New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN)

Jason Industries Inc.

June 24, 2020

Wisconsin-based Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN) and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) filed a long-anticipated (prepackaged) chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday — the latest in a line of manufacturers (e.g., Pyxus International Inc., Libbey Glass Inc., Exide Holdings Inc., Pace Industries LLC) to wind its way into bankruptcy court.

The company is an amalgam of decades of growth by acquisition: it launched its components and seating businesses with acquisitions in ‘93 and ‘95, respectively. Everything appeared to be hunky-dory heading into the Great Financial Crisis when things took a turn for the worse.

And so this isn’t the company’s first rodeo in distress. Back in ‘08-’09, the company engaged in a recapitalization transaction supported by Falcon Investment Advisors LLC and Hamilton Lane Advisors; it persevered through the downturn and ultimately sold to a special-purpose-acquisition-company (Quinpairo Acquisition Corp.) in 2014 for $538.6mm. The acquisition was financed through a combination of (i) the $172.5mm raised by the SPAC in its ‘13 IPO, (ii) rollover equity from the aforementioned sponsors (and management), and (iii) $420mm of first and second lien debt. Stick a pin in that last number: it comes back to haunt the debtors. 👻

In the years since, the company streamlined its operations — selling off assets (i.e., its fiber solutions business and a metal components business) and consolidating around two primary business segments. Through their industrial segment, the debtors manufacture a bunch of stuff used for industrial and infrastructure applications; and through their engineered components segment, the debtors manufacture (a) motorcycle seats, (b) operator seats for construction, agriculture, law and turf care and other industrial equipment markets, and (c) seating for the power sports market. Said another way, the company is heavily indexed to the automotive, heavy truck, steel and construction markets. Powered by approximately 700 employees in the US, the company did $338mm in net sales in 2019.

And that is part of the problem. $338mm in net sales represented an 8.2% ($30.1mm) dropoff from 2018. Adjusted EBITDA declined from $36.7mm in ‘18 to $24.8mm in ‘19. Both segments have been underperforming for years. The question is why?

The debtors cite a dramatic dropoff in demand in ‘19. They note:

This reduction was largely caused by reduced end market demand in key industries across the portfolio, specifically, weak economic conditions in Europe and Asia, lower industrial production in North America, and softening end market demand from OEM customers. For example, since as early as the first quarter of 2019, the Company has experienced reduced OEM build and channel inventory destocking. These problems were exacerbated by the operational disruption and demand reduction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, the debtors busted out the standard playbook to try and manage liquidity (while parallel-tracking a fruitless pre-petition sale and marketing effort). They (a) intensified focus on growing market segments, (b) reduced capital investment in non-core businesses, (c) cut/furloughed labor and instituted pay reductions for execs and other employees (and eliminated a 401(k) match program), (d) closed plants and manufacturing facilities and deferred rent payments or negotiated reduced rent at leased properties, (e) accelerated the consolidation of plants acquired in a recent acquisition, and (f) invested in automation at their facilities to reduce future operating costs (read: replace expensive human beings) and expand margins. Still, the debtors struggled.

…the pandemic’s impact on orders and revenues, combined with preexisting fixed costs and debt service requirements, have constrained available working capital, reduced profitability and cash flow, and significantly impaired the Company’s ability to adequately finance operations.

Which gets us back to the capital structure:

Given where EBITDA numbers were coming in, this thing’s leverage ratio was through the roof. More to the point, the debtors deferred a March 31 second lien interest payment and had been operating under a series of forbearance agreements ever since. Luckily, the capital structure isn’t all-too-complicated and lends itself well to a prepackaged bankruptcy. And so here we are with a restructuring support agreement and proposed prepackaged plan which will effectively turn the company over to the first lien term lenders and, but for some warrants, wipe out the second lien term lenders. Here’s how the above capital structure breaks down:

Source: PETITION LLC

A couple of notable features here:

• Drop it Likes its Hot. There’s a “first lien put option” baked into the plan pursuant to which any first lien term lender who doesn’t want to own equity or the junior converts can “put” its pro rata share of that equity/converts to a first lien lender, Pelican Loan Advisors III LLC (or lenders as the case may be), which has agreed to backstop this baby. Pelican is managed by Monomoy Capital Partners.

• F*ck You Pay Me. Those first lien lenders who consented to forbearances all of those months are about to get paaaaaaayyyyyyyyydd. They’ll receive a pro rated share of and interest in $10mm worth of open market purchases by the debtors of first lien credit agreement claims held by consenting first lien lenders AND a forbearance fee equal to 4.00% of the principal amount of the first lien credit agreement loans held by the consenting lenders as of a date certain. The open market purchases were, presumably, accomplished prior to the filing with 2% of the fee already paid and the remaining 2% to be paid-in-kind on the earlier of the termination date of the RSA or the plan effective date.

• It’s a Trap! Warrants are technically going to be issued to the first lien term lenders and “gifted” to the second lien lenders. But only if they vote to accept the plan. Given the midpoint total enterprise value of $200mm and resultant deficiency claim, this is a nice absolute priority rule workaround. As reflected in the graphic above, the allowed deficiency claim of $64.9mm is obviously impaired and will get a big fat 🍩.

And so this is what the capital structure will look upon emergence:

The first lien lenders have consented to the use of their cash collateral to fund the cases.*

* ⚡️July 15, 2020 Update: The Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee, however, filed a limited objection to the cash collateral motion on the basis that a final order should (a) limit any credit bid to their collateral (noting that a material amount of assets — including 35% of the equity in foreign subs — are excluded from the first lien lenders’ collateral package, and (b) require a finding that there’s diminution of value of the first lien lenders’ collateral such that they, despite providing no new financing, ought to be granted a superpriority lien on previously unencumbered assets. The Committee also previewed objections it will have to the plan of reorganization. For a purportedly “prepackaged” chapter 11, this one looks like it could be more contentious than most. A final hearing on the cash collateral motion is set for July 22, 2020.⚡️

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Laura Krucks, Dan Latona, Jake Gordon, Yates French)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Rebecca Roof)

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Large equityholder: Wynnefield Capital Management LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Creditors (Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Voya CLO Ltd., American Money Management Corp., First Eagle Alternative Credit LLC, Angel Island Capital Services LLC, Monomoy Capital Partners LP, Z Capital Partners LLC)

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Ryan Preston Dahl, Alexander Welch)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • First Lien Agent: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Gregg Bateman)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders: Corre Partners Management LLC, Newport Global Advisors

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steve Pohl, Shari Dwoskin, Kenneth Aulet)

    • Financial Advisor: DC Advisory LLC

Update July 17, 2020

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Akorn Inc. ($AKRX) 💊

Akorn Inc.

May 20, 2020

Akorn Inc. ($AKRX), a specialty pharmaceutical company based in Illinois that develops, manufactures and markets generic and branded prescription pharmaceuticals, finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Why “finally?” Well, back in January 2019 the company, in conjunction with an announcement of new executive and board appointments, noted that restructuring professionals (Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, PJT Partners LP and AlixPartners LLP)* were assisting with the formulation of a business plan and discussions with stakeholders. In December 2019, the publicly-traded company acknowledged in an SEC filing that bankruptcy was on the table, sending the stock into a 33% freefall. Subsequently, in February 2020, the company announced in connection with its Q4 and annual earnings that it had reached an agreement with its lenders to execute a sale of the business “potentially using Chapter 11 protection.” A sale, however, could not generate sufficient value to cover the outstanding funded indebtedness under the company’s term loan credit agreement. Shortly thereafter in March, the company defaulted under said agreement and the company and its lenders pivoted to discussions about a credit bid with an ad hoc group of term lenders serving as stalking horse purchaser of the assets in chapter 11. Alas, here we are. The company and 16 affiliates (the “debtors”) “FINALLY” find themselves in court with recently inked asset purchase and restructuring support agreements in tow. The debtors will use the bankruptcy process to further their sale process and market test bids against the term lenders’ proposed $1.05b credit bid; they hope to have an auction in the beginning of August with a mid/late-August sale hearing.

The sale process, however, is not where the excitement is here.

We are now in an age — post COVID-19 — where M&A deals falling apart is becoming commonplace news and debates about force majeure and “material adverse effect” rage on in the news and, eventually, in the courts. In that respect, Akorn was ahead of the curve.

In April 2017, Akorn and Fresenius Kabi AG ($FSNUY), a massive German healthcare company, announced a proposed merger with Akorn shareholders set up to receive $34/share — a sizable premium to the then prevailing stock price in the high-20s. (PETITION Note: for purposes of comparison, the stock was trading at $1.26/share on the aforementioned announcement of annual earnings). Akorn shareholders approved the merger but then the business began to suffer. Per the debtors:

…Akorn began to experience a steep and sustained drop-off in financial performance drive by a variety of factors, including, among other things: consolidation of buyer power leading to price reductions; the FDA’s expedition of its review and approval process for generic drugs, leading to increased competition and resultant additional price and volume erosion; and legislative attempts to reduce drug prices.

Almost exactly a year later — after all kinds of shady-a$$ sh*t including anonymous letters alleging data integrity and regulatory deficiencies at Akron facilities and sustained poor financial performance — Fresenius was like “we out.” Lawsuits ensued with Akorn seeking to enforce the merger and Fresenius parrying with “material adverse effect” defenses. The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with Fresenius.

This is America so lawsuits beget lawsuits and Fresenius’ announcement that the merger was at risk spawned (i) federal class action litigation against Akron and certain of its present and former directors and officers and (ii) federal and state law derivative litigation. Akorn ultimately settled the class action litigation but four groups of hedge funds opted out and continue to pursue claims against Akorn. Meanwhile, Akorn lost its appeal of the Delaware Chancery Court decision and a decision on Fresenius’ claims for damages remain reserved. Fresenius has at least a $74mm claim.

This litigation overhang — coupled with the debtors’ $861.7mm in term loans (emanating out of strategic acquisitions in 2014) — is what drives this bankruptcy. The debtors believe that, upon resolution of these issues, it is well-positioned to thrive. They had $682mm revenue in ‘19 and $124mm of adjusted EBITDA. In Q1 ‘20, the company achieved adjusted EBITDA of $59mm (PETITION Note: “adjusted” being an operative word here). Large wholesale distributors like AmerisourceBergen Corporation ($ABC), Cardinal Health Inc. ($CAH), and McKesson Corporation ($MCK) are large customers. The U.S. healthcare system is shifting towards generics and big brand-name pharmaceuticals are rolling off-patent and “driving generic opportunities.” Pre-petition efforts to find a buyer who shares the debtors’ optimism, however, proved unfruitful.

Armed with a $30mm DIP commitment from certain of the term lenders in the ad hoc group, the debtors will swiftly determine whether the prospect of owning these assets “free and clear” will generate any higher or better offers.

*Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in its quest for 32,892,239% restructuring market share, ultimately displaced Cravath.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

• Capital Structure: $861.7mm ‘21 Term Loans (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Nicole Greenblatt, Gregory Pesce, Christopher Hayes) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Mark Buschmann)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Term Loan & DIP Agent ($30mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

  • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher (Scott Greenberg, Steven Domanowski, Jeremy Evans, Michael J. Cohen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady)

    • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. LLC (Neil Augustine)

  • Large equityholders: Blackrock Inc., The Vanguard Group, Akorn Holdings LP, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

May 7, 2020

Dallas-based Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, Bergdorf Goodman Inc. and 22 other debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas late this week. If anyone is seeking an explanation as to why that may be outside the obvious pandemic-related narrative, look no farther than this monstrosity:

A quick reality check: that $5b capital structure isn’t attached to an international enterprise with hundreds or thousands of stores. You know, like Forever21. Rather, that horror show backs a 68 store business (43 Neiman Marcus, 2 Bergdorf, 22 Last Call). Ah….gotta love the good ol’ $5b leveraged buyout.

This case is all about “BIG.”

Big capital structure stemming from a big LBO by two big PE funds, Ares Capital Management and CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

Big brands with big price tags. PETITION Note: top unsecured creditors include Chanel Inc., Gucci America, Dolce and Gabbana USA Inc., Stuart Weitzman Inc., Theory LLC, Christian Louboutin, Yves Saint Laurent America Inc., Burberry USA, and more. There is also a big amount allocated towards critical vendors: $42.5mm. Nobody messes with Gucci, folks. Here’s a live shot of a representative walking out of court confident that they’ll get their money:

Big fees. More on this below.

Big, complicated — and controversial — multi-year re-designation and asset stripping transactions that were part of the debtors’ (and now non-debtors’) elaborate strategy to restructure out-of-court by kicking the can down the road. This is undoubtedly going to stir a big fight in the case. More on this below too.

Big value destruction.

Here is what will happen to the pre-petition capital structure under the proposed term sheet and restructuring support agreement filed along with the chapter 11 papers — a deal that has the support of 78% of the term lenders, 78% of the debentures, 99% of the second lien notes, 70% of the third lien notes, and 100% of the private equity sponsors:

The Asset-Based Revolving Credit Facility and FILO Facility will get out at par. There’ll be a $750mm exit facility. Beyond that? All that red constitutes heaps and heaps of value that’s now essentially an option. It’s a bet that there is a place in the future for brick-and-mortar luxury department stores. Pursuant to the deal, the “Extended Term Loans” will get the lion’s share of equity (87.5%, subject to dilution). The rest of the capital structure will get small slivers of reorganized equity. General unsecured creditors will get “their pro rata share of a cash pool.” The private equity sponsors will get wiped out but for their hoped-for liability releases.

