🧀 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - CEC Entertainment Inc. 🧀

CEC Entertainment Inc.

June 24, 2020

For our rundown, please go here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $1.089b funded debt ($760mm TL, $108 RCF, $6mm LOC, $215.7mm notes)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Alfredo Perez, Andrew Citron, Rachael Foust, Scott Bowling)

    • Board of Directors: David McKillips, Andrew Jhawar, Naveen Shahani, Allen Weiss, Peter Brown, Paul Aronzon

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chad Coben)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie O’Connell)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • PE Sponsor: Queso Holdings Inc./AP VIII CEC Holdings, L.P. (Apollo)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP

    • First Lien Credit Agreement Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders: American Money Management Corp, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Arena Capital Advisors LLC, Ares Management LLC, Bank of Montreal, BlueMountain Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, Catalur Capital Management LP, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank New York, Fidelity Management & Research Co., Fortress Investment Group LLC, GS Capital Partners LP, Hill Path Capital, Indaba Capital Fund LP, ICG Debt Advisors, Jefferies Financ LLC, J.H. Lane Partners Master Fund LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, MSD Capital LP, MSD Partners LP, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, Par Four Investment Management LLC, RFG-Clover LLC, Second Lien LLC, UBS AG, Wazee Street Capital Management, Western Asset Management Company LLC, WhiteStar Asset Management, ZAIS Group LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Jason Rubin, Marty Brimmage Jr., Lacy Lawrence)

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Jason Angelo)

    • Ad Hoc Group of ‘22 8% Senior Noteholders (Longfellow Investment Management Co. LLC, Prudential Financial Inc., Resource Credit Income Fund, Westchester Capital Management)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Matthew Warren, Lindsey Henrikson, Michael Rupe)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Wilmington Trust NA, The Coca-Cola Company, National Retail Properties, Performance Food Group, Washington Prime Group, NCR Corporation, Index Promotions

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel & Womble Bond Dickinson LLP (Matthew Ward)

7/17/20 Dkt. 352.

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - PQ New York Inc. (a/k/a Le Pain Quotidien)

PQ New York Inc.

May 27, 2020

New York-based and Belgium-company-owned PQ New York Inc., otherwise known to most as Le Pain Quotidien, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware (along with 104 affiliates) to effectuate a sale of assets to LPQ USA LLC, an affiliate of Aurify Brands. Aurify Brands incubates in-house brands (e.g., Melt Shop) and harvests previously-created brands too (e.g., Five Guys Burgers and Fries). It intends to re-open no fewer than 35 of LPQ’s 98 restaurants (and, to this end, has already filed a lease rejection motion delineating which leases, subject to a negotiation between landlords and the proposed purchaser, are subject to rejection). LPQ USA LLC provided the debtors a $522k bridge loan pre-petition and roll that loan up into a $3mm post-petition DIP credit facility to fund working capital needs during the course of the cases.

This is not a pure COVID story. The debtors financial performance began to decline pre-pandemic as customer preferences shifted away from the casual dining concept towards other concepts like “grab n go.” This trend, combined with management turnover and lack of investment at the store level, led the debtors to begin exploring strategic alternatives for their European and US-based businesses in Q3 of 2019.

Let’s put some numbers around this. In 2018, the debtors had $175mm of sales and $4.4mm in EBITDA. In 2019, sales dropped to $153mm and EBITDA swung by over $20mm to -$16.8mm. Even worse? There was no hope on the horizon. With expensive leases and eroding same store sales, the debtors forecast negative EBITDA through 2023 absent a severe operational restructuring. Prior to COVID slamming the economy and shutting everything down, the debtors had already determined that a bankruptcy filing would be necessary to help negotiate lease terms with landlords, secure funding, and pursue a sale. The shutdown just postponed things for a while.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $522k bridge loan

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Jason Madron, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: PwC (Steven Fleming)

    • Investment Banker: SSG Advisors LLC

    • Real Estate Advisor: RCS Real Estate Advisors

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: LPQ USA LLC

      • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Steven Reisman, Cindi Giglio) & Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti, Morton Branzburg)

🍔New Chapter 11 Filing - SD Charlotte LLC🍔

SD Charlotte LLC

February 7, 2020

SD Charlotte LLC and four affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy on Friday in the Western District of North Carolina. While these are smaller cases than we typically cover here in PETITION, the filing is representative of continued distress in the restaurant space. Why? SD Charlotte LLC is the owner and operator of 73 Sonic Drive-In restaurants, an affiliate is the owner and operator of 14 MOD Pizza restaurants, and another affiliate is the owner and operator of three Fuzzy’s Taco Shop restaurants. In total, the debtors employ 1,900 people and have, as the above numbers might suggest, a large presence in the south east, predominantly in North Carolina.

It’s important to note that the debtors do not indicate that their filing is the result of the various factors we’ve seen in other restaurant filings, i.e., increasing wages, poor leases, VC-backed food delivery services, etc. We can assume, though, that given significant liquidity issues arising almost immediately after the principal franchised the restaurants, that some of these factors were in play. The main issue, however, was the debtors’ debt burden: the debtors appear to have taken on too much debt and expanded too quickly in a difficult environment for restaurants; they have $22.3mm of pre-petition secured debt — a figure that the debtors acknowledge, in their filing, exceeds the value of the debtors’ assets. Ruh roh. 😬

Liquidity has been an issue for the debtors from their inception in 2017. In late 2018, the debtors had to turn to “factors” for liquidity. What the bloody hell is a “factor”? Glad you asked…

A factoring counter-party offers upfront cash payments for future receivables. Said another way, a factor will pay a discounted cash price today and take on the risk of non-payment in exchange for greater cash payments in the near future. To protect, their interest in those future receivables, the factors should obtain a security interest in those receivables and take the proper steps to record those security interests.* The debtors entered into at least at least 10 such agreements in an attempt to stave off the inevitable.

