🙈New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Fred's Inc.🙈

Fred’s Inc.

September 9, 2019

Dallas-based Fred’s Inc. and seven affiliated debtors have filed a long-awaited bankruptcy in the District of Delaware with the intent to unwind the business. The debtors are — or, we should say, were — discount retailers with full service pharmacies, focusing on fixed income families in small and medium-sized towns.

The bankruptcy papers — from a law firm largely known for litigation (a curious fact here until you consider that Alden Global Capital LLC is a large shareholder) — are remarkably sparse. No lengthy back story about the company and how “iconic” it is. Just, “it was founded in 1947, sold a lot of sh*t to people who have no other alternative and now we’re kaput.” No discussion of the interim, say, 70+ years. Not a mention in the First Day Declaration of the failed Walgreens/Rite-Aid transaction that would have given Fred’s a larger pharmacy footprint. Nothing about Alden’s stewardship. Nada. Not a word, outside of the motion to assume the liquidation consultant agreement, about the state of retail (and in that motion, only: “The Debtors faced significant headwinds given the continued decline of the brick-and-mortar retail industry.”). Given the case trajectory — an orderly liquidation — we suppose there’s really no need to spruce things up. There’s nothing really left to sell here.* All in, it’s, dare we say, actually kind of refreshing: finally we have a debtor dispensing with the hyperbole.

The debtors started 2018 with 557 locations. After four rounds of robust closures — 263 between April and June and another 178 between July and August — the debtors have approximately 125 locations remaining. Considering that those stores are now closing too and given that the average square footage per store was 14,684, the end result will be ~8mm of square footage unleashed on the commercial real estate market. We suspect that these small and medium-sized towns will have some empty storefronts for quite some time.

The debtors have a commitment from their pre-petition lenders for a $35mm DIP credit facility (which includes a rollup of pre-petition debt).

*The Debtors previously sold 179 of their pharmacy stores to a Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc. ($WBA) subsidiary for $177 million in fiscal Q4 ‘18 and 38 more to a CVS Health Corp. ($CVS) subsidiary for ~$15 million in August.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

• Capital Structure: $15.1mm RCF (+ $8.8mm LOCs), $20.9mm (Cardinal Health Inc., secured by pharmacy assets), $1.4mm in other secured debt.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP (Adam Shiff, Robert Novick, Matthew Stein, Shai Schmidt) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Andrew Remming, Matthew Harvey, Joseph Barsalona)

  • Board of Directors: Heath B. Freeman, Timothy A. Barton, Dana Goldsmith Needleman, Steven B. Rossi, and Thomas E. Zacharias

  • Special Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Renzi)

  • Investment Banker: PJ Solomon

  • Liquidator: SB360 Capital Partners LLC

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Lender ($35mm): Regions Bank

    • Legal: Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs LLP (Eric Anderson, Bryan Bates) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight)

  • DIP Lender: Bank of America

    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart (John Ventola)

  • Large Shareholder: Alden Global Capital LLC

Update: 9/9/19 #19

New Chapter 11 Filing - RMH Franchise Holdings, Inc.

RMH Franchise Holdings, Inc.

05/08/18

In 🍟Casual Dining is a Hot Mess🍟, we wrote:

…don’t let the lull in restaurant activity fool you. As we’ve stated before, this is a space worth watching given intense competition and the rise of food delivery and meal kit services - both direct-to-consumer and in-grocery.

Looks like we spoke to soon about a lull. Earlier this week RMH Franchise Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. If you’ve never heard of RMH Franchise Holdings Inc., have no fear. You haven’t. Nor had we. But it is purportedly the second largest franchisee operator of Applebee’s Neighborhood Grill & Bar restaurants, operating 159 restaurants across 15 states. The company represents a bit less than 10% of all Applebee’s locations. RMH cobbled together this footprint after a string of acquisitions between 2012 and 2015, growing quickly and expanding its geographical scope.

Alas, Applebee’s is a casual dining establishment and, as previously covered, casual dining is struggling. The company notes,

…significant challenges encountered by the Applebee’s brand generally, and specific managerial decisions made on behalf of it by its franchisor, Applebee’s International, Inc. (the “Franchisor”), have negatively impacted the Debtors’ business operations and left them facing near-term liquidity issues.