Back to those big fees. The biggest issue for this week was the debtors’ proposed $675mm new money DIP credit facility (that comes in junior to the existing ABL in priority…in other words, no roll-up here). The DIP is essentially 13% paper chock full of fees (including a backstop fee payable in “NewCo equity” at 30% discount to plan value). One disgruntled party, Mudrick Capital Management, a holder of $144mm of the term loan, appears to have beef with Pimco and other DIP backstop parties — saying that the backstop agreement is inappropriate and the DIP fees are outrageous, likening the fee grab to a COVID hoarding mentality — and therefore felt compelled to cross-examine the debtors’ banker as to the reasonableness of it all. If you’ve ever imagined a kid suing other kids for not picking him for their dodgeball team, it would look something like this did.

And so Lazard’s testimony basically boiled down to this:

“Uh, yeah, dude, nobody knows when the economy will fully open up. The company only has $100mm of cash on the petition date. And IT’S NOT OPERATING. That money is enough for maybe 3 weeks of cash burn given that the debtors intend to continue paying rent (unlike most other retailers that have filed for bankruptcy lately). Damn pesky high-end landlords. Anyway, so we’ll burn approximately $300mm between now and when stores are projected to reopen in July/August. No operating cash flow + meaningful cash burn = risky AF lending environment. It’s unprecedented to lend into a situation with a cash burn that, while it pales in comparison to something like Uber, is pretty damn extreme. Look at the J.Crew DIP: it ain’t exactly cheap to lend in this market. There are no unencumbered assets; there certainly isn’t a way to get junior financing. And a priming fight makes no sense here given the impossibility of showing an equity cushion. So stop being an entitled little brat. There’s no obligation on anyone to cut you into the deal. And if you’re going to cry over spilled milk, take up your beef with Pimco and f*ck right off. Alternatively, you can subscribe to your pro rata portion of the DIP and enjoy all of the fees other than the backstop fee.”

The Judge was convinced that the above rationale constituted good business judgment and approved the DIP on an interim basis.

The hearing also foreshadowed another contentious issue in the case: the myTheresa situation. See, the Debtors’ position is the following: “The ‘17 MyTheresa designation as unrestricted subs + the ‘18 distribution of the myTheresa operating companies to non-debtor Neiman Marcus Group Inc. (a/k/a the “asset stripping” transaction) + a ‘19 wholesale amend-and-extend + cost-saving initiatives + comparable same store sales growth for 7 of 10 quarters + “significantly expanded margins” during the holiday period = rocket ship future growth but for the damn pandemic. On the flip side, Marble Ridge Capital LP takes the position that:

…the Debtors’ financial troubles were entirely foreseeable well before recent events. The Company has operated at leverage multiples more than twice its peers since at least 2018 (prior to the fraudulent transfers described herein). And last year’s debt restructuring increased the Company’s already unsustainable annual interest expense by more than $100 million while only reducing the Company’s debt load by $250 million leaving a fraction of adjusted EBITDA for any capital expenditures, principal repayment, taxes or one-time charges. Sadly, the Debtors’ financial distress will come as no surprise to anyone.

This ain’t gonna be pretty. Marble Ridge has already had one suit for fraudulent transfer dismissed with prejudice at the pleading stage. Now there are defamation and other claims AGAINST Marble Ridge outstanding. And subsequent suits in the NY Supreme Court. Have no fear, though, folks. There are independent managers in the mix now to perform an “independent” investigation into these transactions.

The debtors intend to have a plan on file by early June with confirmation in September. Until then, pop your popcorn folks. You can socially distance AND watch these fireworks.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Anup Sathy, Chad Husnick, Matthew Fagen, Austin Klar, Gregory Hesse, Dan Latona, Gavin Campbell, Gary Kavarsky, Mark McKane, Jeffrey Goldfine, Josh Greenblatt, Maya Ben Meir) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

  • Independent Managers of NMG LTD LLC: Marc Beilinson, Scott Vogel

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon, Todd Cosenza, Jennifer Hardy, Joseph Davis, Alexander Cheney)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Dennis Stogsdill)

  • Independent Manager of Mariposa Intermediate Holdings LLC: Anthony Horton

    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

  • Neiman Marcus Inc.

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Jeffrey Bjork)

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinstein, Kyle Richter, Marissa Light)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Andrew Zatz, Rashida Adams) & Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner, Paul Moak, Lydia Webb)

  • FILO Agent: TPG Specialty Lending Inc.

    • Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Abbey Walsh, G. Scott Leonard) & Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain)

  • Pre-petition Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG Cayman Islands Branch

    • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz, Christopher Kelly) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham, Martha Wyrick)

  • Second Lien Note Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

  • Third Lien Note Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

  • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: UMB Bank NA

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer)

  • 2028 Debentures Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

  • Ad Hoc Term Loan Lender Group (Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Sixth Street Partners LLC)

    • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus) & Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Kiran Vakamudi, Paul Heath, Matthew Moran, Katherine Drell Grissel)

    • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

  • Ad Hoc Secured Noteholder Committee

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Belisle Eaton, Claudia Tobler, Diane Meyers, Neal Donnelly, Patricia Walsh, Jeffrey Recher) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Large Creditor: Chanel Inc.

    • Legal: Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (Justin Bernbrock, Michael Driscoll)

  • Large Creditor: Louis Vuitton USA Inc.

    • Legal: Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP (Nathan Rugg)

  • Large Creditor: Moncler USA Inc.

    • Legal: Morrison Cohen LLP (Joseph Moldovan, David Kozlowski)

  • Marble Ridge Capital LP & Marble Ridge Master Fund LP

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Edward Weisfelner, Sigmund Wissner-Gross, Jessica Meyers, Uchechi Egeonuigwe)

  • Mudrick Capital Management LP

    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Michael Rosenthal, Mitchell Karlan, David Feldman, Keith Martorana, Jonathan Fortney)

  • Sponsor: CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

    • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Jasmine Ball, Erica Weisgerber) & Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Hugh Ray, William Hotze, Jason Sharp)

  • Sponsor: Ares Capital Management

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Thomas Kreller)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski) & Cole Schotz PC (Daniel Rosenberg)

    • Financial Advisor: M-III Advisory Partners LP (Mohsin Meghji)

    • Valuation Expert: The Michel-Shaked Group (Israel Shaked)

🚗 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Techniplas LLC 🚗

Techniplas LLC

May 6, 2020

Wisconsin-based Techniplas LLC and seven affiliates (the “debtors”), producers and manufacturers of plastic components used primarily in the automotive and transportation industries, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. “The Company produces, among other things, automotive products, such as fluid and air management components, decorative and personalization products, and structural components, as well as nonautomotive products, such as power utility and electrical components and water filtration products.” After cobbling together acquisitions over the course of the decade, the debtors’ business is now global in scale and its main customers are the leading OEMs in the US, Europe and Asia; it had net sales of $475mm and a net loss of $21mm in fiscal ‘19.

A bit more about the business. The debtors’ primary operating unit, “Techniplas Core,” acts “…as a manufacturer of technically complex, niche products across a wide range of applications and end markets, including the automotive and truck, industrial, and commercial markets.” This is roughly 83% of the business. In addition, the debtors have “Techniplas Prime,” which, aside from sounding like a Transformer that may or may not have it out for the human race, acts as a matchmaker between excess manufacturing capacity and customers in need of manufacturing. Per the debtors:

Serving as a nexus between customers, including OEMs, and other manufacturing companies, Techniplas Prime acts as an extension of Techniplas Core by delivering to customers the manufacturing capabilities of its Prime Partners. This makes Techniplas Prime asset-light and creates a “win-win” scenario for customers and Prime Partners.

Interestingly, this business segment was once dubbed “The Airbnb of Auto Manufacturing,” a moniker that makes almost zero sense and completely misunderstands the Airbnb model but, yeah sure, cheap “by-association” points, homies! Per Forbes:

[Founder George] Votis saw Techniplas Prime as an e-manufacturing platform from which customers could order parts electronically according to their own specifications, and have them built by local factories with unused capacity.

Except it’s not a platform. Like, at all. Airbnb is a digital two-sided platform that brings hosts and travelers together and seemlessly connects them. Techniplas Prime…well…

…well…page not found. Airbnb may be struggling in this COVID environment but we can assure you that you’re not EVER getting a 404 when going to their site. Platform…pssssfft. The Forbes article later contradicts itself saying:

…they focused on 3-D printing and advanced manufacturing technology companies that had spare capacity available for contract operations, for which Techniplas Prime is essentially the broker.

Right. Being a broker is different than being a platform y’all. But we digress.

The debtors have a simple capital structure consisting of a $17.59mm ABL, $175mm in 10% ‘20 notes, and a $6.77mm interim financing agreement for total funded debt around $200mm. The debtors, primarily due to this capital structure, began pursuing strategic alternatives in early 2017. Both an attempted sale process and debt refinancing failed. Thereafter, the debtors explored in 2018 a term loan refinancing of the preptition notes and/or a public equity listing in London. Those, too, failed. For this, the debtors blame a downturn in the automotive market and uncertainty from Brexit (PETITION Note: we’ve been foreshadowing that declining production capacity by the major OEMs was going to rattle through the supply chain so nobody should be surprised by this revelation).

In mid-’19, an attempted sale to a strategic buyer, private equity firm The Jordan Company, kicked off but that, despite some forward-moving progress involving a note purchase agreement and an unexercised call option for 100% of the membership interests in the debtors, ultimately fell through due to the inability to refi out the pre-petition notes. Subsequent attempts — now involving ad hoc group of noteholders and Jordan — also came close but ultimately failed due to deteriorating operating performance that pre-dated OOVID. COVID merely exacerbated things. Per the debtors:

Many customers suspended or drastically reduced production, resulting in a swift drop in demand for the Debtors’ products. Additionally, many of the locations where the Company had offices and manufacturing plants worldwide issued lockdown orders and permitted only essential business to remain open in an effort to control the outbreak and protect the health and safety of the public.

All of this was too much to handle: Jordan peaced out. Liquidity increasingly became an issue and so the debtors obtained a $6.7mm super senior priority bridge financing from the ad hoc group. Indeed, the ad hoc group is stepping up big here: in addition to providing the liquidity the debtors needed to get in chapter 11, they’ve agreed to provide a DIP ($20-25mm new money with a $100mm roll-up) and serve as stalking horse bidder — offering $105mm to purchase the debtors’ international operations and three remaining US-based manufacturing facilities. The debtors hope to close the sale within 44 days of the petition date.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: White & Case LLP (David Turetsky, Andrew Zatz, Fan He, Robbie Boone Jr., John Ramirez, Sam Lawand, Thomas MacWright) & Fox Rothschild LLP (Jeffrey Schlerf, Carl Neff, Johnna Darby, Daniel Thompson)

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Peter Smidt, Andrew Hinkelman)

  • Investment Banker: Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC (Richard Klein)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Stalking Horse Purchaser: Techniplas Acquisition Co. LLC

  • Pre-Petition ABL & DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Dennis Twomey, Elliot Bromagen) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

  • DIP Term Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Cole Schotz PC (Daniel Geoghan, J. Kate Stickles, Patrick Reilley)

  • Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA

    • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

  • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group ‘20 10% Senior Secured Notes

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Jonathan Levine, Brian Lohan, Jeffrey Fuisz, Gerardo Mijares-Shafai)

👕 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew) 👕

Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew)

May 4, 2020

If you’re looking for a snapshot of the pre-trade war and pre-COVID US economy look no farther than J.Crew’s list of top 30 unsecured creditors attached to its chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On the one hand there is the LONG list of sourcers, manufacturers and other middlemen who form the crux of J.Crew’s sh*tty product line: this includes, among others, 12 Hong Kong-based, three India-based, three South Korea-based, two Taiwan-based, and two Vietnam-based companies. In total, 87% of their product is sourced in Asia (45% from mainland China and 16% from Vietnam). On the other hand, there are the US-based companies. There’s Deloitte Consulting — owed a vicious $22.7mm — the poster child here for the services-dependent US economy. There’s the United Parcel Services Inc. ($UPS)…okay, whatever. You’ve gotta ship product. We get that. And then there’s Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as the debtors’ pre-petition term loan agent, and Eaton Vance Management as a debtholder and litigant. Because nothing says the US-of-f*cking-A like debt and debtholder driven litigation. ‘Merica! F*ck Yeah!!

Chinos Holdings Inc. (aka J.Crew) and seventeen affiliated debtors (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy early Monday morning with a prearranged deal that is dramatically different from the deal the debtors (and especially the lenders) thought they had at the tail end of 2019. That’s right: while the debtors have obviously had fundamental issues for years, it was on the brink of a transaction that would have kept it out of court. Call it “The Petsmart Effect.” (PETITION Note: long story but after some savage asset-stripping the Chewy IPO basically dug out Petsmart from underneath its massive debt load; J.Crew’s ‘19 deal intended to do the same by separating out the various businesses from the Chino’s holding company and using Madewell IPO proceeds to fund payments to lenders).

Here is the debtors’ capital structure. It is key to understanding what (i) the 2019 deal was supposed to accomplish and (ii) the ownership of J.Crew will look like going forward:

Late last year, the debtors and their lenders entered into a Transaction Support Agreement (“TSA”) with certain pre-petition lenders and their equity sponsors, TPG Capital LP and Leonard Green & Partners LP, that would have (a) swapped the $1.33b of term loans for $420mm of new term loans + cash and (b) left general unsecured creditors unimpaired (100% recovery of amounts owed). As noted above, the cash needed to make (a) and (b) happen would have come from a much-ballyhooed IPO of Madewell Inc.

