🚗 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Techniplas LLC 🚗

Techniplas LLC

May 6, 2020

Wisconsin-based Techniplas LLC and seven affiliates (the “debtors”), producers and manufacturers of plastic components used primarily in the automotive and transportation industries, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. “The Company produces, among other things, automotive products, such as fluid and air management components, decorative and personalization products, and structural components, as well as nonautomotive products, such as power utility and electrical components and water filtration products.” After cobbling together acquisitions over the course of the decade, the debtors’ business is now global in scale and its main customers are the leading OEMs in the US, Europe and Asia; it had net sales of $475mm and a net loss of $21mm in fiscal ‘19.

A bit more about the business. The debtors’ primary operating unit, “Techniplas Core,” acts “…as a manufacturer of technically complex, niche products across a wide range of applications and end markets, including the automotive and truck, industrial, and commercial markets.” This is roughly 83% of the business. In addition, the debtors have “Techniplas Prime,” which, aside from sounding like a Transformer that may or may not have it out for the human race, acts as a matchmaker between excess manufacturing capacity and customers in need of manufacturing. Per the debtors:

Serving as a nexus between customers, including OEMs, and other manufacturing companies, Techniplas Prime acts as an extension of Techniplas Core by delivering to customers the manufacturing capabilities of its Prime Partners. This makes Techniplas Prime asset-light and creates a “win-win” scenario for customers and Prime Partners.

Interestingly, this business segment was once dubbed “The Airbnb of Auto Manufacturing,” a moniker that makes almost zero sense and completely misunderstands the Airbnb model but, yeah sure, cheap “by-association” points, homies! Per Forbes:

[Founder George] Votis saw Techniplas Prime as an e-manufacturing platform from which customers could order parts electronically according to their own specifications, and have them built by local factories with unused capacity.

Except it’s not a platform. Like, at all. Airbnb is a digital two-sided platform that brings hosts and travelers together and seemlessly connects them. Techniplas Prime…well…

…well…page not found. Airbnb may be struggling in this COVID environment but we can assure you that you’re not EVER getting a 404 when going to their site. Platform…pssssfft. The Forbes article later contradicts itself saying:

…they focused on 3-D printing and advanced manufacturing technology companies that had spare capacity available for contract operations, for which Techniplas Prime is essentially the broker.

Right. Being a broker is different than being a platform y’all. But we digress.

The debtors have a simple capital structure consisting of a $17.59mm ABL, $175mm in 10% ‘20 notes, and a $6.77mm interim financing agreement for total funded debt around $200mm. The debtors, primarily due to this capital structure, began pursuing strategic alternatives in early 2017. Both an attempted sale process and debt refinancing failed. Thereafter, the debtors explored in 2018 a term loan refinancing of the preptition notes and/or a public equity listing in London. Those, too, failed. For this, the debtors blame a downturn in the automotive market and uncertainty from Brexit (PETITION Note: we’ve been foreshadowing that declining production capacity by the major OEMs was going to rattle through the supply chain so nobody should be surprised by this revelation).

In mid-’19, an attempted sale to a strategic buyer, private equity firm The Jordan Company, kicked off but that, despite some forward-moving progress involving a note purchase agreement and an unexercised call option for 100% of the membership interests in the debtors, ultimately fell through due to the inability to refi out the pre-petition notes. Subsequent attempts — now involving ad hoc group of noteholders and Jordan — also came close but ultimately failed due to deteriorating operating performance that pre-dated OOVID. COVID merely exacerbated things. Per the debtors:

Many customers suspended or drastically reduced production, resulting in a swift drop in demand for the Debtors’ products. Additionally, many of the locations where the Company had offices and manufacturing plants worldwide issued lockdown orders and permitted only essential business to remain open in an effort to control the outbreak and protect the health and safety of the public.

