo Bank NA
    • Legal: Dechert LLP (Allan Brilliant, Brian Greer, Stephen Wolpert, Humzah Soofi) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
  • Trustee: Tru Taj DIP Notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)
    • Legal: Porter Hedges LLP (Eric English) & (local) Spotts Fain PC (James Donaldson)
  • Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Mattel Inc., Evenflo Company Inc., Simon Property Group, Euler Hermes North America Insurance Co., Veritiv Operating Company, Huffy Corporation, KIMCO Realty, The Bank of New York Mellon, LEGO Systems Inc.)
First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

Updated 10/5/17 11:40 am

New Chapter 11 Filing - Prospector Offshore Drilling S.a r.l.

Prospector Offshore Drilling S.a r.l.

  • 7/20/17 Recap: So that was fast. Like lightening fast. Like if you blinked you may have missed it. Just two days ago Paragon Offshore emerged from bankruptcy and one of the debtors, Paragon Offshore plc, continues down the road of administration. But now it's effectively in bankruptcy again because of feasibility. No, no, just kidding on that. That would be TOO crazy. The issue here pertains to sale leaseback agreements with third-party lessors affiliated with SinoEnergy Capital Management Ltd. and related forbearance agreements that were entered into pre-bankruptcy to keep certain subsidiary entities out of the prior proceeding. Those subsidiaries are debtors here. The debtors intend to use the "breathing spell" provided by the bankruptcy automatic stay to negotiate a resolution to the disputes under the agreements with the third-party lessors. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Stephen Youngman, Christopher Lopez, Jessica Liou, Alfredo Perez, Clifford Carlson, Patrick Thompson) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Amanda Steele)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

Updated 8/8/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Takata Corporation

Takata Corporation

  • 6/25/17 Recap: The long-awaited chapter 11 (and Japanese Civil Rehabilitation Act) filing of the publicly-traded ($TKJP) airbag manufacturer is finally upon us after the Company endured a massive airbag recall (affecting 124mm automobiles that were deployed with non-desiccated PSAN Inflators, worldwide) and corresponding liability. The Company intends to consummate an agreement in principle with privately-held Key Safety Systems out of Sterling Heights Michigan for a sale of substantially all of the Company's assets for $1.588b. Use of proceeds include satisfying the requirements of a plea agreement with the US Department of Justice, paying administrative costs and expenses of the restructuring (cha-ching Weil, PwC, Lazard & Prime Clerk), and funding unsecured creditor recoveries. The Company has secured a $227mm revolving credit facility from Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation to fund the cases; per its press release, it has also negotiated with its Japanese original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") for valuable accommodations and liquidity enhancements and continues to negotiate with OEMs elsewhere. Every car manufacturer under the sun is listed as an "undetermined" general unsecured creditor including the likes of Toyota, FordTesla, Fisker, Ferrari, and, of course, the majors. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Marcia Goldstein, Ronit Berkovich, Matthew Goren, Jessica Diab, Lauren Tauro) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Amanda Steele, Brett Haywood)
    • Financial Advisor: PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (Bill Fasel, Stephen Hammond)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Daimler Trucks North America LLC 
      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Michael Shepard, Richard Graham)
    • General Motors Holdings LLC
      • Legal: O'Melveny & Meyers LLP (George Davis, Daniel Shamah, Andrew Sorkin, Gary Svirsky)
    • General Motors LLC
      • Legal: Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP (Joseph Sgroi, Chauncey C. Mayfield II, Scott Kitai)
    • Key Safety Systems Inc.
      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Ron Meisler, Felicia Gerber Perlman, Christopher Dressel, Christine Okike, Esther Adzhiashvili)
    • Honda North America Inc.
      • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Michael Andolina, Jessica Knowles Boelter) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, J. Kate Stickles)
    • FCA US LLC
      • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Brian Glueckstein, Andrew Dietderich, Alexa Kranzley)
    • Ford Motor Company
      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Mark Freedlander, Frank Guadagnino, John Thompson) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
    • Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC
      • Legal: Mayer Brown LLP (Richard Ziegler)
    • Subaru of America Inc.
      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Adam Rogoff, Anupama Yerramalli, Philip Bentley, David Braun)
    • Toyota Motor Corporation
      • Legal: Frost Brown Todd LLC (Robert Sartin, Patrica Kirkwood Burgess, Ronald Gold) & (local) Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kimberly Brown, Travis Ferguson)
    • BMW Manufacturing Co LLC
      • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (David Rosenzweig, Michael Parker) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
    • Nissan Motor Corporation
      • Legal: Jones Day (Pedro Jimenez)
    • Mitsubishi Motors North America Inc.
      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Daniel Youngblut, Kevin O'Neill)
    • Tesla Inc.
      • Legal: Irell & Manella LLP (Jeffrey Reisner, Michael Strub, Kerri Lyman) & (local) Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Emily Devan)
    • Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Timothy Graulich, Elliott Moskowitz, Darren Klein)
    • Volvo Group North America LLC
      • Legal: Baker Hostetler LLP (Eric Goodman) & (local) Morris Nichols
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Tyson Lomazow, Abhilash Raval, Bradley Scott Friedman) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, Kevin Shaw)
    • Committee of Unsecured Tort Claimant Creditors
      • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, James Stang)