Then COVID-19 happened.

Suffice it to say, IPO’ing a brick-and-mortar based retailer — even if there were any kind of IPO window — is a tall order when there’s, like, a pandemic shutting down all brick-and-mortar business. Indeed, the debtors indicate that they expect a $900mm revenue decline due to COVID. That’s the equivalent of taking Madewell — which earned $602m of revenue in ‘19 after $614mm in ‘18 — and blowing it to smithereens. Only then to go back and blow up the remnants a second time for good measure.* Source of funds exit stage left!

Fun facts. In fiscal 2019, Chino's revenues were:

👕J.Crew - $1.7b (67.2%)
👖Madewell - $602m (23.7%)
🏷Wholesale - $230m (9.1%)

Remember: Madewell is the crown jewel here. According to its S-1, it had $614m of revenue in fiscal '18. Its growth was declining pre-COVID.😬 pic.twitter.com/5jpNnJ5zoR

— 💥PETITION💥 (@petition) May 4, 2020

The post-COVID deal is obviously much different. The term lenders aren’t getting a paydown from Madewell proceeds any longer; rather, they are effectively getting Madewell itself by converting their term loan claims and secured note claims into approximately 82% of the reorganized equity. Some other highlights:

• Those term loan holders who are members of the Ad Hoc Committee will backstop a $400mm DIP credit facility (50% minimum commitment) that will convert into $400mm of new term loans post-effective date. The entire plan is premised upon a $1.75b enterprise value which is…uh…interesting. Is it modest considering it represents a $1b haircut off the original take-private enterprise value nine years ago? Or is it ambitious considering the company’s obvious struggles, its limited brand equity, the recession, brick-and-mortar’s continued decline, Madewell’s deceleration, and so forth and so on? Time will tell.

• Syndication of the DIP will be available to holders of term loans and IPCo Notes (more on these below), provided, however, that they are accredited institutional investors.

• The extra juice for putting in for a DIP allocation is that, again, they convert to new term loans and, for their trouble, lenders of the new term loans will get 15% additional reorganized equity plus warrants. So an institution that’s in it to win it and has a full-on crush for Madewell (and the ghost of JCrew-past) will get a substantial chunk of the post-reorg equity (subject to dilution).

Query whether, if asked a mere six months ago, they were interested in owning this enterprise, the term lenders would’ve said ‘yes.’ Call us crazy but we suspect not. 😎

General unsecured creditors’ new deal ain’t so hot in comparison either. They went from being unimpaired to getting a $50mm pool with a 50% cap on claims. That is to say, maybe…maybe…they’ll get 50 cents on the dollar.

That is, unless they’re one of the debtors’ 140 landlords owed, in the aggregate, approximately $23mm in monthly lease obligations.** The debtors propose to treat them differently from other unsecured creditors and give them a “death trap” option: if they accept the TSA’s terms and get access to a $3mm pool or reject and get only $1mm with a 50% cap on claims. We can’t imagine this will sit well. We imagine that the debtors choice of venue selection has something to do with this proposed course of action. 🤔

We’re not going to get into the asset stripping transaction at the heart of the IPCo Note issuance. This has been widely-covered (and litigated) but we suspect it may get a new breath of life here (only to be squashed again, more likely than not). In anticipation thereof, the debtors have appointed special committees to investigate the validity of any claims related to the transaction. They may want to take up any dividends to their sponsors while they’re at it.

Both Neiman and J. Crew are PE-backed and who each tried cute maneuvers with creditor collateral in order to kick the can but were not able to forestall the inevitable ch 11s. https://t.co/9PV6KxgS4A

— Sujeet Indap (@sindap) May 4, 2020

Both might have succeeded with said maneuvers if it weren’t for the pandemic.

— Miriam Gottfried (@miriamgottfried) May 4, 2020

The debtors hope to have this deal wrapped up in a bow within 130 days. We cannot even imagine what the retail landscape will look like that far from now but, suffice it to say, the ratings agencies aren’t exactly painting a calming picture.

.@jcrew's bankruptcy filing lifts the retail loan default rate to 9%, from 7%. "@fitchratings forecasts the loan retail default rate to reach 19% by year end 2020, far exceeding the overall 5%-6% rate."

— Kelsey Butler (@itskelseybutler) May 4, 2020

Per Moody's, distressed retail and apparel names with a Caa1 rating or lower hit 23 as of 4/24, up from 17 in mid-March. "The number will only grow in coming months."

— 💥PETITION💥 (@petition) May 3, 2020

*****

*Curiously, there are some discrepancies here in the numbers. In the first day papers, the debtors indicate that 2018 revenue for Madewell was $529.2mm. With $602mm in ‘19 revenue, one certainly walks away with the picture that Madewell is a source of growth (13.8%) while the J.Crew side of the business continues to decline (-4%). This graph is included in the First Day Declaration:

Source: First Day Declaration

The Madewell S-1, however, indicates that 2018 revenue was $614mm.

With $268mm of the ‘18 revenue coming in the first half, this would imply that second half ‘18 revenue was $346mm. With ‘19 revenue coming in at $602mm and $333mm attributable to 1H, this would indicate that the business is declining rather than growing. In the second half, in particular, revenue for fiscal ‘19 was $269mm, a precipitous dropoff from $333mm in ‘18. Even if you take the full year fiscal year ‘18 numbers from the first day declaration (529.2 - 268) you get $261mm of second half growth in ‘18 compared to the $269mm in ‘19. While this would reflect some growth, it doesn’t exactly move the needle. This is cause for concern.

**To make matters worse for landlords, the debtors are also seeking authority to shirk post-petition rent obligations for 60 days while they evaluate whether to shed their leases. We get that the debtors were nearing a deal that COVID threw into flux, but this bit is puzzling: “Beginning in early April 2020, after several weeks of government mandated store closures and uncertainty as to the duration and resulting impact of the pandemic, the Debtors began to evaluate their lease portfolio to, among other things, quantify and realize the potential for lease savings.” Beginning in early April!?!?

---

• Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge )

• Capital Structure: $311mm ABL (Bank of America NA), $1.34b ‘21 term loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $347.6 IPCo Notes (U.S. Bank NA)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Candace Arthur, Daniel Gwen) & Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry P Long III, Nathan Kramer)

  • JCrew Opco Special Committee: D.J. (Jan) Baker, Chat Leat, Richard Feintuch, Seth Farbman

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co.

  • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, G. Mark Edgarton) & McGuireWoods LLP (Douglas Foley, Sarah Boehm)

  • Pre-petition Term Loan & DIP Agent ($400mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP

  • Ad Hoc Committee

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Andrew LeBlanc, Matthew Brod) & Tavenner & Beran PLC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners Inc.

  • Large common and Series B preferred stock holders: TPG Capital LP (55% and 66.2%) & Leonard Green & Partners LP (20.7% and 24.8%)

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jacob Adlerstein, Eugene Park, Irene Blumberg) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge Jr., Corey Booker)

  • Large Series A preferred stock holders: Anchorage Capital Group LLC (25.6%), GSO Capital Partners LP (26.1%), Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (15.5%)

📺 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) 📺

Frontier Communications Inc.

April 14, 2020

We often highlight how, particularly in the case of oil and gas companies, capital intensive companies end up with a lot of debt and a lot of debt often results in bankruptcy. In the upstream oil and gas space, exploration and production companies need a lot of upfront capital to, among other things, enter into royalty interest agreements with land owners, hire people to map wells, hire people to drill the earth, secure proper equipment, procure the relevant inputs and more. E&P companies literally have to shell out to pull out.

Similarly, telecommunications companies that want to cover a lot of ground require a lot of capital to do so. From 2010 through 2016, Connecticut-based Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) closed a series of transactions to expand from a provider of telephone and DSL internet services in mainly rural areas to a large telecommunications provider to both rural and urban markets across 29 states. It took billions of dollars in acquisitions to achieve this. Which, in turn, meant the company took on billions of dollars of debt to finance said acquisitions. $17.5b, to be exact. Due, in large part, to the weight of that heavy debt load, it, and its 28922932892 affiliates (collectively, the “debtors”), are now chapter 11 debtors in the Southern District of New York (White Plains).*

The debtors underwrote the transactions with the expectation that synergistic efficiencies would be borne out and flow to the bottom line. PETITION readers know how we feel about synergies: more often than not, they prove elusive. Well:

Serving the new territories proved more difficult and expensive than the Company anticipated, and integration issues made it more difficult to retain customers. Simultaneously, the Company faced industry headwinds stemming from fierce competition in the telecommunications sector, shifting consumer preferences, and accelerating bandwidth and performance demands, all redefining what infrastructure telecommunications companies need to compete in the industry. These conditions have contributed to the unsustainability of the Company’s outstanding funded debt obligations—which total approximately $17.5 billion as of the Petition Date.

Shocker. Transactions that were meant to be accretive to the overall enterprise ended up — in conjunction with disruptive trends and intense competition — resulting in an astronomical amount of value destruction.

As a result of these macro challenges and integration issues, Frontier has not been able to fully realize the economies of scale expected from the Growth Transactions, as evidenced by a loss of approximately 1.3 million customers, from a high of 5.4 million after the CTF Transaction closed in 2016 to approximately 4.1 million as of January 2020. Frontier’s share price has dropped … reflecting a $8.4 billion decrease in market capitalization.

😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬

Consequently, the debtors have been in a state of liability management ever since the end of 2018. Subsequently, they (i) issued new secured notes to refinance a near(er)-term term loan maturity, (ii) amended and extended their revolving credit facility, and (iii) agreed to sell their northwest operations and related assets for $1.352b (the “Pacific Northwest Transaction”). The Pacific Northwest Transaction has since been hurdling through the regulatory approval process and seems poised to close on April 30, 2020.**

While all of these machinations were positive steps, there were still major issues to deal with. The capital structure remained robust. And “up-tier” exchanges of junior debt into more senior debt to push out near-term maturities were, post-Windstream***, deemed too complex, too short-term, and too likely to end up the subject of fierce (and costly) litigation**** As the debtors’ issued third quarter financials that were … well … not good, they announced a full drawn down of their revolver, instantly arming them with hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity.

$FTR with the clean sweep - Revs, margins, ebitda, FCF, churn, subs, ARPC all worse sequentially. https://t.co/vn49m5PDPP

— JV (@AyyouEm) November 5, 2019

The company needed reconstructive surgery. Band-aids alone wouldn’t be enough to dam the tide. In many respects, the company ought to be commended for opting to address the problem in a wholesale way rather than piecemeal kick, kick, and kick the can down the road — achieving nothing but short-term fixes to the enrichment of really nobody other than its bankers (and Aurelius).

And so now the company is at the restructuring support agreement stage. Seventy-five percent of the holders of unsecured notes have agreed to an equitization transaction — constituting an impaired consenting class for a plan of reorganization to be put on file within 30 days. Said another way, the debtors are taking the position that the value breaks within the unsecured debt. That is, that the value is at least $6.6b making the $10.949b of senior unsecured notes the “fulcrum security.” Unsecured noteholders reportedly include Elliott Management Corp., Apollo Global Management LLC, Franklin Resources Inc., and Capital Group Cos. They would end up the owners of the reorganized company.

What else is the RSA about?

• Secured debt will be repaid in full on the effective date;

• A proposed DIP (more on this below) would roll into an exit facility;

• The unsecured noteholders would, in addition to receiving equity, get $750mm of seniority-TBD take-back paper and $150mm of cash (and board seats);

• General unsecured creditors would ride through and be paid in full; and

• Holders of secured and unsecured subsidiary debt will be reinstated or paid in full.

The debtors also obtained a fully-committed new money DIP of $460mm from Goldman Sachs Bank USA. This has proven controversial. Though the DIP motion was not up for hearing along with other first day relief late last week, the subject proved contentious. The Ad Hoc First Lien Committee objected to the DIP. Coming in hot, they wrote:

Beneath the thin veneer in which these so-called “pre-arranged” cases are packaged, lies multiple infirmities that, if not properly addressed by the Debtors, will ultimately result in the unraveling of these cases. While the Debtors seek to shroud themselves in a restructuring support agreement (the “RSA”) that enjoys broad unsecured creditor support, the truth is that underlying that support is a fragile house of cards that will not withstand scrutiny as these cases unfold. Turning the bankruptcy code on its head, the Debtors attempt through their RSA to pay unsecured bondholders cash as a proxy for their missed prepetition interest payment, postpetition interest to yet other unsecured creditors of various subsidiaries, and complete repayment to prepetition revolver lenders that are attempting, through the proposed debtor-inpossession financing (the “DIP Loan”), to effectively “roll-up” their prepetition exposure through the DIP Loan, all while the Debtors attempt to deprive their first lien secured creditors of contractual entitlements to default interest and pro rata payments they will otherwise be entitled to if their debt is to be unimpaired, as the RSA purports to require. While those are fights for another day, their significance in these cases must not be overlooked.

Whoa. That’s a lot. What does it boil down to? “F*ck you, pay me.” The first lien lenders are pissed that everyone under the sun is getting taken care of in the RSA except them.

• You want to deny us our default interest. F+ck you, pay me.

