🧀 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - CEC Entertainment Inc. 🧀

CEC Entertainment Inc.

June 24, 2020

For our rundown, please go here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $1.089b funded debt ($760mm TL, $108 RCF, $6mm LOC, $215.7mm notes)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Alfredo Perez, Andrew Citron, Rachael Foust, Scott Bowling)

    • Board of Directors: David McKillips, Andrew Jhawar, Naveen Shahani, Allen Weiss, Peter Brown, Paul Aronzon

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chad Coben)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie O’Connell)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • PE Sponsor: Queso Holdings Inc./AP VIII CEC Holdings, L.P. (Apollo)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP

    • First Lien Credit Agreement Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders: American Money Management Corp, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Arena Capital Advisors LLC, Ares Management LLC, Bank of Montreal, BlueMountain Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, Catalur Capital Management LP, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank New York, Fidelity Management & Research Co., Fortress Investment Group LLC, GS Capital Partners LP, Hill Path Capital, Indaba Capital Fund LP, ICG Debt Advisors, Jefferies Financ LLC, J.H. Lane Partners Master Fund LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, MSD Capital LP, MSD Partners LP, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, Par Four Investment Management LLC, RFG-Clover LLC, Second Lien LLC, UBS AG, Wazee Street Capital Management, Western Asset Management Company LLC, WhiteStar Asset Management, ZAIS Group LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Jason Rubin, Marty Brimmage Jr., Lacy Lawrence)

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Jason Angelo)

    • Ad Hoc Group of ‘22 8% Senior Noteholders (Longfellow Investment Management Co. LLC, Prudential Financial Inc., Resource Credit Income Fund, Westchester Capital Management)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Matthew Warren, Lindsey Henrikson, Michael Rupe)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Wilmington Trust NA, The Coca-Cola Company, National Retail Properties, Performance Food Group, Washington Prime Group, NCR Corporation, Index Promotions

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel & Womble Bond Dickinson LLP (Matthew Ward)

7/17/20 Dkt. 352.

🔋New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Exide Holdings Inc.🔋

Exide Holdings Inc.

May 19, 2020

Georgia-based Exide Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”), among the world’s largest producers and recyclers of lead-acid batteries used in cars, boats, golf carts and more, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware earlier this week. The filing sparked an entire industry to ask “is it a Chapter 22 or a Chapter 33?” The answer, depending upon your look-back period, is the latter. The fairer answer is probably the former and even that was 7 years ago with emergence 5 years ago (PETITION Note: the Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust had to make a notice of appearance in these new cases so, there’s that). Going back nearly two decades seems to be an impossible standard to hold any business to but 5-7 years seems much fairer.

Since we’re discussing labels, here’s another one: failure. Per the debtors:

Notwithstanding the Company’s efforts to implement its business plan following its emergence from the 2013 Chapter 11 Case and the support of its new owners and lenders, the Company continued to face liquidity, performance, and operational challenges that were more persistent and widespread than anticipated. Coupled with adverse industry and market factors as well as substantial environmental costs, these challenges have resulted in reduced liquidity.

Sooooo…that sucks. We admit it: we were hoping that this was a disruption story. That Elon Musk and the increasingly large cohort of lithium-ion battery using OEMs pushing out electric vehicles were putting the lead-acid battery manufacturers out to pasture. But that is not a state reason for this chapter 3…uh…chapter 2…uh, whatever the f*ck this is. Rather, the debtors state that their post-emergence liquidity issues stem from (a) mounting environmental remediation costs and litigation, (b) rising production costs (PETITION Note: because the debtors shut two recycling facilities, they are now subject to pricing pressures from outside manufacturers rather than just using their own recycled inputs), (c) operational inefficiencies caused by legacy mixed-use facilities, and (d), of course…wait for it…COVID-19. Duck for COVID-cover folks! The debtors say that the pandemic’s impact on demand for product is the cherry on top.

The debtors’ capital structure doesn’t help. Look at this beaut:

With that much funded debt, the debtors’ leverage ratio stands at 9.2x. Debt service averages approximately $26.8mm/year.