These numbers paint a stark picture:

For the trailing twelve months ending March 31, 2018,4 the Debtors generated approximately $375.9 million in gross revenue, and $12.6 million of EBITDA, on a consolidated basis, a drop of roughly 60% in two years from the Debtors’ peak of $431.1 million and $31.4 million, respectively, in the twelve months ending March 31, 2016.

60%. Sixty…percent. Y.I.K.E.S. Much of this is attributable to a steep decline in same store sales over a period of years.

It is apparently also attributable to misguided directives from Applebee’s International Inc. (“AI”), the franchisor. Efforts to convert to wood-fired grill platforms and engage consumers with new ad campaigns flopped, despite the additional capital expenditures that those efforts required. In addition,

These difficulties were exacerbated by generally increased food costs, higher minimum wage rates and other labor costs, and increasing rents.

Consequently, the company spent the last year trying to improve operational efficiency and reduce operating expenses. It (and its agent Hilco Real Estate LLC) renegotiated leases with landlords, shed underperforming locations and negotiated with the corporate overlords to reduce corporate expenses. What it didn’t secure, however, was a long-term definitive agreement with Applebee’s International Inc. (“AI”). Instead, AI indicated that intends to issue a notice of termination of the company’s franchise rights in Arizona and Texas. That, friends, is what you call capitulation.

And the result, friends, is a crash landing into bankruptcy to trigger the automatic stay. Now the company will shed additional leases, negotiate with AI, and determine what options remain for a casual dining establishment that faces a headwinds coming multiple directions.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)
• Capital Structure: $68.4mm debt (Bank of America), $30mm (BMO Harris Bank NA)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Kenneth Enos, Robert F. Poppiti, Jr., Justin H. Rucki, Tara C. Pakrouh)
  • Financial Advisor: Mastodon Ventures Inc.
  • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on case name above for free docket access).
• Other Parties in Interest:

New Chapter 11 Filing - Orion Healthcare Corp.

Orion Healthcare Corp.

3/16/18

You don't see this as the preface to a bankruptcy filing every day:

"...the Debtors are the victims of a large, complex, and brazen fraud that was subject to a complex and deliberate concealment effort perpetrated by their former management that was years in the making. After acquiring several of their businesses, the Debtors’ former CEO, Parmjit “Paul” Parmar (“Parmar,” who previously owned the company) took Constellation Healthcare Technologies, Inc., the parent company of the Debtors (and itself a Debtor), public on the London AIM and then proceeded to raise additional equity for additional acquisitions, many of which are believed to be largely or entirely fictitious. The Debtors borrowed approximately $130 million in debt in connection with a go-private transaction, the majority of which is believed to have been paid to Parmar (as a shareholder, through entities under his control), which is a financial burden the Debtors simply cannot sustain. The Debtors borrowed such funds based upon financials recently discovered by the Debtors’ new management and their professionals to be largely fictitious and involving numerous sham companies and fabricated transactions, revenues, and customers. The Debtors have commenced these chapter 11 cases to (i) market and sell their assets, (ii) wind down certain of their businesses, and (iii) to enable them to ultimately pursue claims against the individuals that put the Debtors in this position for the benefit of all their creditors."

Salacious. 

Orion Healthcare Corp. is in the business of (a) outsourced revenue cycle management (“RCM”) for physician practices, (b) physician practice management, (c) group purchasing services for physician practices, and (d) an independent practice association services, which is organized and directed by physicians in private practice to negotiate contracts with insurance companies on their behalf while such physicians remain independent and which also provides other services to such physician practices. The various businesses were cobbled together after a series of acquisitions. 

Constellation Healthcare LLC, a non-debtor, is an investment vehicle owned by Parmar and set up for the purpose of acquiring Orion back in 2013. Thereafter, the assets were transferred to a vehicle set up to be the holding company of the enterprise and subsequently listed on the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investments Market. After that, the company went on an acquisition spree, picking up five new businesses. The company also hit the secondary market twice to finance the transactions. As if that isn't enough tomfoolery, the company then engaged in a take private transaction pursuant to which the sponsor contributed $82.5 million of cash as equity and the company obtained $130 million in financing from lenders. The company also issued unsecured promissory notes to its shareholders to the tune of $39.6 million. 