All of this was too much to handle: Jordan peaced out. Liquidity increasingly became an issue and so the debtors obtained a $6.7mm super senior priority bridge financing from the ad hoc group. Indeed, the ad hoc group is stepping up big here: in addition to providing the liquidity the debtors needed to get in chapter 11, they’ve agreed to provide a DIP ($20-25mm new money with a $100mm roll-up) and serve as stalking horse bidder — offering $105mm to purchase the debtors’ international operations and three remaining US-based manufacturing facilities. The debtors hope to close the sale within 44 days of the petition date.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: White & Case LLP (David Turetsky, Andrew Zatz, Fan He, Robbie Boone Jr., John Ramirez, Sam Lawand, Thomas MacWright) & Fox Rothschild LLP (Jeffrey Schlerf, Carl Neff, Johnna Darby, Daniel Thompson)

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Peter Smidt, Andrew Hinkelman)

  • Investment Banker: Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC (Richard Klein)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Stalking Horse Purchaser: Techniplas Acquisition Co. LLC

  • Pre-Petition ABL & DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Dennis Twomey, Elliot Bromagen) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

  • DIP Term Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Cole Schotz PC (Daniel Geoghan, J. Kate Stickles, Patrick Reilley)

  • Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA

    • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

  • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group ‘20 10% Senior Secured Notes

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Jonathan Levine, Brian Lohan, Jeffrey Fuisz, Gerardo Mijares-Shafai)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Hexion Holdings LLC

Hexion Holdings LLC

April 1, 2019

What we appreciate that and, we hope thanks to PETITION, others will eventually come to appreciate, is that there is a lot to learn from the special corporate law, investment banking, advisory, and investing niche labeled “restructuring” and “distressed investing.” Here, Ohio-based Hexion Holdings LLC is a company that probably touches our lives in ways that most people have no knowledge of: it produces resins that “are key ingredients in a wide variety of industrial and consumer goods, where they are often employed as adhesives, as coatings and sealants, and as intermediates for other chemical applications.” These adhesives are used in wind turbines and particle board; their coatings prevent corrosion on bridges and buildings. You can imagine a scenario where, if Washington D.C. can ever get its act together and get an infrastructure bill done, Hexion will have a significant influx of revenue.

Not that revenue is an issue now. It generated $3.8b in 2018, churning out $440mm of EBITDA. And operational performance is on the upswing, having improved 21% YOY. So what’s the problem? In short, the balance sheet is a hot mess.* Per the company:

“…the Debtors face financial difficulties. Prior to the anticipated restructuring, the Debtors are over nine times levered relative to their 2018 adjusted EBITDA and face annual debt service in excess of $300 million. In addition, over $2 billion of the Debtors’ prepetition funded debt obligations mature in 2020. The resulting liquidity and refinancing pressures have created an unsustainable drag on the Debtors and, by extension, their Non-Debtor Affiliates, requiring a comprehensive solution.”

This is what that capital structure looks like:

(PETITION Note: if you’re wondering what the eff is a 1.5 lien note, well, welcome to the party pal. These notes are a construct of a frothy high-yield market and constructive readings of credit docs. They were issued in 2017 to discharge maturing notes. The holders thereof enjoy higher priority on collateral than the second lien notes and other junior creditors below, but slot in beneath the first lien notes).

Anyway, to remedy this issue, the company has entered into a support agreement “that enjoys the support of creditors holding a majority of the debt to be restructured, including majorities within every tier of the capital structure.” The agreement would reduce total funded debt by $2b by: (a) giving the first lien noteholders $1.45b in cash (less adequate protection payments reflecting interest on their loans), and 72.5% of new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering at a significant discount to a total enterprise value of $3.1b; and (b) the 1.5 lien noteholders, the second lien noteholders and the unsecured noteholders 27.5% of the new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering. The case will be funded by a $700mm DIP credit facility.

*Interestingly, Hexion is a derivative victim of the oil and gas downturn. In 2014, the company was selling resin coated sand to oil and gas businesses to the tune of 8% of sales and 28% of segment EBITDA. By 2016, segment EBITDA dropped by approximately $150mm, a sizable loss that couldn’t be offset by other business units.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Andrew Parlan, Hugh Murtagh, Caroline Reckler, Jason Gott, Lisa Lansio, Blake Denton, Andrew Sorkin, Christopher Harris) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Amanda Steele, Brendan Schlauch)

  • Managers: Samuel Feinstein, William Joyce, Robert Kaslow-Ramos, George F. Knight III, Geoffrey Manna, Craig Rogerson, Marvin Schlanger, Lee Stewart