So, confronted with all of these factors, the debtors have been engaged in a marketing process since 2018. The continued deterioration of the business, however, ultimately led to a restructuring path and now the debtors intend to use the bankruptcy process to effectuate a sale of (i) the entire business or (ii) the Americas business and/or (iii) the sale of its Europe/Rest-of-World business or (iv) a liquidation (PETITION Note: the debtors fall into chapter 11 largely separated into four main business groups). The Ad Hoc Group has submitted a binding credit bid for the Europe/ROW business group which will serve as a stalking horse bid; they have also committed $15mm in DIP financing to service certain non-debtor affiliates in Europe with an additional $25mm DIP commitment for the administration of the cases coming from Blue Torch Capital LP. The debtors hope to go “effective” by the end of August: this means that everyone has a lot of work to do to try and and locate a buyer for the rest of the debtors’ businesses in the interim.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Jacqueline Marcus, Sunny Singh, Samuel Mendez, Alyssa Kutner, Jason Hufendick) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Independent Directors: Alan Carr, William Transier, Harvey Tepner, Mark Barberio

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Ankura Consulting (Roy Messing)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Daniel Fiorillo, David Morse, Jonathan Helfat)

    • Indenture Trustee

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Jordana Renert)

    • DIP Agent ($40mm): Blue Torch Capital LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matthew Bouslog, Michael Farag) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alice Belisle Eaton, Robert Britton, Eugene Park, Claudia Tobler, Jacqueline Rubin, Douglas Keeton, David Weiss, David Giller) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Sean Greecher, Andrew Magaziner, Ian Bambrick)

    • Large equityholders: Mackay Shields LLC, AllianceBernstein LLP, D.E. Shaw Galvanic Portfolios LLC, Neuberger Berman Group LLC

    • Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Dane Kane, Konstantinos Katsionis)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Hexion Holdings LLC

Hexion Holdings LLC

April 1, 2019

What we appreciate that and, we hope thanks to PETITION, others will eventually come to appreciate, is that there is a lot to learn from the special corporate law, investment banking, advisory, and investing niche labeled “restructuring” and “distressed investing.” Here, Ohio-based Hexion Holdings LLC is a company that probably touches our lives in ways that most people have no knowledge of: it produces resins that “are key ingredients in a wide variety of industrial and consumer goods, where they are often employed as adhesives, as coatings and sealants, and as intermediates for other chemical applications.” These adhesives are used in wind turbines and particle board; their coatings prevent corrosion on bridges and buildings. You can imagine a scenario where, if Washington D.C. can ever get its act together and get an infrastructure bill done, Hexion will have a significant influx of revenue.

Not that revenue is an issue now. It generated $3.8b in 2018, churning out $440mm of EBITDA. And operational performance is on the upswing, having improved 21% YOY. So what’s the problem? In short, the balance sheet is a hot mess.* Per the company:

“…the Debtors face financial difficulties. Prior to the anticipated restructuring, the Debtors are over nine times levered relative to their 2018 adjusted EBITDA and face annual debt service in excess of $300 million. In addition, over $2 billion of the Debtors’ prepetition funded debt obligations mature in 2020. The resulting liquidity and refinancing pressures have created an unsustainable drag on the Debtors and, by extension, their Non-Debtor Affiliates, requiring a comprehensive solution.”

This is what that capital structure looks like:

Screen Shot 2019-04-01 at 12.28.48 PM.png
Screen Shot 2019-04-01 at 12.29.02 PM.png

(PETITION Note: if you’re wondering what the eff is a 1.5 lien note, well, welcome to the party pal. These notes are a construct of a frothy high-yield market and constructive readings of credit docs. They were issued in 2017 to discharge maturing notes. The holders thereof enjoy higher priority on collateral than the second lien notes and other junior creditors below, but slot in beneath the first lien notes).

Anyway, to remedy this issue, the company has entered into a support agreement “that enjoys the support of creditors holding a majority of the debt to be restructured, including majorities within every tier of the capital structure.” The agreement would reduce total funded debt by $2b by: (a) giving the first lien noteholders $1.45b in cash (less adequate protection payments reflecting interest on their loans), and 72.5% of new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering at a significant discount to a total enterprise value of $3.1b; and (b) the 1.5 lien noteholders, the second lien noteholders and the unsecured noteholders 27.5% of the new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering. The case will be funded by a $700mm DIP credit facility.