While factoring can be a viable source of emergency liquidity for struggling companies, the terms can be highly punitive. Note:

…the Debtors sold no less than $7,988,325 of future accounts receivable to the MCA Parties in exchange for cash payments in an amount not less than $5,880,000, less fees and certain expenses. These records indicate that the MCA Parties purchased the Debtors’ future accounts receivable at significant discounts, charged high fees and had the ability to debit the Debtors’ deposit accounts directly. The depletion of the Debtors’ liquidity attributable to obligations under the MCA Agreements, coupled with the seasonal downturn in the Sonic Drive-In restaurants, left the Debtors’ cash flow position untenable.

Carry the one, add the two…yeah, that’s a pretty solid discount to par value: a bit over 25%. Think about that: the debtors’ need for liquidity was so dire that they agreed to give away approximately 25 cents on every dollar that would enter their accounts because they didn’t have the luxury of time to wait for those receivables to come in. Private equity firms and others are often dubbed “vultures” but factors have a very interesting role to play here too.

And so the debtors were so low on cash that they ultimately had to get a bridge loan from their franchisor, SRI Holding Company (Sonic). The bridge loan will rollup into a DIP credit facility agreement which, with the pre-petition secured lenders’ consent, will prime the pre-petition secured debt. The DIP credit facility will finance the debtors’ cases and give the debtors some breathing room to pursue a 363 asset sale that will clear out the pre-petition debt and eliminate any and all uncertainty relating to the factoring agreements.

One final point here: it is highly unlikely that a sale will generate enough proceeds to clear both the DIP credit facility and the pre-petition secured debt. This means that general unsecured creditors will get the royal effing. Given all of the pain in restaurant and grocery chains, this begs the question: how much supply chain pain is there out there right now? Food distributors? Packagers? We reckon quite a bit.

*Here there is some question as to whether certain of the factoring agreement counterparties filed UCC-1 financing statements which may put into dispute the validity of their said security interest in those receivables. Any official committee of unsecured creditors will take great interest in whether UCC-1s have been recorded though it likely won’t matter given the value of the assets and the likely superceding security interests held by the prepetition secured lender.

  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of North Carolina (Judge Beyer)

  • Capital Structure: $450k Bridge Loan (SRI Holding Company), $22.3mm (Bridge Funding Group Inc.)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Moore Van Allen PLLC (Zachary Smith, Gabriel Mathless, Hillary Crabtree, Joanne Wu, James Langdon) & JD Thompson Law (Linda Simpson)

    • Independent Director: Finley Group (Matthew Smith)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Meru LLC (Brian Rosenthal, Alissia Bell)

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: SRI Holding Company, SRI Operating Company, Sonic Franchising LLC and Sonic Industries LLC

      • Legal: DLA Piper US LLP (Daniel Simon, Davi Avraham) & Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson PA (David Schilli)

🍸New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - BL Restaurants Holding LLC (Bar Louie)🍸

BL Restaurants Holding LLC

January 27, 2020

Another day, another Sun Capital Partnersportfolio company* in bankruptcy. Texas-based BL Restaurants Holding LLC — known to most as Bar Louie — and 3 affiliated entities filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Bar Louie is a gastrobar concept that operates 110 owned locations plus 24 franchises across 26 states and the District of Columbia. In 2019, it did $252mm of sales, down 3.7% YOY.

We hate to feed into the private-equity-destroys-everything-it-touches-trope but, well, judge for yourself…

The company notes:

Over the past several years, the opening of new locations was the primary driver for sales and profit growth for the Company. This growth was partially funded through new debt, but also utilized cash flow from operations, which ultimately over time restricted liquidity otherwise needed for store refreshes and equipment maintenance and modernization, resulting in inconsistent delivery of the brand promise across the system. This inconsistent brand experience, coupled with increased competition and the general decline in customer traffic visiting traditional shopping locations and malls, resulted in less traffic at the Company’s locations proximate to shopping locations and malls and contributed to sales falling short of forecast. These customer declines were also driven by major changes in consumer behavior, including the general national trend away from casual dining. The combination of these factors had a particularly major impact on a significant segment of the Company’s footprint.

Indeed, all of that growth — coupled with disruptive trends confronting both malls and casual dining — took its toll. Indeed, 38 locations, in particular, really saddled the company. Apparently it’s a bad sign when a third of your footprint has negative same store sale comps of 10.9%. 😬 This brought down the rest of the enterprise (which “only experienced a 1.4% SSS decline.”). Only. The debtors closed the aforementioned 38 locations pre-filing.

What of the debt? The company has $87mm of funded debt, $8mm of trade debt and approximately $6mm of other unsecured debt excluding lease termination claims. Things aren’t looking so great for the trade. The pre-petition lenders have agreed to place a $22mm DIP.

So now the debtors will use that DIP to give themselves time to attempt a sale in bankruptcy. The debtors’ first lien secured lenders and the pre-petition first lien secured agent will serve as a stalking horse via a credit bid. They are owed approximately $56.4mm. Pursuant to the sale motion filed with the court, they seek a 3% breakup fee in connection with the agreement to be the stalking horse which, if you asked us, seems a bit ridiculous under the circumstances. Why do they need a breakup fee at all when they’re trying to shed this turd? Do they really want to own this business? A multi-month pre-petition marketing campaign would seem to indicate otherwise. This reeks of greed and ought to spark an objection from creditors who will be hoping there’s some buyer who comes out of the wood work and overbids for this thing.

We wouldn’t bet on it.

