✈️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - AeroCentury Corp. ($ACY) ✈️

California-based AeroCentury Corp. ($ACY) and two affiliates (together, the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases on Monday March 29, 2021 in the District of Delaware. The debtors are in the business of investing in mid-life regional turboprop and jet aircraft equipment and then turning around and leasing that equipment to foreign and domestic regional air carriers. Their portfolio consists of thirteen aircraft, six of which are held under operating leases, two under financing leases, and five held for sale in whole or as parts. If this general type of business sounds familiar, well, congratulations, you’ve been paying attention: over the last few weeks, we’ve been highlighting the challenges that aircraft finance businesses have faced due to COVID-19 primarily in the context of Nordic Aviation (hereherehere and here).

COVID-19 did no favors for the debtors either. The debtors experienced an 85% decrease in YOY revenue in Q320; they had generated $43.6mm in revenue in FY19. That hurts when thrown against ~$83mm of pre-petition first lien debt due in 2023 (exclusive of debt held on certain non-debtor special purpose entities backing individual aircraft).

Of course, there were problems pre-pandemic. In fact, the debtors have been in a perpetual state of forbearance with their agent bank, MUFG Union Bank NA ($MUFG), and their lenders since October 28, 2019. Not that you could tell from the looks of this chart:

Source: Koyfin

Source: Koyfin

Anywho, pre-COVID, the debtors’ banker, B. Riley Securities Inc. ($RILY), was out to market on a dual track, soliciting bids for a sale of the debtors’ assets on one hand, while also pursuing a capital raise on the other. The bankruptcy will apparently take the first path.

The debtors march into bankruptcy court with a stalking horse agreement in place with Drake Asset Management Jersey Limited, which purchased all of the debt held by the debtors’ lenders in October 2020. Drake will credit bid $83.5mm; it did not negotiate a break-up fee or expense reimbursement so anyone bullish on an airline turnaround is apparently more than welcome to enter the fray with little to no impediments (well, other than than credit bid amount). Given that RILY has been marketing the debtors for what seems like an eternity now, the debtors hope to push the sale process expeditiously, completing the process in approximately 50 days.

Date: March 29, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

Capital Structure: $83mm of funded debt

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Erica Richards) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Joseph Barry, Ryan Bartley, Joseph Mulvihill, S. Alexander Faris)

  • Investment Banker: B. Riley Securities Inc. (Adam Rosen)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • RCF Agent: MUFG Union Bank NA

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Briggs & Stratton Corporation ($BGG)

Briggs & Stratton Corporation

July 20, 2020

You may not know of Briggs & Stratton Corporation ($BGG) but it’s likely that you’ve used one of its products. Its small gasoline engines are used in outdoor power equipment like lawn mowers, and it designs, manufactures and markets power generation, pressure washer, lawn and garden, turf care and job site products. Its engines even power go-karts! It offers a variety of different brands and its products are in 100 countries around the world.

The company has a rich history. In Wisconsin circa 1908, inventor Stephen Briggs and investor Harold Stratton co-founded what, two years later, would be an auto and auto parts manufacturer incorporated as Briggs & Stratton. The two men added small gasoline engines to their product suite, powering early washing machines and reel mowers. The company went public in 1928. For decades thereafter, the business ventured into agricultural and military applications (producing generators for the WWII effort), ultimately revolutionizing the first lightweight aluminum engine in 1953. The post-War suburbian boom helped fuel the company’s growth in the 50s and 60s. Lots of lawns to mow! The company has iterated a lot since then: it no longer produces auto components, for instance. The core business is currently focused around two segments: engines (primarily sold to OEMs of lawn and garden equipment) and products (i.e., outdoor power equipment, job site products, etc.).

Unfortunately, a rich history doesn’t insulate companies from distress — a lesson that many long-standing companies have learned lately as the bankruptcy bin fills to the brim with companies with 100+ year histories (see, also, BJ Services LLC, Brooks Brothers Group, RTW Retailwinds, Congoleum Corporation). Alas, the company and four affiliates (the “debtors”) also could not avoid chapter 11, filing early Monday in the Eastern District of Missouri, and citing (i) cautious ordering patterns from channel partners, (ii) weather, (iii) Sears’ demise and bankruptcy (bankruptcy dominos!!), (iv) consumer preference shifts, and (v) China, for its troubles. With approximately $200mm of notes maturing at year end (Dec) and a springing maturity of 9/15/20 if the notes are still outstanding by then, the debtors, to top things off, faced real challenges related to the balance sheet.

Because of all of the aforementioned factors, the debtors implemented a “strategic repositioning plan” that included shutting plants, laying off workers, suspending employee benefits (including underfunded and unfunded pensions), lowering capital and discretionary spending, eliminating a shareholder dividend and suspending a share repurchase program. COVID-19, as we’ve seen over and over again, got in the way of these efforts. “The preliminary estimate of the sales decline caused by the pandemic for the fiscal fourth quarter was $157 million and for the fiscal year was $197 million.” 😬

The good news is that the debtors have a buyer in the wings. Bucephalus Buyer LLC, a dramatically-named affiliate of KPS Capital Partners LP entered into a stalking horse purchase agreement with the debtors pursuant to which it would buy the debtors’ assets and equity interests in non-debtor subsidiaries for $550m in cash plus the assumption of certain liabilities. To fund this process (and take out the ABL in full), the debtors obtained (i) a commitment from prepetition ABL lender, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, for a $412.5mm DIP ABL (L+3.5%), (ii) a commitment from KPS for a $265mm DIP Term Loan facility (L+7%) and (iii) consent to use the ABL lenders’ cash collateral. The DIP agreement mandates that a qualified sale order be entered by the bankruptcy court no later than September 24, 2020 (subject to caveats that would push the date out to December 31, 2020).

  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Missouri (Judge Schermer)

  • Capital Structure: $260.4mm North American ABL, $53mm LOCs, $12.4mm Swiss ABL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), 202.7mm unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Ronit Berkovich, Debora Hoehne, Martha Martir, Andrew Citron, Edward Soto, Janiel Jodi-Ann Myers, Lauren Alexander, Corey Berman) & Carmody MacDonald PC (Robert Eggmann, Christopher Lawhorn, Danielle Suberi, Thomas Riske, Lindsay Leible Combs, Angela Drumm)

    • Financial Advisor: EY (Jeffrey Ficks)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Reid Snellenbarger, Jeffrey Lewis)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition & DIP Agent ($677.5mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Peter Knight, Jonathan Gordon)

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser ($550mm): Bucephalus Buyer, LLC (KPS Capital Partners LP)

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Chad Husnick, Gregory Pesce, Claire Stephens, Guy Macarol) & Armstrong Teasdale LLP (Richard Engel)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Imperial Capital LLC

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Aldrich Pump LLC

Aldrich Pump LLC

June 18, 2020

Another day, another asbestos-sparked bankruptcy. Man. These things have legs. Aldrich Pump LLC and Murray Boiler LLC are recently formed LLCs spun out of a recent reorganization of Trane Technologies plc, a publicly-traded manufacturer of climate solutions for buildings, homes and transportation (and, via a subsidiary, successor by merger to Ingersoll-Rand Company).

While the debtors don’t mine or use asbestos in manufacturing products, they made industrial products that, in some cases, used asbestos-containing components manufactured and designed by third parties. As a result, the debtors’ have been subject to asbestos litigation going as far back as 1982. Year over year, the debtors now face “thousands upon thousands” of asbestos-related claims. The bankruptcy cases are meant to “…permanently, globally and fairly resolve the asbestos claims….” Here comes another 524(g) trust y’all.

  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of North Carolina (Judge Whitley)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Gregory Gordon, Brad Erens, David Torborg, James Jones, Mark Cody, Caitlin Cahow, Genna Ghaul) & Rayburn Cooper & Durham PA

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Carrianne Basler)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Proteus Digital Health Inc.💊

Proteus Digital Health Inc.

June 15, 2020

In a week chock full of chapter 11 bankruptcy filings, in our opinion, the filing of California-based medtech company Proteus Digital Health Inc. is the most interesting and unique. Sure Extraction Oil & Gas ($XOG) is a publicly-traded oil and gas exploration and production company but, aside from the fact that it operates primarily in Colorado rather than Texas or Oklahoma, there’s nothing particularly fresh or interesting about it. We get it already: oil and gas is f*cked.

In contrast (and with apologies for the long block quote), when’s the last time you read about a chapter 11 debtor that does this:

The Debtor is a pioneer and leader of the “Digital Medicines” industry. “Digital Medicines” are oral pharmaceuticals formulated with an ingestible sensor aimed at tracking a patient’s adherence to prescribed medication treatments. When patients use Digital Medicines, their mobile devices collect information about medication taken and safely transmit the data via the cloud to the healthcare provider. Care teams are able to see if their patients are properly taking their medication and observe and analyze real-time data regarding the patient’s overall health such as heart rate, activity and rest. Digital Medicines enable care teams to manage larger patient populations and make medical decisions without the need for a patient to physically travel to the doctor’s office. Digital Medicines can help accelerate the trend toward conducting medical consultations over the internet. This opportunity is especially pronounced in rural areas and developing economies both domestically and internationally, particularly in light of challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting social distancing measures.

That’s like some Minority Report sh*t right there. Founded in 2002, the debtor has spent the better part of two decades developing its tech, testing its tech, commencing clinical trials, obtaining FDA approval of its drug-device combination product, entering into a marketing and distribution relationship with Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. ($OTSKY)(which it later expanded the scope of), and agreeing to a multi-year outcomes-based initiative with the State of Tennessee’s Medicaid program with a focus on hepatitis C treatment of underserved populations. The company currently “…has a panel of more than 20 Digital Medicines that treat cardiovascular and metabolic diseases including hypertension and diabetes being prescribed to patients in the United States.” Its patent portfolio is 400 strong.

On the flip side, the company is currently “pre-revenue.” And as you can imagine, accomplishing all of the above required a significant amount of upfront capital. There’s a reason why this company raised venture capital all the way through a Series H round: $461.5mm, actually, according to Angelist, with the last round of $50mm taking place in April 2016. The company’s cap table includes, among many others, The Carlyle Group ($CG)(Series B & C rounds), Medtronic PLC ($MDT)(Series D round), Novartis Pharma AG ($NVS)(Series E & F rounds), and PepsiCo Inc. ($PEP)(Series G round). The company also has a $9.5mm pre-petition credit facility.