*Interestingly, Hexion is a derivative victim of the oil and gas downturn. In 2014, the company was selling resin coated sand to oil and gas businesses to the tune of 8% of sales and 28% of segment EBITDA. By 2016, segment EBITDA dropped by approximately $150mm, a sizable loss that couldn’t be offset by other business units.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Andrew Parlan, Hugh Murtagh, Caroline Reckler, Jason Gott, Lisa Lansio, Blake Denton, Andrew Sorkin, Christopher Harris) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Amanda Steele, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Managers: Samuel Feinstein, William Joyce, Robert Kaslow-Ramos, George F. Knight III, Geoffrey Manna, Craig Rogerson, Marvin Schlanger, Lee Stewart

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

    • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders (Angelo Gordon & Co. LP, Aristeia Capital LLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Beach Point Capital Management LP, Capital Research and Management Company, Citadel Advisors LLC, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, DoubleLine Capital LP, Eaton Vance Management, Federated Investment Counseling, GoldenTree Asset Management LP, Graham Capital Management LP, GSO Capital Partners LP, Heyman Enterprise LLC, Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management LLC, OSK VII LLC, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Silver Rock Financial LP, Sound Point Capital Management LP, Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP, UBS Securities LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Daniel Fisher, Naomi Moss, Abid Qureshi)

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Noteholders (Aegon USA Investment Management LLC, Aurelius Capital Master Ltd., Avenue Capital Management II LP, Avenue Europe International Management, Benefit Street Partners LLC, Cyrus Capital Partners LP, KLS Diversified Asset Management LLC, Loomis Sayles & Company LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, New Generation Advisors LLC, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP)

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Samuel Khalil, Matthew Brod)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group of 1.5 Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Jones Day (Sidney Levinson, Jeremy Evans)

    • Pre-petition RCF Agent & Post-petition DIP Agent ($350mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

    • Trustee under the First Lien Notes: U.S. Bank NA

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Kristin Elliott) & (local) Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

    • Trustee of 1.5 Lien Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP

    • Trustee of Borden Indentures: The Bank of New York Mellon

    • Sponsor: Apollo

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Agrium US, Inc.; The Bank of New York Mellon; Mitsubishi Gas Chemical America; PVS Chloralkali, Inc.; Southern Chemical Corporation; Wilmington Trust; Wilmington Savings Fund Society; and Blue Cube Operations LLC

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Kenneth Eckstein, Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer) & (local) Bayard PA (Scott Cousins, Erin Fay, Gregory Flasser)

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Samuel Star)

Updated:

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Things Remembered Inc.

Things Remembered Inc.

2/6/19

This has been a rough week for "out-of-court" restructurings in the retail space. On the heals of Charlotte Russe's collapse into bankruptcy after an attempted out-of-court solution, Things Remembered Inc. filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware on February 6, 2019. We recently wrote about Things Remembered here. Let's dig in a bit more. 

The 53-year old retailer filed with a stalking horse purchaser, Ensco Properties LLC, in line to purchase, subject to a tight 30-day timeframe, a subset of the company's store footprint and direct-sales business. The company writes in the most Trumpian-fashion imaginable:

"Although stores not acquired will need to close, the going-concern sale wills save hundreds of jobs and potentially many more and provide an improved, and significantly less risky, recovery to stakeholders." What does "potentially many more" mean? Don't they know how many people are employed at the locations being sold as well as corporate support? Seems like a Trumpian ad lib of corresponding inexactitude. But, whatever. 

What caused the need for bankruptcy?

"Like many other retailers, the Company has suffered from adverse macro-trends, as well as certain microeconomic operational challenges. Faced with these challenges, the Company initiated multiple go-forward operational initiatives to increase brick-and-mortar profitability, such as store modernization through elimination of paper forms and the addition of iPads to streamline the personalization and sale process, and by shuttering a number of underperforming locations. The Company also sought to bolster the Debtors’ online-direct sale business, including aggressive marketing to loyal customers to facilitate sales through online channels, attracting new customers via an expanded partnership with Amazon, and increasing service capabilities for the business-to-business customer segment."

Read that paragraph and then tell us that retail management teams (and their expensive advisors) have any real clue how to combat the ails confronting retail. Elimination of paper forms? Ipads? Seriously? Sure, the rest sounds sensible and comes right out of today's standard retail playbook, i.e., shutter stores, bolster online capabilities, leverage Amazon's distribution, tapping into "loyal customers," etc. We're surprised they didn't mention AR/VR, Blockchain, "experiential retail," pop-ups, advertising on scooters, loyalty programs, and all of the other trite retail-isms we've heard ad nauseum (despite no one actually proving whether any or all of those things actually drive revenue). 

The rest of the story is crazy familiar by this point. The "challenging operating environment" confronting brick-and-mortar and mall-based retail, specifically, led to missed sales targets and depressed profitability. Naturally there were operational issues that compounded matters and, attention Lenore Estrada (INSERT LINK), "…vendors have begun to place pressure on the supply chain cost structure by delaying or cancelling shipments until receiving payment." Insert cash on delivery terms here. Because that's what they should do when a customer is mid-flush. 