*The debtors’ first day declaration only refers to its private equity sponsors as “its current owners”. While it’s not entirely clear from the bankruptcy papers, it appears that Sun Capital may also be the second lien lender agent here (and lenders) — a presumption that is bolstered by the appearance of Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP as counsel. Morgan Lewis has represented Sun Capital portfolio companies in a number of recent chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. Curious how, with one exception, there was virtually no mention of Sun Capital’s involvement in any of the papers.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: $42mm Term Loan + $14.4mm RCF (Antares Capital LP), $23.6mm second lien debt (BL Restaurants Group Holding Corp.)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti, Michael Yurkewicz)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Carl Marks Advisory Group LLC (Howard Meitiner)

    • Investment Banker: Configure Partners LLC (Vin Batra)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition First Lien Secured Agent and DIP Agent: Antares Capital LP

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (James Ktsanes, Jeremy Webb) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Andrew Magaziner)

    • DIP Lenders: Midcap Funding XVI Trust, Midcap Funding XXX Trust, Midcap Financial Trust, Woodmont 2017-2 Trust, Woodmont 2017-3 LP, Woodmont 2018-4 Trust

    • Prepetition Second Lien Agent:

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Barbara Shander)

    • Purchaser: BLH Acquisition Co., LLC

🍔New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - The Krystal Company🍔

The Krystal Company

January 19, 2020

Georgia-based quick-service restaurant chain, The Krystal Company, which features cheap — some might say “iconic” (read: the company = “some”) — square burgers among other horrendous-for-your-health fare (eggnog shakes, anyone?), filed for bankruptcy in the Northern District of Georgia over the holiday weekend. We’re guessing that most of you snobby coastal elites have likely never heard of Krystal and, well, neither had we to be honest. To our surprise, Krystal is purportedly “the oldest quick-service restaurant chain in the South and the second oldest in the United States, the Krystal brand has a prominent place in the South’s cultural landscape.” You learn something new every day.

The chain operates 182 restaurant locations across nine states; it has approximately 4900 employees; it doesn’t own its real estate; it does have 116 franchisees. It also has over $65mm in debt.

Why the bankruptcy? PETITION readers are very familiar with the trends afflicting quick service restaurants. A number have stumbled into bankruptcy in recent years. To point, the company’s Chief Restructuring Officer also recently worked with Kona Grill and Ignite Restaurant Group. There are plenty of distressed restaurant chains to keep the fee meter running, it seems.

So, what are these trends?

  • Shifting consumers tastes and preferences (PETITION Note: people are becoming more health-conscious and a slab of previously-frozen meat stacked between a gnarled bun, diced onions, a pickle and some stadium mustard don’t really pass muster anymore). ✅

  • Fast casual and online delivery are crushing quick service chains (PETITION Note: we’re going to have to start referring to “The Chipotle Effect”). ✅

  • It is increasingly hard to find and retain qualified employees in the current labor market, as turnover exceeds 200% (PETITION Note: #MAGA!!). ✅

  • Commodity costs are rising (PETITION Note: but there’s virtually no inflation folks). ✅

  • Unfavorable lease terms. ✅

Facing all of this, the company did what struggling companies tend to do: they hired an expensive consultant. Boston Consulting Group came in and to advise the company with respect to “competitive positioning” and this led to a capital intensive rebuilding project of nine of its locations. Yes, they completely demolished and rebuilt nine locations in ‘18 and ‘19. Ultimately, this led to increased sales at those locations but it clearly couldn’t course correct the entire enterprise.

Consequently, the company breached a financial covenant in Q4 ‘18. It obtained an equity infusion which stopped the bleeding…for like a hot second. The company then defaulted under its credit agreement because it couldn’t obtain a “going concern” qualification for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2018. It has been in forbearance since October. Meanwhile, it has been shedding costs: people have been fired and stores have been closed.

About those stores. The average occupancy cost of the company’s locations is $482k/month. Because of this, the company regularly reviews profitability and recently has turned several of its stores “dark” by ceasing all business there. On day one of its chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, the company filed a motion seeking to reject (i) these “dark” leases (38 of them) as well as (ii) several other locations that franchisees operate under subleases that are not profitable (40 total locations).

So, what now? The papers don’t really say much. Oddly enough, the first day declaration ends with some information about a payment processing data breach and says nothing about DIP financing (there isn’t any) or the direction of the case. In a press release, however, the company says that it intends to use the bankruptcy process to pursue “an orderly sale of its business and assets as a going concern.” Now, in the past, we’ve certainly made fun of debtors who have used their first day papers as de facto marketing materials. Not because it’s stupid: it’s rather smart. It was just also rather blatant and shamelessly spinful. Here, though, Krystal doesn’t even mention anything about a marketing process in its papers or, for that matter, a banker (which happens to be the newly merged Piper Sandler).

These guys are off to a rockin start.

*****

Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC), the agent under the company’s secured loan, agrees. It filed an objection to the company’s motion seeking authorization to use cash collateral. They wrote:

As the Debtors’ largest stakeholder, the Agent is extremely concerned with the manner in which the Debtors are positioning these cases. The Debtors have yet to file their budget for either the interim period until the second interim hearing or a longer-term budget, but based on the draft budgets that were provided to the Agent prior to filing, it appears that operating on cash collateral alone will not provide the Debtors with sufficient liquidity to make it through a sale process and affords almost no margin for error. The Bankruptcy Code does not permit the Debtors to avoid their obligation to provide adequate protection to the Prepetition Secured Parties on the basis that the Debtors elected a budget that will not permit it. Were the Debtors to run out of cash during the sale process, as they are likely to do, the attendant disruption could jeopardize the entire going concern value of the business and the sale process.

Nothing like a contested cash collateral hearing to get things off on the right foot.

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Georgia (Judge Hagenau)

  • Capital Structure: $10mm RCF, $54.1mm Term Loan (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $1.5mm promissory note (KRY LLC).

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Leia Clement Shermohammed)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jonathan Tibus)

    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffray & Co. (aka Piper Sandler)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Jennifer Feldshur, Charlie Liu) & Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs LLP (C. Edward Dobbs, Rufus Dorsey, Michael Sullivan)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Cafe Holdings Corp.

Cafe Holdings Corp.

November 15, 2018

Source: Fatz.com

Source: Fatz.com

Anyone interested in a game of hot potato?

Cafe Holdings Corp. is a privately-owned chain of fast casual dining restaurants called Fatz Cafe. Fatz Cafe has 38 locations across 5 states and, as you can surely note from the image above, has an abundance of potato options on its menu. And it, in this scenario, is the hot potato.

