🍿New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.🍿

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.

February 18, 2020

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”) filed prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware; they are manufacturers of luxury seating products for movie theaters. Here’s the problem: end user customers stopped ordering their stuff. Yup, that’s right, there’s a finite market for luxury seating in movie theaters. Who knew?

Here are some of the problems this company confronted:

• They made chairs that were too good. That’s right. Too good. The chairs had a longer lifecycle than the company likely wanted. Either that or people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

• Movie theaters slowed down their renovation activities and construction of new locations. Perhaps people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

• Movie theaters reduced capital investment — mostly because they haven’t exactly performed very well themselves and have their own debt and equityholders to contend with. Also, people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

• They conquered the total addressable market, securing 70% market share with little to no room to grow thanks to all of the foregoing bulletpoints.

Are we being too flip about $NFLX? Well, don’t take our word for it. Here’s the company explaining one of the reasons why it’s in trouble:

“Continued proliferation of online streaming services and alternative viewing experiences, which has led to declining movie attendance, a poor outlook sentiment for the overall U.S. movie theatre industry and particularly put significant pressure on the stock price of AMC, a key customer for the Company.”

Because of all of the foregoing factors, the debtors triggered an event of default under their first lien credit agreement and have been in a state of forbearance with their lenders ever since — all with the hope of negotiating an out-of-court restructuring transaction.

That hope was extinguished when Odeon reduced seating orders, napalming everyone’s financial models upon which the proposed out-of-court transaction was premised. Now we’re in prepackaged bankruptcy territory with a restructuring support agreement that will shed $178mm of debt and infuses the company with a $33mm DIP credit facility — of which $13mm is new money and $20mm is a roll-up of prepetition debt. Here is the pre-petition capital structure:

The liquidity is highly necessary. The debtors are burning cash like Rick Dalton burns interlopers bursting into his Hollywood Hills mansion. The debtors filed for bankruptcy with just $1mm in liquidity remaining.

Speaking of burning cash, that’s pretty much what you can say about the $200-or-so-million that previously went into these debtors. The restructuring support agreement will (a) convert first lien loans to preferred and common equity, (b) donut the second lien claims, and (c) donut the general unsecured claimants (unless they opt-in to a release, in which case they’ll get $5k). Critical to everything is the fact that HIG Capital LLC, the existing shareholder in the company, will write a new-money check of $7mm and enter in a management services agreement with the reorganized newco. In exchange for this investment, HIG will get preferred equity and 51% of the common equity.* Everyone is going to be holding their breath for the next 6 weeks, hoping that no other large chains cancel or downsize orders. If that happens, this deal could blow up.

*Suffering PTSD from the last-minute collapse of the out-of-court deal, HIG also negotiated the ability to walk if the debtors have less than $1.5mm of available unrestricted cash on the “Exit Date.”

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• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi, Christine Pirro Schwarzman) & Bayard PA (Erin Fay, Daniel Brogan, Gregory Flasser)

  • Independent Director: Michael Foreman

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Stephen Spitzer)

  • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • First Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

    • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners LP

  • Second Lien Agent & Second Lien Lenders: Oaktree Fund Administration LLC

    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Ginsburg, Joanne Lau) and Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Matthew Lunn, Edmon Morton, Betsy Feldman)

  • Sponsor: HIG Capital LLC & HIG Middle Market LBO Fund II LP

    • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Brooks Gruemmer, Jay Kapp)

🐄New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Borden Dairy Company🐄

Borden Dairy Company

January 5, 2020

Dallas-based Borden Dairy Company and 17 affiliated companies joined fellow dairy manufacturer, Dean Foods Company (which we’ve written about here, here, here and, lastly, here upon its chapter 11 filing) in bankruptcy court this week. Why? “Like other milk producers and distributors, Borden is facing a multi-year trend of shrinking margins and increasing competition. These negative trends have been exacerbated by declining margin over milk at retail even as the price of raw Class 1 milk has been increasing.” Boo Moo.