In late 2019, the company experienced a severe liquidity crisis due, in part, to complications arising out of the expanded collaboration agreement with Otsuka. The debtor nearly wiggled its way out of trouble; it negotiated a synchronized deal with Otsuka and its prepetition lender that would coordinate (a) payments in from Otsuka and (b) payments out to the lender and (c) let the company get back to business as usual and buy it some time to source additional financing. But then COVID-19 struck and the company again found itself in a position where it wouldn’t be possible to live up to its obligations — in this case, a $7.75mm repayment to its pre-petition lender on or before April 30. This thing is like whack-a-mole.

The company spent April and May trying to negotiate itself out of its quagmire and hired Raymond James & Associates Inc. ($RJF) as investment banker to pursue a marketing and sale process. The company entered into a series of agreements with Otsuka and its lender to stem the tide but, ultimately, the shot clock ran out:

In light of all of these circumstances, and after having explored multiple options and carefully considering the alternatives, the Board, in consultation with managements and the Debtor’s advisors, made the difficult decision to file for chapter 11 protection in order to preserve the Debtor’s assets and conduct a sale process or other transaction, all in an effort to maintain continuity of business operations (including the Debtor's TennCare initiative) and maximize going concern value for the benefit of the Debtor’s creditors and equity stakeholders. The Debtor anticipates that it will seek approval of appropriate bidding and sale procedures in the early weeks of the Chapter 11 Case.

The pre-petition lender has consented to the use of its cash collateral to fund the case. Now we’ll see if there are any buyers out there who are as impressed with the premise of Digital Medicines as we are.*

*Full disclosure, we’re going purely off of what the debtor describes and have no medical knowledge whatsoever to opine on the efficacy of such initiatives. Sure sounds cool AF though.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

  • Capital Structure: $9.5mm secured debt (OrbiMed Royalty Opportunities II LP)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Goodwin Procter LL (Nathan Schultz, Barry Bazian, Aretm Skorostensky) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (L. Katherine Good, Aaron Stulman)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: SierraConstellation Partners LLC (Lawrence Perkins)

    • Board of Directors: Shumeet Banerji, Regina Benjamin, Robert Epstein, Frank Fischer, Alan Levy, Ryan Schwarz, Joseph Swedish, Jonathan Symonds, Immanuel Thangaraj, Andrew Thompson

    • Investment Banker: Raymond James & Associates

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Lender: OrbiMed Royalty Opportunities II LP

    • Large Series A Preferred Equityholder: Spring Ridge Ventures I LP

    • Large Series B Preferred Equityholders: Carlyle Venture Partners II LP, Adams Street V LP, BVCF IV LP

⛽️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Vista Proppants and Logistics LLC ⛽️

Vista Proppants and Logistics LLC

June 9, 2020

You wouldn’t know it from the equity price action in oil and gas this week but lest there be any confusion: generally speaking, oil and gas is still very much f*cked.

Privately-held (The Lonestar Prospects Holdings Company LLC and First Reserve) Texas-based Vista Proppants and Logistics LLC (along with its affiliate filers, the “debtors”) is yet another victim of the oil and gas malaise. Its principal business is producing mine-to-wellhead high-quality, fine-grade “Texas Premium White” frac sand for end users in TX and OK. The business includes mining (via debtor subsidiary Lonestar Prospects Management LLC), trucking (via debtor subsidiary MAALT LP, and transloading (via debtor subsidiary MAALT Specialized Bulk LLC). The company operates three mines in Texas, twelve transloading terminals in TX and OK, three trucking facilities in TX, and a fleet of approximately 100 “last-mile” transport vehicles. Spoiler alert: when oil prices break through the floor and everyone cuts back capacity, there ain’t a whole lot of need for frac sand. Toss in a little COVID into the mix — further decimating the oil and gas space — and, well, here we are in bankruptcy court. The debtors have shut down their mining operations and aren’t engaging in any trucking and transloading activity.

As you might expect, even with all of the cost cutting initiatives under the sun, not operating can have an effect on liquidity. And indeed that’s the case here: the debtors ran out of money to service their operations and their $357+mm of debt (Ares Capital Corporation ($ARCC)). The bankruptcy filing avails the debtors of $11mm of DIP financing and provide an opportunity for the debtors to pursue a sale of their assets to Ares or a third-party buyer.

The other thing this bankruptcy filing does is provide the debtors of the same opportunity that previous frac sand provider, Emerge Energy Services, took advantage of in bankruptcy court. That is, the rejection of railcar leases. These fixed cost contracts make no sense for the debtors anymore as they simply don’t have the volumes to transport. Indeed, the debtors have already filed a slate of contract rejection motions.

Along those lines, this isn’t the first frac sand chapter 11 bankruptcy and it likely isn’t the last either.


*For the avoidance of doubt, ARCC placed this sucker on non-accrual previously. Notably, Bloomberg reported on various comments that Ares’ CEO Michael Arougheti said this week at the Morgan Stanley Virtual U.S. Financials Conference:

“There is a little bit of a risk that people are underestimating the level of distress in the small business and consumer landscape absent the government support,” Michael Arougheti, chief executive officer at Ares Management Corp. said. “When you look at the government aid programs, they’ve generally been structured to get us through June and July, and after that is a big question mark.”

Vista seems apropos of that comment. The question is whether Vista is also the canary in the coal mine for BDC investments. Bloomberg also noted:

The firm’s portfolio companies have received capital injections from equity owners to support business, he said. Within its credit holdings, Ares has been able to negotiate stronger covenants and higher loan prices. The firm is “cautiously optimistic” of receiving debt payments in June, he said.

Set your alarms.


  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Morris)

  • Capital Structure: $357.5mm Term Loan (Ares Capital Corporation), $21.9mm ABL (PlainsCapital Bank), MAALT Facility

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Stephen Pezanosky, Ian Peck, David Staab)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Gary Barton)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ares Capital Corporation

      • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Dennis Twomey, Charles Persons, Juliana Hoffman)

    • Lonestar

      • Legal: Jackson Walker LLP (Kenneth Stohner Jr., Vienna Anaya)

    • PlainsCapital Bank

      • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Holland O’Neil, Thomas Scannell)

⛽️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Templar Energy LLC ⛽️

Templar Energy LLC

May 31, 2020

Templar Energy LLC (and six affiliates, the “debtors”), an Oklahoma City-based independent oil and gas exploration and production company that operates primarily in the Greater Anadarko Basin of Western Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle, filed a prepackaged plan of liquidation early Monday morning — the culmination of a multi-year effort to stave off the inevitable.

A quick flashback. Four years ago oil and gas companies were collapsing into bankruptcy left and right. After oil and gas prices fell hard, the oil and gas tide rolled out and left a lot of investors stranded naked on the beach. Most funds were of the view that this was just a hiccup. One fund after another raised billions after billions of dollars thinking that energy was “where it’s at.” We now know how off-kilter that thesis was.

Some companies back then were luckier than others. Thanks in large part to its relatively simple and highly concentrated capital structure and a clear demarcation of value based on prevailing commodity prices of the time, in September 2016, Templar Energy was able to consummate an out-of-court restructuring that extinguished $1.45b of second lien debt. Repeat: $1.45 BILLION of second lien debt — a tremendous amount of value destruction a mere four years after the company’s formation. Of course, as with all things there are nuances here. “Value destruction” is a relative phrase that applies to the par holders of the debt when originally issued. Certain second lien lenders who participated in the out-of-court restructuring may very well have purchased the paper for cents on the dollar once the par guys had to pull the ripcord. Destruction there, therefore, is a function of price. There’s no way to know (from publicly available information) whether any of the original holders of second lien paper came out ahead upon receiving $133mm in cash and 45% of the equity in exchange for their second lien paper. It’s certainly possible that some did.

It’s also highly probable that some didn’t. Take Ares Management LLC, Bain Capital and Paulson & Co. Inc. for instance; they each participated in a rights offering for participating preferred equity in the company in exchange for $220mm dumped into this turd (plus $145mm placed by legacy equity holders). Given that the RBL IS NOW IMPAIRED here, clearly that equity check hasn’t borne fruit. It was also used to pay the aforementioned $133mm of cash recovery so … suffice it to say … this does not seem like one that the aforementioned funds will be referencing in future LP-oriented marketing materials.

Emanating out of that ‘16 transaction is the debtors’ current $600mm RBL. This time around, it is the fulcrum security. The debtors note, “Critically the claims under the RBL Facility are deeply impaired.” And the RBL lenders have no intention of owning the assets — predominantly leases with various oil and gas mineral owners covering non-exclusive working interests in approximately 2,165 oil and gas wells over approximately 273,400 continuous acres of property. Let’s be clear here: first lien lenders generally aren’t in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. Of course, right now, the debtors aren’t really in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. At least technically speaking. Given where oil and gas prices are — thanks Putin/MBS on the supply side, COVID-19 on the demand side — the debtors aren’t even conducting any drilling. Typically they operate anywhere up to 13 rigs at a time. All of which is to say that the lenders’ position explains why this is a sale + plan of liquidation case rather than a second debt-for-equity play.*

To aid the debtors’ attempts to continue pre-petition sale efforts post-petition, certain of the RBL Lenders have committed to a $37.5mm DIP (with a 0.5-to-1 $12.5mm rollup). Pursuant to a restructuring support agreement, the RBL lenders have agreed to receive their pro rata share of any net sale proceeds and all remaining cash held by the debtors’ estates as of the plan effective date minus (i) cash needed to repay the DIP, (ii) wind down funds, and (iii) monies placed into a professional fee escrow. Royalty owners, materialman and mechanics’ lienholders will be paid in full. General unsecured claimants and equity will get wiped.

*We should note — to hammer home the point — that one of the events that hammered the debtors’ liquidity position was the RBL lenders’ April 1, 2019 redetermination down of the RBL borrowing base to $415mm. This regularly scheduled redetermination analysis created an immediate $22mm “deficiency payment” liability for the debtors as it had $437mm borrowed at the time. The debtors stopped making those payments in November 2019. They’ve been in a state of forbearance with the RBL lenders ever since.