The company filed for bankruptcy in the District of South Carolina earlier this week — exhibiting yet another sign, as PETITION has discussed at length previously, that casual dining is a really tough space right now. The company, itself, acknowledges:

Over the past several years, casual dining chains have experienced strong headwinds due to a combination of shifting consumer tastes and preferences, growth in labor and commodity costs, increased competition, and unfavorable lease terms. Indeed, a number of national and regional restaurant chains – including Real Mex Restaurants, certain Applebee’s franchisees, Ignite Restaurant Group, Macaroni Grill, Garden Fresh, Bertucci’s, and Logan’s – have buckled under these secular pressures and were forced to restructure their balance sheets and operations through a chapter 11 bankruptcy.

The company blames its unsustainable $30mm capital structure, “industry-wide challenges, trade market changes and challenges, underperforming strategic initiatives, and unsatisfactory business performance.” All of this is despite efforts to run the typical distressed restaurant playbook: install new management, refinance debt, restructure leases, shutter underperforming locations, deploy overhead rationalization, innovate around new product and promotional strategies, update the menu, invest in tech, renegotiate with vendors, etc. PETITION Note: nothing in the standard playbook can do anything about the fact that there are just far too many dining options available to consumers today. Period. The company’s consolidated adjusted network-wide EBITDA for the 12 months ended September 2018 and the fiscal year ended 2017 were approximately ($635,087) and $1.40 million, respectively.

And so the company turned to the next page in the playbook: a marketed sale. Yet, despite outreach to more than 200 parties, including both potential financial and strategic partners, the company didn’t generate any bids. Then comes the hot potato:

Unfortunately, after months of effort and outreach to more than 200 parties, including both potential financial and strategic purchasers, the Company was not able to obtain any bids for the Fatz assets. Moreover, the Company’s then first lien lender, Madison Capital Funding LLC (“Madison”), informed the Company that it did not wish to offer financing or serve as a stalking horse bidder in a chapter 11 sale process, and ultimately sold its debt position to Shrayne Capital, LLC (“Shrayne”). After further diligence, ultimately Shrayne decided it also did not wish to serve as a stalking horse bidder in a chapter 11 sale process and, in turn, sold its position to Atalaya Capital Management, LP and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Atalaya”), who agreed to provide debtor in possession financing and to serve as a stalking horse bidder in a section 363 sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets.

You have to think that Atalaya Capital Management got that first lien paper at a meaningful discount to face value. Indeed, Shrayne only owned the paper for 5 weeks and then ran for the hills. Atalaya will provide the company with a $3.2mm DIP and, though the company has not filed its bidding procedures or stalking horse asset purchase agreement, presumably credit bid its debt to own the company out of Chapter 11. Now, for the uninitiated, the bankruptcy code permits a creditor to “credit bid” its debt, which is basically, as payment, exchanging a claim for the assets. A creditor can do that to the full extent of the claim, regardless of the the price said creditor paid for that claim. In other words, Atalaya may have paid Shrayne $0.01 for the first lien paper but because the face value of the first lien paper is $9.7mm, Atalaya can, but doesn’t have to, “bid” up to $9.7mm of that claim (like a coupon, in effect) for the company. Alternatively, it can provide the $3.2mm DIP credit facility and just credit bid that amount. There are a number of ways that this can be structured. Suffice it to say that Atalaya will need to infuse the business with capital if it wants it to have a fighting chance but it is under no obligation to cover and pay down the full extent of the debt. Indeed, the junior lenders and the ~63.5% equityholder, Milestone Partners III LP I and II, can effectively kiss their investments goodbye.

Opportunistic players who love feasting on the restaurant space will continue to have an abundance of opportunities like this one.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of South Carolina

  • Capital Structure: $9.7mm first lien (Atalaya Capital Management), $2mm second lien, $17.5mm mezzanine unsecured loan, $1.9mm unsecured subordinated note

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Ian Peck, J. Fraser Murphy, David Staab) and (local) McNair Law Firm PA (Michael Weaver, Robin Stanton, Weyman Carter)

    • Financial Advisor: Loughlin Management Partners & Co.

    • Investment Banker: Duff & Phelps LLC (Vin Batra)

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

Updated 11/17/18

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Taco Bueno Restaurants, Inc.

Taco Bueno Restaurants, Inc.

November 6, 2018

Damn you Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. ($CMG).

It’s been a rough several months for Mexican restaurants. Over the summer, Tennenbaum Capital and Z Capital-owned RM Holdco LLC (Real Mex) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware and pursued a sale of its business. Now, Texas-based, TPG-owned Taco Bueno Restaurants, Inc., a Tex-Mex quick service restaurant (“QSR”) with 140 owned and 29 franchised locations, has filed a prepackaged bankruptcy that will convey ownership to Taco Supremo LLC, an affiliate of Sun Holdings Inc., which bought-out the debtors’ initial lenders in October. Taco Supremo subsequently signed a restructuring support agreement memorializing its intent to effectuate a debt-for-equity swap and provide the debtors with a DIP credit facility.

So, why is all of this necessary? The company noted:

…while Taco Bueno possesses a traditional brand with a loyal customer base and the potential for future growth under the leadership of its new management team, Taco Bueno’s existing capital structure is unsustainable and its financial performance fell significantly due to, among other things, historical mismatches between price and product value, a lack of product innovation, and deferred maintenance capital investment. In addition, competition in the Mexican food industry – including the rise in popularity of tacos at both QSRs and other types of restaurants – increased substantially in recent years, causing certain Taco Bueno stores to experience stagnant or reduced customer traffic and sales. Moreover, while Taco Bueno recently launched a process to close underperforming stores to better focus on core markets and high-value stores, Taco Bueno continues to suffer from a number of underperforming restaurants. Accordingly, Taco Bueno needs to continue to restructure its lease footprint and renegotiate existing leases to optimize profitability.

Even the “Buenoheads” — yes, that’s actually a thing, apparently — couldn’t save this thing from bankruptcy. The debtors’ EBITDA fell to approximately $17.2 million in 2017 with a projected EBITDA of approximately $5.9 million for 2018, compared to approximately $33 million in 2016 EBITDA and approximately $31 million in 2015 EBITDA. Of course, the $130mm of debt doesn’t help either.