• You want a DIP despite having hundreds of millions of cash on hand and $1.3b of sale proceeds coming in? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want a 2-for-1 roll-up where, “as a condition to raising $460 million in debtor-in-possession financing, the Debtors must turn around and repay $850 million to their prepetition revolving lenders, thus decreasing the Debtors’ overall liquidity on a net basis”? F+ck you, pay me.

• You shirking our pro rata payments we’d otherwise be entitled to if our debt is to be unimpaired? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to pay unsecured senior noteholders “incremental payments” of excess cash to compensate them for skipped interest payments without paying us default interest and pro rata payments? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to use sale proceeds to pay down unsecureds when that’s ours under the first lien docs? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to pay interest on the sub debt without giving us default interest? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to do all of this without a proper adequate protection package for us? F+ck you, pay me.

The second lien debtholders chimed in, voicing similar concerns about the propriety of the adequate protection package. For the uninitiated, adequate protection often includes replacement liens on existing collateral, super-priority claims emanating out of those liens, payment of professional fees, and interest. In this case, both the first and second liens assert that default interest — typically several bps higher — ought to be included as adequate protection. The issue, however, was not up for hearing on the first day so all of this is a preview of potential fireworks to come if an agreement isn’t hashed out in coming weeks.

The debtors hope to have a confirmation order within four months with the effective date within twelve months (the delay attributable to certain regulatory approvals). We wish them luck.

______

*Commercial real estate is getting battered all over the place but not 50 Main Street, Suite 1000 in White Plains New York. Apparently Frontier Communications has an office there too. Who knew there was a speciality business in co-working for bankrupt companies? In one place, you’ve got FULLBEAUTY Brands Inc. and Internap Inc. AND Frontier Communications. We previously wrote about this convenient phenomenon here.

**The company seeks an expedited hearing in bankruptcy court seeking approval of it. It is scheduled for this week.

***Here is a Bloomberg video from June 2019 previously posted in PETITION wherein Jason Mudrick of Mudrick Capital Management discusses the effect Windstream had on Frontier and predicted Frontier would be in bankruptcy by the end of the year. He got that wrong. But did it matter to him? He also notes a CDS-based short-position that would pay out if Frontier filed for bankruptcy within 12 months. For CDS purposes, looks like he got that right. By the way, per Moody’s, here was the spread on the CDS around the time that Mudrick acknowledged his CDS position:

Here it was a few months later:

And, for the sake of comparison, here was the spread on the CDS just prior to the bankruptcy filing last week:

Clearly the market was keenly aware (who wasn’t given the missed interest payment?) that a bankruptcy filing was imminent: insurance on FTR got meaningfully more expensive. Other companies with really expensive CDS these days? Neiman Marcus Group (which, Reuters reports, may be filing as soon as this week), J.C. Penney Corporation Inc., and Chesapeake Energy Corporation.

****Notably, Aurelius Capital Management LP pushed for an exchange of its unsecured position into secured notes higher in the capital structure — a proposal that would achieve the triple-frontier-heist-like-whammy of better positioning their debt, protecting the CDS they sold by delaying bankruptcy, and screwing over junior debtholders like Elliott (PETITION Note: we really just wanted to squeeze in a reference to the abominably-bad NFLX movie starring Ben Affleck, an unfortunate shelter-in indulge). On the flip side, funds such as Discovery Capital Management LLC and GoldenTree Asset Management LP pushed the company to file for bankruptcy rather than engage in Aurelius’ proposed exchange.

---

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: $850mm RCF, $1.7b first lien TL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), $1.7b first lien notes (Wilmington Trust NA), $1.6b second lien notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $10.95mm unsecured senior notes (The Bank of New York Mellon), $100mm sub secured notes (BOKF NA), $750mm sub unsecured notes (U.S. Bank Trust National Association)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Chad Husnick, Benjamin Rhode, Mark McKane, Patrick Venter, Jacob Johnston)

  • Directors: Kevin Beebe, Paul Keglevic, Mohsin Meghji

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Carlin Adrianopoli)

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Major equityholders: BlackRock Inc., Vanguard Group Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Management

  • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon

    • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Katelin Morales)

  • Indenture Trustee and Collateral Agent for the 8.500% ‘26 Second Lien Secured Notes

    • Legal: Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP (Joseph Schwartz, Curtis Plaza, Tara Schellhorn)

  • Credit Agreement Administrative Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Nicholas Baker, Jamie Fell)

  • DIP Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut, Stephen Piraino, Samuel Wagreich)

  • Ad Hoc First Lien Committee

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Gregory Laufer, Kyle Kimpler, Miriam Levi)

    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

  • Second lien Ad Hoc Group

    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Susheel Kirpalani, Benjamin Finestone, Deborah Newman, Daniel Holzman, Lindsay Weber)

  • Ad Hoc Senior Notes Group

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss)

    • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

  • Ad Hoc Committee of Frontier Noteholders

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Michael Price)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group of Subsidiary Debtholders

    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Amy Caton, Douglas Mannal, Stephen Zide, Megan Wasson)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Richard Newman)

    • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC (Elizabeth LaPuma)

🍿New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.🍿

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.

February 18, 2020

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”) filed prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware; they are manufacturers of luxury seating products for movie theaters. Here’s the problem: end user customers stopped ordering their stuff. Yup, that’s right, there’s a finite market for luxury seating in movie theaters. Who knew?

Here are some of the problems this company confronted:

• They made chairs that were too good. That’s right. Too good. The chairs had a longer lifecycle than the company likely wanted. Either that or people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

• Movie theaters slowed down their renovation activities and construction of new locations. Perhaps people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

• Movie theaters reduced capital investment — mostly because they haven’t exactly performed very well themselves and have their own debt and equityholders to contend with. Also, people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

• They conquered the total addressable market, securing 70% market share with little to no room to grow thanks to all of the foregoing bulletpoints.

Are we being too flip about $NFLX? Well, don’t take our word for it. Here’s the company explaining one of the reasons why it’s in trouble:

“Continued proliferation of online streaming services and alternative viewing experiences, which has led to declining movie attendance, a poor outlook sentiment for the overall U.S. movie theatre industry and particularly put significant pressure on the stock price of AMC, a key customer for the Company.”

Because of all of the foregoing factors, the debtors triggered an event of default under their first lien credit agreement and have been in a state of forbearance with their lenders ever since — all with the hope of negotiating an out-of-court restructuring transaction.

That hope was extinguished when Odeon reduced seating orders, napalming everyone’s financial models upon which the proposed out-of-court transaction was premised. Now we’re in prepackaged bankruptcy territory with a restructuring support agreement that will shed $178mm of debt and infuses the company with a $33mm DIP credit facility — of which $13mm is new money and $20mm is a roll-up of prepetition debt. Here is the pre-petition capital structure:

The liquidity is highly necessary. The debtors are burning cash like Rick Dalton burns interlopers bursting into his Hollywood Hills mansion. The debtors filed for bankruptcy with just $1mm in liquidity remaining.

Speaking of burning cash, that’s pretty much what you can say about the $200-or-so-million that previously went into these debtors. The restructuring support agreement will (a) convert first lien loans to preferred and common equity, (b) donut the second lien claims, and (c) donut the general unsecured claimants (unless they opt-in to a release, in which case they’ll get $5k). Critical to everything is the fact that HIG Capital LLC, the existing shareholder in the company, will write a new-money check of $7mm and enter in a management services agreement with the reorganized newco. In exchange for this investment, HIG will get preferred equity and 51% of the common equity.* Everyone is going to be holding their breath for the next 6 weeks, hoping that no other large chains cancel or downsize orders. If that happens, this deal could blow up.

*Suffering PTSD from the last-minute collapse of the out-of-court deal, HIG also negotiated the ability to walk if the debtors have less than $1.5mm of available unrestricted cash on the “Exit Date.”

---

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi, Christine Pirro Schwarzman) & Bayard PA (Erin Fay, Daniel Brogan, Gregory Flasser)

  • Independent Director: Michael Foreman

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Stephen Spitzer)

  • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • First Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

    • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners LP

  • Second Lien Agent & Second Lien Lenders: Oaktree Fund Administration LLC

    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Ginsburg, Joanne Lau) and Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Matthew Lunn, Edmon Morton, Betsy Feldman)

  • Sponsor: HIG Capital LLC & HIG Middle Market LBO Fund II LP

    • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Brooks Gruemmer, Jay Kapp)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - RentPath Holdings Inc.

RentPath Holdings Inc.

February 12, 2020

RentPath Holdings Inc. and eleven affiliated entities (the “debtors”), a digital marketing solutions enterprise that links property managers with prospective renters to simplify the residential rental experience, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. The business did $226.7mm of revenue in fiscal 2019 and had EBITDA of $46.8mm.

Where there’s money there’s competition. Where there’s competition, revenue maintenance becomes more challenging. And because of that competition, the debtors were forced to up their marketing spend and promotional activity which dented liquidity. A lack of liquidity presents some really big problems when your annual interest expense is $54.4mm on approximately $700mm of funded debt. For the math challenged, $46.8mm against approximately $700mm of funded debt means that this sucker has a leverage ratio of approximately 15. Or as President Trump would say, “It’s UUUUUUUUUUUGE.” Clearly that is unsustainable AF.

The good news is that the debtors have found themselves a potential buyer, CSGP Holdings LLC, an affiliate of CoStar Group Inc. ($CSGP), which has come forward with a $587.5mm cash bid (plus the assumption of certain liabilities) for the debtors’ assets. The debtors hope to consummate the sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization. To get there and fund the cases in the interim, the debtors obtained a fully-backstopped commitment of $74.1mm in DIP financing from certain members of the crossholder ad hoc committee and other first lien lenders.

• Jurisdiction: (Judge Shannon)

• Capital Structure: $37.95mm First Lien Revolving Facility, $479.75mm First Lien Term Loan, $170mm Second Lien Term Loan

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, David Griffiths, Andriana Georgallas, Gaby Smith, Alexander Cohen, Kyle Satterfield, Justin Pitcher, Leslie Liberman, Martha Martir, Richard Slack, Amanda Burns Shulak) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFrancheschi, Zachary Shapiro)

  • Independent Director: Marc Beilinson, Dhiren Fonseca

  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent & First Lien Agent:

    • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Michael Baker, Shekhar Kumar)

  • Successor Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Marie Polito Hofsdal) & Ashby & Geddes PA (William Bowden, Gregory Taylor)

  • Crossholder Ad Hoc Committee

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Evan Fleck, Nelly Almeida, Andrew Harmeyer) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona)

  • Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Philip Dublin, Rachel Biblo Block) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona)

  • Stalking Horse Purchaser: CSGP Holdings LLC (CoStar Group Inc.)

    • Legal: Jones Day (Daniel Moss, Nicholas Morin) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill)

  • Large Equityholders: Providence Equity & TPG

    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (David Meyer)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Hexion Holdings LLC

Hexion Holdings LLC

April 1, 2019

What we appreciate that and, we hope thanks to PETITION, others will eventually come to appreciate, is that there is a lot to learn from the special corporate law, investment banking, advisory, and investing niche labeled “restructuring” and “distressed investing.” Here, Ohio-based Hexion Holdings LLC is a company that probably touches our lives in ways that most people have no knowledge of: it produces resins that “are key ingredients in a wide variety of industrial and consumer goods, where they are often employed as adhesives, as coatings and sealants, and as intermediates for other chemical applications.” These adhesives are used in wind turbines and particle board; their coatings prevent corrosion on bridges and buildings. You can imagine a scenario where, if Washington D.C. can ever get its act together and get an infrastructure bill done, Hexion will have a significant influx of revenue.

Not that revenue is an issue now. It generated $3.8b in 2018, churning out $440mm of EBITDA. And operational performance is on the upswing, having improved 21% YOY. So what’s the problem? In short, the balance sheet is a hot mess.* Per the company:

“…the Debtors face financial difficulties. Prior to the anticipated restructuring, the Debtors are over nine times levered relative to their 2018 adjusted EBITDA and face annual debt service in excess of $300 million. In addition, over $2 billion of the Debtors’ prepetition funded debt obligations mature in 2020. The resulting liquidity and refinancing pressures have created an unsustainable drag on the Debtors and, by extension, their Non-Debtor Affiliates, requiring a comprehensive solution.”

This is what that capital structure looks like:

(PETITION Note: if you’re wondering what the eff is a 1.5 lien note, well, welcome to the party pal. These notes are a construct of a frothy high-yield market and constructive readings of credit docs. They were issued in 2017 to discharge maturing notes. The holders thereof enjoy higher priority on collateral than the second lien notes and other junior creditors below, but slot in beneath the first lien notes).

Anyway, to remedy this issue, the company has entered into a support agreement “that enjoys the support of creditors holding a majority of the debt to be restructured, including majorities within every tier of the capital structure.” The agreement would reduce total funded debt by $2b by: (a) giving the first lien noteholders $1.45b in cash (less adequate protection payments reflecting interest on their loans), and 72.5% of new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering at a significant discount to a total enterprise value of $3.1b; and (b) the 1.5 lien noteholders, the second lien noteholders and the unsecured noteholders 27.5% of the new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering. The case will be funded by a $700mm DIP credit facility.