Anyway, shocker: negative cash flows persisted. Consequently, the company and its professionals commenced a marketing process that landed Enesco as stalking horse bidder. Enesco has committed to acquiring the direct-sales business (which constitutes 26% of all sales in 2018 and includes the e-commerce website, hq, fulfillment and distribution center in Ohio and related assets) and approximately 128 stores (subject to addition or subtraction, but a floor set at 50 store minimum). Store closings of approximately 220 stores and 30 kiosks commenced pre-petition. A joint venture between Hilco Merchant Resources LLC and Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC is leading that effort (which again begs the question as to how Gymboree is the only recent retailer that required the services of four "liquidators"). The purchase price is $17.5mm (subject to post-closing adjustments). $17.5mm is hardly memorable. That said, the company did have negative $4mm EBITDA so, uh, yeeeeeaaaaah. 

$18.7mm '19 revolving credit facility (Cortland Capital Markets Services LLC); $124.9mm 12% '20 TL. 

The capital structure represents the result of an August 30, 2016 out-of-court exchange that, let's be honest here, didn't do much other than incrementally lessen the debt burden, kick the can down the road and get some professionals paid. If this sounds familiar, it's because it's not all that different than Charlotte Russe in those respects. 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: $mm debt     

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Christopher Greco, Derek Hunger, Angela Snell, Spencer Winters, Catherine Jun, Scott Vail, Mark McKane) & (local) Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Matthew McGuire, Kimberly Brown, Matthew Pierce)

    • Legal (Canada): Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Robert Duffy, Brett Witherell)

    • Investment Bank: Stifel Nicolaus & Co. Inc. and Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC (James Doak)

    • Liquidators: Hilco Merchant Resources LLC and Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

      • Legal: Pepper Hamilton LLP (Douglas Herman, Marcy McLaughlin)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: Enesco Properties LLC  (Balmoral Funds LLC)

      • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Jeffrey Pomerantz, Maxim Litvak, Joseph Mulvihill)

    • Lender: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Lisa Lansio) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro)

    • Sponsor: KKR & Co.

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Jewelry Concepts Inc., Gravotech Inc., Chu Kwun Kee Metal Manufactory, Brookfield Property REIT, Inc., Simon Property Group LP)

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Kristin Elliott, Lauren Schlussel) & (local) Connolly Gallagher (N. Christopher Griffiths, Shaun Michael Kelly)

      • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. (Carol Cabello, Sanjuro Kietlinski, Jorge Gonzalez, Michael Martini)

New Chapter 11 Filing - iHeartMedia Inc.

iHeartMedia Inc.

3/14/18

iHeartMedia Inc., a leading global media company specializing in radio, outdoor, mobile, social, live media, on-demand entertainment and more, has filed for bankruptcy -- finally succumbing to its $20 billion of debt ($16 billion funded) and $1.4 billion of cash interest in 2017. WOWSERS. The company purports to have "an agreement in principle with the majority of [its] creditors and [its] financial sponsors that reflects widespread support across the capital structure for a comprehensive plan to restructure...$10 billion..." of debt.

The company notes $3.6 billion of revenue and unparalleled monthly reach ((we'll have more to say about this in this Sunday's Members-only newsletter (3/18/18) - this claim deserves an asterisk)). 

Still, as it also notes, the company faces significant headwinds. It states in its First Day Declaration,

"Among other factors, the global economic downturn that began in 2008 resulted in a decline in advertising and marketing spending by the Debtors’ customers, which resulted in a corresponding decline in advertising revenues across the Debtors’ business. Then, as the economy recovered, the Debtors’ industry faced new and intense competition from the rapidly-growing internet and digital advertising industry and the entry of on-demand streaming services, both of which siphoned off the share of advertiser revenues allocated by agencies and brands to broadcast radio. The Debtors have taken various operational steps to stem the negative effect of these trends; among other initiatives, the Debtors have successfully developed emerging platforms including its industry-leading iHeartRadio digital platform and nationally-recognized iHeartRadio-branded live events that are audio and video streamed and televised nationwide."

The company ought to expect these trends to continue.

Large creditors include Cumulus Media Inc. (~$5.6 million...yikes) and Spotify (~$2 million).  

