New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Avadim Health Inc.

North Carolina-based Avadim Health Inc. and four affiliates (together, the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware over the Memorial Day holiday. The “vertically integrated healthcare and wellness company” intends to “expeditiously complete a third-party sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets” to their pre-petition secured lenders (Hayfin Services LLP), who have agreed not only to serve as stalking horse purchaser but DIP lenders.

Historically, the debtors have sold topical products like pre-saturated towelettes, foaming, spray and other products B2B to acute care hospitals, nursing homes, and long-term care facilities. In 2016, nine years after their founding, the debtors expanded to B2C, unleashing their products in over 47k pharmacy locations and later adding its own website and an Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) presence to the mix. Between ‘17 and ‘19, the debtors’ annual net revenues popped from $10.8mm to $45.8mm.

On the liability side of the ledger, the debtors historically used debt, private placements of equity, convertible notes and revenues to fund ops. The capital structure includes:

• $79.6mm term loan;

• $22mm senior secured notes;

• $6.4mm 6% unsecured convertible notes; and

• $2.01mm 1% unsecured PPP loan due 4/22.

The company also owes $4.8mm pursuant to a settlement agreement tied to a patent dispute.

Remember those rising revenues? Yeah, well, that’s all fine and good unless it’s entirely offset by significant selling and marketing expenses and excess inventory build-up because not as many institutions want your product than you modeled out. This bit is brutal:

The Company’s sales related expenses resulted in limited free cash flow to fund other operating expenses, debt service, and investment in new products. In particular, the Company ramped up significant media/marketing expenditures and built up inventory in anticipation of its previously planned early 2020 IPO; however, that IPO never materialized.

Oh, wait, it gets worse:

Notwithstanding spending tens of millions of dollars over the past decade to build the Company’s brand, the Company has been unsuccessful in reaching profitability.

Ok, sorry, folks, but when we think of “brand” we think of LVMH, the parent company of luxury brands like Dior, Louis Vuitton, and Tiffany. In other words, a company with a market cap over 320b Euro which, earlier this month, made Bernard Arnault the richest person in the world (yes, over Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk). We DON’T think of “Theraworx Protect” (the debtors’ immune health line), Theraworx Protect U-Pak (the urinary health line) or Combat One (for soldier and first responder readiness). And we DEFINITELY don’t think of a company that lost $49.5mm $34.8mm and $53.6mm in ‘18, ‘19 and ‘20 respectively.

Apparently neither does the market. The IPO failed. Thereafter, the company initiated a strategic alternatives review that came up empty (with marketing taking place from March ‘20 through October ‘20 … poor timing). This is when the army of restructuring pros got involved, including independent directors on a “Restructuring Committee,” a CRO and some bankers for good measure. All roads, however, led back to the pre-petition secured lenders owed more than $102mm in principal amounts under the term loan and the secured notes. Apparently nobody else wanted to hop aboard a ship that (a) “[o]ver the past few years … [has] been perpetually distressed, constantly facing liquidity crunches and incurring defaults under the [term loan]” and (b) had to enter into “seven amendments to their [term loan] since June 2019, increasing the principal amount available to the Debtors, expanding interest obligations owed to the lenders, and extending maturities.”

So, uh, why would anyone else want to get in on this?!?

As noted above, they don’t. The pre-petition lenders, on the other hand, are in a solid position to make a grab for valuable tax attributes and net operating losses!

MIDAVA HOLDINGS 3, INC. is the new entity formed by the pre-petition lenders to serve as stalking horse. The proposed DIP is $7.156mm at L+12%.

The debtors are represented by Chapman and Cutler LLP (Larry Halperin, Joon Hong) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, David Bertenthal, Timothy Cairns) as legal counsel, Carl Marks Advisors (Keith Daniels) as financial advisor and CRO, SSG Capital Advisors LLC as banker and Omni Agent Solutions as claims agent. Hayfin is represented by Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Bryan Podzius, Rachael Foust) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Cavid Queroli).

The first day hearing is scheduled for later this morning at 11am ET.

---

Date: May 31, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Goldblatt)

Capital Structure: see above

Company Professionals:

• Legal: Chapman and Cutler LLP (Larry Halperin, Joon Hong) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, David Bertenthal, Timothy Cairns)

• Board of Directors: Dewey Andrew, Linda McGoldrick, Charles Owen III, Steven Panagos, Karan Rai, James Rosati, Stephen Woody

• Financial Advisor/CRO: Carl Marks Advisors (Keith Daniels)

• Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

• Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

• Term Loan Agent: Hayfin Services LLP

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Bryan Podzius, Rachael Foust) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Cavid Queroli)

🍣 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Sustainable Restaurant Holdings Inc. 🍣

Sustainable Restaurant Holdings Inc.