Parmar resigned from the company in September 2017 and, subsequently, the company has been engaged in a large forensic investigation that purports to have uncovered multiple fraudulent transactions while the company was publicly listed, including fabricated customer lists and associated revenue (which, naturally, would have the effect of jacking up valuation and violating reps and warranties, presumably, to the lenders). Moreover, it is alleged that there were a variety of sham acquisitions that had the effect of unjustly enriching Parmar to the detriment of the now-over-levered company.

In light of all of this - as well as the unsustainable debt on the balance sheet and other issues such as the lack of integration between business lines and various litigation - the company filed for bankruptcy. The purpose of the filing is to market and sell some of the business, wind down certain of the businesses, and pursue claims against a coterie of allegedly fraudulent m*therf*ckers. 

• Jurisdiction: E.D. of New York (Judge Trust)

• Capital Structure: $159.3mm senior term loan, revolving loan and bridge loan (Bank of America NA)

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Richard Chesley, Thomas Califano, Rachel Nanes)

  • Legal (Conflicts Counsel): Hahn & Hessen LLP

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Timothy Dragelin)

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Bradley Jordan, Dave Salemi, Andrew Redmond, Ethan Kopp, Jack Foster)

  • Independent Director: Robert Rosenberg

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition Agent & DIP Agent ($7.5mm): Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Moore & Van Allen PLLC (James Langdon, Zachary Smith, David Eades, Gabriel Mathless)

  • Parmjit Singh Parmar (and affiliated non-Debtor entities

    • Legal: Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf LLP (Charles Simpson)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (JQ 1 Associates LLC, Christine Cohen, Kolb Radiology P.C.)

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Ilan Scharf, Richard Mikels, Maxim Litvak)

    • Financial Advisor: CBIZ NY (Charles Berk, David Greenblatt, Sharmeen Khan, Patrick Donnelly, Michal Sudo)

Updated 11/28/18

New Chapter 11 Filing - ExGen Texas Power LLC

ExGen Texas Power LLC

• 11/7/17 Recap: The last 12 months haven't been friendly to companies in the power space. The following have filed for bankruptcy: Panda Temple Power LLC, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, GenOn Energy Inc., Illinois Power Generating Co., and La Paloma Generating Company LLC. Here, the owner of five natural-gas-fired power generation projects in the great state of Texas filed for bankruptcy in the face of significant headwinds. Literally. In its bankruptcy papers, the company primarily blames decreased demand and, in turn, decreased revenue, on an increase in wind production. And mild weather. Indeed, unlike retailers who incessantly blame weather for poor performance, this is actually believable. The company notes, "public policy initiatives and incentives continue to promote the development of additional wind capacity, placing downward pressure on wholesale power prices. Such additional capacity, coupled with low natural gas prices and mild and windy weather, have exacerbated the Debtors' financial struggles. By way of example, the cost per megawatt hour in 2008 was more than $70; in 2016, it was less than $25, and just prior to the Petition Date, it was approximately $25. These factors have persisted, as additional wind and other capacity is being added to the grid, which has driven down prices in light of relatively flat demand, thereby further constricting the Debtors' revenues and cash flow." In light of these issues, the company hired a banker to market the assets and only non-Debtor Exelon Generation Company LLC bit on one of the five debtor projects to the tune of $60mm (plus various forms of other consideration). The debt in the other four projects will be equitized and the term lenders will now be owners of power generation projects, subject to approval of a plan of reorganization. Interestingly, this all comes in the same week that a proposed tax overhaul bill by the House Republicans seeks to significantly curtail wind energy production tax credits. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)
• Capital Structure: $660mm first lien TL (funded, ex-interest)(Bank of America NA)     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Joseph Barsalona)
  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting (David Rush)
  • Investment Banker: Scotia Capital (USA) Inc.
  • Independent Board of Director: Alan Carr
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest: 
  • Asset Purchaser: Exelon Generation Company LLC
    • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Richard Chesley, Daniel Simon)
  • TL Agent: Bank of America NA
    • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Louis Strubeck, Greg Wilkes) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
  • Commodity Hedge Counterparty: Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc.
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Angela Libby) & (local) Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill, D. Ryan Slaugh)

Updated: 11/8/17 at 1:00pm CT (No UCC)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA - Toys "R" Us Inc.

Toys "R" Us Inc.