$37.5mm DIP with $12.5 rollup

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Sarah Harnett, Teresa Li) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Jaime Luton Chapman, Tara Pakrouh)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Morgan Suckow)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent ($37.5mm): Bank of America NA

    • Consenting RBL Lenders

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Amy Kyle, Andrew Gallo) & Richards Layton & Finger PA

      • Financial Advisor: RPA Advisors LLC

    • Large Class A equityholders: Ares Management LLC, Paulson & Co. Inc., Bain Capital, Lord Abbett, Archview Investment, Bank of America, Seix Advisors, Bardin Hill/Halcyon Loan Invest Management, Oppenheimer Funds

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Akorn Inc. ($AKRX) 💊

Akorn Inc.

May 20, 2020

Akorn Inc. ($AKRX), a specialty pharmaceutical company based in Illinois that develops, manufactures and markets generic and branded prescription pharmaceuticals, finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Why “finally?” Well, back in January 2019 the company, in conjunction with an announcement of new executive and board appointments, noted that restructuring professionals (Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, PJT Partners LP and AlixPartners LLP)* were assisting with the formulation of a business plan and discussions with stakeholders. In December 2019, the publicly-traded company acknowledged in an SEC filing that bankruptcy was on the table, sending the stock into a 33% freefall. Subsequently, in February 2020, the company announced in connection with its Q4 and annual earnings that it had reached an agreement with its lenders to execute a sale of the business “potentially using Chapter 11 protection.” A sale, however, could not generate sufficient value to cover the outstanding funded indebtedness under the company’s term loan credit agreement. Shortly thereafter in March, the company defaulted under said agreement and the company and its lenders pivoted to discussions about a credit bid with an ad hoc group of term lenders serving as stalking horse purchaser of the assets in chapter 11. Alas, here we are. The company and 16 affiliates (the “debtors”) “FINALLY” find themselves in court with recently inked asset purchase and restructuring support agreements in tow. The debtors will use the bankruptcy process to further their sale process and market test bids against the term lenders’ proposed $1.05b credit bid; they hope to have an auction in the beginning of August with a mid/late-August sale hearing.

The sale process, however, is not where the excitement is here.

We are now in an age — post COVID-19 — where M&A deals falling apart is becoming commonplace news and debates about force majeure and “material adverse effect” rage on in the news and, eventually, in the courts. In that respect, Akorn was ahead of the curve.

In April 2017, Akorn and Fresenius Kabi AG ($FSNUY), a massive German healthcare company, announced a proposed merger with Akorn shareholders set up to receive $34/share — a sizable premium to the then prevailing stock price in the high-20s. (PETITION Note: for purposes of comparison, the stock was trading at $1.26/share on the aforementioned announcement of annual earnings). Akorn shareholders approved the merger but then the business began to suffer. Per the debtors:

…Akorn began to experience a steep and sustained drop-off in financial performance drive by a variety of factors, including, among other things: consolidation of buyer power leading to price reductions; the FDA’s expedition of its review and approval process for generic drugs, leading to increased competition and resultant additional price and volume erosion; and legislative attempts to reduce drug prices.

Almost exactly a year later — after all kinds of shady-a$$ sh*t including anonymous letters alleging data integrity and regulatory deficiencies at Akron facilities and sustained poor financial performance — Fresenius was like “we out.” Lawsuits ensued with Akorn seeking to enforce the merger and Fresenius parrying with “material adverse effect” defenses. The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with Fresenius.

This is America so lawsuits beget lawsuits and Fresenius’ announcement that the merger was at risk spawned (i) federal class action litigation against Akron and certain of its present and former directors and officers and (ii) federal and state law derivative litigation. Akorn ultimately settled the class action litigation but four groups of hedge funds opted out and continue to pursue claims against Akorn. Meanwhile, Akorn lost its appeal of the Delaware Chancery Court decision and a decision on Fresenius’ claims for damages remain reserved. Fresenius has at least a $74mm claim.

This litigation overhang — coupled with the debtors’ $861.7mm in term loans (emanating out of strategic acquisitions in 2014) — is what drives this bankruptcy. The debtors believe that, upon resolution of these issues, it is well-positioned to thrive. They had $682mm revenue in ‘19 and $124mm of adjusted EBITDA. In Q1 ‘20, the company achieved adjusted EBITDA of $59mm (PETITION Note: “adjusted” being an operative word here). Large wholesale distributors like AmerisourceBergen Corporation ($ABC), Cardinal Health Inc. ($CAH), and McKesson Corporation ($MCK) are large customers. The U.S. healthcare system is shifting towards generics and big brand-name pharmaceuticals are rolling off-patent and “driving generic opportunities.” Pre-petition efforts to find a buyer who shares the debtors’ optimism, however, proved unfruitful.

Armed with a $30mm DIP commitment from certain of the term lenders in the ad hoc group, the debtors will swiftly determine whether the prospect of owning these assets “free and clear” will generate any higher or better offers.

*Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in its quest for 32,892,239% restructuring market share, ultimately displaced Cravath.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $861.7mm ‘21 Term Loans (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Nicole Greenblatt, Gregory Pesce, Christopher Hayes) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood)

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Mark Buschmann)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Term Loan & DIP Agent ($30mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher (Scott Greenberg, Steven Domanowski, Jeremy Evans, Michael J. Cohen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. LLC (Neil Augustine)

    • Large equityholders: Blackrock Inc., The Vanguard Group, Akorn Holdings LP, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

🥾New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Stage Stores Inc. ($SSI) 🥾

Stage Stores Inc.

April 10, 2020

Houston-based Stage Stores Inc. ($SSI) marks the second department store chain to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy in Texas this week, following on the heals of Neiman Marcus. With John Varvatos and J.Crew also filing this week, the retail sector is clearly starting to buckle. All of these names — with maybe the exception of Varvatos — were potentially headed towards chapter 11 pre-COVID. As were J.C. Penney Corp. ($JCP) and GNC Holdings Inc. ($GNC), both of which may be debtors by the end of this week. Sh*t is getting real for retail.

We first wrote about Stage Stores in November ‘18, highlighting dismal department store performance but a seemingly successful experiment converting 8 department stores to off-price. At the time, its off-price business had a 9.9% comp sales increase. Moreover, the company partnered with ThredUp, embracing the secondhand apparel trend. While we have no way of knowing whether this drove any revenue, it, in combination with the conversions, showed that management was thinking outside the box to reverse disturbing retail trends.

By March ‘19, the company was on record with plans to close between 40-60 department stores. In August ‘19, it became public knowledge that Berkeley Research Group was working with the company. The company reported Q2 ‘19 results that — the hiring of a restructuring advisor with a lot of experience with liquidating retailers, aside — actually showed some promise. We wrote:

Thursday was a big day for the company. One one hand, some big mouths leaked to The Wall Street Journal that the company retained Berkeley Research Group to advise on department store operations. That’s certainly not a great sign though it may be a positive that the company is seeking assistance sooner rather than later. On the other hand, the company reported Q2 ‘19 results that were, to some degree, somewhat surprising to the upside. Net sales declined merely $1mm YOY and comp sales were 1.8%, a rare increase that stems the barrage of consecutive quarters of negative turns. Off-price conversions powered 1.5% of the increase. The company reported positive trends in comps, transaction count, average transaction value, private label credit card growth, and SG&A. On the flip side, COGs increased meaningfully, adjusted EBITDA declined $2.1mm YOY and interest expense is on the rise. The company has $324mm of debt. Cash stands at $25mm with $66mm in ABL availability. The company’s net loss was $24mm compared to $17mm last year.

Some of the reported loss is attributable to offensive moves. The company’s inventory increased 5% as the company seeks to avoid peak shipping expense and get out ahead of tariff risk (PETITION Note: see a theme emerging here, folks?). There are also costs associated with location closures: the company will shed 46 more stores.

What’s next? Well, the company raised EBITDA guidance for fiscal ‘19: management is clearly confident that the off-price conversion will continue to drive improvements. No analysts were on the earnings call to challenge the company. Restructuring advisors will surely want to pay attention to see whether management’s optimism is well-placed.

As we wrote in February ‘20, subsequent results showed that “management’s optimism was, in fact, misplaced.” Now, three months later, the company is in court.

We should take a second to note that this is a potential sale case. The first day papers, therefore, are meant to paint a picture that will draw interest from potential buyers. And so it’s all about the successful conversion of stores. Indeed, the company asserts that its transformation WAS, in fact, taking hold as it moved beyond the initial small batch of store conversions to a more wholesale approach to off-price. By September 2019, 82 store transitions had been completed. And, to date, 233 department stores have been converted to the Gordmans off-price model (PETITION Note: the company acquired Gordmans out of bankruptcy. The company also deigns to suggest that the stock price increase from under a dollar in January ‘19 to $9.50 in early ‘20 is indicative of the market’s support of the off-price conversion and the potential for success post-conversion — as if stock prices mean sh*t in this interest rate environment.). The company now has 289 off-price stores in total (including the Gordmans acquisition) and 437 department stores.

Enter COVID-19 here. No operations = no liquidity. The company’s conversion plan stopped in its tracks. Like every other retailer in the US, the company stopped paying rent and furloughed thousands of employees. “Combined with zero revenue and uncertainty associated with consumer demand in the coming months, Stage Stores, like so many others, is in the middle of a perfect storm.

The company’s plan in bankruptcy appears to be to leave open any and all optionality. One one hand, it will liquidate inventory, wind-down operations and close stores. On the other hand, it will pursue a sale process, managing inventory in such a way “…to increase the likelihood of a going-concern transaction and, to the extent one materializes … pivot to cease store closings at any stores needed to implement the going-concern transaction.” To aid this plan, the company will seek court latitude as it relates to post-petition rent. These savings, coupled with cash collateral, will avail the company of liquidity needed to finance this dual-path approach (PETITION Note: the company suggests that, if needed, the company will explore a DIP credit facility at a later time).

We should note that Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC) is the company’s lender and has permitted the use of over $10mm for cash collateral. We previously wrote:

Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC) is the company’s administrative agent and primary lender under the company’s asset-based credit facility. Prior to Destination Maternity’s ($DEST) chapter 11 filing, Wells Fargo tightened the screws, instituting reserves against credit availability to de-risk its position. It stands to reason that it is doing the same thing here given the company’s sub-optimal performance and failure to meet projections. Said another way, WFC has had it with retail. Unlike oil and gas lending, there are no pressures here to play ball in the name of “relationship banking” when, at the end of the day, so many of these “relationships” are getting wiped from the earth.