Consequently, to salvage liquidity and allow its bankers to conduct a process, the debtors closed 20 locations in the last year (and are in the midst of negotiations with Spirit Realty Capital Inc. ($SRC), U.S Realty Capital, and Kamin Realty Co., the landlords of over 50% of the debtors’ leases). The management team has turned over and the company attempted a prepetition sale process. That process culminated in the above-noted RSA-based transaction that will attempt to flush the company in and out of bankruptcy court by the middle of December.

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas

  • Capital Structure: $130.9mm debt     

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins (David Meyer, Jessica Peet, Paul Heath, Garrick Smith, Matthew Pyeatt, Andrew Geppert)

    • CRO/Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Haywood Miller)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Adam Dunayer)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Jones Lang LaSalle Americas Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Initial Lender: Bank of America NA

    • Sponsor: TPG Growth III Management LLC

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - PGHC Holdings Inc.

PGHC Holdings Inc.

November 5, 2018

On Sunday night, the New England Patriots took down the Green Bay Packers but the official pizza of the team took an “L.” Indeed, New England local news reported that dozens of area Papa Gino’s locations had abruptly shut down. Now we know why. And, it turns out, the dozens were really 95 stores all in. Which, we’d be remiss not to note, affects 1,100 employees who are now out of jobs.

On Monday morning, PGHC Holdings Inc., the parent company of 141 company-owned and 37 franchisee-and-licensee-owned New England restaurant chains Papa Gino’s Pizzeria and D’Angelo Grilled Sandwiches, filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a sale to WC Purchaser LLC, an affiliate of Wynnchurch Capital. Wynnchurch will provide a DIP credit facility to fund the case.

We, here, at PETITION have highlighted disruption in the casual dining space ad nauseum. The debtors, in their filings, confirmed a lot of what we’ve been saying. They noted:

Consumer preferences have shifted from in-restaurant dining to delivery and carryout ordering, which require fewer overall restaurants and smaller restaurant size to service the same geographic area. As a result of these shifting consumer preferences, the Debtors’ existing footprint is too large — in terms of both number and size of restaurants. In addition, minimum wage increases across many of the Debtors’ markets combined with higher employee benefit costs associated with health plans have also pressured the Debtors’ cash flows. The Debtors also have faced increased competition and associated price pressure from national chains that have increased their footprint in the Debtors’ core New England markets. In addition to these and other operational factors, the Debtors have a substantial debt load that, as noted above, they have been unable to service and are in default under.

Consequently, the debtors have let leases expire, engaged in (mostly unsuccessful) negotiations with landlords on lease forgiveness, changed internal IT systems, emphasized digital media marketing and formulated a smaller more efficient restaurant concept. Nevertheless, these efforts didn’t generate enough revenue and profitability to enable the debtors to handle their debt burden.

Wynnchurch will provide the company with a $13.8mm DIP facility, permit the use of cash collateral, and credit bid the debt it took over to the tune of $20mm. In other words, this is effectively a “loan-to-own” play. Bravo!

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware

  • Capital Structure: $6.9mm Revolver A, $1.5mm Revolver B, $18.4mm Term Loan A (WC Financeco A LLC, as assignee), $34.2mm second lien debt (WC Financeco B LLC, as assignee), $27.9mm unsecured mezz debt (Hartford Life Insurance Company), $11.9mm unsecured mezz debt (Brookside Mezzanine Fund)

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Matthew Harvey, Eric Moats)

    • Financial Advisor: CR3 Partners LLC

    • Investment Banker: North Point Advisors LLC

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Mezz Debt Lenders

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Douglas Gooding)

🌮New Chapter 11 Filing - RM Holdco LLC (Real Mex)🌮

In April's piece entitled "🍟Casual Dining is a Hot Mess🍟" and then in a follow-up in July creatively and originally entitled "🍟Casual Dining Continues to = a Hot Mess🍟" we noted that...well...casual dining is a hot mess. As of today…A. Spicy. Hot. Mess. Actually.

Late last night, RM Holdco LLC, the owner of a portfolio of 69 company-operated and 11 franchised restaurants and contemporary taquerías including Chevy's Fresh Mex, Siniqual, El Torito Grill, Las Brisas and Alcapulco filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a "363 sale" of substantially all of its assets to an affiliate of one of its pre-petition equityholders, Z Capital Partners LLC for $46.75mm. Interestingly, this filing also marks the third — that’s right, THIRD — chapter 22 filing in the last week following Home Heritage Group Inc. and Brookstone Inc. This is how we previously described a “Chapter 22”:

For the uninitiated, Chapter 22 in bankruptcy doesn’t actually exist. It is a somewhat snarky term to describe companies that have round-tripped back into chapter 11 after a previous stint in bankruptcy court.

Real Mex previously filed for bankruptcy in October 2011 and sold to Z Capital and Tennenbaum Capital Partners LLC in March 2012. At the time of that previous chapter 11 filing, the company operated approximately 128 restaurants.

This time, the signs of an imminent bankruptcy filing were out there shining for all to see as the company has been sending smoke signals for months. Back in May, Bloombergreported that the company hired Piper Jaffray to pursue a sale — including one that could be consummated in bankruptcy. Thereafter, in June, the company filed a WARN Notice with the Department of Labor indicating that it intends to close its Times Square location and lay off 134 employees. Perhaps the signs were in place even earlier when the company hired the former CFO of Wet Seal, a retailer that, itself, found its way into bankruptcy court twice.

The company highlights various macro factors as reasons for this chapter 11 filing:

For the past six (6) years, the Debtors have struggled with certain industry-wide and company-specific pressures that have negatively impacted their operations. Trends in the greater restaurant industry, including increases to minimum wage and commodity costs, have created substantial pressure on the entire sector, as evidenced by the numerous brands that have filed for bankruptcy in recent years, including Ignite Restaurant Group (Brick House and Joe’s Crab Shack), Macaroni Grill, Garden Fresh, Bertucci’s, Crumbs, Cosi, and Buffets.