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders (Angelo Gordon & Co. LP, Aristeia Capital LLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Beach Point Capital Management LP, Capital Research and Management Company, Citadel Advisors LLC, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, DoubleLine Capital LP, Eaton Vance Management, Federated Investment Counseling, GoldenTree Asset Management LP, Graham Capital Management LP, GSO Capital Partners LP, Heyman Enterprise LLC, Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management LLC, OSK VII LLC, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Silver Rock Financial LP, Sound Point Capital Management LP, Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP, UBS Securities LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Daniel Fisher, Naomi Moss, Abid Qureshi)

    • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Noteholders (Aegon USA Investment Management LLC, Aurelius Capital Master Ltd., Avenue Capital Management II LP, Avenue Europe International Management, Benefit Street Partners LLC, Cyrus Capital Partners LP, KLS Diversified Asset Management LLC, Loomis Sayles & Company LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, New Generation Advisors LLC, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP)

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Samuel Khalil, Matthew Brod)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group of 1.5 Lien Noteholders

    • Legal: Jones Day (Sidney Levinson, Jeremy Evans)

  • Pre-petition RCF Agent & Post-petition DIP Agent ($350mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

  • Trustee under the First Lien Notes: U.S. Bank NA

    • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Kristin Elliott) & (local) Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

  • Trustee of 1.5 Lien Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP

  • Trustee of Borden Indentures: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Sponsor: Apollo

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Agrium US, Inc.; The Bank of New York Mellon; Mitsubishi Gas Chemical America; PVS Chloralkali, Inc.; Southern Chemical Corporation; Wilmington Trust; Wilmington Savings Fund Society; and Blue Cube Operations LLC

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Kenneth Eckstein, Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer) & (local) Bayard PA (Scott Cousins, Erin Fay, Gregory Flasser)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Samuel Star)

Updated:

📽New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Frank Theatres Bayonne/South Cove LLC📽

Frank Theatres Bayonne/South Cove LLC

Just in time for a sh*tty holiday movie season with subpar fare like “Vice” and “Aquaman” hitting theaters, Frank Theatres Bayonne/South Cove LLC and 23 affiliated companies filed for bankruptcy in the District of New Jersey. Under brand names Frank Theatres, CineBowl & Grille and Revolutions, the company owns and operates 9 pure play movie theaters, 3 family entertainment complexes (i.e., bowling, arcade, etc.), and 3 combination — movie theater AND family entertainment — locations. Despite a robust year for Hollywood on the heals of highly successful-cum-intellectually-retarding movies like Avengers:Infinity War and Venom, the company’s revenues and resultant losses over the past three years paint a clear picture as to why this company is in bankruptcy court. From 2016 through 2018, revenues have declined from approximately $65mm to $56mm to $40mm, respectively. Losses, in turn, come in at $10.2mm, $11.3mm and $9.7mm. These are brutal numbers.

Of course, part of the issue here is that, in certain cases, this chain knew nothing of first run screenings of the aforementioned hits. Per the company, the expansion beyond the core theater business into the broader entertainment space proved disastrous, marked by poor locations, unprofitable leases, cost overruns, delayed openings, and ineffective management. Consequently, the company started deploying theater revenue like an ATM to service the flailing entertainment business. Except, there was one giant problem with all of this:

While operating cash and third-party loans were being used to support the liquidity need caused by the over-budget, past-deadline, and unprofitable new locations, the remainder of the existing locations also steadily declined in general admissions and total revenues as preventative maintenance, standard course refreshes, and local marketing initiatives were reduced or abandoned altogether. In addition, landlords and critical vendors were not paid or were materially aged beyond their standard payment terms. These poor management decisions were made in most cases without the knowledge or consent of the Debtors’ capital providers.

Whoops.

In some instances, the Company was evicted, locked out of its theater locations, and/or box office studios refused to allow the theaters to exhibit key first run movies which further exacerbated the decline in financial performance.

Like we said: they knew nothing of first run screenings. Not that you’d want to see them at these theaters anyway:

Under Debtors’ prior management (pre-September 2017), the physical state of many locations was severely neglected. Much needed capital improvements were not made into maintenance or upgrades of many locations. As a result, over time, the locations became dirty and in disrepair, which ultimately deterred business and resulted in a decrease in revenue.

Now if that doesn’t sound like an oh-so-lovely-holiday-moviegoing experience we don’t know what does. Usually a rabies shot isn’t a prerequisite to seeing a new flick.