What a storied history. Founded by Gail Borden in 1856 (PETITION Note: read the link if you want to feel awful about yourself and what you’ve accomplished in your life), the New York Condensed Milk Company started the first successful condensed milk processing plant in 1861. In the latter part of the 19th century, the company added processed and evaporated milk to its offerings and pioneered the use of glass milk bottles.

In 1919, the company changed its name to Borden Company in honor of Mr. Borden. This was a period of great uncertainty — one captured in Hemingway’s “The Sun Also Rises” — but that didn’t stop Mr. Borden’s descendants from expanding their dairy-fueled reign. They acquired two of the largest ice cream manufacturers in the US, while also adding cheese and acquiring a chemicals company. Over those years, Borden acquired over 200 companies. “Elsie the Cow” was born in 1936 and became a well known mascot.

By the 80s, Borden was the world’s largest dairy operator with sales exceeding $7.2b. Then gravity prevailed. By the early 90s, the company experienced financial distress borne out of two much expansion over the years and sold to KKR for $2b. KKR then dismantled Borden by selling off divisions and brands to various buyers.

The debtors underwent a comprehensive restructuring in 2017. At the time of the restructuring, the debtors took on a $275mm credit facility held, in tranches, by PNC Bank and KKR. The effective interest rate on the term loan facilities was 9.3% as of 12/31/19, which is on top of the 4.95% interest due under the revolving portion of the loan. So, yeah, debt and the debtors’ interest expense nut is a big part of this bankruptcy filing.

The company is no longer the behemoth it once was. Nevertheless, it employees over 3000 people and makes tens of thousands of service calls to its customers (e.g., Walmart Inc. & Sam’s Club ($WMT)), Kroger Inc. ($KR), 7-Eleven, CVS HealthCorp. ($CVS), Starbucks Inc. ($SBUX), etc.).

But its number suck. In 2018, the company had a total net income loss of $14.6mm on ~$1.2b of sales. In 2019, the loss widened to $42.4mm. Liquidity, therefore, is a big issue — and it’s compounded by (a) interest expense and amort payments on the term loan and (b) employee obligations under mandatory retirement plans and settlements related to pension funds. More on this below.

The macro reasons for the debtors’ problems sound like a Dean Foods’ encore:

• The milk industry is highly competitive ✅;

• Non-dairy products and beverages are stealing share (DISRUPTION!!) ✅;

• Discount grocers have “intensified competition and reduced the margin over milk at retail” ✅; and

• Walmart and other retailers who use milk as a loss leader are napalming margins ✅;

• Commodity and freight costs are up ✅.

The company doesn’t tip its hand as to what it hopes to achieve in bankruptcy other than a “breathing spell” to get its sh*t in order. The Wall Street Journal noted:

Borden Chief Executive Tony Sarsam told The Wall Street Journal that he believes Acon, which took a major stake in the company in 2017, will be the primary owner of the business after the bankruptcy. He declined to say how much debt Borden would erase as part of its bankruptcy restructuring.

Acon is currently one of the debtors’ majority owners.

*****

There’s one thing that the Wall Street Journal doesn’t pick up on though. The debtors’ pensioners are about to get the royal screw.

The debtors note that, pre-filing, they made periodic payments pursuant to two settlement agreements they entered into in connection with their withdrawal from its (a) Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund terminated in ‘14 (“Central States”) and (b) Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union pension fund terminated in ‘16 (“RWDSU”). In connection with the ‘17 restructuring, the debtors established a special purpose account funded with $30mm to fund these settlement payments — $185,225/month to Central States and $6,000/month to RWDSU. The account now has $26.6mm in it.

The debtors are laying claim to this money; they note that it is unencumbered by their lenders nor the pensioners.