• 9/19/17 Recap: So. Much. To. Unpack. Here. We've previously discussed the run-up to this massive chapter 11 bankruptcy filing here and here. Still, suffice it to say that, unlike many of the other retailers that have predictably filed for bankruptcy thus far in 2017, this one was different. This one seemingly came out of nowhere - particularly given the proximity to the holiday shopping season. Before we note what this case is, lets briefly cover what it isn't and clear the noise that is pervasive on the likes of Twitter: this is NOT "RIP" Toys "R" Us. We don't get overly sentimental usually but the papers filed with the bankruptcy court were well-written and touching: this is a store, a brand, that means a lot to a lot of people. And it's not going anywhere (the company will have its challenges to assure people that this is the case). This is a financial restructuring not a liquidation: the company simply hasn't been able to evolve while paying $400mm in annual interest expense on over $5b of private equity infused debt. Plain and simple. Yes, there are other challenges (blah blah blah, Amazon), but with that debt overhang, it appears the company hasn't been able to confront them (PETITION side note: an ill-conceived deal with Amazon 18 years ago is mind-blowing when viewed from the perspective of Amazon's long game). With this filing, the company is signaling that the time for short term band-aids to address its capital structure is over. Now, "[t]he time for change, and reinvestment in operations, has come." Decisive. Management isn't messing around anymore. With a reduction in debt, the company will be unshackled and able to focus on "general upkeep and the condition of...stores, [its] inability to provide expedited shipping options, and [its] lack of a subscription-based delivery service." Indeed, the company intends to use a $3.1b debtor-in-possession credit facility to begin investing in modernization immediately.
• Interesting Facts:
  • Toy Manufacturers: Mattel ($MAT)(approx $136mm), Hasbro ($HAB) (approx $59mm) & Lego (approx $31.5mm) are among the top general unsecured creditors of the company. Mattel and Hasbro's stock traded down quite a bit yesterday on the rampant news of this filing. Query whether any of the $325mm of requested critical vendor money will apply to these companies.
  • The Power of the Media (read: NOT "fake news"): This CNBC piece helped push the company into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy professionals were retained in July (or earlier in the case of Lazard) to pursue capital structure solutions. In August the company engaged with some of its lenders. But then "...a news story published on September 6, 2017, reporting that the Debtors were considering a chapter 11 filing, started a dangerous game of dominos: within a week of its publication, nearly 40 percent of the Company’s domestic and international product vendors refused to ship product without cash on delivery, cash in advance, or, in some cases, payment of all outstanding obligations. Further, many of the credit insurers and factoring parties that support critical Toys “R” Us vendors withdrew support. Given the Company’s historic average of 60-day trade terms, payment of cash on delivery would require the Debtors to immediately obtain a significant amount—over $1.0 billion—of new liquidity." 
  • Revenue. The company generates 40% of its annual revenue during the holiday season.
  • Footprint. The company has approximately 1,697 stores and 257 licensed stores in 38 countries, plus additional e-commerce sites in various countries. The company has been shedding burdensome above-market leases and combining its Babies and Toys shops under one roof; it intends to continue its review of its real estate portfolio. Read: there WILL be store closures.
  • Eff the Competition. Toys has some choice words for its competition embedded in its bankruptcy papers; it accuses Walmart ($WMT) and Target ($TGT)(the "big box retailers") of slashing prices on toys and using toys as a loss leader to get bodies in doors; it further notes that "retailers such as Amazon are not concerned with making a profit at this juncture, rendering their pricing model impossible to compete with..." ($AMZN). Yikes. 
  • Experiential Retail. The company intends to invest in the "shopping experience" which will include (i) interactive spaces with rooms to use for parties, (ii) live product demonstrations put on by trained employees, and (iii) the freedom for employees to remove product from boxes to let kids play with the latest toys. And...wait for it...AUGMENTED REALITY. Boom. Toysrus.ar and Toysrus.ai here we come. 
• Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Phillips)
• Capital Structure: see below     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jamie Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Edward Sassower, Chad Husnick, Joshua Sussberg, Robert Britton, Emily Geier) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael A. Condyles, 
    Peter J. Barrett, Jeremy S. Williams) & (Canadian counsel) Goodmans LLP
  • Legal to the Independent Board of Directors: Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Jonathan Goulding, Tom Behnke, Cari Turner, Jim Grover, Arjun Lal, Doug Lewandowski, Bobby Hoernschemeyer, Scott Safron, Kara Harmon, Nick Cherry, Adam Fialkowski)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (David Kurtz)
  • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Communications Consultant: Joele Frank Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
• Other Parties in Interest:
• ABL/FILO DIP Admin Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
  • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Brian Resnick, Eli Vonnegut, Veerle Roovers) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry (Toby) Long III, Justin Paget)
• DIP Admin Agent (Toys DE Inc). NexBank SSB & Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders (Angelo Gordon & Co LP; Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Roystone Capital Management LP, and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP)
  • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus, Neil Chatani) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Bohm, Douglas Foley)
• Ad Hoc Group of Taj Noteholders.
  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Samuel Lovett, Kellie Cairns) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Jennifer Wuebker)
• Steering Committee of B-2 and B-3 Lenders (American Money Management, Columbia Threadneedle Investments, Ellington Management Group LLC, First Trust Advisors L.P., MJX Asset Management LLC, Pacific Coast Bankers Bank, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, Sound Point Capital Management, Taconic Capital Advisors LP).
  • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, D. Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Rosa Evergreen)
• 12% ’21 Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust, National Association.
  • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, David Posner, Gianfranco Finizio) & (local) ThompsonMcMullan PC (David Ruby, William Prince IV)
• Bank of America NA
  • • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
  • Private Equity Sponsors: Bain Capital Private Equity LP, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. ($KKR), and Vornado Realty Trust ($VNO)
• Large Creditor: Mattel Inc.
  • Legal: Jones Day (Richard Wynne, Erin Brady, Aaron Gober-Sims) & (local) Michael Wilson PLC (Michael Wilson)
• Large Creditor: LEGO Systems Inc.
  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi) & (local) Walcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
• Large Creditor: American Greetings Corporation.
  • Legal: Baker & Hosteler LLP (Benjamin Irwin, Eric Goodman)
• Creditor: River Birch Capital
  • Legal: Andrews Kurth & Kenyon LLP (Paul Silverstein)
• Creditor: Owl Creek Asset Management
  • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Samantha Martin)
• TRU Trust 2016-TOYS, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-TOYS acting through Wells Fargo Bank NA
  • Legal: Dechert LLP (Allan Brilliant, Brian Greer, Stephen Wolpert, Humzah Soofi) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
• Trustee: Tru Taj DIP Notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)
  • Legal: Porter Hedges LLP (Eric English) & (local) Spotts Fain PC (James Donaldson)
• Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Mattel Inc., Evenflo Company Inc., Simon Property Group, Euler Hermes North America Insurance Co., Veritiv Operating Company, Huffy Corporation, KIMCO Realty, The Bank of New York Mellon, LEGO Systems Inc.)