*Interestingly, Hexion is a derivative victim of the oil and gas downturn. In 2014, the company was selling resin coated sand to oil and gas businesses to the tune of 8% of sales and 28% of segment EBITDA. By 2016, segment EBITDA dropped by approximately $150mm, a sizable loss that couldn’t be offset by other business units.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Andrew Parlan, Hugh Murtagh, Caroline Reckler, Jason Gott, Lisa Lansio, Blake Denton, Andrew Sorkin, Christopher Harris) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Amanda Steele, Brendan Schlauch)

  • Managers: Samuel Feinstein, William Joyce, Robert Kaslow-Ramos, George F. Knight III, Geoffrey Manna, Craig Rogerson, Marvin Schlanger, Lee Stewart

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders (Angelo Gordon & Co. LP, Aristeia Capital LLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Beach Point Capital Management LP, Capital Research and Management Company, Citadel Advisors LLC, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, DoubleLine Capital LP, Eaton Vance Management, Federated Investment Counseling, GoldenTree Asset Management LP, Graham Capital Management LP, GSO Capital Partners LP, Heyman Enterprise LLC, Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management LLC, OSK VII LLC, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Silver Rock Financial LP, Sound Point Capital Management LP, Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP, UBS Securities LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Daniel Fisher, Naomi Moss, Abid Qureshi)

    • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Noteholders (Aegon USA Investment Management LLC, Aurelius Capital Master Ltd., Avenue Capital Management II LP, Avenue Europe International Management, Benefit Street Partners LLC, Cyrus Capital Partners LP, KLS Diversified Asset Management LLC, Loomis Sayles & Company LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, New Generation Advisors LLC, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP)

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Samuel Khalil, Matthew Brod)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group of 1.5 Lien Noteholders

    • Legal: Jones Day (Sidney Levinson, Jeremy Evans)

  • Pre-petition RCF Agent & Post-petition DIP Agent ($350mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

  • Trustee under the First Lien Notes: U.S. Bank NA

    • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Kristin Elliott) & (local) Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

  • Trustee of 1.5 Lien Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP

  • Trustee of Borden Indentures: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Sponsor: Apollo

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Agrium US, Inc.; The Bank of New York Mellon; Mitsubishi Gas Chemical America; PVS Chloralkali, Inc.; Southern Chemical Corporation; Wilmington Trust; Wilmington Savings Fund Society; and Blue Cube Operations LLC

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Kenneth Eckstein, Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer) & (local) Bayard PA (Scott Cousins, Erin Fay, Gregory Flasser)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Samuel Star)

Updated:

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LBI Media Inc.

LBI Media Inc.

November 21, 2018

Happy Thanksgiving y’all!! LBI Media Inc. and several affiliates FINALLY filed for bankruptcy today in the District of Delaware after years of questions about its financial health. The company is a privately held minority-owned Spanish-language broadcaster that owns or licenses 27 Spanish-language television and radio stations in the largest US markets; it services the largest media markets in the nation, including Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, Miami, Houston and Dallas. It is also a victim of disruption.

The company notes that it has “faced the market pressures that have broadly affected U.S. television and radio broadcasters, including the 2008 recession and the diversion of advertising spend by companies to digital media.” Insert Facebook Inc. ($FB) here. That’s not all, though, of course: the company is also hampered by “a substantial debt load and corresponding interest expense obligations” which has stunted LBI’s financial performance, ability to invest and grow, and liquidity.

To address this situation, the company obtained an investment from its now-DIP lender, HPS Investment Partners, in April 2018 for a new first lien credit facility. This provided the company with much needed liquidity and, in turn, briefly extended the company’s runway out of bankruptcy court. The “make-whole” provision attached to the facility, however, became the subject of much controversy and an ad hoc group of second lien noteholders sued in New York state court for an injunction to hinder the transaction. Ultimately, the state court denied the noteholders.

But…but…the noteholders persisted. And this, apparently, left a bitter taste in the mouth’s of company management (and its counsel). Junior Noteholders, meet bus. 🚌🚌 The company notes:

Following the closing of the transaction, LBI sought to continue its growth efforts. However, such efforts were weakened by the Junior Noteholder Group, which continued to litigate against the Company, its founder and CEO, and HPS, the Company’s sole senior lender. The Junior Noteholder Group commenced multiple lawsuits, and threatened several more, distracting management from operations. These actions and threats not only hindered the Debtors’ efforts to improve their operations, but certain actions, including seeking to enjoin the first lien financing, risked pushing LBI into a precipitous freefall bankruptcy.

When coupled with the Debtors’ tightening liquidity (which was exacerbated by the expense of the Junior Noteholder Group litigation), the Junior Noteholder Group’s actions made it substantially more difficult for LBI to achieve the growth it had hoped for, and the Company determined that a comprehensive reorganization may be necessary.

Thereafter, settlement talks with the Junior Noteholders proved unsuccessful and, now, therefore, the company marches into bankruptcy court with a Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”) in hand with HPS whereby, subject to a “fiduciary out,” HPS will serve as (prearranged but hardly set in stone) Plan sponsor and swap its $233mm first lien senior secured notes for a majority equity interest in the company. The Plan — which at the time of this writing isn’t on the docket yet — reportedly provides for recoveries for other “supporting” constituencies. What’s that we hear? IT’S A (DEATH) TRAP!?!

(PETITION NOTE: for the uninitiated, a “death trap plan” is an inartful term for when the Debtor proposes and the senior lenders allows a recovery to trickle down the “priority waterfall” to junior lenders but only on account of said junior lenders’ support of, or vote for, the proposed Plan. In essence, its consideration for dispensing with “holdup value.” A “fiduciary out” gives the Debtor flexibility to, despite the RSA, agree to an alternative transaction that bests the HPS transaction without penalty or the need to pay a “break-up fee.”).

The plan provides the company with 75-day period to run a marketing process. While the company will market the company to potential strategic and financial investors, it is also making overtures to the Junior Noteholders to take out HPS’ claim(s) (without needing to satisfy the make-whole) and become the Plan sponsor such that it could walk away with 100% equity in the company.

All of which is to say: don’t let the terms “RSA” and “Plan” fool you. This is far from a consensual case being presented to the Bankruptcy Court Judge wrapped up in a shiny bow. The Junior Noteholders have been fighting the company and HPS for months: there is no reason to suspect that that will stop now merely because the company is a chapter 11 debtor.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Lane)

• Capital Structure: $233mm 10% ‘23 senior secured notes, $262mm 11.5/13.5 ‘20 PIK toggle second priority secured notes, $27.95mm 11% ‘22 PIK unsecured Intermediate senior Holdco notes (TMI Trust Company), $8.46mm 11% ‘17 unsecured Holdco notes (U.S. Bank NA)    

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Garrett Fail, David J. Cohen) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi)

  • Board of Directors: Jose Liberman, Lenard Liberman, Winter Horton, Rockard Delgadillo, Peter Connoy, Neal Goldman

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC

  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition First Lien & DIP Lender: HPS Investment Partners LLC ($38mm)

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jeffrey Safferstein, Sarah Harnett) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, M. Blake Cleary)

  • First Lien Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster (Jonathan Levine) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (William Bowden)

  • Collateral Trustee for First Lien Notes: Credit Suisse AG

    • Legal: Locke Lorde LLP (Juliane Dziobak)

  • Ad Hoc Group of (Junior) Second Lien Noteholders

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Rachel Strickland)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Holdco Noteholders

    • Legal: Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Matthew McGuire)

Updated 11/21/18 at 8:27 CT

🔥New Chapter 11 Filing - Westmoreland Coal Company🔥

Westmoreland Coal Company

October 9, 2018

In our April piece entitled "🌑Trouble Brews in Coal Country🌑," we noted how Westmoreland Coal Company ($WLB) was headed towards a bankruptcy filing. Subsequently, in May, the company obtained a small round of financing ($90mm) to bridge itself to a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Alas, we're upon that filing — a “Chapter 33,” of sorts, for good measure.

And it’s an…interesting…one. The company’s First Day Declaration leads with “What is Coal” and then goes on to mansplain what coal is. It’s beautiful. It’s educational. It’s…odd. Per the Declaration:

Coal is a fossil fuel that forms from the remains of vegetation as long as 400 million years ago. The plants from eons ago captured energy through photosynthesis to create compounds (carbon) in plant tissue. When those plants and trees died, they ultimately sank to the bottom of swamps and formed a dense material called peat, which progressively carbonized under the earth’s pressure and changing temperatures and eventually became a combustible sedimentary and metamorphic rock, which is referred to as coal.

There are at least four ranks of coal, depending on the carbon content: lignite; subbituminous; bituminous; and anthracite. Some estimate that 90 percent of the coal in America is bituminous (i.e., soft) coal, which is primarily used to make electricity through combustion in boilers to make steam that is used to generate power (called steam or thermal coal) and coke for the steel industry (metallurgical or coking coal). The Debtors mine lignite, subbituminous, and bituminous coal.

We are thankful for the explanation. After all, there haven’t been many opportunities over the last decade to explore the intersection of coal and bankruptcy. Oh…wait. Hang on. Right. Ok, sure, there was Peabody Energy. Ah, yeah, and Alpha Natural Resources. And Edison Mission Energy, Patriot Coal (x2), Walter Energy, Arch Coal, Xinergy, Armstrong Energy and James River Coal. To name a few. But we digress.

Anyway, THIS bankruptcy implicates Westmoreland (with affiliates, “WLB”), a thermal coal producer that sells coal to “investment grade power plants under long-term cost-protected contracts, as well as to industrial customers and barbeque charcoal manufacturers.” The company’s mines are located in Montana, North Dakota, Texas, Ohio and New Mexico, of which only 4 of a total of 23 are active. The company’s strategy generally revolves around focusing on coal markets where the company can leverage geographic proximity to power plants, some of which were specifically designed to use the company’s coal. Close proximity also permits the company to avoid onerous transportation costs, which, in turn, provides the company with flexibility to be a low(er) cost provider. There is a bit of an export business as well.

The problem is that “[t]he American coal industry is intensely competitive.” The company adds:

In addition to competition from other coal producers, the Debtors compete with producers of alternative fuels used for electrical power generation, such as nuclear energy, natural gas, hydropower, petroleum, solar, and wind. Costs and other factors such as safety, environmental, and regulatory considerations related to alternative fuels affect the overall demand for coal as a fuel. Political dynamics in the United States and Canada have additionally resulted in a reduction of the market demand for coal-based energy solutions.

Tack on a hefty chunk of debt:

And then mix in that the company is (i) subject to 7 collective bargaining agreements and, (ii) in addition to a multi-employer pension plan, that it also provides defined benefit pension plans to qualified employees — which, naturally, are underfunded by approximately $29mm and carry a termination liability of approximately $77.3mm. But wait, there’s more. The company also has, among other things, approximately (i) $1.3mm in retiree medical obligations, (ii) $18.2mm in federal regulatory Black Lung Act obligations, (iii) $334mm of “other post-employment benefit” obligations and (iv) asset retirement obligations of approximately $474.5mm. Why anyone would want to get into the coal business is beyond us. That all sounds outright depressing.

The company blames the following for its bankruptcy filing: (a) a challenging macro environment (⬇️ production and ⬇️demand); (b) a capital intensive business model; (c) the rise of natural gas as a lower cost alternative to coal (score one for the frackers!); and (d) regulation which, as you can see from the panoply of liabilities noted above, helps create a quite a heavy hitter lineup of economic obligations. Per the company:

When coupled with the external pricing pressure, increased regulation, political opposition to coal in the United States and Canada, and other costs associated with WLB’s businesses, these liabilities have hindered WLB’s ability to operate competitively in the current market environment.

And so the company has filed its chapter 11 bankruptcy with the consent of 76% of its term lenders, 57.9% of its senior secured noteholders and 79.1% of its bridge lenders to pursue a dual-track sale of its core assets to an entity to be formed on behalf of the senior secured noteholders and term lenders, subject to highest or best offers for the core assets at an auction. The sale will be consummated through a plan to, among other things, preserve tax benefits. The company will also continue to market its non-core assets. Likewise, the master limited partnership 94% owned by the company (“WMLP”) is for sale. Notably, with no prospect of a restructuring on the horizon, there is no deal in place with the unions and retirees and WLB may have to proceed on a non-consensual basis.

The company marched in to court with a commitment for a $110mm DIP. It will roll-up the bridge loan and fund the cases while the sale processes progress.

Update: In “Grocery Workers, Miners, and Who Ain’t Getting Paid (Short #MAGA),” we noted how coal miners employed by Westmoreland Coal Company were, due to a recent decision by Judge Jones in the Southern District of Texas, in for a world of hurt. Now the company has officially filed its motion seeking to reject certain collective bargaining agreements and modify certain retiree benefits pursuant to sections 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code. #MAGA!!

Update: On January 21, 2019, the company filed a “Notice of Cancellation of Auction and Designation of Successful Bidder” after the company didn’t receive any qualified bids for its core assets other than the original stalking horse bid. The company’s Buckingham Mine, a non-core asset, did, in contrast, receive some interest and the company, therefore, will seek to sell that mine in due time.

• Jurisdiction: S.D of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Edward Sassower, Stephen Hessler, Michael Slade, Greg Pesce, Anna Rotman, Christopher Koenig, Gerardo Mijares-Shafai, Timothy Bow) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh)

  • Legal Conflicts Counsel to Westmoreland Resource Partners LP and the Conflicts Committee of the Board of Directors of Westmoreland Resources GP LLC: Jones Day (Heather Lennox, Timothy Hoffman, Oliver Zeltner)

  • Financial Advisor to Westmoreland Resource Partners LP and the Conflicts Committee of the Board of Directors of Westmoreland Resources GP LLC: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Robert Campagna)

  • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners LLC (Marc Puntus)

  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. (*click on company name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • WMLP Ad Hoc Group

    • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (David Hillman, Kristine Manoukian, Lucy Kweskin, Kelly Knight) & (local) Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain, Mark Mintz)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc.