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure:    
Screen Shot 2018-03-15 at 2.28.26 PM.png

 

  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Brian Wolfe, William Guerrieri, Christopher Marcus, Stephen Hackney, Richard U.S. Howell, Benjamin Rhode, AnnElyse Gibbons) & Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)
    • Financial Advisor to the Company: Moelis & Co. 
      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Caroline Reckler, Matthew Warren)
    • Restructuring Advisor to the Company: Alvarez & Marsal LLC
    • Legal for the Independent Directors: Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Kevin Allred, Seth Goldman, Thomas Walper, John Spiegel)
    • Financial Advisor to the Independent Directors: Perella Weinberg Partners LP
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Large Equity Holders: Bain Capital & Thomas H. Lee Partners
      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Christopher Lopez, Gabriel Morgan)
    • Potential Buyer: Liberty Media Corporation & Sirius XM Holdings Inc.
      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Stephen Karotkin, Ray Schrock, Alfredo Perez)
    • Successor Trustee for the 6.875% '18 Senior Notes and 7.25% '27 Senior Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Jason Zakia, Erin Rosenberg, J. Christopher Shore, Harrison Denman, Michele Meises, Mark Franke, Michael Garza) & Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Matthew Silverman) & (local) Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP (Robin Russell, Timothy A. Davidson II, Ashley Harper)
    • Successor Trustee for the 11.25% '21 Priority Guaranty Notes
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Benjamin Feder, Kristin Elliott)
    • Successor Trustee for the 14.00% Senior Notes due 2021
      • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright (US) LLP (Jason Boland, Christy Rivera, Marian Baldwin Fuerst)
    • Term Loan/PGN Group
      • Legal: Jones Day (Thomas Howley, Bruce Bennett, Joshua Mester)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Loan Lenders
      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Christopher Odell, Hannah Sibiski) 
    • TPG Specialty Lending Inc.
      • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, David Hillman, James Bentley) & (local) Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain, Laura Ashley) 
    • Special Committees of the Board of Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc.
      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Paul Shalhoub, Christopher Koenig, Jennifer Jay Hardy)
    • Ad Hoc Committee of 14% Senior Noteholders of iHeart Communications
      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matt Williams, Keith Martorana, Matthew Porcelli) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Aaron Power, Samuel Spiers)
    • 9.00% Priority Guarantee Notes due 2019 Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA
      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Fliman, Brian Wells) & (local) Haynes and Boone, LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Martha Wyrick, Kelsey Zottnick)
    • Citibank N.A.
      • Legal: Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Levitin, Richard Stieglitz Jr.) & (local) Locke Lord LLP (Berry Spears)
    • Delaware Trust Company
      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Benjamin Finestone, K. John Shaffer, Monica Tarazi, Victor Noskov)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss, Charles Gibbs, Marty Brimmage)

Updated 3/30/18

New Chapter 11 Filing - Orexigen Therapeutics Inc.

Orexigen Therapeutics Inc. 

3/12/18

Orexigen Therapeutics is a publicly-traded ($OREX) biopharmaceutical company with one FDA-approved product - "Contrave" - an adjunct to a reduced-calorie diet and exercise for chronic weight management in certain eligible adults. (Before we continue, please take a minute to appreciate the exquisite creativity these folks deployed with the name, "Contrave." Control + crave = Contrave. We hope they didn't shell out too much cash money to the brand consultants for that one). 

Anyway, the drug could theoretically service the 36.5% of adults the Center for Disease Control & Prevention has identified as obese, a potential market of 91-93 million people in the United States alone. And that number is predicted to rise to 120 million people in the next several years. Yikes: that's 33% of the U.S. population. Apropos, the drug is the number one prescribed weight-loss brand in the US with over 1.8 million prescriptions written to date, subsuming 700,000 patients. The drug is also approved in Europe, South Korea, Canada, Lebanon, and the UAE. 

All of that surface-level success notwithstanding, the company has lost approximately $730 million since its inception. This is primarily because it has been spending the last 16 years burning cash on R&D, clinical studies for FDA approval, recruitment, manufacturing, marketing, etc., both in and outside the U.S. And people wonder why drugs are so expensive. The company believes it could be profitable by 2019 under its existing operating model and revenue forecasts; it enjoys a patent until 2030. 