May 12, 2020

Portland-based Sustainable Restaurant Holdings Inc., the holding company behind ten environmentally-friendly restaurants under the Bamboo Sushi and Quickfish brands, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. The company is owned by Kristofor Lofgren (42.1%) and supported by the Bain Capital Double Impact Fund LP (35.4%).

The company suffered, predictably, once COVID-19 struck and changed the business dynamic for restaurants all over the country. An attempted shift to take-out delivery wasn’t enough to drive revenue and shore up liquidity. The company makes no mention of any attempt to secure PPP funds pursuant to the CARES Act but, presumably, it wouldn’t have been eligible due to its connection to Bain. Bain, however, is stepping up to fund a $375k DIP that will fund the chapter 11 bankruptcy cases and hopefully buy the debtors time to locate a potential buyer of their assets.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

• Capital Structure: ~$1.5mm unsecured note

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti)

  • Independent Director: Pamela Corrie

  • Financial Advisor: Getzler Henrich & Associates LLC (David Campbell)

  • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Major Equityholder & DIP Lender ($375k): Bain Capital Double Impact Fund LP

🎭 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Rubie's Costume Company Inc. 🎭

Rubie’s Costume Company Inc.

April 30, 2020

Star Wars. Marvel’s Avengers. Stranger Things. You’d think any business associated with this hot IP would be killing it. And yet it seems that even the Black Panther is susceptible to poor business fundamentals in a disrupted retail environment.

New York-based Rubie’s Costume Company Inc. and five affiliates (the “debtors”) — designers, manufacturers and distributors of costumes and related accessories — filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of New York. The debtors have non-exclusive licenses with the likes of Disney Inc. ($DIS), Lucasfilm, Marvel and others as well as non-licensed costumes for all of your not-just-Halloween costume needs (nobody is judging, people). They sell via 4 costume stores in New York, online, and wholesale channels; they count Target Inc. ($TGT), Walmart Inc. ($WMT), Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) and Party City Holdco Inc. ($PRTY) as distribution channels (the latter, itself, in trouble).

The debtors note that operating performance has been on the decline for years, attributing this primarily to “[i]ndependent customers hav[ing] declined and the average order per existing customer also ha[ving] declined.” Disruption! The small mom and pop costume shops are getting smoked while the bigbox retailers who have more leverage over pricing take over. We’re willing to bet that even Party City will attribute its recent travails to the rise of the bigbox retailer coupled with “The Amazon Effect.” The debtors highlight:

For the fiscal year ending December 31, 2018 (“FY 2018”) net sales and Adjusted EBITDA were approximately $310 million and $2 million, respectively. As a result of the decline in independent customers, for fiscal year ending December 31, 2019 (“FY 2019”), the Company generated net sales and Adjusted EBITDA of approximately $268 million ($42 million decline) and $3 million ($5 million decline), respectively.

The debtors also have over $47mm of secured debt outstanding under its pre-petition credit agreement with lenders such as HSBC Bank USA NA, Bank of America NA, Wells Fargo Bank NA, JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, TD Bank NA, and Citibank NA (the “Bank Group”). Operating under a series of forbearance agreements, the debtors have been engaged in an operational cost-cutting process since 2019.

Forbearances (accompanied, of course, with enhanced collateral packages and fees) and cost-cutting can only get you so far, of course. With COVID-19 hitting, the debtors suffered from a liquidity crunch. After all, we’re not hearing much about Zoom-costume-parties. The Bank Group has apparently taken a look at the debtors’ business prospects and said, “no way, Jose.” Per the debtors:

…the COVID crisis has had an impact on the Debtors’ ability to obtain new financing from the Bank Group. The Bank Group has declined to provide continued financing and the Debtors’ efforts to obtain replacement financing on an asset based lending structure have been slowed by the crisis.

Indeed, Wells Fargo Bank NA pulled out of refi discussions — a move consistent with Wells’ recent savagely escapist approach with respect to retail.

It advised the Debtors that its decision was based on the conditions in the global lending market due to the COVID-19 crisis and internal restrictions on its current lending, and was not a reflection on the Debtors’ creditworthiness.

Yeah, maybe.

The Debtors demonstrated the viability of their business to the Banks in a number of ways including through the business plan implemented over the last year with the assistance of BDO, the continued value of their inventory which exceeds the debt owed to the Banks and even most recently the fact that major national account clients placed firm orders for the Halloween season.