  • Administrative Agent under Bridge Loan & DIP Agreements: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & (local) Okin Adams LLP (Matthew Okin, David Curry Jr.)

  • WMB Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Thomas Mayer, Stephen Zide)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Todd Goren, Jennifer Marines, Dimitra Doufekias) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Michael Warner, Felice Yudkin, Nicholas Brannick, Benjamin Wallen)

  • United States Trustee

    • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (M. Natasha Labovitz, Erica Weisgerber) & (local) Zach Clement PLLC

New Chapter 11 Filing - R.E. Gas Development LLC (a/k/a Rex Energy)

R.E. Gas Development LLC

5/18/18

Pennsylvania-based R.E. Gas Development LLC and its affiliates are independent publicly-traded ($REXX) oil and gas companies operating in the Appalachian Basin with a focus on drilling and exploration activity in the Marcellus Shale, Utica Shale and Upper Devonian Shale, mostly throughout Western Pennsylvania. Like most other exploration and production companies that have found their way in bankruptcy court over the last several years, the sudden steep decline in crude oil and nat gas prices that began in 2014 significantly affected the company's liquidity and ability to manage its balance sheet. After all, this company isn't operating in the Permian. Revenues for 2017 were $205.3 million. 

After months and months of foreplay, the company enters bankruptcy court with a restructuring support agreement ("RSA") in tow: it provides for a dual path pursuant to which the company will, in agreement with its secured lenders, pursue a sale of substantially all assets or, in the absence of qualified bids, pursue a plan process pursuant to which the first lien lenders (i.e., Angelo Gordon) will swap (DIP) debt for equity in the reorganized company. The RSA purportedly has the support of 100% of the first lien lenders and 71.8% of the outstanding second lien notes.

To fund the company throughout the dual process, the company seeks a $411 million DIP credit facility, the proceeds of which will be used to (i) roll up $261 million of prepetition loans and (ii) settle the "makewhole provision" under the first lien credit agreement to the tune of $50 million. The makewhole was put into place at the time of the issuance of the first lien loan just short of a year ago.  For the uninitiated, the makewhole entitles the lender to certain economics in the event the lenders are "repaid in whole or in part prior to the maturity date or the outstanding indebtedness under the facility is accelerated for any reason." The economics are calculated "based on the sum of remaining interest payments and certain fees due on all loans for the remainder of the make whole period, which terminates on October 28, 2019." In other words, Angelo Gordon structured this to give themselves the utmost economics in the (highly likely) case of an event of default and eventual bankruptcy. Solid planning on their part -- assuming, in particular, that the assets fetch a purchase price that will clear the first lien debt and makewhole amount. Respect. 

So, lo and behold, there was an event of default called in February for failure to deliver quarterly financial statements (which led to other defaults as well). In April, the lenders, after a short forbearance period, issued a notice of acceleration. Cha ching! Makewhole!!

The DIP credit agreement imposes fairly expedited -- but not wholly unreasonable (relative to other recent cases) -- timing on the company, including closing of any sale or confirmation of a plan 170 days after the filing date. 

• Jurisdiction: W.D. of Pennsylvania (Judge Deller)
• Capital Structure: see below.
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Tom Howley, Michael Cohen, Anna Kordas, Rachel Biblo Block) & (local) Buchanan Ingersoll and Rooney PC (James Newell, Timothy Palmer, Tyler Dischinger)
  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Albert Conly)
  • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners (Alexander Tracy)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Prepetition First Lien Admin Agent: Angelo Gordon Energy Servicer
    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Michael Torkin) & (local) Duane Morris LLP
    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners
  • Informal Group of 1%/8% Senior Secured Second Lien Notes due 2020 of Rex Energy Corporation
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Michael Stamer, Meredith Lahaie, Stephen Kuhn, Kevin Zuzolo) and (local) Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Maura McIntyre)
    • Financial Advisor: Stephens Inc.
  • Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, Daniel Harris) & (local) Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Maura McIntyre)
  • BOKF, National Association
    • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, George Angelich, Jordana Renert) & (local) Federic Dorwart, Lawyers PLLC (Samuel Ory)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Stark, Chelsea Mullarney, Sigmund Wissner-Gross, Brian Rice, Steven Pohl, Andrew Carty, Bennett Silverberg, Chelsea Mullarney, Emily Koruda, Justin Cunningham) & (local) Leech Tishman Fuscaldo & Lampl LLC (Patrick Carothers, David Lampl, John Steiner)
    • Financial Advisor: Conway MacKenzie Inc. (John Young Jr.)

Source: First Day Declaration

New Chapter 11 Filing - FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. 

March 31, 2018

#MAGA!!

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. ("FES"), the wholly-owned subsidiary of publicly-traded (non-debtor) FirstEnergy Corp. has filed a "freefall" bankruptcy in the Northern District of Ohio. FES is a provider of "unregulated"-yet-regulated energy-related products and services to retail and wholesale customers primarily in Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania. It owns and operates (a) fossil generating facilities (read: coal) in Ohio (three) and Philadelphia (one) through its FirstEnergy Generation subsidiary ("FG") and, (b) 3 nuclear generating facilities (two in Ohio and one in Philadelphia)through its FirstEnergy Nuclear Generation LLC ("NG") subsidiary. 

For those of you who aren't power geeks - and we confess that we are not - this filing gives a pretty solid primer on how United States' power production and distribution works. Or doesn't work - depending on your point of view, we suppose. We summarize some high points here but if you're especially nerdy and want to understand the power industry better, read docket number 55. You can find it via the case name link above. 

A big piece of this bankruptcy filing is the debtors' retail electricity business. Retail sellers of electricity are subject to state-applied "Renewable Portfolio Standards" ("RPS") that requires sellers to obtain a certain percentage or amount of its power supply from renewable energy sources. One way to comply is through the purchase of renewable energy credits ("RECs"). Historically, FES has obtained RECs to comply with the RPS via eight power purchase agreements entered into between 2003-2011 with various wind and solar power producers. But apparently things have changed considerably since then. And FES no longer wants the RECs. 

What's changed? Now FES's actual and projected sales are much lower. Per the company in more detail: 

"The main drivers to the collapse in prices include:

• Lower natural gas prices due to continued improvements in natural gas fracking;

• Excess generating capacity due in part to lower than expected load growth;

• Lower cost of construction for renewable technologies, and/or improved performance (e.g., higher capacity factors); and

• Surplus of RECs."

Also, future market prices and outlook for power and RECs are projected materially lower. RPS mandates are less demanding (#MAGA!!). And the supply of RECs is significantly greater. Said another way: energy disruption. From frackers pushing a rapid expansion in nat gas supplies which, in turn, caused plummeting electricity prices and reduced profits. From regulation and the rise of renewables. From energy efficient electronics. 

Per the company, "While the PPAs made sense to FES at the time they were entered into, a dramatic downturn in the energy market and prices of RECs now renders these contracts extremely burdensome and uneconomic to FES." They're also, according to the debtor, unnecessary: FES is phasing out its retail business and, today, expects to sell less than half of the amount of power this year that it sold in 2013. Consequently, FES seeks to reject those PPAs in bankruptcy.

Which is not the only PPA it seeks to reject. The debtor also seeks to shed its multi-party intercompany PPA pursuant to which it and several other power companies purchase power generated via fossil fuel from the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation ("OVEC"). The debtor alleges that this obligation is priced at above-market rates. And because FES sells very little wholesale power emanating out of the OVEC PPA, it stands to lose approximately $268 million from the deal. Yikes. 

The issue, though, is whether the rejection of the nine PPAs will cause disruption to the continued supply of wholesale electricity or impact the reliability of the transmission grid in the regional transmission organization that governs FES and FG. That generally means YOUR electricity - if you live in the Northeast. Naturally, the debtor argues it won't. The federal government may think otherwise. And this is precisely why the company filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to prevent the feds from hindering -- on the basis of the Federal Power Act -- the company's attempts to reject the PPAs under the federal bankruptcy code. FERC regulates the wholesale power market. It is also why the company has filed a request for assistance from Rick Perry, President Trump's Energy Secretary. This is some real dramatic sh*t folks: a conflict between federal statutes with efforts for executive branch intervention. Someone dial up Daniel Day-Lewis and bring him out of retirement: this could be the next "Lincoln." 

So, in a nutshell: the company filed for bankruptcy because it needs to leverage the bankruptcy code's debtor-friendly provisions to shed some burdensome contracts - including the PPAs. It also needs to address its cost structure, its over-levered balance sheet (in terms of interest payments and near-term maturities), and lease payments under certain sale-leaseback arrangements related to one of its power facilities. Said another way, this is a full-stop restructuring: both operational and financial in nature. There is a "Process Support Agreement" with various parties in interest which reflects a good faith commitment to cooperate on first day motions, implementation of employee retention and severance programs, and establishing a protocol for the disposition of company assets. Sounds great but it doesn't really promise any certainty given the various claims and regulatory issues. Buckle your seat belts. 

Some additional things of note:

• "Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in!" (Long Don Corleone). Ironically in the week that Westinghouse Electric Corp. emerged out of its own bankruptcy proceeding, it may now find itself back in bankruptcy court for purposes of adjudicating its $2.36 million trade claim.
• Coal (#MAGA!!). A first order of business is the debtor is seeking to reject its coal transportation agreements with BNSF Railway Company ((owned by Berkshire Hathaway ($BRK.A)) and Norfolk Southern Railway Company ($NSC). Why? It expects to order 200,000 tons of coal less than the 2.5 million tons of coal minimum requirement delineated in the contract. The debtor claims that rejection of the contract will save it $105.6 million over the next 12 months as it replaces rail with barge transportation. 
• Commodities. The company also seeks to reject certain uranium supply contracts because (i) it already has enough uranium inventory for the rest of 2018 and 2019, (ii) the spot price for uranium has dropped precipitously since entering into the agreements (from $36 and $48 per pound, respectively, to $22 per pound), and (iii) there is "ample supply of uranium available in the market." 
• Professional Retentions: Two law firms represent the Ad Hoc Group of Holders of the 6.85% Pass Through Certificates due 2034 because George Davis departed O'Melveny & Myers LLP for Latham & Watkins LLP. 

• Jurisdiction: N.D. of Ohio (Judge Koschik)
• Capital Structure: $3.8 billion funded debt     

  • FES

    • $700 million secured revolving credit facility, ~$332 million of '21 6.05% unsecured notes; (c) ~$363 million of '39 6.80% unsecured notes; and (d) $150 million revolving credit note with Allegheny Energy Supply Company, LLC under which $102 million is currently outstanding and is due on April 2, 2018. 

  • FG

    • ~$328 million of secured fixed-rate pollution control revenue notes ("PCNs"); ~$677 million of unsecured fixed-rate PCNs

  • NG

    • ~$285 million of secured PCNs; ~$842 million of unsecured PCNs

• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Lisa Beckerman, Brad Kahn, Scott Alberino, Kate Doorley, David Applebaum, Todd Brecher, Sean O'Donnell, Rachel Presa, Brian Carney, Abid Qureshi, Joseph Sorkin, David Zensky) & (local) Brouse McDowell LPA (Marc Merklin, Kate Bradley, Bridget Franklin) & (conflicts) Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Charles Moore)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Ltd. 
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Special Nuclear Regulatory Counsel: Hogan Lovells US LLP
  • Industry Consultants: ICF International Inc.
  • Special Litigation Counsel: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
  • Tax Consultant: KPMG US LLP
  • Communications Consultant: Sitrick and Company
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Board of Directors of FirstEnergy Corp. 
    • Legal: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP (Stephen Lerner, Peter Morrison, Julia Furlong)
  • Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    • Legal: KIlpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, Michael Langford) & (local) McDonald Hopkins LLC (Michael Kaczka, Scott Opincar, Maria Carr)
  • Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.
  • Indenture Trustee to PCNs: UMB Bank, National Association
  • Ad Hoc Group of Holders of the 6.85% Pass Through Certificates due 2034
    • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Latham & Watkins LLP
    • Financial Advisor: Guggenheim Partners LLC
  • Ad Hoc Group of Holders of PCNs issued by FG and NG
    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 
    • Financial Advisor: GLC Advisors & Co.
  • Contract Counterparty: BNSF Railway Company
    • Legal: Whitmer & Eherman LLC (Mary Whitmer, James Ehrman, Robert Stefancin)
  • Non-debtor Parent: FirstEnergy Corp.
    • Legal: Jones Day (Heather Lennox, Thomas Wilson)

New Chapter 11 Filing - iHeartMedia Inc.

iHeartMedia Inc.

3/14/18

iHeartMedia Inc., a leading global media company specializing in radio, outdoor, mobile, social, live media, on-demand entertainment and more, has filed for bankruptcy -- finally succumbing to its $20 billion of debt ($16 billion funded) and $1.4 billion of cash interest in 2017. WOWSERS. The company purports to have "an agreement in principle with the majority of [its] creditors and [its] financial sponsors that reflects widespread support across the capital structure for a comprehensive plan to restructure...$10 billion..." of debt.

The company notes $3.6 billion of revenue and unparalleled monthly reach ((we'll have more to say about this in this Sunday's Members-only newsletter (3/18/18) - this claim deserves an asterisk)). 