Looks like they’re at least providing a little bit of leash here to give the company at least some chance of locating a White Knight that will provide value above and beyond liquidation value (however you calculate that these days)* and keep this thing alive. Which is to say that none of this is likely to give much solace to the staggering $173mm worth of unsecured trade debt here. 😬

Not that the unsecureds should be the only concerned parties here. With first day relief totaling over $2mm, employee wage obligations running potentially as high as $8mm, and high-priced professionals, this thing could very well be administratively insolvent from the get-go.

*Perhaps news coming out of T.J. Maxx (TJX) will help spark interest from a buyer. There are also some potentially valuable NOLs here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: $178.6mm RCF (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $47.4mm Term Loan (Wells Fargo Bank, Pathlight Capital LLC)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Neil Herman, Joshua Altman, Kevin McClelland, Jeremy Fielding) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

    • CRO: Elaine Crowley

    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Stephen Coulombe)

    • Investment Banker: PJ Solomon LP (Mark Hootnick)

    • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners

    • Liquidation Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Jaime Koff, Brendan Recupero, Paul Bekkar, Steven Fox) & Winstead PC (Sean Davis, Matthew Bourda)

    • Term Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Mark Silva) & Winstead PC (Sean Davis, Matthew Bourda)

    • Large equityholder: Axar Capital Management LP

🎭 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Rubie's Costume Company Inc. 🎭

Rubie’s Costume Company Inc.

April 30, 2020

Star Wars. Marvel’s Avengers. Stranger Things. You’d think any business associated with this hot IP would be killing it. And yet it seems that even the Black Panther is susceptible to poor business fundamentals in a disrupted retail environment.

New York-based Rubie’s Costume Company Inc. and five affiliates (the “debtors”) — designers, manufacturers and distributors of costumes and related accessories — filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of New York. The debtors have non-exclusive licenses with the likes of Disney Inc. ($DIS), Lucasfilm, Marvel and others as well as non-licensed costumes for all of your not-just-Halloween costume needs (nobody is judging, people). They sell via 4 costume stores in New York, online, and wholesale channels; they count Target Inc. ($TGT), Walmart Inc. ($WMT), Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) and Party City Holdco Inc. ($PRTY) as distribution channels (the latter, itself, in trouble).

The debtors note that operating performance has been on the decline for years, attributing this primarily to “[i]ndependent customers hav[ing] declined and the average order per existing customer also ha[ving] declined.” Disruption! The small mom and pop costume shops are getting smoked while the bigbox retailers who have more leverage over pricing take over. We’re willing to bet that even Party City will attribute its recent travails to the rise of the bigbox retailer coupled with “The Amazon Effect.” The debtors highlight:

For the fiscal year ending December 31, 2018 (“FY 2018”) net sales and Adjusted EBITDA were approximately $310 million and $2 million, respectively. As a result of the decline in independent customers, for fiscal year ending December 31, 2019 (“FY 2019”), the Company generated net sales and Adjusted EBITDA of approximately $268 million ($42 million decline) and $3 million ($5 million decline), respectively.

The debtors also have over $47mm of secured debt outstanding under its pre-petition credit agreement with lenders such as HSBC Bank USA NA, Bank of America NA, Wells Fargo Bank NA, JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, TD Bank NA, and Citibank NA (the “Bank Group”). Operating under a series of forbearance agreements, the debtors have been engaged in an operational cost-cutting process since 2019.

Forbearances (accompanied, of course, with enhanced collateral packages and fees) and cost-cutting can only get you so far, of course. With COVID-19 hitting, the debtors suffered from a liquidity crunch. After all, we’re not hearing much about Zoom-costume-parties. The Bank Group has apparently taken a look at the debtors’ business prospects and said, “no way, Jose.” Per the debtors:

…the COVID crisis has had an impact on the Debtors’ ability to obtain new financing from the Bank Group. The Bank Group has declined to provide continued financing and the Debtors’ efforts to obtain replacement financing on an asset based lending structure have been slowed by the crisis.

Indeed, Wells Fargo Bank NA pulled out of refi discussions — a move consistent with Wells’ recent savagely escapist approach with respect to retail.

It advised the Debtors that its decision was based on the conditions in the global lending market due to the COVID-19 crisis and internal restrictions on its current lending, and was not a reflection on the Debtors’ creditworthiness.

Yeah, maybe.

The Debtors demonstrated the viability of their business to the Banks in a number of ways including through the business plan implemented over the last year with the assistance of BDO, the continued value of their inventory which exceeds the debt owed to the Banks and even most recently the fact that major national account clients placed firm orders for the Halloween season.

While we don’t find this particularly convincing either, Wells didn’t really need a pretense to bail out of retail these days.

Anyway, here we are. Without the refinancing, the debtors are in bankruptcy court seeking the use of cash collateral while they use the bankruptcy process to find a new source of capital.

  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of New York (Judge Trust)

  • Capital Structure: $46.7mm RCF

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Togut Segal & Segal LLP (Frank Oswald, Brian Moore) & Meyer Suozzi English & Klein PC (Edward LoBello, Howard Kleinberg, Jordan Weiss)

    • Financial Advisor: BDO USA LLP

    • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition Agent: HSBC

      • Legal: Phillips Lytle LLP (William Brown)

🚢 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Speedcast International Limited 🚢

Speedcast International Limited

April 22, 2020

This is a fun one.

Speedcast International Limited, a publicly-traded Australian company headquartered in Houston and 32 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed rare freefall bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas earlier this week. In a week where another 4.4mm people filed for unemployment, one thing seems abundantly clear: the Texas’ bankruptcy courts are going to need help. While Delaware has also been extremely busy, both the Northern District and Southern District of Texas are seeing rock solid bankruptcy flow these days. If the judges got volume bonuses, they’d be rolling in it.

Who’s the big loser? Well, with all of these bankruptcy hearings conducted telephonically, we reckon it’s the city of Houston. In normal times, there’d be a steady stream of suits flushing through the local economy there: staying at the hotels, eating at the restaurants, drinking at the bars. Brutal. But we digress. 🤔

One thing the restructuring industry gives us is an open window into how one domino can topple over others. For instance, the energy and cruise industries are clearly effed currently and so it stands to reason that service providers to those industries would also feel pain. This is where Speedcast comes in: it is a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses. They plug a hole: they offer telecom services to users in remote parts around the world, “primarily where there is limited or no terrestrial network.” Picture some evildoer in some decked out yacht-lair somewhere plotting to take over the world Austin Powers-style. He is probably leveraging Speedcast for IT solutions (PETITION Note: we’re just painting a picture folks; we’re not suggesting that the company merely deals with shady-a$$ mofos. Don’t @ us.). The business is truly international in scope.

Putting aside yacht-loving villains, Speedcast has high profile clients. Carnival Corp. ($CCL), for instance, contracted with Speedcast in December 2018 — long before any of Carnival’s customers contracted with the coronavirus. Cruisers streaming reports about their horrific cruise-going experiences likely used Speedcast product to get the word out. 😬 This was a growing business segment. Revenue increased by $36.5mm from fiscal year 2018 to 2019.

Likewise, the debtors’ energy business had also been growing. The debtors provide “high-bandwidth remote communication services to all segments of the global energy industry, including companies involved in drilling and exploration, floating production storage, offloading, offshore service, general service, engineering, and construction.” Revenue there increased from $158.3mm in FY18 to $164.5mm. We’re pretty sure we know which direction that number is heading in FY20.

Similarly, the debtors’ other business segments — Enterprise & Emerging Markets and Government — demonstrated growth between ‘18 and ‘19. All in, this is a $722.3mm revenue business. Unfortunately, it also had net losses of $459.8mm in FY19. So, yeah. There’s that. The debtors’ rapid expansion over the years apparently didn’t lead to immediate synergistic realization and the debtors suffered from margin compression, revenue declines from specific business lines, and other ails that affected performance and liquidity.

While there have been operational issues for some time now, those were just jabs. COVID-19 and the attendant global shutdown body slammed the company. The debtors note:

Further, the lasting and distressed market conditions in the maritime and oil and gas industries, and the recent and dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, have impacted all players in the global marketplace. The Company has been particularly hard hit by these adverse market conditions. The outsized impact on the Company’s Maritime Business and Energy Business customers has manifested in a dramatic reduction in cash receipts. This macroeconomic downturn, along with the above-mentioned headwinds that contributed to the lower than expected FY19 financial results, made clear that the Company would not satisfy the Net Leverage Covenant under the Credit Agreement.

Right. The debt. $689.1mm of it, to be exact (exclusive of financing arrangements) — of which approximately $590mm is a term loan. With a capital structure this simple, one would think that this is a case that is ripe for a prearranged deal memorialized via a pre-petition restructuring support agreement. But no. There isn’t one here. Why not?

The term lenders argue that the debtors engaged them too late in the game. Therefore, there wasn’t enough time to conduct due diligence on the business, they say. Surely quarantine ain’t helping matters on that front. Nor is the fact that the company is international in nature.

And so this is a traditional freefall balance sheet and operational restructuring — something you don’t really see much of anymore. This case looks headed towards either a sale — which we’re guessing is the term lenders preferred outcome (par plus accrued baby!) — or a plan that would equitize the term lenders and put the go-forward financing needs of the debtors on the shoulders of the term lenders. A plan would preserve the debtors’ net operating losses which, as noted above, could be meaningful.

The debtors and the ad hoc lenders did nail down a commitment for a multiple-draw super-priority senior secured term loan DIP which includes a $90mm new money portion ($35mm on an interim basis) and a $90mm roll-up ($35mm on an interim basis). Judge Isgur took some exception to the interim roll-up portion of the proposed facility but the debtors and the lenders were hand-in-hand saying that — particularly under the circumstances today — the interim roll-up was necessary and appropriate because the lenders need a “big incentive” to lend and “the lenders’ capital providers are getting squeezed themselves.” 🤔 (PETITION Note: The DIP market sounds vicious — though some of that, here, is attributable to the nature of the assets. Delta Airlines can place senior secured notes right now at around 7% because, well … duh … planes!). Judge Isgur did caution however that he wants no part of professionals throwing this interim roll-up in his face as precedent in an upcoming case (Um, we’ll see how that plays out…this financing environment ain’t exactly reversing overnight). While the ad hoc lenders are clearly in pole position for the DIP commitment, they’re syndicating the loan now (which would obviously affect the roll-up too). The DIP will push the professionals towards a path forward over the next couple of weeks and the hope is for a result to be consummated within six months.