While we don’t find this particularly convincing either, Wells didn’t really need a pretense to bail out of retail these days.

Anyway, here we are. Without the refinancing, the debtors are in bankruptcy court seeking the use of cash collateral while they use the bankruptcy process to find a new source of capital.

• Jurisdiction: E.D. of New York (Judge Trust)

• Capital Structure: $46.7mm RCF

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Togut Segal & Segal LLP (Frank Oswald, Brian Moore) & Meyer Suozzi English & Klein PC (Edward LoBello, Howard Kleinberg, Jordan Weiss)

  • Financial Advisor: BDO USA LLP

  • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition Agent: HSBC

    • Legal: Phillips Lytle LLP (William Brown)

🍦New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Ample Hills Holdings Inc.🍦

Ample Hills Holdings Inc.

March 15, 2020

“Hey, honey. Things are really tense right now with coronavirus spreading and the market imploding. I could really use some comfort food.”

“How about some of your favorite ice cream?”

“Ooooh, yeah, that’s an excellent call. Ample Hills Creamery has some sick-a$$ flavors. In!!”

BOOM. Bankrupt. Because there can’t be any good news this week, folks.

We know what you’re thinking: the coronavirus has claimed ice cream as a victim. That nasty virus has taken our sweet SWEEEET snack, the godforsaken beast!

But no. What claimed Brooklyn-based Ample Hills — and sent it reeling into chapter 11 bankruptcy — was an off-the-rails expansion. After becoming a favorite darling of A-listers like Bob Iger and Oprah Winfrey, the company experienced a nightmare shared by every New Yorker who has ever tried to do a reno project in their apartment: extensive and ridiculous time and cost overruns. That’s right, this story is ALL TOO FAMILIAR. It’s a homeowner’s lament:

Ample Hills estimated that it would take one year to build out the Factory. In all, it took a full year and a half longer than estimated before the Factory was operational. Ample Hills’ total investment in the Factory was roughly $6.7 million, which was $2.7 million higher than its original budget. Because the Factory delays impacted Ample Hills’ expansion strategy, the Factory has not been as fully utilized as Ample Hills originally planned, which has led to continuing operating losses.

So cliche, folks, so cliche. To finish the build-out and expand shops, the company raised an $8mm Series A round in late 2017 and subsequently expanded to LA and Miami to bring its total to 16 shops in 4 states.

What, on the outside, looked like a lot of successful growth belied the reality: the factory delays were creating significant liquidity problems.

In the 52 weeks ending December 31, 2019, Ample Hills reported approximately $10.8 million in sales and gross profit of $7.5 million. At the store level, Ample Hills’ shops generated positive cash flow. On average the shops generated 15% EBIDTA in 2019. Ample Hills, however, lost approximately $6.9 million during the same period as a result of depreciation, amortization, interest expense, payroll and other operating costs associated with supporting the Factory.

Alarm bells went off. The company went searching for fresh capital but all attempts to secure additional financing fell flat. Thereafter, the company sought a strategic buyer. That, too, failed. This chapter 11 filing is meant to give the company a platform by which to find a bidder (with time funded via a limited duration use of cash collateral). Absent one surfacing, the company acknowledges that it will be left with no choice but to liquidate the business.

• Jurisdiction: E.D. of New York (Judge Lord)

• Capital Structure: $3.5mm (Flushing Bank), $1.75mm (SBA Loan), $6.4mm convertible notes

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Herrick Feinstein LLP (Stephen Selbst, Steven Smith, George Utlik, Silvia Stockman, Rachel Ginzburg)

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Scouler Kirchhein LLC (Daniel Scouler)

  • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Lender: Flushing Bank

    • Legal: Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman LLP (Richard J. McCord)

🏠New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Decor Holdings Inc.🏠

Decor Holdings Inc.

February 12, 2019

Source: https://www.robertallendesign.com

Privately-owned New York-based Decor Holdings Inc. (d/b/a The RAD Group and The Robert Allen Duralee Group) and certain affiliates companies filed for bankruptcy earlier this week in the Eastern District of New York. The debtors state that they are the second largest supplier of decorative fabrics and furniture to the design industry in the U.S., designing, manufacturing and selling decorative fabrics, wall coverings, trimmings, upholstered furniture, drapery hardware and accessories for both residential and commercial applications. All of which begs the question: do people still actually decorate with this stuff?!? In addition to private label product lines, the company represents six other furnishing companies, providing tens of thousands of sku options to design professionals and commercial customers. The company maintains a presence via showrooms in large metropolitan cities in the US and Canada as well as an agent showroom network in more than 30 countries around the world. In other words, for a company you’ve likely never heard of, they have quite the reach.