Obviously the patent is critical because the company, through its banker, attempted a sale prior to the bankruptcy filing but proved unsuccessful. The goal of the bankruptcy filing, therefore, is to effectuate a sale with the benefit of "free and clear" status. While no stalking horse bidder is lined up, The Baupost Group LLC, is leading a group of secured noteholders (including Ecori Capital, Highbridge Capital and UBS O'Connor) to provide a $35 million DIP credit facility and buy the company some time. Will they end up owning it? 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
  • Capital Structure: $165mm 0% '20 convertible notes (The Baupost Group LLC), $115mm 2.75% '20 convertible notes ($25 million outstanding, Wilmington Trust NA), $49.6mm 2.75% '20 convertible exchange senior notes ($38.9 million outstanding, US Bank NA) 
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Hogan Lovells LLP (Christopher Donolo, Eric Einhorn, Christopher Bryant, Jon Beck, Sean Feener) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Andrew Remming, Jose Bibiloni)
    • Financial Advisor: E&Y
    • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners 
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition Collateral Agent & Prepetition Trustee: U.S. Bank NA
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Benjamin Feder)
    • DIP Lenders
      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Eric Winston)
    • DIP Administrative Agent: Wilmington Trust Company
      • Legal: Arnold & Porter (Tyler Nurnberg)
    • DIP Lender: Highbridge Capital Management LLC
      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Stark, Stephen Levine, Uchechi Egeonuigwe) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLC (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, Aaron Stulman)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Elliott Greenleaf PC (Rafael Zahralddin-Aravena, Eric Sutty) & (local) Irell & Manella LLP (Jeffrey Reisner, Michael Strub Jr., Kerri Lyman)

Updated March 30, 2018

New Chapter 11 Filing - MAC Acquisition LLC (aka Romano's Macaroni Grill)

MAC Acquisition LLC (aka Romano's Macaroni Grill)

  • 10/18/17 Recap: Back in 2015, Ignite Restaurant Group offloaded Romano's Macaroni Grill to RedRock Partners LLC in an attempt to bolster its liquidity and avoid bankruptcy. It failed: the company filed for bankruptcy earlier this year (case summary here). Perhaps that had something to do with the fact that the sale was for a measly $8mm, "a price akin to dumping your unwanted junk on Craigslist." Now, Romano's Macaroni Grill has filed for bankruptcy to restructure its balance sheet and further an operational restructuring, including dealing with lessor damage claims arising out of terminated leases (the company closed 37 company-operated locations in 2017; it has 93 company-owned restaurants remaining exclusive of non-debtor franchises). The company blames its chapter 11 filing on (i) the inability to generate sufficient cashflow, sales and margin to cover operating expenses let alone service its debt (TTM EBITDA as of 8/17 was -$12mm), and (ii) increased costs for both commodities and labor. We note that this provision in the company's bankruptcy papers is indicative of a larger trend befalling the casual dining segment: "The Debtors’ operations and financial performance have been adversely affected by a number of economic factors, but perhaps most notably by an overall downturn for the casual dining industry. The preferences of such customers have shifted to cheaper, faster alternatives. On the other end of the spectrum, there is a trend among younger customers to spend their disposable income at non-chain “experience-driven” restaurants, even if slightly more expensive." In other words, this bankruptcy is partly Evan Spiegel (Snapchat, $SNAP) and Kevin Systrom's (Instagram, $FB) fault. The company has a restructuring support agreement with its major stakeholders to pursue a dual-track bankruptcy via a plan of reorganization and a potential sale upon the hiring of an investment banker (heads up: bankers!!). The company has secured a junior $5mm DIP credit facility from Raven Capital Management LLC. P.S. Nothing to see here for the REITS: Simon Property Group has made a notice of appearance in the matter. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)
  • Capital Structure: $12mm RCF (Bank of Colorado), $2.5mm TL (Bank of Colorado), $3.5mm LOC (Bank of Colorado), $5mm Funding Loan 
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Jeffrey Krause, Michael Neumeister, Emily Speak, Brittany Schmeltz) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Edmon Morton, Ryan Bartley, Elizabeth Justison)
    • Financial Advisor/Chief Restructuring Officer: Mackinac Partners LLC (Nishant Machado, Pasquale Maturo)
    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender: Raven Capital Management LLC
      • Legal: Winston & Strawn LLP (Justin Rawlins, Carey Schreiber, Eric Sagerman) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Stacy Newman)
    • Bank of Colorado
      • Legal: Shaw Fishman Glantz & Towbin LLC (Thomas Horan, Johnna Darby, Brian Shaw) & (local) Markus Williams Young & Zimmermann LLC (James Markus)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Gregory Flasser)

Updated 11/8/17

New Chapter 15 Filing - Ocean Rig UDW Inc.