Given all of this (and alleged mismanagement which is now the subject of ongoing litigation), the company was ill-suited to compete (deep voice) in a world where the industry shifted to the “premium” movie-going experience. After all, why go to the movies at all if you can just sit at home and watch Sandra Bullock evade zombies on Netflix. The only reason is, thanks to 4DX and the like, to feel that punch to the face from Dwayne Johnson or the wind in your hair when Tom Cruise races down the streets of London on a motorcycle. Except, this company didn’t have any of that new razzle dazzle. They did have the prices though:

While the condition of the Company’s locations deteriorated, the movie theater industry in general trended toward an enhanced movie going experience, including luxury recliners and a more “premium” experience. At the same time, the Debtors’ ticket and concession prices continued to rise in line with, or over, the industry average (which further discouraged customers).

And so now bankruptcy. The company has a restructuring support agreement that includes participation from both its first lien and second lien lenders. The former, Elm Park Capital Management LLC, will have $20mm of their debt reinstated (which may included up to $5mm in DIP financing). The latter, Seacoast Capital Partners III LP, will reinstate $2.5mm to be paid with 25% of net cash proceeds from the sale/monetization of the reorganized assets (once Elm Park has received $20mm on account of their claims). The balance of secured debt will convert into equity. General unsecured creditors are likely to donut.

The company intends to emerge from bankruptcy with only the most profitable locations intact.

• Jurisdiction: D. of New Jersey (Judge Meisel)

• Capital Structure: $31mm first lien debt (Elm Park Capital Management LLC), $8mm second lien debt (Seacoast Capital Partners III LP)

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Kenneth Rosen, Joseph DiPasquale, Michael Papandrea, Eric Chafetz)

  • Financial Advisor: Moss Adams LLP & Paragon Entertainment Holdings LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • First Lien & DIP Lender: Elm Park Capital Management

    • Legal: Neligan LLP — Patrick Neligan Jr., John Gaither

  • Second Lien Lender: Seacost Capital Partners III LP

    • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP — Larry Makel, Eric Lopez Schnabel

  • Benefit Street Partners LLC

    • Legal: Moore & VanAllen — Alan Pope

New Chapter 11 Filing - Jet Midwest Group LLC

Jet Midwest Group LLC

2/26/18

Kansas City-based seller and lessor of commercial aircraft and engines has filed for bankruptcy. 

• Jurisdiction: DofDelaware (Judge Carey)
• Capital Structure: $17.5mm debt     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Shanti Katona, Randye Soref)
  • Claims Agent: JND Corporate Restructuring (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: None.
• Secured Lender: Jet Midwest International Co., Ltd.
  • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Shnabel, Robert Mallard, Alessandra Glorioso, Richard Silberberg, Geoffrey Sant, Eric Epstein)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Keystone Tube Company LLC (A.M. Castle & Co.)

Keystone Tube Company LLC (A.M. Castle & Co.)

• 6/18/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($CASL) Illinois-based specialty metals distribution company with customers in some hard hit sectors of late, e.g., oil and gas, retail, mining, defense, filed a prepackaged bankruptcy case to de-lever its balance sheet. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
• Capital Structure: $112mm first lien debt (Cantor Fitzgerald Securities), $177mm
• 18 12.75% second lien notes (US Bank NA), $22.3mm '19 5.25% convertible third lien notes (US Bank NA)     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski, Jeffrey Pomerantz, Maxim Litvak, John Lucas, Peter Keane)
  • Financial Advisor & Investment Banker: Imperial Capital LLC (Joseph Kazanovski)
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Lender Committee (At Filing: Corre Partners Management LLC, Highbridge Capital Management LLC, SGF Inc., Pandora Select Partners LP, Whitebox Advisors LLC, Wolverine Asset Management Ltd.)
    • Legal (except SGF Inc.): Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Jacob Adlerstein, Michael Rudnick) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Joel Waite, Ian Bambrick)
    • Legal (SGF Inc): Goodwin Proctor LLP (Michael Goldstein, Gregory Fox) & (local) Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier, John Schanne)
    • Financial Advisor: Ducera LLC
  • Prepetition First Lien Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities
    • Legal: Shipman & Goodwin LLP
  • Prepetition Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA
    • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Robert Mallard, Alessandra Glorioso)
  • Administrative Agent: PNC Bank NA
    • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd (Jacob Marshall, Danielle Juhle) & (local) Blank Rome LLP (Josef Mintz)
  • Bank of America NA
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Jody Barillare, Rachel Jaffe Mauceri)
  • Nantahala Capital Management
    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Arthur Steinberg) & (local) The Rosner Law Group LLC (Frederick Rosner)

Updated 7/11/17 6:22 pm

Source: First Day Declaration.