The debtors’ problems derive from a 2017 merger between the Duralee business and the Robert Allen business. Why? Well, frankly, it sounds like the merger between the two is akin to a troubled married couple that decides that having a kid will cure all of their ills. Ok, that’s a terrible analogy but in this case, both companies were already struggling when they decided that a merger between the two might be more sustainable. But, “[l]ike many industries, the textile industry has been hard hit by the significant decrease in consumer spending and was severely affected by the global economic downturn. As a result, the Debtors experienced declining sales and profitability over the last several years.” YOU MEAN THE PERCEIVED SYNERGIES AND COMBINED EFFICIENCIES DIDN’T COME TO FRUITION?!? Color us shocked.

Ok, we’re being a little harsh. The debtors were actually able to cut $10-12mm of annual costs out of the business. They could not, however, consolidate their separate redundant showroom spaces outside of bankruptcy (we count approximately 32 leases). Somewhat comically, the showroom spaces are actually located in the same buildings. Compounding matters was the fact that the debtors had to staff these redundant spaces and failed to integrate differing software and hardware systems. In an of themselves, these were challenging problems even without a macro overhang. But there was that too: “…due to a fundamental reduction of market size in the home furnishings market, sales plummeted industry wide and the Debtors were not spared.” Sales declined by 14% in each of the two years post-merger. (Petition Note: we can’t help but to think that this may be the quintessential case of big firm corporate partners failing to — out of concern that management might balk at the mere introduction of the dreaded word ‘bankruptcy’ and the alleged stigma attached thereto — introduce their bankruptcy brethren into the strategy meetings. It just seems, on the surface, at least, that the 2017 merger might have been better accomplished via a double-prepackaged merger of the two companies. If Mattress Firm could shed leases in its prepackaged bankruptcy, why couldn’t these guys? But what do we know?).

To stop the bleeding, the debtors have been performing triage since the end of 2018, shuttering redundant showrooms, stretching payables, and reducing headcount by RIF’ing 315 people. Ultimately, however, the debtors concluded that chapter 11 was necessary to take advantage of the breathing spell afforded by the “automatic stay” and pursue a going concern sale. To finance the cases, the debtors obtained a commitment from Wells Fargo Bank NA, its prepetition lender, for a $30mm DIP revolving credit facility of which approximately $6mm is new money and the remainder is a “roll-up” or prepetition debt (PETITION Note: remember when “roll-ups” were rare and frowned upon?). The use of proceeds will be to pay operating expenses and the costs and expenses of being in chapter 11: interestingly, the debtors noted that they’re administratively insolvent on their petition. 🤔

Here’s to hoping for all involved that a deep-pocked buyer emerges out of the shadows.

• Jurisdiction: E.D. of New York (Judge Grossman)

• Capital Structure: $23.7mm senior secured loan (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $5.7mm secured junior loan (Corber Corp.)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Hahn & Hesson LLP (Mark Power, Janine Figueiredo)

  • Conflicts Counsel: Halperin Battaglia Benzija LLP (Christopher Battaglia)

  • Financial Advisor: RAS Management Advisors LLC (Timothy Boates)

  • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC (J. Scott Victor)

  • Liquidator: Great American Group LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Professionals:

  • DIP Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Otterbourg P.C. (Daniel Fiorillo, Jonathan Helfat)

  • Subordinated Noteholder: Corber Corp.

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (John Morris, John Lucas)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Republic Metals Refining Corporation

Republic Metals Refining Corporation

Source: Pexels.com

November 2, 2018

Republic Metals Refining Corporation (and affiliates), a Miami-based family-owned refiner of gold and silver, filed for bankruptcy to run an orderly sale process of their assets and operations. Last spring, the debtors discovered “a significant discrepancy” in their inventory accounting that, ultimately, led to summer-time default notices from their various senior lenders. The lenders, however, were mostly kept at bay until the filing because the debtors appeared, on multiple occasions, to be close to a going concern sale.

Close. But no cigar.