This hasn’t been a great time for pensioners. With coal bankruptcies galore, Jack Cooper, and now the dairy producers, anxiety levels must be through the roof.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

• Capital Structure: $275mm of funded debt (see above). $30mm Term Loan A (PNC), $175mm Term Loan B (KKR Credit Advisors US LLC), $70mm RCF (PNC)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (D. Tyler Nurnberg, Seth Kleinman, Sarah Gryll, Jeffrey Fuisz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Kenneth Enos, Elizabeth Justison, Betsy Feldman)

  • Independent Directors: Harold Strunk, Andrea Fischer Newman

  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • ACON Dairy Investors LLC

  • New Laguna LLC

  • Agent, RCF Facility Lenders & Term Loan A Facility Lenders: PNC Bank NA

    • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (Regina Stango Kelbon, Josef Mintz, John Lucian, Gregory Vizza)

  • Term Loan B Facility Lenders: KKR Credit Advisors US LLC/Franklin Square Holdings LP

    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Roger Schwartz, Peter Montoni, Christopher Boies, Stephen Blank) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Curtis Miller, Matthew Harvey, Matthew Talmo)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Matthew Clemente, Genevieve Weiner, Michael Fishel, Michael Burke) & Morris James LLP (Carl Kunz III, Eric Monzo, Brya Keilson)

🛌New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA Filing - Hollander Sleep Products LLC🛌

Hollander Sleep Products LLC

May 19, 2019

Florida-based private equity owned Hollander Sleep Products LLC and six affiliates (including one Canadian affiliate) have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The debtors are “the largest bed pillow and mattress pad manufacturer in North America.” The debtors produce pillows, comforters and mattress pads for the likes of Ralph Lauren, Simmons, Beautyrest, Nautica and Calvin Klein; their products are available at major retailers like Costco Wholesale Corporation ($COST), Kohl’s Corporation ($KSS), Walmart Inc. ($WMT) and Target Inc. ($TGT) and with the Marriott International Inc. ($MAR) chain of hotels; they have a main showroom in New York City, nine manufacturing facilities throughout the US and Canada, and a sourcing, product development and quality control office in China. Speaking of China, 60% of the debtors’ top 10 creditors are Chinese companies.

Why bankruptcy? Interestingly, the debtors colorfully ask, “How Did We Get Here?” And the answer appears to be a combination of (a) “[r]ecent substantial price increases on materials” like fiber, down and feathers, (b) acquisition integration costs, (c) too much competition in a low margin space, (d) employee wage increases “as a result of natural wage inflation and the tight job market” and (e) too much leverage. The debtors burned through $20mm in the last year on material cost increases alone (it opted NOT to pass price increases on to the consumer), straining liquidity to the point that, at the time of filing, the company had less than $1mm of cash on hand.

With the filing, the debtors seek to restructure approximately $166.5mm of term debt, effectuating a debt-for-equity swap in the new reorganized entity (plus participation in a $30mm exit facility). 100% of the debtors’ term lenders support the plan. As does lender and equity sponsor, Sentinel Capital Partners LLC. That doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that they truly want to own the post-reorg company. Indeed, the debtors have indicated that while they march towards plan confirmation (which they say will be in four months), they will also entertain the possibility of a sale of the company to a third-party. These dual-track chapter 11 cases are all the rage these days, see, e.g., Shopko.

If approved by the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy will be funded by a $118mm DIP credit facility which will infuse the debtors with $28mm in incremental new money and roll-up the debtors’ prepetition asset-backed first priority credit facility.

The debtors note that “the sleep industry as a whole is both healthy and growing. Market trends favor healthy lifestyle sectors, and the basic bedding segment is generally recession resilient.” We have no quibble with either comment. The company believes that by, among other things, (i) delevering its balance sheet, (ii) gaining access to new capital, (iii) engaging in selective price increases, (iv) implementing material efficiencies, (v) streamlining manufacturing, and (vi) building out their e-commerce channel, it will have a more sustainable path forward. Whether that path will be taken at the direction of their lenders or a strategic buyer remains to be seen.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Wiles)

• Capital Structure: $125mm ABL ($43mm funded), $166.5mm term loan

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Christopher Greco, Joseph Graham, Andrew McGaan, Laura Krucks)