And:

In addition, increased competition, especially in the form of available, quality Mexican fast casual options, has had a significant impact on traffic in the Debtors’ restaurants.

For anyone keeping track of the “What Caused Bankruptcy” standings, this would be Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) 282,499,209 and (now) Chipotle Inc. ($CMG) 1.

Compounding matters here is (i) the company’s $200+ million in debt, (ii) an expensive workers’ compensation program, (iii) long-term lease burden (it leases all of its locations, the majority if which are in California), (iv) an expensive-yet-unconsummated-growth-strategy (the company attempted but failed to pursue expensive M&A processes with bankrupted Garden Fresh Restaurant Intermediate Holdings, among others), and (v) poor risk management procedures. On the latter point, it seems the company was a wee bit cavalier about not-at-all-serious matters like alcohol awareness, sexual harassment and food handling safety; therefore, it “experienced higher-than-normal litigation and enforcement-related expenses.” Yikes.

Now, back in October 2016 — in the context of Garden Fresh’s chapter 11 filing — we asked “Are Progressives Bankrupting Restaurants?” Therein we highlighted the following:

…Morberg's explanation for the bankruptcy went a step farther. He noted that cash flow pressures also came from increased workers' compensation costs, annual rent increases, minimum wage increases in the markets they serve, and higher health benefit costs -- a damning assessment of popular progressive initiatives making the rounds this campaign season. And certainly not a minor statement to make in a sworn declaration.  

It's unlikely that this is the last restaurant bankruptcy in the near term. Will the next one also delineate progressive policies as a root cause? It seems likely.

Points for PETITION’s bullseye?

Notably, here, the company also underscores that employee costs were a significant contributor to its liquidity constraints. It states:

While struggling with the specific issues discussed above, the Debtors have also suffered from rising employee wage costs, which are particularly high in California, where the vast majority of the Debtors’ restaurants are located. In an attempt to minimize these costs, the Debtors have implemented a scheduling program that has reduced employee hours and has optimized both front-of-house and back-of-house staffing.

Welcome to the party, Mr. Unintended Consequences.

The company seeks to use the bankruptcy process to effectuate the afore-mentioned sale to Z Capital. While the purchase price is a mere fraction of the debt on balance sheet, Z Capital’s proposed stalking horse asset purchase agreement also provides that it will “offer employment to all Company employees at purchased restaurants who are employed at the closing, and may offer employment to other Company employees as well.” In other words, this may be one of those instances where the funds lose on their investments but the (remaining) employees come out relatively okay. Z Capital and Tennenbaum are also providing the company with a $5.5mm DIP credit facility to finance operations during course of the cases.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge [ ])

  • Capital Structure: $41.7mm first lien credit facility (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $195.1mm second lien credit facility (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $17.53mm in secured reimbursement obligation loans (from Letters of Credit), $53.62mm unsecured subordinated convertible debt (Z Capital = large holder)    

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Vijay Sekhon, Christina Craige, Ariella Thal Simonds) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Elizabeth Justison, Andrew Magaziner, Edmon Morton, Michael Nestor)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Jonathan Tibus)

    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffray & Co. (Jean Hosty, Terri Stratton, Michael Sutter) 

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Stalking Horse Bidder & DIP Lender: Z Capital Group LLC (Legal: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP)

    • DIP Lender: Tennenbaum Capital Partners (Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP & (local) Landis Rath & Cobb LLP)

    • DIP Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA (Thompson & Hine LLP)

New Chapter 11 Filing - RMH Franchise Holdings, Inc.

RMH Franchise Holdings, Inc.

05/08/18

In 🍟Casual Dining is a Hot Mess🍟, we wrote:

…don’t let the lull in restaurant activity fool you. As we’ve stated before, this is a space worth watching given intense competition and the rise of food delivery and meal kit services - both direct-to-consumer and in-grocery.

Looks like we spoke to soon about a lull. Earlier this week RMH Franchise Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. If you’ve never heard of RMH Franchise Holdings Inc., have no fear. You haven’t. Nor had we. But it is purportedly the second largest franchisee operator of Applebee’s Neighborhood Grill & Bar restaurants, operating 159 restaurants across 15 states. The company represents a bit less than 10% of all Applebee’s locations. RMH cobbled together this footprint after a string of acquisitions between 2012 and 2015, growing quickly and expanding its geographical scope.

Alas, Applebee’s is a casual dining establishment and, as previously covered, casual dining is struggling. The company notes,

…significant challenges encountered by the Applebee’s brand generally, and specific managerial decisions made on behalf of it by its franchisor, Applebee’s International, Inc. (the “Franchisor”), have negatively impacted the Debtors’ business operations and left them facing near-term liquidity issues.

These numbers paint a stark picture:

For the trailing twelve months ending March 31, 2018,4 the Debtors generated approximately $375.9 million in gross revenue, and $12.6 million of EBITDA, on a consolidated basis, a drop of roughly 60% in two years from the Debtors’ peak of $431.1 million and $31.4 million, respectively, in the twelve months ending March 31, 2016.

60%. Sixty…percent. Y.I.K.E.S. Much of this is attributable to a steep decline in same store sales over a period of years.

It is apparently also attributable to misguided directives from Applebee’s International Inc. (“AI”), the franchisor. Efforts to convert to wood-fired grill platforms and engage consumers with new ad campaigns flopped, despite the additional capital expenditures that those efforts required. In addition,

These difficulties were exacerbated by generally increased food costs, higher minimum wage rates and other labor costs, and increasing rents.

Consequently, the company spent the last year trying to improve operational efficiency and reduce operating expenses. It (and its agent Hilco Real Estate LLC) renegotiated leases with landlords, shed underperforming locations and negotiated with the corporate overlords to reduce corporate expenses. What it didn’t secure, however, was a long-term definitive agreement with Applebee’s International Inc. (“AI”). Instead, AI indicated that intends to issue a notice of termination of the company’s franchise rights in Arizona and Texas. That, friends, is what you call capitulation.