Interestingly, the largest single unsecured creditor is an entity that suffers from its own issues and has reportedly hired bankruptcy professionals for advice: Intelsat SA is owed $44mm. In late March, Intelsat terminated their contract with the debtors in a pretty savage leverage play. We talk about leverage a lot in PETITION. There’s balance sheet leverage and then there is situational leverage. Intelsat flexed its muscles and exercised the latter. In exchange it got critical vendor designation, acknowledgement of the full amount of their pre-petition claim and mutual releases. Significantly, the debtors stressed the importance of the relationship, noting that the IT services were needed more than ever as vessels sail adjusted routes due to COVID (read: boats are circling around because governments won’t let passengers disembark).

We should know within a few weeks what a deal may look like here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $87.7mm RCF, $591.4mm Term Loan, $10.6mm LOC

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Alfredo Perez, David Griffiths, Brenda Funk, Martha Martir, Kelly DiBlasi, Stephanie Morrison, Paul Genender, Amanda Pennington Prugh, Jake Rutherford) & Herbert Smith Freehills LLP

    • Independent Director: Stephe Wilks, Grant Scott Ferguson, Michael Martin Malone, Peter Jackson, Carol Flaton, David Mack)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Healy)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company Co. (Paul Rathborne, Adam Waldman)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders

      • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, David Schiff, Jonah Peppiatt, Jarret Erickson) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • DIP Agent: Credit Suisse AG

      • Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Steven Messina, George Howard, Albert Hogan III, David Wagener)

    • Large Creditor: Intelsat SA

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Steven Serajeddini, Anthony Grossi) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Large Creditor: Inmarsat Global Limited

      • Legal: Steptoe & Johnson LLP (Michael Dockterman) & Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Bob Bruner)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (S. Lee Whitesell, John Beck, David Simonds, Ron Silverman, Michael Hefter) & Husch Blackwell LLP (Randall Rios, Timothy Million)

🚗New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Pace Industries LLC🚗

Pace Industries LLC

April 12, 2020

Arkansas-based Pace Industries LLC and ten affiliates (the “debtors”) — fully-integrated suppliers and manufacturers of aluminum, zinc, and magnesium die cast and finished products in service of several industries (auto, powersports, lawn & garden, lighting & electric, appliances & industrial motors etc.) — filed fully-accepted prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware over the holiday weekend. The plan features one impaired class which voted 100% to equitize pre-petition debt.

A quick digression before we delve into what happened here. COVID-19 provides the ultimate cover for any and all businesses that file for chapter 11 over the next several months. You’re going to see all kinds of companies “clean out the junk” over earnings reports. It will be important, therefore, to parse through company messaging to determine whether they’re just massaging matters or whether, on the other hand, there were fundamental problems confronting the business prior to COVID-19 rearing its ugly head and shutting down the US economy. Where a company discloses that problems existed prior to March, there is absolutely no reason NOT to believe them. So it’s important that the collective we — newsletters writers, journalists, the twitterverse — get things right when talking about the carnage created by COVID-19.

And this case is only partially a COVID-19 story. Given the rush to sensationalize headlines and tweets, this is something we now feel compelled to note with each new bankruptcy filing. While the debtors, like everyone else, have been affected by the virus, it was not the catalyst to the debtors’ filing. The debtors have been seeking new capital sources since the summer of 2018; they initially sought an equity investment but when that couldn’t get done, the debtors shifted towards a sale and marketing process. Any and all initial interest in the debtors’ assets dissipated, however, when the debtors suffered from a poor Q4 ‘19. Interestingly, the disappointing performance was attributable to lower demand in the lighting, BBQ grill and appliance markets. To make matters worse, General Motors Inc’s ($GM) employees went on strike further compressing decreasing automobile production volumes. Moreover, the company self-inflicted some wounds: production inefficiencies relating to new products also hurt performance. Bankruptcy lawyers and advisors were hired in January — long before COVID stormed through and complicated matters further.

The debtors solicited their plan prior to their filing making this a true prepackaged plan. In other words, old school. None of this new solicitation technology; no straddle stuff. The only impaired class, the pre-petition noteholders, voted to accept the plan pursuant to which they would swap $232.1mm in notes for (i) equity in a reorganized LLC (subject to dilution from a management incentive plan AND warrants issued to the debtors’ post-petition DIP term loan lenders) and (ii) take-back term loan paper. This means the new owners will be TCW and Cerberus.

The cases feature a roll-up DIP ABL (which will ultimately be refi’d out through an exit facility) and a post-petition DIP term loan that will be refi’d out via a new term loan exit facility. The aforementioned warrants could amount to 51% of the new post-reorg equity.

This should be a quick case. The DIP terminates in 90 days from the petition date. Given that acceptance was 100% and that general unsecured creditors will be paid in full, this case should, absent other crazy externalities, be in and out of bankruptcy relatively quickly.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $92.1mm ABL, $232.1mm pre-petition notes

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Rachel Strickland, Debra Sinclair, Melany Cruz Burgos) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Edmon Morton, Joseph Mulvihill)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Patrick Flynn, Johnathan Miller)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Revolver Agent ($125mm): Bank of Montreal

      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Wade Kennedy, Alexandra Shipley, Brian Swett) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

    • DIP Term Agent ($50mm): TCW Asset Management Company LLC

      • Legal: Schule Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Kelly Knight) & Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis)

🎢New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - TZEW Holdco LLC (a/k/a Apex Parks Group LLC)🎢

Apex Parks Group LLC

April 8, 2020

California-based TZEW Holdco LLC and six affiliates (including Apex Parks Group LLC, the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. The debtors are Carlyle-owned family entertainment centers located in California, Florida and New Jersey. Here’s what the debtors’ website says about their business prospects:

According to a 2011 International Association of Amusement Parks survey, 25% of Americans surveyed visited an amusement park within the last 12 months, with 43 percent of Americans indicating they plan to visit in the next 12 months. Consumers have a desire to get out of the house for fun, but want their entertainment dollars to represent a good value for the entire family. In America, people visit amusement parks nearly 300 million times each year and generate more than $12 billion in revenue.

Eesh. That’s a tough read these days. 😬😷

The purpose of the filing is to eliminate debt and sell the business to their pre-petition secured lenders. Troubles have been brewing here since 2019: indeed, the debtors have been “perpetually distressed.” Per the debtors:

The Company suffered from a number of challenges leading to these chapter 11 cases, including, among others, increased industry competition and consolidation, heavy operational expenditure requirements, the seasonal nature of the business, general litigation, and irregular management turnover. In the years and months leading up to the Petition Date, the Company initiated multiple go-forward operational initiatives to increase profitability, such as implementing strategic pricing and season pass sales, redesigning food and beverage offerings, optimizing operating calendars, and generally investing in the maintenance and improvement of its locations. Despite these efforts, the Company continued to experience negative cash flows and, ultimately, an unsustainable balance sheet. In the months leading up to the Petition Date, the Company faced rapidly dwindling liquidity and, in order to maintain day-to-day operations, needed to increasingly rely on discretionary disbursements under its prepetition financing agreement.

The Disney Effect!!

Indeed, the debtors blame Disney Inc. ($DIS) and Six Flags Entertainment Corporation ($SIX) for being bigger, better, and deep-pocketed. Well, and having much better IP. Anyone looking for a bullish reason to buy DIS stock — assuming COVID-19 is a short-term issue — can see here, in the words of a competitor, why DIS’ IP strategy over the years has been solid. Per the debtors:

For example, estimates suggest that Universal Studio Orlando's first Harry Potter attraction boosted attendance by 50% over the attraction's first three years. Similarly, Disney has recently constructed Star Wars themed attractions at Walt Disney World it Orlando, Florida and Disneyland in Anaheim, California, as part of a $2 billion investment Disney has made in its theme parks. This industry competition and consolidation by major corporations in recent years has been a key driver in a string of closures of small and middle market theme parks across the country.

The debtors were in the midst of parallel-tracking their marketing process while also talking to their lenders about additional sources of liquidity. COVID-19 didn’t help matters. The debtors shut down their parks and now that people are Amazon Priming their cotton candy, the revenue spigot is off.

As you well know, interest payments are, absent waivers/forbearance from lenders, still due. The debtors owe $79mm to lender, Cerberus Business Finance LLC. An affiliate thereof will serve as stalking horse purchaser of the debtors’ assets with an eye towards the EBITDA-rich June-September period — assuming people are allowed out and are willing to go to amusement parks by then. Cerberus is also providing the DIP. In other words, Cerberus is driving the bus here. The DIP commitment requires a sale hearing no later than May 11, 2020.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure: $79mm (Cerberus Business Finance LLC)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, David Bertenthal, Timothy Cairns)

    • Independent Directors: Michael Short, Jeffrey Dane

    • Financial Advisor: Paladin Management Group LLC (Scott Avila, Jennifer Mercer)

    • Investment Banker: Imperial Capital

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Administrative Agent: Cerberus Business Finance LLC

      • Legal: KTBS Law LLP (Michael Tuchin, David Fidler, Jonathan Weiss, Sasha Gurvitz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Robert Poppitti Jr.)

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: APX Acquisition Company LLC

    • Largest Equityholders: Benefit Street Partners & Edgewater Growth Capital Partners

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Valeritas Holdings Inc. $VLRX

Valeritas Holdings Inc.

February 9, 2020

After a particularly active year in 2019 for both biopharma and biotech, we were wondering when 2020 might usher in its first case in the category. Now we have it.

New Jersey-based Valeritas Holdings Inc. ($VLRX) and three affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a sale of its Chinese-manufactured insulin delivery device (V-Go) and associates assets to Zealand Pharma A/S ($ZEAL) for $23mm in cash plus the assumption of certain liabilities.

On the surface, there’s not much new here: most of these biotech cases follow the same pattern. The debtors get to a certain stage of development and then run out of cash and try to find a strategic partner. That’s what happened here. Except the debtors also ran into a manufacturing issue. Consequently, they had to halt product delivery and take time to identify and solve for the issue, suffering a $3.5mm inventory write-off in the process. All of this scared away any potential buyers.