  • Board of Directors: Eric Bommer, Michael Fabian, Steve Cumbow, Chris Baker

  • Disinterested Director: Matthew Kahn

    • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP

  • Financial Advisor: Carl Marks Advisory Group LLC (Mark Pfefferle)

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Saul Burian)

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition and ($90mm) DIP ABL Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Prisca Kim) & (local) Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Laura Metzger, Peter Amend)

  • ($28mm) DIP Term Loan Agent:

5/2/19, #2

New Chapter 11 Filing - Product Quest Manufacturing LLC

Product Quest Manufacturing LLC

9/7/18

Product Quest Manufacturing LLC, a contract manufacturer of sunscreens and other sun care products, OTC drugs, prescription drugs, topical animal health products and cosmetics has filed for bankruptcy in the Middle District of North Carolina. At one point, the company produced $125mm worth of units per year, servicing the likes of drug store retailers (e.g., Walgreens, Rite Aid), big box retailers like Walmart and Target, and discount retailers like Dollar General. With an impressive customer list like that, what could've gone wrong?

The company provides a shockingly blunt reason:

These chapter 11 cases have been caused by ineffective senior leadership, employee turnover, extensive product quality issues and the subsequent recall of many products manufactured in the Daytona Facility due to stability and contamination issues and regulatory compliance issues affecting the Daytona Facility and the Kannapolis Facility.

Wowsers. You don't typically see such a harsh and to-the-point statement like that. But, the company apparently "suffered from operational cost overruns, ineffective production standards and poor pricing practices leading to significant margin erosion." Consequently, the senior lenders called a default and replaced the company's board of managers. It also received a Form 483 notice from the Food and Drug Administration regarding potential FDA violations that include, among other things, "potential cross contamination of human health and animal health products." And we were wondering why we recently started moo'ing. Now we know: it must've been the OTC treatments we purchased at CVS. This is f*cked up. And, accordingly and (apparently) appropriately, the company CEO got binned as a result. 

An investigation by King & Spalding revealed that there were, in fact, quality control issues. A little microbial contamination here. A little compliance deficiency there. Some out of specification products here. A little Staphylococcus aureus here and a little Pseudomonas aeruginosa there. The company implemented quarantines and initiated product recalls (including a CVS nasal spray product). The company also ceased operations at its two facilities. Jokes aside, we hope that no one was severely hurt. Luckily these issues were discovered before things became worse. 

The company will seek to sell its assets in chapter 11. 

• Jurisdiction: M.D. of North Carolina
• Capital Structure: $153.6mm secured debt (Madison Capital Funding LLC)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Northern Blue LLP (John Northern, Vicki Parrott, John Paul H. Cournoyer)
  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Conway MacKenzie Inc. (Joe Geraghty) 
  • Board of Directors Legal: King & Spalding LLP
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Financial Sponsor: Kainos Capital LLC
  • Prepetition Secured Lender: Bank of America NA

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Rentech WP U.S. Inc.

Rentech WP U.S. Inc.

• 12/19/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($RNTK) Colorado-based wood fibre processing company that services large pulp, paper and packaging manufacturers with three core businesses: (i) contract wood handling and chipping services; (ii) the manufacture and sale of wood pellets for the U.S. heating market; and (iii) the manufacture, aggregation, and sale of wood pellets for the utility and industrial power generation market, has filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a sale to FFI Acquisition Inc. as buyer (Scott Davis Chip Company Inc. is the affiliate guarantor of the buyer). The company's wood fibre is used in the manufacturing of boxboard, containerboard, paper, and medium density fiberboard for building products. The company blames a strategic pivot from the development and commercialization of certain alternative energy tech to the the wood fibre processing business for its ultimate downfall. The company incurred debt to complete various acquisitions and cost overruns in connection with the development of various facilities combined to limit the company's liquidity. Now, the company intends, under cover of the use of cash collateral, to use pursue a plan pursuant to a plan of reorganization. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)
• Capital Structure: $19.5mm Term Loan (GSO/Credit Suisse AG), $20mm L/C (Bank of Montreal)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Peter Gilhuly, Kimberly Posin, Adam Malatesta) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Matthew Lunn)
  • Financial Advisor: RPA Advisors LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Prepetition Term Lenders (GSO Special Situations Master Fund LP, GSO Palmetto Opportunistic Investment Partners LP, GSO Credit-A Partners LP, Steamboat Credit Opportunities Master Fund LP, GSO Coastline Credit Partners LP, GSO Cactus Credit Opportunities Fund LP, and GSO Aiguille des Grands Montets Fund II LP)
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Daniel Fisher, Kevin Eide) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Joseph Barsalona)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - REAL ALLOY (Real Industry Inc.)