Still, as it also notes, the company faces significant headwinds. It states in its First Day Declaration,

"Among other factors, the global economic downturn that began in 2008 resulted in a decline in advertising and marketing spending by the Debtors’ customers, which resulted in a corresponding decline in advertising revenues across the Debtors’ business. Then, as the economy recovered, the Debtors’ industry faced new and intense competition from the rapidly-growing internet and digital advertising industry and the entry of on-demand streaming services, both of which siphoned off the share of advertiser revenues allocated by agencies and brands to broadcast radio. The Debtors have taken various operational steps to stem the negative effect of these trends; among other initiatives, the Debtors have successfully developed emerging platforms including its industry-leading iHeartRadio digital platform and nationally-recognized iHeartRadio-branded live events that are audio and video streamed and televised nationwide."

The company ought to expect these trends to continue.

Large creditors include Cumulus Media Inc. (~$5.6 million...yikes) and Spotify (~$2 million).  

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
• Capital Structure:    

• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Brian Wolfe, William Guerrieri, Christopher Marcus, Stephen Hackney, Richard U.S. Howell, Benjamin Rhode, AnnElyse Gibbons) & Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)
  • Financial Advisor to the Company: Moelis & Co. 
    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Caroline Reckler, Matthew Warren)
  • Restructuring Advisor to the Company: Alvarez & Marsal LLC
  • Legal for the Independent Directors: Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Kevin Allred, Seth Goldman, Thomas Walper, John Spiegel)
  • Financial Advisor to the Independent Directors: Perella Weinberg Partners LP
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Large Equity Holders: Bain Capital & Thomas H. Lee Partners
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Christopher Lopez, Gabriel Morgan)
  • Potential Buyer: Liberty Media Corporation & Sirius XM Holdings Inc.
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Stephen Karotkin, Ray Schrock, Alfredo Perez)
  • Successor Trustee for the 6.875% '18 Senior Notes and 7.25% '27 Senior Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Jason Zakia, Erin Rosenberg, J. Christopher Shore, Harrison Denman, Michele Meises, Mark Franke, Michael Garza) & Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Matthew Silverman) & (local) Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP (Robin Russell, Timothy A. Davidson II, Ashley Harper)
  • Successor Trustee for the 11.25% '21 Priority Guaranty Notes
    • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Benjamin Feder, Kristin Elliott)
  • Successor Trustee for the 14.00% Senior Notes due 2021
    • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright (US) LLP (Jason Boland, Christy Rivera, Marian Baldwin Fuerst)
  • Term Loan/PGN Group
    • Legal: Jones Day (Thomas Howley, Bruce Bennett, Joshua Mester)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Term Loan Lenders
    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Christopher Odell, Hannah Sibiski) 
  • TPG Specialty Lending Inc.
    • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, David Hillman, James Bentley) & (local) Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain, Laura Ashley) 
  • Special Committees of the Board of Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc.
    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Paul Shalhoub, Christopher Koenig, Jennifer Jay Hardy)
  • Ad Hoc Committee of 14% Senior Noteholders of iHeart Communications
    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matt Williams, Keith Martorana, Matthew Porcelli) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Aaron Power, Samuel Spiers)
  • 9.00% Priority Guarantee Notes due 2019 Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA
    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Fliman, Brian Wells) & (local) Haynes and Boone, LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Martha Wyrick, Kelsey Zottnick)
  • Citibank N.A.
    • Legal: Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Levitin, Richard Stieglitz Jr.) & (local) Locke Lord LLP (Berry Spears)
  • Delaware Trust Company
    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Benjamin Finestone, K. John Shaffer, Monica Tarazi, Victor Noskov)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss, Charles Gibbs, Marty Brimmage)

Updated 3/30/18

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Cenveo Inc.

Cenveo Inc.

• 2/2/18 Recap: Publicly-traded ($CVO) large envelope and label manufacturer with roots tracing back 100 years filed for bankruptcy. Interestingly, you, our treasured PETITION readers, probably interact with Cenveo's products in your day-to-day life. Cenveo prints comic books you can buy at the bookstore, produces specialized envelopes used by JPMorgan Chase Bank ($JPM) and American Express ($AMEX) to deliver credit card statements, and manufactures point of sale roll receipts used in cash registers and prescription labels found on medication at national pharmacies. Why did it file for bankruptcy? Disruption. And debt. The company notes that its filing was necessary to tame its burdensome funded debt and corresponding annual $99.4mm debt payments (inclusive of cash and "principle" payments). In light of its leverage, the company apparently also suffered from other pressures on the business, including restrictive trade terms and/or the departure of business from vendors. But, wait! There's more. And its textbook disruption. Per the company, "In addition to Cenveo’s leverage issues, macroeconomic factors, including the introduction of new e-commerce, digital substitution for products, and other technologies, are transforming the industry. Consumers increasingly use the internet and other electronic media to purchase goods and services, pay bills, and obtain electronic versions of printed materials. Moreover, advertisers increasingly use the internet and other electronic media for targeted campaigns directed at specific consumer segments rather than mail campaigns." Ouch. To put it simply, every single time you opt-in for an electronic bank statement, you're f*cking over Cenveo. More from the company, "As society has become increasingly dependent on digital technology products such as laptops, smartphones, and tablet computers, spending on advertising and magazine circulation has eroded, resulting in an overall decline in the demand for paper products, and in-turn lowering reliance on certain of Cenveo’s print marketing business. In addition, there is generally a decline in supply of paper products in the industry, such that only a handful of paper mills control the majority of the paper supply. As a result, paper mills and other vendors that sell paper products have a large amount of leverage over their customers, including Cenveo. The overall decline in the paper industry combined with the diminished supply in paper products has led to overall decline in the industry, dramatically impacting Cenveo’s revenues." Consequently, the company has spent years trying to streamline operations and cut costs: it is not entirely clear from the company's filing, but this disruption clearly led to the "downsizing [of] its workforce," a reduction in its geographic footprint, and asset dispositions. But, ultimately, earnings couldn't manage the balance sheet. The company engaged its various parties in interest and was able to secure a (shaky?) restructuring support agreement and a commitment of financing in the amount of a $190 million ABL DIP Facility provided by the Prepetition ABL Lenders and a new $100 million DIP Term Facility backstopped by more than a majority of the holders of First Lien Notes. It will need to address its underfunded pensions (approximately $92.9mm). 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York 
• Capital Structure: see below.
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jayme Sprayragen, Jonathan Henes, Joshua Sussberg, Michael Slade, Gregory Pesce, Melissa Koss, George Klidonas, Natasha Hwangpo)
  • Financial Advisor: Zolfo Cooper LLC (Eric Koza)
  • Investment Banker: Rothschild Inc. (Neil Augustine, Dan Skolds, Matthew Chou, Philip Engel, Daniel Flanary, Thomas Galluccio, Trip Burke, Farhat Suvhanov)
  • Real Estate Consultants: VanRock Real Estate Consulting LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • New Independent Director: Eugene Davis
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Prepetition ABL Agent; $190mm ABL DIP Facility Agent: Bank of America NA
  • $100mm DIP Term Facility Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
  • FILO Notes Trustee/First Lien Notes Trustee/Second Lien Notes Trustee/Unsecured Notes Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon
    • Legal: Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP (Joseph Schwartz, Curtis Plaza, Tara Schellhorn)
  • FILO Noteholder: Allianz GI US High Yield Fund
  • First Lien and Second Lien Noteholder: Brigade Capital Management, LP
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Michael Stamer, David Zensky, Stephanie Lindemuth, James Savin, Kevin Eide)
  • Ad Hoc Committee of First Lien Noteholders
    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Brett Lawrence, Erez Gilad, Matthew Garofalo, Gabriel Sasson)
    • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC
  • Examiner: Susheel Kirplani
    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Kenneth Rosen, Mary Seymour, Bruce Buechler, Bruce Nathan)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Samuel Star)

Source: DIP Motion

Updated 4/2/18

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Walter Investment Management Corp.

Walter Investment Management Corp. 

• 11/30/17 Recap: Mortgage banking firm focused primarily on the servicing and origination of loans, including forward and reverse loans, has filed a much-anticipated prepackaged bankruptcy with the intention of shedding nearly $800mm of debt from its balance sheet. The company originates "conventional conforming loans eligible for securitization by government-sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or eligible for guarantees by government agencies, such as Ginnie Mae MBSs." If that was painful reading, imagine how the lawyers felt drafting that. Even more painful is understanding that this bankruptcy is directly attributable to decisions the company made in the aftermath of the financial crisis. From 2010 through 2015, the company went on a debt-ridden acquisition spree (including once bankrupt Residential Capital LLC) which just goes to show that, while one's crisis is another's opportunity, one's crisis could be one's crisis. With this deleveraging transaction, the company hopes to be more competitive in the market going forward.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Garrity)

• Capital Structure: $100mm '18 RCF, $1.4b '20 TL (Credit Suisse AG), $540mm 7.875% '21 senior unsecured notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $242mm '19 senior subordinated convertible notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)(public equity: $WAC)

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Matthew Barr, Sunny Singh)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (David Coles)

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Reid Snellenbarger, Jeffrey Levine, Jeffrey Lewis, James Page, Daniel Martin, Derek Kuns)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on case name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Administrative Agent: Credit Suisse AG

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Michelle McGreal)

  • Consenting Term Lenders (Carlson Capital LP, TAO Fund LLC, Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Nuveen, Symphony Asset Management LLC, Eaton Vance Management)

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Gregory Pesce)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

  • Consenting Senior Noteholders (Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, CQS UK LLP, Deer Park Road Management Company LP, Lion Point Capital LP, Oaktree Capital Management LP, Omega Advisors Inc.)

    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Gregory Bray, Haig Maghakian, Rachel Franzoia)

    • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Co.

  • Prepetition Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Patrick Sibley, Seth Lieverman, Matthew Silverman)

  • Prepetition Convertible Notes Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Thompson Hine LLP (Curtis Tuggle)

  • Administrative Agent for DIP Warehouse Facilities: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital LLC

    • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (Gerard Catalanello, Karen Gelernt, James Vincequerra)

  • Fannie Mae

    • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP (Darren Patrick, Steve Warren, Jennifer Taylor)

  • Freddie Mac

    • Legal: McKool Smith (Paul Moak, Kyle Lonergan)

First Day Declaration

Updated 11/30/17 10:05 CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA - Toys "R" Us Inc.

Toys "R" Us Inc.