New Chapter 11 & CCAA Filing - SquareTwo Financial Services Corporation

SquareTwo Financial Services Corporation

• 3/19/17 Recap: Colorado-based privately held acquirer, manager, and collector of charged-off U.S. and Canadian consumer and commercial accounts-receivable filed a prepackaged plan of reorganization seeking to split the company into an acquired-co and "wind down co", with Resurgent Holdings LLC putting in approximately $264mm of new money in exchange for 100% equity in the acquired co. This is on the heels of a prior recapitalization that provided for the exchange of second lien notes for a 1.5 Lien Term Loan & preferred stock (enter Apollo and KKR here). Under the proposed plan of reorganization, the lenders holding claims under the first lien credit facilities will get paid in full; the holders of claims under the 1.5 Lien Term Loan will get a pro rata share of remaining cash; Resurgent will own the remaining business (with the rest liquidated); and the remaining creditors - including the second lien holdouts and the Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement System (?!?!) - will get a big fat donut. Because who gives a sh*t about public school teachers anyway: what have they ever done for folks who work at Apollo and KKR?
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
• Capital Structure: $60mm first lien RCF ($41mm out) & $105mm first lien Term Loan (Cerberus Business Finance LLC), $15mm 1.25 Lien Term Loan (plus $1.3mm interest) & $176.1 mm 1.5 Lien Term Loan (plus $15.4mm interest) (Cortland Capital Market Services LLC), $1.9 mm second lien notes (unexchanged in prior recapitalization)(U.S. Bank National Association)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Paul Shalhoub, Robin Spigel, Debra McElligott, Gabriel Brunswick) & (Canadian counsel) Thornton Grout Finnigan LLP (D.J. Miller, Leanne Williams, Asim Iqbal, Mitch Grossell)
  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (Mark Thorson)
  • Investment Banker(s): Keefe Bruyette & Woods Inc. & Miller Buckfire & Co. (John McKenna)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Prepetition Agent & DIP Agent: Cerberus Business Finance LLC
    • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Frederic Ragucci, Adam Harris)
  • Ad Hoc Group of 1.25 lien and 1.5 lien Lenders (Apollo Capital Management LP, KKR Credit Advisors LLC)
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Elizabeth McColm, Michael Turkel)
  • Prepetition 1.25 Lien and 1.5 Lien Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC
    • Legal: Holland & Knight LLP (Barbra Parlin, Joshua Spencer)
  • U.S. Bank National Association
    • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso) & (local) Maslon LLP (Clark T. Whitmore)
  • Preferred Stock Holders: Apollo Investment Corporation & KKR Financial CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
  • Majority Common Stock Holders: Norwest Mezzanine Partners II LP & Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement System
  • New Money Investor: Resurgent Holdings LLC
    • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Patricia Lane, Michael Small, Benjamin Rikkers, Jack Haake)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Robert Hirsh, George Angelich, Jordana Renert)
    • Financial Advisor: Gavin/Solmonese LLC (Ted Gavin)

Updated 5/31/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - AtopTech Inc.

AtopTech Inc.

• 1/13/17 Recap: Tech company in the midst of infringement lawsuit files for bankruptcy to, among other things, effectuate a 363 sale.
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
• Capital Structure: $472k secured debt (Silicon Valley Bank)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Janet Weiss, Stephen O'Neill, Jessica McKinley, Alessandra Glorioso, Robert Mallard, Robert Franklin, Thomas Hwang)
  • Investment Banker: Cowan & Company (Randy Lederman, Thomas Stierwalt, Patrick Fraley, Charles Tudor, Vance Tuminelli)
  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Synopsys Inc.
      • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Krista Schwartz, Richard Wynne, Patrick Michael, Joshua Morse, Stacey Corr-Irvine, Peter Saba, Monika Weiner) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
    • Draper Athena Management Co., Ltd.
      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Fredric Sosnick, Foteini Teloni)

Updated 4/2/17