REAL ALLOY - Real Industry Inc.

• 11/17/17 Recap: This one is going to be a snorer for those of you who don't like to geek out over the technical intricacies of commodities businesses. Here, REAL ALLOY is a publicly-traded holding company ($RELY) that leverages its substantial net operating losses to improve the free cash flow position of various undervalued businesses that it acquires. The company acquired Real Industry in 2015 from Aleris Corporation (formerly bankrupt) for $554.5mm, substantially leveraging its balance sheet in the process. Post-acquisition, Real Alloy became one of the largest aluminum recyclers in North America and Europe with products and services availed to wrought alloy processers, automotive original equipment manufacturers (read: big car companies), foundries and casters. In other words, the company serves the automotive, consumer packaging, aerospace, building and construction, steel and durable goods industries by processing new scrap, old scrap, and various aluminum byproducts. All of this puts the company squarely into the aluminum recycling supply chain. The company blames the filing on weakness in the steel industry, the strong U.S. dollar creating arbitrage opportunity, operational setbacks (heightened, to some degree, by Hurricane Harvey), and a reduction in credit insurance and tightening supplier terms. The company is seeking approval of a $365mm DIP credit facility to facilitate the case wherein it hopes to preserve the value of its NOLs and pursue a transaction with a new strategic partner.  
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
• Capital Structure: $96mm ABL (Bank of America, NA), $305mm '19 10% senior secured notes (Wilmington Trust, NA)  
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Gary Lee, Todd Goren, Mark Lightner, Benjamin Butterfield, J. Alexander Lawrence, Geoffrey Peck) & (local) Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Mark Minuti, Monique Bair DiSabatino, Sharon Levine)
  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC
  • Investment Banker: Jefferies LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group
    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, Jason Gott, Ted Dillman) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (MIchael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle)

Updated 11/17/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Beaulieu Group LLC

Beaulieu Group LLC

• 7/17/17 Recap: Georgia-based carpet manufacturer filed for bankruptcy as consumers increasingly prefer hardwood flooring over carpets that remind them of a convalescent center. Consequently, the $10b market has gotten increasingly competitive and price compression is the result: the company's revenues have declined nearly 50% from $1b in 2007 to approximately $525mm in 2016. Recognizing these trends, the company commenced an operational restructuring in 2016 but with sustained overhead and a bloated cost structure, the company needs to do more. Its borrowing base, however, has decreased and the company, therefore, has run out of liquidity to continue pursuing its efforts. The company has arranged a $70mm DIP facility to facilitate a restructuring - the form of which is unspecified. 
• Jurisdiction: ND of Georgia 
• Capital Structure: $51.7mm RCF (Bank of America NA), $15.8mm TL (Cygnets LLC), $6mm third lien loan (CT Lender LLC) 
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Scroggins & Williamson PC (Robert Williamson, Ashley Reynolds Ray, Matthew Levin)
  • Financial Advisor: Armory Strategic Partners LLC (Scott Avila)
  • Investment Banker: Coveview Advisors LLC and Advisory Group Equity Services Ltd. (Thomas Canning)
  • Claims Agent: American Legal Claim Services LLC 
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Prepetition & DIP Agent: Bank of America NA
    • Legal: Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs LLP (C. Edward Dobbs, James Rankin Jr.)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Fox Rothschild LLP (Michael Menkowitz, Paul Labov, Jason Manfrey, Marie Dooley) & (local) Thompson Hine LLP (John Isbell, Garrett Nail, John Allerding, Douglas Walters)
    • Financial Advisor: Phoenix Management Services LLC (Michael Jacoby, Bayard Hollingsworth, Pat Bellot)

Updated 9/21/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - CST Industries Holdings Inc.