• 9/19/17 Recap: So. Much. To. Unpack. Here. We've previously discussed the run-up to this massive chapter 11 bankruptcy filing here and here. Still, suffice it to say that, unlike many of the other retailers that have predictably filed for bankruptcy thus far in 2017, this one was different. This one seemingly came out of nowhere - particularly given the proximity to the holiday shopping season. Before we note what this case is, lets briefly cover what it isn't and clear the noise that is pervasive on the likes of Twitter: this is NOT "RIP" Toys "R" Us. We don't get overly sentimental usually but the papers filed with the bankruptcy court were well-written and touching: this is a store, a brand, that means a lot to a lot of people. And it's not going anywhere (the company will have its challenges to assure people that this is the case). This is a financial restructuring not a liquidation: the company simply hasn't been able to evolve while paying $400mm in annual interest expense on over $5b of private equity infused debt. Plain and simple. Yes, there are other challenges (blah blah blah, Amazon), but with that debt overhang, it appears the company hasn't been able to confront them (PETITION side note: an ill-conceived deal with Amazon 18 years ago is mind-blowing when viewed from the perspective of Amazon's long game). With this filing, the company is signaling that the time for short term band-aids to address its capital structure is over. Now, "[t]he time for change, and reinvestment in operations, has come." Decisive. Management isn't messing around anymore. With a reduction in debt, the company will be unshackled and able to focus on "general upkeep and the condition of...stores, [its] inability to provide expedited shipping options, and [its] lack of a subscription-based delivery service." Indeed, the company intends to use a $3.1b debtor-in-possession credit facility to begin investing in modernization immediately.
• Interesting Facts:
  • Toy Manufacturers: Mattel ($MAT)(approx $136mm), Hasbro ($HAB) (approx $59mm) & Lego (approx $31.5mm) are among the top general unsecured creditors of the company. Mattel and Hasbro's stock traded down quite a bit yesterday on the rampant news of this filing. Query whether any of the $325mm of requested critical vendor money will apply to these companies.
  • The Power of the Media (read: NOT "fake news"): This CNBC piece helped push the company into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy professionals were retained in July (or earlier in the case of Lazard) to pursue capital structure solutions. In August the company engaged with some of its lenders. But then "...a news story published on September 6, 2017, reporting that the Debtors were considering a chapter 11 filing, started a dangerous game of dominos: within a week of its publication, nearly 40 percent of the Company’s domestic and international product vendors refused to ship product without cash on delivery, cash in advance, or, in some cases, payment of all outstanding obligations. Further, many of the credit insurers and factoring parties that support critical Toys “R” Us vendors withdrew support. Given the Company’s historic average of 60-day trade terms, payment of cash on delivery would require the Debtors to immediately obtain a significant amount—over $1.0 billion—of new liquidity." 
  • Revenue. The company generates 40% of its annual revenue during the holiday season.
  • Footprint. The company has approximately 1,697 stores and 257 licensed stores in 38 countries, plus additional e-commerce sites in various countries. The company has been shedding burdensome above-market leases and combining its Babies and Toys shops under one roof; it intends to continue its review of its real estate portfolio. Read: there WILL be store closures.
  • Eff the Competition. Toys has some choice words for its competition embedded in its bankruptcy papers; it accuses Walmart ($WMT) and Target ($TGT)(the "big box retailers") of slashing prices on toys and using toys as a loss leader to get bodies in doors; it further notes that "retailers such as Amazon are not concerned with making a profit at this juncture, rendering their pricing model impossible to compete with..." ($AMZN). Yikes. 
  • Experiential Retail. The company intends to invest in the "shopping experience" which will include (i) interactive spaces with rooms to use for parties, (ii) live product demonstrations put on by trained employees, and (iii) the freedom for employees to remove product from boxes to let kids play with the latest toys. And...wait for it...AUGMENTED REALITY. Boom. Toysrus.ar and Toysrus.ai here we come. 
• Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Phillips)
• Capital Structure: see below     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jamie Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Edward Sassower, Chad Husnick, Joshua Sussberg, Robert Britton, Emily Geier) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael A. Condyles, 
    Peter J. Barrett, Jeremy S. Williams) & (Canadian counsel) Goodmans LLP
  • Legal to the Independent Board of Directors: Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Jonathan Goulding, Tom Behnke, Cari Turner, Jim Grover, Arjun Lal, Doug Lewandowski, Bobby Hoernschemeyer, Scott Safron, Kara Harmon, Nick Cherry, Adam Fialkowski)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (David Kurtz)
  • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Communications Consultant: Joele Frank Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
• Other Parties in Interest:
• ABL/FILO DIP Admin Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
  • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Brian Resnick, Eli Vonnegut, Veerle Roovers) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry (Toby) Long III, Justin Paget)
• DIP Admin Agent (Toys DE Inc). NexBank SSB & Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders (Angelo Gordon & Co LP; Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Roystone Capital Management LP, and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP)
  • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus, Neil Chatani) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Bohm, Douglas Foley)
• Ad Hoc Group of Taj Noteholders.
  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Samuel Lovett, Kellie Cairns) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Jennifer Wuebker)
• Steering Committee of B-2 and B-3 Lenders (American Money Management, Columbia Threadneedle Investments, Ellington Management Group LLC, First Trust Advisors L.P., MJX Asset Management LLC, Pacific Coast Bankers Bank, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, Sound Point Capital Management, Taconic Capital Advisors LP).
  • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, D. Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Rosa Evergreen)
• 12% ’21 Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust, National Association.
  • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, David Posner, Gianfranco Finizio) & (local) ThompsonMcMullan PC (David Ruby, William Prince IV)
• Bank of America NA
  • • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
  • Private Equity Sponsors: Bain Capital Private Equity LP, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. ($KKR), and Vornado Realty Trust ($VNO)
• Large Creditor: Mattel Inc.
  • Legal: Jones Day (Richard Wynne, Erin Brady, Aaron Gober-Sims) & (local) Michael Wilson PLC (Michael Wilson)
• Large Creditor: LEGO Systems Inc.
  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi) & (local) Walcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
• Large Creditor: American Greetings Corporation.
  • Legal: Baker & Hosteler LLP (Benjamin Irwin, Eric Goodman)
• Creditor: River Birch Capital
  • Legal: Andrews Kurth & Kenyon LLP (Paul Silverstein)
• Creditor: Owl Creek Asset Management
  • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Samantha Martin)
• TRU Trust 2016-TOYS, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-TOYS acting through Wells Fargo Bank NA
  • Legal: Dechert LLP (Allan Brilliant, Brian Greer, Stephen Wolpert, Humzah Soofi) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
• Trustee: Tru Taj DIP Notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)
  • Legal: Porter Hedges LLP (Eric English) & (local) Spotts Fain PC (James Donaldson)
• Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Mattel Inc., Evenflo Company Inc., Simon Property Group, Euler Hermes North America Insurance Co., Veritiv Operating Company, Huffy Corporation, KIMCO Realty, The Bank of New York Mellon, LEGO Systems Inc.)

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

Updated 10/5/17 11:40 am

New Chapter 11 Filing - TerraVia Holdings Inc.

TerraVia Holdings Inc.

• 8/1/17 Recap: TerraVia, a publicly-traded (Nasdaq: $TVIA) "next-generation" algae-based food company based out of San Francisco filed for bankruptcy. The company has a stalking horse bidder lined up to buy it for $20mm plus certain assumed liabilities and seeks to jam this case through bankruptcy in about 6 weeks lest it run out liquidity in the process (even with a proposed $10mm DIP); it claims that more time is unnecessary given that it ran a robust marketing process pre-filing that included outreach to over 100 parties. We'll let the company economics do the rest of the talking (see below).
• Jurisdiction: (Judge Sontchi)
• Capital Structure: $144.2mm 5% '19 convertible senior subordinated notes (GLAS Trust Company LLC) & $33.475mm 6% '18 convertible senior subordinated notes (Wilmington Trust)   
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Steven Szanzer, Adam Shpeen, Benjamin Kaminetzky) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger P.A. (Mark Collins, Amanda Steele)
  • Financial Advisor: 
  • Investment Banker: Rothschild & Co. (Tero Janne)
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB & Ad Hoc Consortium of Holders of Convertible Senior Subordinated Debt (Gilead Capital LP, Higher Ground SICAV PLC Core Wealth Fund, Lazard Asset Management LLC, Passport Capital LLC, Wolverine Asset Management LLC, Zazove Associates LLC)
    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Stark, Steven Levine, Brian Rice, Kellie Fisher) & (local) Ashby & Geddes P.A. (William Bowden, Gregory Taylor, Katharina Earle)
    • Financial Advisor: GLC Advisors & Co. LLC
  • Passport Capital
    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss) & (local) Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (Patrick Jackson)
  • 6% Notes Successor Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA
    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Craig Barbarosh, Karen Dine, Jerry Hall) & (local) Morris James LLP (Eric Monzo)
  • JV Partner: Bunge Global Innovation LLC
    • Legal: Jones Day (Joshua Morse)
  • Silicon Valley Bank
    • Legal: Troutman Sanders LLP (Harris Winsberg, Stephen Roach) & (local) Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole LLP (William Chipman Jr., Mark Olivere)
  • Corbion NV
    • Legal: Baker & McKenzie LLP (Debra Dandeneau, Frank Grese) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLC (L. Katherine Good, Aaron Stulman)

Updated 8/26/17

First Day Declaration.

New Chapter 11 Filing - Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.

Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.

• 5/1/17 Recap: Once publicly-traded Arizona-based environmental solutions provider (obviously) to oil and natural gas shale-oriented energy and exploration companies filed for chapter 11 to delever its balance sheet pursuant to a restructuring support agreement and prepackaged plan of reorganization agreed to by its major lenders. The company seeks approval of a $31.5mm DIP to fund the cases. The term lenders will receive equity, cash, and board seats, the '21 noteholders 99.75% of the reorganized equity and the '18 noteholders will get the remainder (subject to a rights offering post-confirmation and a management incentive plan...of course). And as you might expect, the equityholders stand to recover bupkis. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $24.6mm ABL (funded - Wells Fargo Bank NA), $80mm TL, $327mm 12.5%/10% '21 senior secured second lien notes, $40.4mm '18 9.875% unsecured senior notes (Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA, replaced by Wilmington Trust Savings Fund Society FSB) 
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Douglas Bartner, Fredric Sosnick, Sara Coelho, Stephen Blank) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Kenneth Enos, Jamie Luton Chapman)
  • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLC (Robert Albergotti, Dan Kelsall)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Middle Market LLC (Andrew Torgove)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Group of '21 Supporting Noteholders
    • Legal: Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP (Brad Scheler, Jennifer Rodburg, Carl Stapen) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Peter Keane)
  • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA
    • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Dimitri Karcazes, Gary Zussman, Jacob Marshall) & (local) DLA Piper LLP (Stuart Brown, Daniel Brogan)
  • Trustee to '21 Senior Secured Second Lien Notes & TL Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, James Newton) & (local) Morris James LLP (Eric Monzo) 
  • Term Lenders: Ascribe Capital LLC, Gates Capital Management Inc.
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, Paul Rosenblatt, Jonathan Polonsky, Michael Langford, Lindsey Simon) & (local) Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Richard Cobb, Matthew McGuire, Travis Ferguson, Matthew Pierce)
    • Financial Advisor: Batuta Capital Advisors LLC (Alexandre Zyngier)

Updated 7/13/17 1:56 am CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - Avaya Inc.

Avaya Inc.

• 1/19/17 Recap: Late in its transition from a hardware-based business model to a software model, Santa Clara California based communications services provider filed a freefall bankruptcy to address its $6b+ balance sheet and ~$1.45b of pension/OPEB liabilities with the help of a proposed $725mm DIP Facility. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
• Capital Structure: $55mm domestic ABL credit facility (Citigroup USA Inc.), $3.235b prepetition cash flow credit facility (Citigroup USA Inc.), $1b 7% '19 first priority note, $290mm 9% '19 second priority note, $1.384b 10.5% '21 second priority notes (Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company N.A.).   
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jayme Sprayragen, Jonathan Henes, Patrick Nash, Ryan Preston Dahl, Bradley Giordano, Justin Bernbrock, Kan Asimacopoulos, Bern Meyer-Loewy, Carl Pickerill, Asif Attarwala, Ameneh Bordi, Robert Britton, Jeremy Evans, Natasha Hwangpo, Stephen Iacovo, George Klidonas, Christopher Kochman, Justin Mercurio)
  • Financial Advisor: Zolfo Cooper LLC (Eric Koza, Charlie Carnaval, Jesse DelConte, Denise Lorenzo, Conor McShane, Fred Jelks, Andrew Ralph, Adam Searles, Jeff Wooding, Howard Gou, Eugene Lavrov, Rohan Joseph, Chris Baydar)
  • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (John Bosacco)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP Agent: Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Natasha Tsiouris, Aryeh Falk)
  • Ad Hoc First Lien Noteholders' Group (400 Capital Management LLC, Aegon USA Investment Management LLC, Alta Fundamental Advisors LLC, Anchorage Capital Group LLC, Apollo Management LP, Auburn Mesa LLC, Bain Capital Credit LP, Bank of America NA, Barclays Capital Inc., Benefit Street Partners LLC, Bennett Restructuring Fund Inc., Blackrock Financing Management Inc., Blackrock Advisors LLC, Blackrock Institutional Trust Company NA, BlueCrest Capital Management, Candlewood Group Investment Group LP, Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, Carlson Capital LP, Centerbridge Capital LP, Cetus Capital LLC, Columbia Management Investment Advisors LLC, Continental Casualty Company, CQS (US) LLC, Crescent Capital Group LP, CRG Financial LLC, Cyrus Capital Partners LP, Deutsche Bank AG Cayman Islands Branch, Driehaus Capital Management LLC, DW Catalyst Master Fund Ltd., Empyrean Investments LLC, Farallon Capital Partners LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners V LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners II LP, Farallon Capital Offshore Investors II LP, Farallon Capital F5 Master I LP, Farallon Capital (AM) Investors LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners III LP, Noonday Offshore Inc., GLG LLC, Graham Capital Management, GSO Capital Partners LP, HG Vora Capital Management LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Investcorp Credit Management US LLC, ISL Loan Trust, ISL Loan Trust II, J.H. Lane Partners LP, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, JP Morgan Investment Management LLC, Lord Abbett & Co. LLC, Mariner Glen Oaks LP, Medtronic Holding Switzerland GMBH, Merced Capital LP, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., Midtown Acquisitions LP, MJX Asset Management LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Napier Park Global Capital, Newfleet Asset Management LLC, New Mexico State Investment Council, Nut Tree Capital Management LP, NYL Investors LLC, OZ Management LP, OZ Management II LP, OFI Global Asset Management Inc., Onex Credit Partners LLC, OSK V LLC, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP, Putnam Investments, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Sentinel Dome Partners LLC, Shenkman Capital Management Inc., Silver Point Capital LP, Standard General LP, Taconic Capital Advisors LP, Talamod Asset Management LLC, Telos Asset Management LLC, THL Credit, Voya CLO, Wayzata Opportunities Fund III, Wayzata Opportunities Fund Offshore III LP, Wells Fargo Bank NA, Whitebox Advisors LLC, Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Limited, Z Capital Credit Partners)
    • Legal: Akin Gump Straus Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin)
    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP 
  • Ad Hoc Crossover Noteholders' Group (Alden Global Capital LLC, AllianceBernstein LP, Avenue Capital Management II LLP, Benefit Street Partners, Susquehanna Advisors Group Inc., Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, Greenlight Capital Inc., Highland Capital Management LP, PGIM Inc., Symphony Asset Management LLC)
  • Updated Ad Hoc Crossover Noteholders' Group (Less: Benefit Street Partners)
    • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kris Hansen, Sayan Bhattacharyya, Gabriel Sasson)
    • Financial Advisor: Rothschild
  • Communications Workers of America
    • Legal: Saul Ewing LLP (Sharon Levine)
  • Successor Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Doerr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Nancy Manzer)
  • First Lien Notes Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Glenn Siegel, Joshua Dorchak, Rachel Jaffe Mauceri)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Todd Goren, Erica Richards, Benjamin Butterfield, Rahman Connelly, Andrew Kissner, James Newton)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (David Miller, Byron Smyl, Marc Alms, Laureen Ryan, Rich Newman, Andrea Gonzalez, Hamish Allanson, Leslie Lambert, Vance Yudell, Jeff Gunsel, Steve Coverick)
    • Investment Banker: Jefferies LLC (Leon Szlezinger)

Updated 5/31/17