Ocean Rig UDW Inc.

  • 3/28/17 Recap: Offshore drilling contractor files for bankruptcy under Chapter 15 to EFF the "vulture investors." Seriously. The Company has secured a TRO to block creditors from obstreperously vulturing their way through a potential debt restructuring. While we're somewhat serious about the foregoing, the Company is also in the midst of four interrelated schemes of arrangement and the Chapter 15 is meant to give the Company breathing room to effectuate a debt-for-equity swap thereunder - exchanging $3.7b of debt for new equity, $450mm of new secured notes, and $288mm of cash. The cause of impairment is the obvious: an "unprecedented decline in recent years in petroleum prices and exploration and development activity," which made interest coverage and refinancing difficult.  
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
  • Capital Structure: $1.83b '20 TLB, $1.27b '21 TLB, $460mm '17 6.5% DRH secured notes (U.S. Bank NA), $423mm '19 7.25% unsecured notes .     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Evan Hollander, Raniero D'Aversa Jr., Monica Perrigno, Ayanna Lewis-Gruss)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (Eleanor Fisher, Simon Appell)
    • Investment Banker: Evercore
    • Information Agent: Prime Clerk LLC
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Highland Floating Rate Opportunities Fund, Highland Global Allocation Fund, Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund, Highland Loan Master Fund LP, NexPoint Credit Strategies Fund 
      • Legal: Venable LLP (Jeffrey Sabin, Konstantinos Katsiris, Carol Weiner Levy)
    • Ad Hoc Group of TL Lenders
      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Gerard Uzzi, Mark Shinderman, James Behrens, Brian Kinney)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Holders of 6.5% DRH Secured Notes
      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jayme Sprayragen, Edward Sassower, Brian Schartz, Patrick Nash)
    • Indenture Trustee: US Bank, NA
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Benjamin Feder)

Updated 3/31/17 3:53 pm

New Chapter 22 Filing - General Wireless Operations Inc. (f/k/a Radio Shack)

General Wireless Operations Inc.

  • 3/8/17 Recap: We're exasperated. Let's revisit history. In February 2015, Radio Shack filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan of reorganization in October 2015 and it went effective just five days later. So...six...wait, carry the one...yeah, sixteen months later the successor entity General Wireless Operations is now in bankruptcy looking to shut the lights and/or pass this toad on to another sucker as Standard General pulls the chute. Why did this all happen? Well, because Sprint sucks, apparently ("[w]hile the retail business progressed, the Sprint relationship did not yield the benefits that the Debtors expected"). The arrangement out of bankruptcy was for the reinvented Radio Shack to have co-branded stores with Sprint for the purpose of selling Sprint mobile devices that nobody wants (note: 78+mm Apple iphones were sold last quarter). Sprint was obligated to pay rent for the space it occupied as well as commissions above a certain threshold level of sales ($60mm). Hahahaha...above a threshold level of sales? Yeah, never got there (wait what? erroneous projections? you don't say!).  Absent that cash inflow, the company had insufficient funds to continue to operate as a going concern. Hence, the Scarlet 22.  
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $75mm revolver and term loan debt ($25.5mm funded) (Royal Bank of Canada & GACP Finance Co. LLC) & $88mm second lien revolver and term loan debt ($39.7mm funded)(Standard General Master Fund LP, Cortland Capital Market Services LLC, Prisma Capital Partners LP) & $23mm IP term loan (Kensington Technology Holdings LLC)
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Scott Greenberg, Mark Cody) & Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier, Evelyn Meltzer, Michael Custer, Kay Kress)
    • Financial Advisor: Loughlin Management Partners & Company Inc.
    • Liquidation Consultant: Tiger Capital Group LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Sprint
      • Legal: McGuire Woods LLP (David Swan, James Van Horn) & (local) K&L Gates LLP (Steven Caponi)
    • Kensington Technology Holdings LLC
      • Legal: Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP (Joseph Sgroi)
    • GACP Finance Co. LLC
      • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Andrew Tenzer, Leslie Plaskon, Michael Comerford) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Justin Rucki, Allison Mielke)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Michael Yurkewicz)

Updated 3/21/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Vanguard Natural Resources