And the result, friends, is a crash landing into bankruptcy to trigger the automatic stay. Now the company will shed additional leases, negotiate with AI, and determine what options remain for a casual dining establishment that faces a headwinds coming multiple directions.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)
  • Capital Structure: $68.4mm debt (Bank of America), $30mm (BMO Harris Bank NA)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Kenneth Enos, Robert F. Poppiti, Jr., Justin H. Rucki, Tara C. Pakrouh)
    • Financial Advisor: Mastodon Ventures Inc.
    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on case name above for free docket access).
  • Other Parties in Interest:

New Chapter 11 Filing - Bertucci's Holdings, Inc.

4/16/18

Bertucci's, the well-known Massachusetts-based restaurant chain with 59 casual family dining restaurants has filed for bankruptcy in order to effectuate sale to Right Lane Dough Acquisition, LLC. The company is owned by an affiliate of Levine Leichtman Capital Partners

As we discussed in a recent Members'-only write-up, the casual dining space has been under siege for some time. The company notes,

"With the rise in popularity of quick-casual restaurants and oversaturation of the restaurant industry as a whole, Bertucci’s – and the casual family dining sector in general – has been affected by a prolonged negative operating trend in an ever increasing competitive price environment. Consumers have more options than ever for spending discretionary income, and their preferences continue to shift towards cheaper, faster alternatives. Since 2011, Bertucci’s has experienced a year-over-year decline in sales and revenue."

To combat these trends, the restaurant implemented what seemingly every company selling a product is trying today: experiential something-or-other. It brought back its original executive chef and deployed quarterly food and wine pairings, specialty menus, express lunches and wine specials to draw and cultivate customers. Taking a page out of Domino's book, it also invested in and launched a mobile app. These measures -- along with attempts to streamline operational costs and re-negotiate leases -- were meant to help stop the bleeding. While millions of dollars of costs were taken out and 29 unprofitable leases identified (all of which the company intends to reject immediately), revenue could not support the company's debt and working capital needs. The company defaulted on its credit facility late last year. 

The company has determined that a sale of the remaining business is the best option for maximizing value to its stakeholders. What's that value, you ask? $1.7 million in cash, a credit bid against the DIP credit facility of no less than $4 million (which is the full principal amount of the DIP), and $14 million in new second lien notes. 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
  • Capital Structure: $37.9mm secured 1st lien term loan (CIT Bank), $29.6mm secured 2nd lien term loan (DV, an affiliate of Levine Leichtman Capital Partners), $42.9mm secured holdco first lien term loan (DV)  
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kerri Mumford, Kimberly Brown, Jennifer Cree) & (special counsel) Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris) 
    • Investment Banker: Imperial Capital LLC
    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Stalking Horse Bidder: Right Lane Dough Acquisition, LLC
      • Legal: McDonald Hopkins LLC (David Agay)
    • 1st Lien Agent: CIT Bank
      • Legal: Holland & Knight LLP (Brent McIlwain) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Vasari LLC (d/b/a Dairy Queen)

Vasari LLC

  • 10/30/17 Recap: Texas-based large franchise operator of Dairy Queen brand restaurants operating approximately 70 locations across Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico filed for bankruptcy. Burdened under the weight of its debt, its lease obligations, and franchise fees, the company struggled to generate revenue to offset its obligations. Why? Well, somewhat surprisingly, the company doesn't immediately dive into the "restaurant excuse bin" (air-quotes) with hackneyed narratives like "bad weather," "experiential desires" and "millennials don't SNAP upside-down frozen treats." Rather, the company notes, "[t]he difficulties faced by the Debtor can largely be traded to the much publicized decline in oil prices. The decline in oil prices has severely impacted the job market for oil related jobs in regions of west Texas and east Oklahoma and has thus resulted in cross-industry declines in revenues in areas heavily dependent on oil related jobs." The company continues, "Since bouncing from a 12 year low, oil prices have begun to rebound; however, oil-related jobs have not. Without oil-related jobs, certain DQ locations will likely continue to underperform, causing a drain on the Debtor's resources." Hurricane Harvey was the cherry on top, disrupting operations in 17 locations. Now, the company intends to use bankruptcy to continue to evaluate its store footprint, shed some stores, and pursue a sale of the remaining locations. 
  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Mullin)
  • Capital Structure: $10.8mm debt (Cadence Bank NA), $777k PIK subordinated promissory note.    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Husch Blackwell LLP (Vickie Driver, Christina Stephenson, Ryan Burgett, Alexander Terras)
    • Financial Advisor: Mastodon
    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition/DIP Lender: Cadence Bank NA
      • Legal: Morris Manning & Martin LLP (Frank DeBorde, David Mayo) & (local) Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP (Holland O'Neil, Jason Binford)  
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner, Michael Bishop, Lydia Webb)

Updated 11/17/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - MAC Acquisition LLC (aka Romano's Macaroni Grill)

MAC Acquisition LLC (aka Romano's Macaroni Grill)