In the absence of a pre-petition buyer and/or stalking horse bidder, the debtors will now continue their potential sale process or, alternatively, engage in a process to liquidate. The debtors have an agreement with their senior lenders for the consensual use of cash collateral for a short period to attempt a sale, liquidate, and implement a plan for the wind down of the debtors’ estates.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York

• Capital Structure: $177mm senior debt

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Akerman LLP (Susan Balaschak, Andrea Hartley, Katherine Fackler, John Mitchell, Esther McKean)

  • Financial Advisor: Paladin Management Group LLC (Scott Avila)

  • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano (*click on company name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Senior Lender: ICBC Standard Bank Plc

    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (J. Frasher Murphy, Eli Columbus, Geoffrey Raicht)

  • Senior Lenders: Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., New York Branch, Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., Bank Hapoalim B.M., Mitsubishi International Corporation, Techemet Metal Trading LLC, Woodforest National Bank, and Bank Leumi USA.

    • Legal: Luskin Stern & Eisler LLP (Richard Stern, Alex Talesnick)

New Chapter 11 Filing - ABT Molecular Imaging Inc.

ABT Molecular Imaging Inc. 

6/13/18

ABT is the designer, manufacturer and distributor of a Biomarker Generator. Our eyes glazed over just reading the filing papers on this one so we're going to outsource here, spare ourselves some time, and spare ourselves some serious boredom. 

The bottom line is that the company lost more money ($5.5mm) than it made in sales ($5.4mm). The company has $30mm of liabilities, all in, and assets with a net book value of merely $2.5mm. The disparity stems, in most respects, from the debt on the company's balance sheet. The purpose of the filing is to address the balance sheet and/or pursue a sale of the business. The company's secured lender, SWK Funding LLC, has agreed to fund a DIP credit facility over the course of the case and sponsor a sale through a chapter 11 plan if, during the bankruptcy process, the company is unable to find another suitable purchaser. 

• Jurisdiction: D of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)
• Capital Structure: $9.6mm first lien debt (SWK Funding LLC), $16.1 second lien debt (SWK Funding LLC)  
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Erin Fay, Daniel Brogan, Greg Flasser)
  • Investment Banker:: SSG Capital Advisors LLC (J. Scott Victor, Neil Gupta, Michael Gunderson)
  • Claims Agent: Garden City Group (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Secured Lender: SWK Funding LLC
    • Legal: Holland & Knight LLP (Brian Smith, Brent Mcilwain) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP 

New Chapter 11 Filing - Unilife Corporation

Unilife Corporation

• 4/12/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($UNIS) manufacturer and B2B supplier of injectable drug delivery systems (including wearables) to pharmaceutical and biotechnology customers filed for bankruptcy to attempt a 363 sale of the business. This is kind of like a bad episode of Shark Tank. The Company appears to manufacture pretty innovative drug delivery systems - innovative in that the devices seem to be unobtrusive and, if we understand this correctly, help patients receive treatments without the need for multiple needles. But this is one of those episodes where the Sharks start asking about the numbers and they ain't pretty: the company is post-revenue and has some patents but it is pre-FDA approvals and pre-delivery (of medicine) to end users. Its limited revenue source is through negotiated supply agreements. It has a lot of debt (see below) and an expensive facility lease. It also had - in a very Kevin O'Leary-like fashion - a royalty agreement with its senior secured lender (ROS) which entitled ROS to a 4.52% royalty on the first $50mm of net sales (with ratchets for higher sales). So sharky. Of course, this isn't really that relevant when your incurred net losses are $100.8mm like they were in '16 (but we really enjoyed playing with the analogy). Now, ROS is providing a $7.5mm DIP credit facility to fund the cases for 90 days so that the company can attempt to find a buyer (note: there is no stalking horse bidder). Reminder: this was a PUBLICLY-TRADED company so, surely, there are some angry shareholders somewhere. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $70mm secured term loan (ROS Acquisition Offshore LP), $45.7mm senior secured convertible note (Amgen Inc.), $12.1mm mortgage (First National Bank), $1.9mm financing authority loan (Keystone Redevelopment Group LLC/Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Financing Authority)     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Cozen O'Connor (Mark Felger, Keith Kleinman, Eric Scherling, Frederick Schmidt) 
  • Financial Advisor: Protiviti Inc. (Guy Davis)
  • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC (J. Scott Victor)
  • Claims Agent: Rust Consulting/Omni Bankruptcy (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP Lender: ROS Acquisition Offshore LP
    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Jeffrey Davidson, Henry Kevane, Debra Grassgreen)
  • Senior Secured Convertible Noteholder: Amgen Inc.
    • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (James Wilton, Patricia Chen) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Katharina Earle)
  • Large General Unsecured Creditor: Sanofi Winthrop Industrie
    • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Stuart Brown, Kaitlin Edelman)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Michael Etkin, David Banker, Barry Bazian, Gerald Bender) & (local) Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP (Richard Barkasy)

Updated 7/17/17