Updated 7/11/17 6 pm (CT)

New Chapter 11 Filing - The Gymboree Corporation

The Gymboree Corporation

  • 6/12/17 Recap: Yawn...another private equity owned retailer in bankruptcy. Why? Standard fare for everyone following the retail story at this point: a substantial brick-and-mortar presence (1300 stores) in need of rightsizing, higher expenses than web-based competitors, an underdeveloped wholesale operation, an underdeveloped web presence, insufficient "omnichannel" capabilities (the go-to buzzword for retailers these days), and more debt than competitors like Children's Place and the Gap. In other words, private equity, that's why (here, Bain Capital Private Equity LP). Notably, "[a]pproximately 35% of their domestic real estate space is concentrated with Simon Property Group, Inc. and GGP Inc. (previously General Growth Properties, Inc.)" ($SPG, $GGP) and, in the first instance, the company is seeking to close 450 stores. Hmmm. The Company will operate under a $105mm DIP term loan credit facility ($35mm new money) and a $273.5mm DIP revolving credit facility; it will also seek to avail itself of $80mm in new equity capital by way of a fully-backstopped rights offering. The upshot of all of this financial mumbo-jumbo is that the term lenders will own the majority of the company. 
  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia
  • Capital Structure: $81mm '17 ABL RCF (Bank of America NA), $47.5mm '17 ABL Term Loan (Pathlight Capital LLC), 788.8mm '18 TL (Credit Suisse), $171mm '18 unsecured notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Joshua Sussberg, Steven Serajeddini, Matthew Fagen, Laura Elizabeth Krucks, Timothy Bow, Gabor Balassa, Ben Tyson) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael Condyles, Peter Barrett, Jeremy Williams)
    • Legal (Special Committee): Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Thomas Wolper, Seth Goldman, Kevin Allred)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (James Mesterharm, Liyan Woo)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke)
    • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
    • Liquidators: Tiger Capital Group LLC and Great American Group LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Consenting Term Loan Lenders & DIP Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch
      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Boehm, K. Elizabteh Sieg)
      • Financial Advisor: Rothschild & Co.
    • DIP ABL Administrative Agent
      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Julia Frost-Davies, Robert A.J. Barry, Amelia Clark Joiner) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Justin Paget)
    • DIP ABL Term Agent
      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jennifer Fenn) & (local) Whiteford Taylor Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
    • Sponsor: Bain Capital Private Equity LP 
      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Robert Lemons) & (local) Wolcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Unsecured Noteholders
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, Jason Rubin)
    • Pathlight Capital
      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jonathan Marshall) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
    • Indenture Trustee: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
      • Legal: Moses & Singer LLP (Alan Gamza, Kent Kolbig, Jessica Boneque) & (local) Hirschler Fleischer PC (Robert Westermann, Rachel Greenleaf)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Hahn & Hessen LLP (Mark Power, Mark Indelicato, Janine Figueiredo, Alison Ladd) & (local) Tavenner & Beran PC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

Updated 7/11/17 at 7:25 pm CT