CST Industries Holdings Inc.

• 6/9/17 Recap: So this is a soap opera. Kansas City-based manufacturer of (i) industrial containers used to store architectural and agricultural products, water, dry bulk and oil and gas and (ii) domes, filed for bankruptcy due to its unsustainable capital structure and seemingly strained relationship with its senior subordinated noteholders. According to the company's first day declaration, the company sought a prepetition sale that would pay off its BNP Paribas' loan and make a "substantial payout" to its unsecured creditors. But one obstreperous unsecured creditor rejected the sale overtures and demanded that the company pay to hire advisors "that in turn charged CST substantial fees and expenses" to the tune of $8-10mm (inclusive of its own pros fees). Welcome to the party pal. These fees, coupled with downturns in the oil and gas and Middle Eastern water markets, led to a precipitous drop in EBITDA and a liquidity crisis. Now the company hopes to use Chapter 11 to sell itself (pursuant to a $15mm DIP credit facility).
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $57.5mm TL (funded, BNP Paribas), $114.3mm senior subordinated notes (The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company & OCM Mezzanine Fund II LP).     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP (Kathryn Coleman, Christopher Gartman, Jacob Gartman, Anson Frelinghuysen) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill, D. Ryan Slaugh)
  • Financial Advisor/Investment Banker: CDG Group LLC (Robert Del Genio)
  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • TL Agent: BNP Paribas
    • Legal: Chadbourne & Parke LLP (Howard Beltzer, James Copeland, Joseph Giannini) & Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Louis Strubeck Jr.) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Kara Hammond Coyle)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Jeffrey Prol, David Banker, Wojciech Jung, Bruce Nathan) & (local) Shaw Fishman Glantz & Towbin LLC (Thomas Horan, Ira Bodenstein, Christina Sanfelippo)
    • Financial Advisor: Teneo Restructuring and Teneo Capital LLC (Christopher Wu)
  • OCM Mezzanine Fund II, L.P.
    • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (William Meyers)
  • Private Equity Sponsor: The Sterling Group

Updated 7/11/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Rupari Holding Corp.

Rupari Holding Corp.

• 4/11/17 Recap: Private-equity owned Illinois-based manufacturer of pre-cooked and sauced pork ribs and other barbeque products under the Roma Products brand (sounds gnarley) filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a sale pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363 to Carl Buddig & Co. for $26 million. Love this bit: "Rupari began to encounter substantial headwinds shortly after WPP Group's investment in the business." NICE. Looks like the Wind Point Partners guys really earned that 2-and-20 with this beauty. But wait! There's more! We have the Chinese and a freaky-AF diarrhea virus to blame for the business difficulties as well. And, finally, "specific issues unrelated to its everyday operations exacerbated Rupari's challenges," - namely, a $1.2mm judgment against the company in favor of Danish Crown. This abstract description really lets the imagination run wild - we were having flashbacks to "Brick Top" from Snatch - but it was only this. Anticlimactic. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $67mm first lien secured debt ($23.3mm funded - Antares Capital LP), $34.9mm second lien secured debt (Wind Point Partners), $95.4mm unsecured mezzanine debt 
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Richard Chesley, John Lyons, R. Craig Martin, Maris Kandestin)
  • Investment Banker: Kinetic Advisors (Sudhin Roy)
  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Antares Capital LP
    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (John Sieger, Paul Musser) & (local) Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Bruce Nathan, Jeffrey Cohen, Wojciech Jung, MIchael Papandrea, Keara Waldron) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, Aaron Stulman)
    • Financial Advisor: CohnReznick LLP (Kevin Clancy, Jeff Manning, Roberta Probber, Mitchell Insero)

Updated 7/18/17

No, not creepy at all.