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

Updated 10/5/17 11:40 am

New Chapter 11 Filing - Beaulieu Group LLC

Beaulieu Group LLC

• 7/17/17 Recap: Georgia-based carpet manufacturer filed for bankruptcy as consumers increasingly prefer hardwood flooring over carpets that remind them of a convalescent center. Consequently, the $10b market has gotten increasingly competitive and price compression is the result: the company's revenues have declined nearly 50% from $1b in 2007 to approximately $525mm in 2016. Recognizing these trends, the company commenced an operational restructuring in 2016 but with sustained overhead and a bloated cost structure, the company needs to do more. Its borrowing base, however, has decreased and the company, therefore, has run out of liquidity to continue pursuing its efforts. The company has arranged a $70mm DIP facility to facilitate a restructuring - the form of which is unspecified. 
• Jurisdiction: ND of Georgia 
• Capital Structure: $51.7mm RCF (Bank of America NA), $15.8mm TL (Cygnets LLC), $6mm third lien loan (CT Lender LLC) 
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Scroggins & Williamson PC (Robert Williamson, Ashley Reynolds Ray, Matthew Levin)
  • Financial Advisor: Armory Strategic Partners LLC (Scott Avila)
  • Investment Banker: Coveview Advisors LLC and Advisory Group Equity Services Ltd. (Thomas Canning)
  • Claims Agent: American Legal Claim Services LLC 
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Prepetition & DIP Agent: Bank of America NA
    • Legal: Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs LLP (C. Edward Dobbs, James Rankin Jr.)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Fox Rothschild LLP (Michael Menkowitz, Paul Labov, Jason Manfrey, Marie Dooley) & (local) Thompson Hine LLP (John Isbell, Garrett Nail, John Allerding, Douglas Walters)
    • Financial Advisor: Phoenix Management Services LLC (Michael Jacoby, Bayard Hollingsworth, Pat Bellot)

Updated 9/21/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - rue21 Inc.

rue21 Inc.