Vanguard Natural Resources

  • 2/2/17 Recap: Houston-based oil and gas producer files chapter 11 pursuant to a restructuring support agreement that, if implemented, will permit the company to cut over $700mm of debt. The company has secured a $50mm DIP. 
  • Jurisdiction: SD of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $1.372b '18 L+250 RBL (Citibank N.A.), $76mm '20 7% second lien notes, $51'm '19 8.375% unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust), $382mm '20 7.875% unsecured notes (UMB Bank)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Chris Dickerson, James Grogan, Todd Schwartz, Alexander Bongartz, Brendan Gage)
    • Financial Advisor: Opportune LLP (Scott Anchin)
    • Investment Banker: Evercore Partners (Daniel Aronson, Marco Acerra)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Group of 2L noteholders (Fir Tree Inc., Wexford Capital LP, York Capital Management Global Advisors)
      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, John Pintarelli, Daniel Harris) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Monica Blacker, Matthew Cavenaugh)
    • Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Noteholders & UMB Bank NA
      • Legal: Milbank (Dennis Dunne, Andrew LeBlanc, Samuel Khalil) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English)
      • Investment Bank: PJT Partners Inc.
    • RBL Lender: Citibank NA
      • Legal: Weil (Stephen Karotkin, Joseph Smolinsky, Blaire Cahn, Christopher Lopez)
    • UMB Bank
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Benjamin Feder, T. Charlie Liu)
    • Wilmington Trust
      • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Matthew Silverman) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Michael Warner, Benjamin Wallen)
    • Independent Directors of the Board
      • Legal: Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP (Robin Russell, Tad Davidson, Joseph Buoni)
    • Unsecured Noteholder & Preferred Unitholder: Panning Capital Management 
      • Legal: Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Thomas Wolper, Seth Goldman) & (local) Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (William Greendyke, Jason Boland, Bob Bruner, Louis Strubeck) 
    • Ad Hoc Equity Committee
      • Legal: Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP (John Melko, Sharon Beausoleil, Michael Riordan, Sean Wilson, Holland O'Neil)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Akin Gump (Charles Gibbs, Michael Stamer, Abid Qureshi, Meredith Lahaie, Kevin Zuzolo)
      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting

Updated 3/22/17

 

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Limited Stores Company LLC

Limited Stores Company LLC

  • 1/17/17 Recap: Sun Capital owned multi-channel retailer with 250 locations (down from a peak of 750) filed for bankruptcy to continue its Hilco-assisted liquidation and sell its IP and e-commerce channel for a proposed ~$25.5mm sum to Sycamore Partners. Looks like some "A Malls" owned by Simon Property Group and GGP Limited Partnership just got nicked.  
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $50mm RCF (unfunded, BofA), $13.4 TL (Cerberus Business Finance LLC)   
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti, Michael Yurkewicz)
    • Financial Advisor: RAS Management Advisors LLC (Timothy Boates)
    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Durc Savini, Ryan Mash, Michael Gottlieb, Ben Loveland, Justin Kundrat, Grace Dai)
    • Sponsor: Sun Capital Partners Inc.
    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Cerberus Business Finance LLC
      • Legal: Klee Tuchin Bogdanoff & Stern LLP (Michael Tuchin, David Fidler, Jonathan Weiss)
    • Sycamore Partners
      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Stempel)
    • TradeGlobal LLC
      • Legal: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP (Elliot Smith) & (local) Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Jason Adams, James Carr, James Shickich, Kristin Elliott) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Bradford Sandler, James O'Neill)
      • Financial Advisor: CBIZ Accounting Tax and Advisory of New York (Esther DuVal)

Updated 3/30/17

New Filing - Scout Media Holdings Inc.

Scout Media Holdings Inc.

  • 12/8/16 Recap: Digital sports media company files a responsive chapter 11 to an earlier involuntary filing with an unsustainable balance sheet and various litigations listed as the causes. There's some juicy inferences here about the former CEO perhaps not adhering to his fiduciary duties as they relate to uses of liquidity. The filing supports attempts to sell the business and/or wind-down the business in an orderly manner with the support of a $6.2mm DIP Facility.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $11mm first lien debt (Multiplier Capital LP), $11.6mm second lien secured bridge loans.     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP (Matthew Ward, Nicholas Verna, Morgan Patterson, Ericka Johnson)
    • Financial Advisor: Sherwood Partners Inc. (Andrew De Camara)
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP & First Lien Lender: Multiplier Capital LP 
      • Legal: Levy Small & Lallas (Leo Plotkin) & Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole (William Chapman Jr.)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Jason Adams)
      • Financial Advisor: BDO Consulting LLP (Michelle Michaelis)

Updated 1/21/17.