This is where the coronavirus comes in. Per the company:

Notwithstanding the Company’s quick response to address the manufacturing yield issue, it could not resurrect the Out of Court Process. Moreover, the yield issue unfortunately coincided with certain external factors impacting production. The CMO and the Company’s other manufacturers and suppliers in China are closed for the Lunar New Year (Chinese New Year) celebrations, which took place this year between January 27, 2020 through February 3, 2020, which was extended through February 9, 2020 by the Chinese government due to the coronavirus epidemic in China.

There’s more:

Additionally, many Chinese businesses, including the Company’s CMO, employ rural workers and, as a result, may experience production capability issues due to the uncertainty surrounding when these rural employees will return to work. All of the foregoing unanticipated delays further strained the Company’s balance sheet and truncated its financial runway, although, due to careful planning, it generally has not impacted the Company’s ability to make V-Go® available to the majority of patients to date. Specifically, these delays have impacted new production, retesting of existing V-Go® kits, and the packaging and shipping of finished goods to the United States.

Oooof. Talk about bad timing. Query whether this depressed the purchase price. 🤔

So, there you have it folks: our first coronavirus mention in US-based bankruptcy papers. We reckon it won’t be the last.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $20mm Term Loan (Capital Royalty Group)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: DLA Piper LLP (Rachel Albanese, Maris Kandestin)

    • Financial Advisor: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

    • Investment Banker: Lincoln International Inc.

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: HB Fund LLC

    • Senior Secured Lender: Capital Royalty Group

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: Zealand Pharma A/S

🍔New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - The Krystal Company🍔

The Krystal Company

January 19, 2020

Georgia-based quick-service restaurant chain, The Krystal Company, which features cheap — some might say “iconic” (read: the company = “some”) — square burgers among other horrendous-for-your-health fare (eggnog shakes, anyone?), filed for bankruptcy in the Northern District of Georgia over the holiday weekend. We’re guessing that most of you snobby coastal elites have likely never heard of Krystal and, well, neither had we to be honest. To our surprise, Krystal is purportedly “the oldest quick-service restaurant chain in the South and the second oldest in the United States, the Krystal brand has a prominent place in the South’s cultural landscape.” You learn something new every day.

The chain operates 182 restaurant locations across nine states; it has approximately 4900 employees; it doesn’t own its real estate; it does have 116 franchisees. It also has over $65mm in debt.

Why the bankruptcy? PETITION readers are very familiar with the trends afflicting quick service restaurants. A number have stumbled into bankruptcy in recent years. To point, the company’s Chief Restructuring Officer also recently worked with Kona Grill and Ignite Restaurant Group. There are plenty of distressed restaurant chains to keep the fee meter running, it seems.

So, what are these trends?

  • Shifting consumers tastes and preferences (PETITION Note: people are becoming more health-conscious and a slab of previously-frozen meat stacked between a gnarled bun, diced onions, a pickle and some stadium mustard don’t really pass muster anymore). ✅

  • Fast casual and online delivery are crushing quick service chains (PETITION Note: we’re going to have to start referring to “The Chipotle Effect”). ✅

  • It is increasingly hard to find and retain qualified employees in the current labor market, as turnover exceeds 200% (PETITION Note: #MAGA!!). ✅

  • Commodity costs are rising (PETITION Note: but there’s virtually no inflation folks). ✅

  • Unfavorable lease terms. ✅

Facing all of this, the company did what struggling companies tend to do: they hired an expensive consultant. Boston Consulting Group came in and to advise the company with respect to “competitive positioning” and this led to a capital intensive rebuilding project of nine of its locations. Yes, they completely demolished and rebuilt nine locations in ‘18 and ‘19. Ultimately, this led to increased sales at those locations but it clearly couldn’t course correct the entire enterprise.

Consequently, the company breached a financial covenant in Q4 ‘18. It obtained an equity infusion which stopped the bleeding…for like a hot second. The company then defaulted under its credit agreement because it couldn’t obtain a “going concern” qualification for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2018. It has been in forbearance since October. Meanwhile, it has been shedding costs: people have been fired and stores have been closed.

About those stores. The average occupancy cost of the company’s locations is $482k/month. Because of this, the company regularly reviews profitability and recently has turned several of its stores “dark” by ceasing all business there. On day one of its chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, the company filed a motion seeking to reject (i) these “dark” leases (38 of them) as well as (ii) several other locations that franchisees operate under subleases that are not profitable (40 total locations).

So, what now? The papers don’t really say much. Oddly enough, the first day declaration ends with some information about a payment processing data breach and says nothing about DIP financing (there isn’t any) or the direction of the case. In a press release, however, the company says that it intends to use the bankruptcy process to pursue “an orderly sale of its business and assets as a going concern.” Now, in the past, we’ve certainly made fun of debtors who have used their first day papers as de facto marketing materials. Not because it’s stupid: it’s rather smart. It was just also rather blatant and shamelessly spinful. Here, though, Krystal doesn’t even mention anything about a marketing process in its papers or, for that matter, a banker (which happens to be the newly merged Piper Sandler).

These guys are off to a rockin start.

*****

Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC), the agent under the company’s secured loan, agrees. It filed an objection to the company’s motion seeking authorization to use cash collateral. They wrote:

As the Debtors’ largest stakeholder, the Agent is extremely concerned with the manner in which the Debtors are positioning these cases. The Debtors have yet to file their budget for either the interim period until the second interim hearing or a longer-term budget, but based on the draft budgets that were provided to the Agent prior to filing, it appears that operating on cash collateral alone will not provide the Debtors with sufficient liquidity to make it through a sale process and affords almost no margin for error. The Bankruptcy Code does not permit the Debtors to avoid their obligation to provide adequate protection to the Prepetition Secured Parties on the basis that the Debtors elected a budget that will not permit it. Were the Debtors to run out of cash during the sale process, as they are likely to do, the attendant disruption could jeopardize the entire going concern value of the business and the sale process.

Nothing like a contested cash collateral hearing to get things off on the right foot.

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Georgia (Judge Hagenau)

  • Capital Structure: $10mm RCF, $54.1mm Term Loan (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $1.5mm promissory note (KRY LLC).

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Leia Clement Shermohammed)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jonathan Tibus)

    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffray & Co. (aka Piper Sandler)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Jennifer Feldshur, Charlie Liu) & Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs LLP (C. Edward Dobbs, Rufus Dorsey, Michael Sullivan)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Bayou Steel BD Holdings LLC

Bayou Steel BD Holdings LLC

October 1, 2019

It’s all of the rage these days to rail on private equity. Elizabeth Warren is all over the industry these days and we, too, have been very critical of PE-backed shenanigans (mostly dividend recaps) that ultimately help destroy companies. The truth is, however, that there are two sides to that coin. Private equity can be a critical source of liquidity to businesses that might not otherwise get it.

And so this means that private equity is often in places you wouldn’t suspect. As just one example, we’ve previously noted, in our usually snarky way, how your Nana’s post-acute care may be powered by private equity. Here is another example: Bayou Steel BD Holdings LLC. Bayou Steel is a mini-mill with electric arc furnace steelmaking, continuous billet casting, and a medium section rolling mill; it also operates a bar product rolling mill. Its facilities are in Tennesee and Louisiana; it also has distribution depots in Oklahoma, Illinois and Pennsylvania. Since 2016, nearly 13 years after a previous foray in bankruptcy court, the company has been owned by Black Diamond Capital Management. Three years later, it and two affiliated companies are chapter 11 debtors: they filed for bankruptcy earlier this week in the District of Delaware.

The debtors’ bankruptcy papers are not as fulsome as we’re accustomed to. They don’t provide an extensive history of the company; they don’t offer a sweeping synopsis of the events that led to the chapter 11 filings; they don’t mention any sort of sordid mismanagement by their private equity sponsor; they don’t serve as de facto marketing materials for any prospective buyer. To that last point, there’s no mention whatsoever of any banker marketing the assets at all. There’s also no DIP credit facility: the company intends to function in bankruptcy using Bank of America NA ($BAC) and SunTrust Bank’s ($STI) cash collateral. To what end? To liquidate its inventory and assets.

They do mention, however, that the company “suffered under its debt load” which, ultimately, created “severe liquidity issues” and “eventually default” under its asset-backed loan facility (“ABL”). The company has $41.25mm outstanding under the ABL and another $36.5mm outstanding, mostly on a second lien basis, under a term loan with Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLC.* Per the company:

Left with no liquidity, and little hope of turnaround, the Company determined not to purchase any further raw materials and, as it has done in the ordinary course of business in the past when faced with excess inventory or liquidity concerns, the Company began selling off its finished goods inventory in order to pay down its secured debt.

They also sh*tcanned an overwhelming majority of their employees — all of whom were in “complete shock.”

Governor John Bel Edwards (D) — who is set to experience a tough primary in mid-October — chimed in with a statement:

“The Louisiana Workforce Commission is working with the company, the parish president and elected officials to assist those employees who are directly impacted by today’s news,” said Gov. Edwards. “While Bayou Steel has not given any specific reason for the closure, we know that this company, which uses recycled scrap metal that is largely imported, is particularly vulnerable to tariffs. Louisiana is among the most dependent states on tariffed metals, which is why we continue to be hopeful for a speedy resolution to the uncertainty of the future of tariffs. Meanwhile, we will do everything within our power to help those displaced workers.”

Curious. Indeed, the company did give a specific reason for the closure: its debt. Is it possible that tariffs played a role? Sure, that wouldn’t surprise us. But the company did not expressly state that (in its papers at least).

But since we’re on the topic of tariffs, let’s go there. In early September, in “💥PG&E. Sugarfina. uBiome. PetroSmart.💥,” we wrote the following:

Retail (Long Leverage & BSDs). Oh man. Target Inc. ($TGT) ain’t trifling. Choice bit:

“Target has communicated to its suppliers the retailer will not be raising prices for consumers nor accepting higher prices from suppliers as a result of existing and forthcoming tariffs on imported Chinese goods. 

‘Our expectation is that you will develop the appropriate contingency plans so that we don’t have to pass price increases along to our guests,’ wrote Target Executive Vice President and Chief Merchandising Officer Mark Tritton in a memo, according to multiple outlets.”

Savage. Can’t wait to see “the Target Effect” mentioned in future First Day Declarations.