  • 10/18/17 Recap: Back in 2015, Ignite Restaurant Group offloaded Romano's Macaroni Grill to RedRock Partners LLC in an attempt to bolster its liquidity and avoid bankruptcy. It failed: the company filed for bankruptcy earlier this year (case summary here). Perhaps that had something to do with the fact that the sale was for a measly $8mm, "a price akin to dumping your unwanted junk on Craigslist." Now, Romano's Macaroni Grill has filed for bankruptcy to restructure its balance sheet and further an operational restructuring, including dealing with lessor damage claims arising out of terminated leases (the company closed 37 company-operated locations in 2017; it has 93 company-owned restaurants remaining exclusive of non-debtor franchises). The company blames its chapter 11 filing on (i) the inability to generate sufficient cashflow, sales and margin to cover operating expenses let alone service its debt (TTM EBITDA as of 8/17 was -$12mm), and (ii) increased costs for both commodities and labor. We note that this provision in the company's bankruptcy papers is indicative of a larger trend befalling the casual dining segment: "The Debtors’ operations and financial performance have been adversely affected by a number of economic factors, but perhaps most notably by an overall downturn for the casual dining industry. The preferences of such customers have shifted to cheaper, faster alternatives. On the other end of the spectrum, there is a trend among younger customers to spend their disposable income at non-chain “experience-driven” restaurants, even if slightly more expensive." In other words, this bankruptcy is partly Evan Spiegel (Snapchat, $SNAP) and Kevin Systrom's (Instagram, $FB) fault. The company has a restructuring support agreement with its major stakeholders to pursue a dual-track bankruptcy via a plan of reorganization and a potential sale upon the hiring of an investment banker (heads up: bankers!!). The company has secured a junior $5mm DIP credit facility from Raven Capital Management LLC. P.S. Nothing to see here for the REITS: Simon Property Group has made a notice of appearance in the matter. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)
  • Capital Structure: $12mm RCF (Bank of Colorado), $2.5mm TL (Bank of Colorado), $3.5mm LOC (Bank of Colorado), $5mm Funding Loan 
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Jeffrey Krause, Michael Neumeister, Emily Speak, Brittany Schmeltz) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Edmon Morton, Ryan Bartley, Elizabeth Justison)
    • Financial Advisor/Chief Restructuring Officer: Mackinac Partners LLC (Nishant Machado, Pasquale Maturo)
    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender: Raven Capital Management LLC
      • Legal: Winston & Strawn LLP (Justin Rawlins, Carey Schreiber, Eric Sagerman) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Stacy Newman)
    • Bank of Colorado
      • Legal: Shaw Fishman Glantz & Towbin LLC (Thomas Horan, Johnna Darby, Brian Shaw) & (local) Markus Williams Young & Zimmermann LLC (James Markus)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Gregory Flasser)

Updated 11/8/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Ignite Restaurant Group

Ignite Restaurant Group

  • 6/6/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($IRG) Houston-based owner of 112 Joe's Crab Shack locations and 25 Brick House Tavern + Tap locations filed for bankruptcy because people can't tear their eyes off of whatever mobile device they're towing around long enough to sit at a casual dining spot. "The market for casual dining has been deteriorating for some time." No kidding, dudes. That said, someone clearly still believes in the space as the company has lined up a stalking horse bidder to purchase the company in bankruptcy for $50mm and some assumed liabilities (subject to deductions/increases). That "someone" is KRG Acquisitions Co LLC, an affiliate of Kelly Investment Group. Maybe it's the "'I'm relaxed' restaurant experience" that the buyer finds compelling...? (Serious question: is weed legal in Texas yet?). Anyway, good luck with that. 
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $30mm RCF & $165mm TL (Credit Suisse AG)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Edward Ripley, Elizabeth Dechant)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (John Tibus)
    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffray & Co. (Richard Shinder, Teri Stratton)
    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC 
    • Claims Agent: Garden City Group LLC (*click on company name above for the free docket)
    • Other Parties in Interest:
      • Credit Suisse AG
        • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Keith Simon, David Hammerman, Hugh Murtagh) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins)
      • KRG Acquisition Co LLC 
        • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Prisca Kim) & (local) Okin Adams LLP (Matthew Okin, Ryan O'Connor)
      • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
        • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Jeffrey Pomerantz, Bradford Sandler) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Michael Warner)
      • Potential Buyer: Landry's Inc.
        • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Patrick Hughes, Arsalan Muhammad, Jonathan Pressment, Sarah Jacobson)

Updated 7/17/17 11:23 am CT

New Filing - Garden Fresh Restaurant Intermed. Holdings LLC

Garden Fresh Restaurant Intermed. Holdings LLC

  • 10/3/16 Recap: Operator of 123 farm-sourced self-serve restaurants under the Souplantation & Sweet Tomatoes brands seeks expedited sale after suffering cash flow pressure from sector headwinds, workers' comp liability, minimum wage and health benefit pressures and rent increases.  
  • 8/8/17 Update: Perpetual Capital Partners and CR3 Capital LLC acquired the reorganized company for an undisclosed amount.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: ~$195mm of funded debt     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis (Neil Herman, James Moore, Benjamin Cordiano, Katherine Lindsay) & (local) Young Conaway (Kenneth Enos, Michael Nestor, Ian Bambrick, Michael Neiburg, Travis Buchanan)
    • Financial Advisor: RAS Management Advisors LLC (Timothy Boates, Michael Rizzo)
    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffrey (Teri Stratton, Peter Schwab, Jean Hosty, John Twichell, Jason Wang, Cooper Ziecik, Galen Hand)
    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC (Ryan Lawlor)
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Term Loan A Agent: Cerberus Business Finance LLC
    • Term Loan B Agent & DIP Lender: Cortlandt Capital Market Services LLC
      • Legal: Holland & Knight LLP (Barbra Parlin) & (local) Pachulski Stang (Laura Davis Jones)
    • Term Loan C and Term Loan D Agent: Apollo Investment Management
    • Other Lenders:
      • Ares Capital Corporation, Beach Point Capital, Sun Capital
    • UCC:
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Lauren Schlussel, Jason Adams, Eric Wilson, Scott Fleisher, Charlie Liu) & (local) Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (Steven Kortanek, Joseph Argentina, Robert Malone)
      • Financial Advisor: Province Advisors (Paul Huygens, Thomas Jones, Carol Cabello, Jorge Gonzalez, Jin Dong)

Updated - Done

New Filing - Cosi Inc.

Cosi, Inc.

  • 10/1/16 Recap (updated 11/29/16): Fast casual chain seeks expedited asset sale to stalking-horse lenders (who had agreed not to credit bid their debt). Outcome: no competing bid came in and so the company sold to the stalking horse bidder for $10mm, including, in the end, a credit bid, after all. 
  • Capital Structure: $31.2mm debt     
  • Company Professionals:
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • UCC:
      • Legal: Nixon Peabody LLP (Lee Harrington, Christopher Desiderio, Christopher Fong)
      • Financial Advisor: Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP (John Doyle)
    • Lenders:
    • JPMorgan Chase Bank
      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Andrew Gallo, Christopher Carter)