• 5/15/17 Recap: Pennsylvania-based specialty fashion retailer (owned by private equity shop Apax Partners LP) with 1184 brick-and-mortar locations (pre recent closing initiative) in various strip centers, regional malls and outlet centers filed for bankruptcy to (i) further revamp its e-commerce strategy, (ii) improve the in-store experience, (iii) right-size the store footprint and lease portfolio, (iv) de-lever its capital structure, and (v) effectuate a long-term business plan under its relatively new management. The numbers here are interesting: the company had a negative EBITDA swing of approximately $51mm from 2015 to 2016 - despite rising sales. The company's girls' division got decimated due to "an evolution of customer tastes." Wow! Who knew that teenage girls have fickle fashion tastes? These merchandising issues combined with (a) supply chain issues (heightened - in a self-fulfilling kind of way - by all of the rumors surrounding the company's bankruptcy), (b) "the shift away from brick-and-mortar retail sales to online channels," AND (c) a "not as robust" e-commerce presence relative to competitors, to put the company in a tough spot. A digression: we have previously noted David Simon's comments on the Simon Properties Group (SPG) earnings call from 4/27/17 that SPG is NOT experiencing a decline in traffic - though he offered absolutely ZERO data to back that up. According to SPG's own website, there are currently 90 rue21 locations in SPG properties (which translates to nearly 8%): we're curious to see whether any of these 90 locations will be featured in store closing motions coming soon to a bankruptcy court near you; indeed, in the first instance, it appears that some already are). The company is proposing a deal whereby the Term Lenders will effectively own the majority of the company post-bankruptcy after rolling-up a $100 DIP credit facility (applied in addition to $50mm of new money to be rolled into an exit facility). They've been so kind so as to give general unsecured creditors (read: the little guys) a 4% equity kiss - but only if they vote to accept the plan. Otherwise, the "death trap" door opens and general unsecured creditors end up with nada. We're sure a creditors' committee will have something to say about that. 
• Jurisdiction: W.D. of Pennsylvania
• Capital Structure: $150mm RCF ($78mm funded)(Bank of America), $521mm '20 TLB (Wilmington Savings Fund Society as successor to JPMorgan Chase Bank NA), $239mm '21 9% unsecured bonds (Wells Fargo Bank NA).    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Nicole Greenblatt, Robert Britton, George Klidonas) & (local counsel) Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Jared Roach)
  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Stephen Coulombe, Kyle Richter, Patrick Farley)
  • Investment Banker: Rothschild Inc. (Neil Augustine, Jonathan Brownstein)
  • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners LLC
  • Liquidator: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC
    • Legal: Greenberg Traurig LLP (Nancy Peterman)
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for access to the free docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • ABL Agent and DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Matthew Furlong, Marc Ledue, Julia Frost-Davis) & (local) Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC (James Newell, Timothy Palmer, Kelly Neal)
  • TL Agent and DIP TL Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB and Term Lender Group (Bayside Capital LLC, Benefit Street Partners LLC, Bennett Management Corporation, Citadel Advisors LLC, Eaton Vance Management, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, Southpaw Credit Opportunity Master Fund LP, Stonehill Capital Management LLC, Voya Investment Management)
    • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Scott Greenberg, Michael J. Cohen, Jeffrey Bresch, Genna Ghaul)
    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners
  • Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Gerard Uzzi, Robert Nussbaum, Eric Stodola)
  • Sponsor: Apax Partners LP
    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Elisha Graff, Nicholas Baker, Jonathan Endean) & Duane Morris LLP (Joel Walker, Kenneth Argentieri)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Cooley LLP (Jay Indyke, Cathy Hershcopf, Seth Van Aalten, Michael Klein, Lauren Reichardt) & Fox Rothschild LLP (John Gotaskie Jr.)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Samuel Star)

Updated 7/12/17