We were highlighting Target, specifically, but we were also foreshadowing something we expected to see, generally, over coming months: that is, US trade policy affecting domestic companies and, at least in part, causing chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. Is it happening?

In mid-September, the Barber Steel Foundry in Rothbury Michigan announced that it would close at the end of the year. 61 people will have a rough holiday season. This followed a July announcement that NLMK Pennsylvania, would layoff 80 workers and slow production. Even big time U.S. Steel Corp. ($X) announced that it would shut down two furnaces at its flagship plant in Indiana. Professor Mark Perry, writing for the conservative American Enterprise Institute blog, noted the following:

Measured by the loss of stock market capitalization since March 2018, the steel tariffs have contributed to the following losses: the stock market value of Nucor has declined by $5.2 billion, US Steel by $5.5 billion and Steel Dynamics by $3.7 billion, for a combined loss of stock market capitalization for the three steel companies of $14.4 billion.

Regardless of whether Governor Edwards’ claims are correct in this specific case, there is zero doubt that tariffs will continue to reverberate throughout the business community and help spark bankruptcy filings.

*The second lien term lenders have a first lien on the company’s real estate. They may be a critical element to this case.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $41.25mm ABL Credit Facility (Bank of America NA, SunTrust Bank), $36.5mm Term Loan (Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLC — first lien on real estate)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Shanti Katona, Stephen Astringer)

    • Financial Advisor: Candlewood Partners LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Bradley Foxman) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins)

    • Secured Lender: Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLC

🎓New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - The College of New Rochelle🎓

The College of New Rochelle

September 20, 2019

Non-profit The College of New Rochelle filed for bankruptcy, an unfortunate step for a school founded in 1898 and meant to serve underprivileged and first-generational college students. Sadly, the school’s problems stem from a rogue Controller who (i) failed to pay payroll taxes over a two year period, (ii) misappropriated government grant money, (iii) used endowment funds in an unauthorized manner, (iv) stiffed creditors with all kinds of schemes, and (v) concealed the true nature of the school’s financial condition by, among other things, misrepresenting financial health and issuing false financial statements. Ouch.

While Mr. Incompetent Controller pled guilty to fraud and failure to pay payroll taxes, that, unfortunately, does not cure the financial situation for the school, which finds itself “with over $31 million in previously undisclosed debts.” As for the Controller, he was sentenced to three years in federal prison, a $25k fine, and ordered to pay restitution of no less than $13.2mm — which there isn’t a chance in hell he’ll be able to do.

As if this isn’t horrible enough already, the school’s endowment is too small and the school’s enrollment revenue is too inadequate to address this massive liability. Consequently, the school is now forced to wind-down to pay off its debts. As a practical matter, what does this mean? Well, first, the school had to figure out a solution for its students. It did so via a “teach-out agreement” with a neighboring school, pursuant to which the students were able to continue their education and secure credit. Second, the school owns its real estate and has hired a real estate broker to pursue sales thereof. Those sales will go a long way towards paying the past due taxes owed and secured debt. The company has a commitment for a $4mm DIP credit facility to fund the cases.

What a sad social commentary: one dude’s malfeasance tore down 100+ years of history. Tragic.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $31.9mm secured loan (Citizens Bank/DASNY), $2mm secured loan (Carney Family Charitable Foundation), ~$2.4mm secured loan (Key Bank NA), ~$14mm bond debt (Industrial Bonds, UMB Bank NA, trustee)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Cullen and Dykman LLP (Matthew Roseman, Bonnie Pollack, Elizabeth Aboulafia, Sophia Hepheastou)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Getzler Henrich & Associates LLC (Herbert Weil, Mark Podgainy)

    • Real Estate Broker: A&G Realty Partners LLC/B6

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Key Bank NA

      • Legal: Nolan Heller Kauffman LLP (Francis Berman)

    • DIP Lender ($4mm): Summit Investment Management LLC

      • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, David Posner, Paul Rosenblatt)

🥒New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - NORPAC Foods Inc.🥒

NORPAC Foods Inc.

August 22, 2019

Oregon-based NORPAC Foods Inc, a cooperative owned by over 140 members and the “largest processor” of frozen vegetables and fruits in the Pacific Northwest, filed for bankruptcy earlier this week (along with two affiliates) with a plan to effectuate a $149.5mm asset sale to stalking horse, Oregon Potato Company.* The sale price clears the first lien debt by over $25mm (subject to the adjustments), leaving potential recoveries for unsecured creditors. SierraConstellation Partners LLC is quarterbacking the sale effort for the debtors.

The debtors have lined up a $102.5mm DIP credit facility commitment from pre-petition secured lender, CoBank ACB, which will constitute a roll-up of $87.5mm of pre-petition revolving commitments and provide $15mm of incremental new liquidity to fund the cases and help fund the sale process in-court.

On the asset side, the debtors claim to have had over $310mm in sales for each of the last three years. The debtors own and operate two raw processing plants in Oregon, another in Washington, and a packaging plant in Oregon. Each plant has cold storage facilities. They have a customer base of over 1,250 buyers worldwide, powered by a supply chain of over 220 contract growers spanning more than 40k acres.

On the liability side, the debtors employ over 2000 people and are one of the largest unionized agricultural employers in Oregon, with approximately 2,000 union members; they are party to four pension plans, one as a single-employer sponsor and three multi-employer plans. They also owe their top 20 unsecured creditors in excess of $10mm. While, again, the debtors state that they’ve done over $300mm in sales over each of the last three years, they were nevertheless “in default in the performance of their obligations under the Credit Agreement” and have been operating under a series of forbearance agreements for months. And clearly CoBank has no interest in owning this company. Therefore, the debtors have been in a state of marketing since May of 2018.

Pursuant to the proposed DIP, the debtors hope to have consummated the sale prior to the end of October.

While the bankruptcy papers do not blame tariffs for the filing, one cannot help but wonder whether the bankruptcy dockets will soon be replete with ag-based debtors given the intensifying trade war. Per The Hill:

The National Farmers Union (NFU) on Friday hammered President Trump over his escalating trade war with China, saying he is “making things worse.”

“[I]nstead of looking to solve existing problems in our agricultural sector, this administration has just created new ones. Between burning bridges with all of our biggest trading partners and undermining our domestic biofuels industry, President Trump is making things worse, not better.”

Oy. The bright side? What may be a tsunami for growers may be a boon for West Coast restructuring advisors like SierraConstellation.

*The purchase price is subject to adjustments on account of the value of accounts receivable, the value of inventory, less the amount due to growers at the closing of the 2019 crop.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Oregon (Judge McKittrick)

  • Capital Structure: $124mm credit facility (CoBank ACB)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Tonkon Torp LLP (Albert Kennedy, Timothy Conway, Michael Fletcher, Ava Schoen)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: SierraConstellation Partners LLC (Winston Mar)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition & DIP Lender: CoBank ACB

      • Legal: Faegre Baker Daniels LLP (Michael Stewart, Dennis Ryan) & MIller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP (Teresa Pearson)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Legacy Reserves Inc.⛽️

Legacy Reserves Inc.

June 18, 2019

Even at 95 years old, you can’t get one past Charlie Munger. #Legend.

The Permian Basin in West Texas is where it’s at in the world of oil and gas exploration and production. Per Wikipedia:

As of 2018, the Permian Basin has produced more than 33 billion barrels of oil, along with 118 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This production accounts for 20% of US crude oil production and 7% of US dry natural gas production. While the production was thought to have peaked in the early 1970s, new technologies for oil extraction, such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have increased production dramatically. Estimates from the Energy Information Administration have predicted that proven reserves in the Permian Basin still hold 5 billion barrels of oil and approximately 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

oil gushing.gif

And it may be even more prolific than originally thought. Norwegian research firm Rystad Energy recently issued a report indicating that Permian projected output was already above 4.5mm barrels a day in May with volumes exceeding 5mm barrels in June. This staggering level of production is pushing total U.S. oil production to approximately 12.5mm barrels per day in May. That means the Permian now accounts for 36% of US crude oil production — a significant increase over 2018. Normalized across 365 days, that would be a 1.64 billion barrel run rate. This is despite (a) rigs coming offline in the Permian and (b) natural gas flaring and venting reaching all-time highs in Q1 ‘19 due to a lack of pipelines. Come again? That’s right. The Permian is producing in quantities larger than pipelines can accommodate. Per Reuters:

Producers burned or vented 661 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd) in the Permian Basin of West Texas and eastern New Mexico, the field that has driven the U.S. to record oil production, according to a new report from Rystad Energy.

The Permian’s first-quarter flaring and venting level more than doubles the production of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico’s most productive gas facility, Royal Dutch Shell’s Mars-Ursa complex, which produces about 260 to 270 mmcfd of gas.

The Permian isn’t alone in this, however. The Bakken shale field in North Dakota is also flaring at a high level. More from Reuters:

Together, the two oil fields on a yearly basis are burning and venting more than the gas demand in countries that include Hungary, Israel, Azerbaijan, Colombia and Romania, according to the report.

All of which brings us to Legacy Reserves Inc. ($LGCY). Despite the midstream challenges, one could be forgiven for thinking that any operators engaged in E&P in the Permian might be insulated from commodity price declines and other macro headwinds. That position, however, would be wrong.

Legacy is a publicly-traded energy company engaged in the acquisition, development, production of oil and nat gas properties; its primary operations are in the Permian Basin (its largest operating region, historically), East Texas, and in the Rocky Mountain and Mid-Continent regions. While some of these basins may produce gobs of oil and gas, acquisition and production is nevertheless a HIGHLY capital intensive endeavor. And, here, like with many other E&P companies that have recently made their way into the bankruptcy bin, “significant capital” translates to “significant debt.”

Per the Company:

Like similar companies in this industry, the Company’s oil and natural gas operations, including their exploration, drilling, and production operations, are capital-intensive activities that require access to significant amounts of capital.  An oil price environment that has not recovered from the downturn seen in mid-2014 and the Company’s limited access to new capital have adversely affected the Company’s business. The Company further had liquidity constraints through borrowing base redeterminations under the Prepetition RBL Credit Agreement, as well as an inability to refinance or extend the maturity of the Prepetition RBL Credit Agreement beyond May 31, 2019.

This is the company’s capital structure:

Legacy Cap Stack.png

The company made two acquisitions in mid-2015 costing over $540mm. These acquisitions proved to be ill-timed given the longer-than-expected downturn in oil and gas. Per the Company:

In hindsight, despite the GP Board’s and management’s favorable view of the potential future opportunities afforded by these acquisitions and the high-caliber employees hired by the Company in connection therewith, these two acquisitions consumed disproportionately large amounts of the Company’s liquidity during a difficult industry period.

WHOOPS. It’s a good thing there were no public investors in this thing who were in it for the high yield and favorable tax treatment.*

Yet, the company was able to avoid a prior bankruptcy when various other E&P companies were falling like flies. Why was that? Insert the “drillco” structure here: the company entered into a development agreement with private equity firm TPG Special Situations Partners to drill, baby, drill (as opposed to acquire). What’s a drillco structure? Quite simply, the PE firm provided capital in return for a wellbore interest in the wells that it capitalized. Once TPG clears a specified IRR in relation to any specific well, any remaining proceeds revert to the operator. This structure — along with efforts to delever through out of court exchanges of debt — provided the company with much-needed runway during a rough macro patch.

It didn’t last, however. Liquidity continued to be a pervasive problem and it became abundantly clear that the company required a holistic solution to its balance sheet. That’s what this filing will achieve: this chapter 11 case is a financial restructuring backed by a Restructuring Support Agreement agreed to by nearly the entirety of the capital structure — down through the unsecured notes. Per the Company:

The Global RSA contemplates $256.3 million in backstopped equity commitments, $500.0 million in committed exit financing from the existing RBL Lenders, the equitization of approximately $815.8 million of prepetition debt, and payment in full of the Debtors’ general unsecured creditors.

Said another way, the Permian holds far too much promise for parties in interest to walk away from it without maintaining optionality for the future.

*Investors got burned multiple times along the way here. How did management do? Here is one view (view thread: it’s precious):

😬

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Duston McFaul, Charles Persons, Michael Fishel, Maegan Quejada, James Conlan, Bojan Guzina, Andrew O’Neill, Allison Ross Stromberg)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Seth Bullock, Mark Rajcevich)

    • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners (Kevin Cofsky)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Wilmington Trust NA, Dalton Investments LLC, Paul Drueke, John Dinkel, Nicholas Mumford)

    • GSO Capital Partners LP

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Adam Goldberg, Christopher Harris, Zachary Proulx, Brett Neve, Julian Bulaon) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson)

    • DIP Lender: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Orrick LLP (Raniero D’Aversa, Laura Metzger)

    • Prepetition Term Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Gerardo Mijares-Shafai, Seth Kleinman)

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Pryor Cashman (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Andrew Richmond)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Noteholders (Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, DoubleLine Income Solutions Fund, J.H. Lane Partners Master Fund LP, JCG 2016 Holdings LP, The John C. Goff 2010 Family Trust, John C. Goff SEP-IRA, Cuerno Largo Partners LP, MGA insurance Company Inc., Pingora Partners LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Stephen Piraino, Michael Pera) & (local) Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores)

Updated 7/7/19 #188

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - White Star Petroleum Holdings LLC⛽️

White Star Petroleum Holdings LLC

May 28, 2019

Hey look. It’s Tuesday. It must be time for another oil and gas bankruptcy filing! White Star Petroleum Holdings LLC is the latest oil and gas company to make an oh-so-2015-like appearance in bankruptcy court. No need to knock your skull or check your watch: yes, it is very much 2019.*

The company, formerly known as American Energy — Woodford LLC, was originally formed in 2013 by American Energy Partners LP, a shared services platform founded by Aubrey McClendon, the eccentric wildcatter who plowed his life (literally) and billions of dollars of cash into the exploration and production business. In 2014, The Energy & Minerals Group LP (“EMG”) and other investors cut an equity check and, in this case, it didn’t take Mr. McClendon as long as usual to fail: by 2016, the company and its businesses were separated from American Energy to become White Star, a standalone company independent of the American Energy platform. Of course, in typical McClendon fashion, the company sprayed and prayed for a while prior to the transition, gobbling up Mississippian Lime and Woodford Shale assets along the way.

Which is not to say that, post separation/transition, the company just sat on its hands. In 2016 and thereafter, the company extended its shopping spree. First it acquired additional Mississippian Lime and Woodford Shale assets from Devon Production Company LP for approximately $200mm (funded in part by equity from ESG and borrowings under the company’s revolving credit facility). Then it acquired Lighthouse Oil and Gas LP (which was 49.4% minority owned by EMG, but whatevs) through a combination of equity and more borrowings under the credit facility. Finally, the company expanded its portfolio into the Sooner Trend Anadarko Canadian Kingfisher area with borrowings under its credit facility. If you’ve been paying attention, yes, E&P is a capital intensive business: there’s a reason why so many of these companies are levered up the wazoo.

What did that capital buy? “As of December 31, 2018, the Debtors had proved reserves of approximately 84.4 million barrels of oil equivalent (“boe”) across approximately 315,000 net leasehold acres….” But, to be sure, this is a company that focuses its exploration and production on “unconventional” resource plays. Said another way, it is a horizontal driller and hydraulic fracker: its assets tend to produce in high volume for two or so years and then tail off considerably requiring capital to acquire and develop a steady stream of new wells. Of course, an investment in new wells only works if the commodity environment permits it to. With oil and gas trading where it has been trading, well…suffice it to say…the environment is proving unaccommodating. Per the company:

“Despite controlling significant leasehold and mineral acreage in the MidContinent region, due to the declines in commodity prices in the fourth quarter of 2018 and the Debtors’ financial condition, the Debtors ceased drilling new wells in April 2019 and have not resumed such activities as of the Petition Date.”

Consequently, the company suffered a net loss of $114mm in 2018 after losing $14mm in 2017; it has negative working capital of $61mm as of 12/31/18 and $70mm as of the petition date. This sucker is burning cash.

The company’s capital structure looks as follows:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

The current capital structure is the result of clear triage undertaken by the company in the midst of a severe commodity downturn. WE CANNOT EMPHASIZE THIS ENOUGH: nearly every oil and gas exploration and production company under the sun was forced into some sort of balance sheet transaction around the 2015 time period — many in-court, others out-of-court in an attempt to stave off bankruptcy. Here, notably, the $10.3mm of unsecured notes represent the remnants of a distressed exchange that took place in 2015 whereby approximately $340mm of unsecured notes (with a 9% cash-pay interest coupon) were exchanged for approximately $348mm 12% second lien notes. Thereafter, in late 2015 and extending through August 2016, the company entered into a series of cash and equity transactions that took out the second lien notes in a cash-draining attempt to strengthen the balance sheet and extend liquidity (by way of reduced interest expense)**. The company was effectively playing whack-a-mole.

Alas, the company is in bankruptcy. That happens when your primary sources of capital are large equity checks, borrowings under a credit facility, and proceeds from producing oil and gas properties in a rough price environment. Of course, not all oil and gas properties are created equal either. This company happens to frack in challenging territory. Per the company:

Independent oil and gas companies, such as the Debtors, with Mississippian Lime-weighted assets in the Mid-Continent region have been particularly hard-hit by volatile market conditions in recent years and the majority of the Debtors’ peers in the region have filed for chapter 11 since 2015. This is in large part due to operational challenges unique to the region, including complex geological characteristics. One of these challenges is the Mississippian Lime’s relatively high ratio of “saltwater” to produced oil and gas. During the normal production of oil and gas, saltwater mixed with hydrocarbon byproducts comes to the surface, and its separation and disposal increases production costs. Low production volumes and higher than expected production costs, together with allegations that increased saltwater injection by the operators in the area caused increased seismic activity, resulted in many operators reducing activity and many capital providers discounting asset values in the region.

Recognizing the dire nature of the situation, the company’s RBL lenders effectuated a debilitating borrowing base redetermination that created a deficiency payment that the company simply couldn’t manage. This triggered a “potential” Event of Default under the facility. Thereafter, the company entered into an amendment with the RBL lenders with the hope of securing some capital to refinance the RBL. Spoiler alert: the company couldn’t get it done. The amendment also dictated that the company attempt to secure a buyer so as to repay the debt. To chapter 11 filing is meant to aid that marketing and sale process.*** To aid this process, the company has a commitment from MUFG Union Bank NA, its prepetition RBL Agent, for a DIP credit facility of $28.5mm as well as the use of cash collateral.

*We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight that in the “AlixPartners 14th Annual Turnaround & Restructuring Experts Survey” released in February 2019, oil and gas was listed as the second most likely sector to face distress, with 36% of respondents predicting it would be a hot and heavy sector (up from 31% the in 2018).

**The company also refinanced its RBL, sold midstream and non-strategic properties and adjusted midstream pipeline commitments.

***Some trigger happy creditors beat the company to the punch here. On May 24, five “purported” creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the company in the Western District of Oklahoma. Considering Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations Inc. ($GE) is among the top 5 largest creditors, we can’t say we’re that surprised.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, Alexa Kranzley) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnel LLP (Derek Abbott, Gregory Werkheiser, Tamara Mann, Joseph Barsalona)

    • Independent Director: Patrick Bartels Jr.

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Ed Mosley)

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • RBL Agent: MUFG Union Bank NA

      • Legal: Winston & Strawn LLP (Justin Rawlins)

    • TL Agent: EnLink Oklahoma Processing LP

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

😷New Chapter 11 Filing - Astria Health😷

Astria Health

May 6, 2019

Astria Health, a large non-profit healthcare system based in Eastern Washington, has filed for bankruptcy along with a dozen or so affiliates. The company blames its chapter 11 filing on regulatory approval processes that stunted expansion plans, poor collections on accounts receivable, and charitable care that, despite best efforts, hadn’t been offset by charitable contributions. All of these issues have squashed cash flow and triggered issues with the debtors’ secured debt, part of which is uber-expensive. The debtors intend to use their DIP credit facility to take out their expensive “high cost of capital” MidCap Financial Trust-provided (and other) debt; they also hope to use the “breathing spell” provided by the automatic stay to remedy their collections problems and march towards a plan of reorganization within 150 days.

  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Washington (Judge Kurtz)

  • Capital Structure: $72mm secured debt

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Dentons US LLP (Samuel Maziel) & (local) Bush Kornfeld LLP (James Day)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: JMB Financial Advisors

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Robert Hirsh, Jordana Renert) & (local) Southwell & O’Rourke (Kevin O’Rourke)