✈️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - AeroCentury Corp. ($ACY) ✈️

California-based AeroCentury Corp. ($ACY) and two affiliates (together, the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases on Monday March 29, 2021 in the District of Delaware. The debtors are in the business of investing in mid-life regional turboprop and jet aircraft equipment and then turning around and leasing that equipment to foreign and domestic regional air carriers. Their portfolio consists of thirteen aircraft, six of which are held under operating leases, two under financing leases, and five held for sale in whole or as parts. If this general type of business sounds familiar, well, congratulations, you’ve been paying attention: over the last few weeks, we’ve been highlighting the challenges that aircraft finance businesses have faced due to COVID-19 primarily in the context of Nordic Aviation (hereherehere and here).

COVID-19 did no favors for the debtors either. The debtors experienced an 85% decrease in YOY revenue in Q320; they had generated $43.6mm in revenue in FY19. That hurts when thrown against ~$83mm of pre-petition first lien debt due in 2023 (exclusive of debt held on certain non-debtor special purpose entities backing individual aircraft).

Of course, there were problems pre-pandemic. In fact, the debtors have been in a perpetual state of forbearance with their agent bank, MUFG Union Bank NA ($MUFG), and their lenders since October 28, 2019. Not that you could tell from the looks of this chart:

Source: Koyfin

Source: Koyfin

Anywho, pre-COVID, the debtors’ banker, B. Riley Securities Inc. ($RILY), was out to market on a dual track, soliciting bids for a sale of the debtors’ assets on one hand, while also pursuing a capital raise on the other. The bankruptcy will apparently take the first path.

The debtors march into bankruptcy court with a stalking horse agreement in place with Drake Asset Management Jersey Limited, which purchased all of the debt held by the debtors’ lenders in October 2020. Drake will credit bid $83.5mm; it did not negotiate a break-up fee or expense reimbursement so anyone bullish on an airline turnaround is apparently more than welcome to enter the fray with little to no impediments (well, other than than credit bid amount). Given that RILY has been marketing the debtors for what seems like an eternity now, the debtors hope to push the sale process expeditiously, completing the process in approximately 50 days.

Date: March 29, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

Capital Structure: $83mm of funded debt

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Erica Richards) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Joseph Barry, Ryan Bartley, Joseph Mulvihill, S. Alexander Faris)

  • Investment Banker: B. Riley Securities Inc. (Adam Rosen)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • RCF Agent: MUFG Union Bank NA

📺New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - MobiTV Inc.📺

MobiTV Inc.

On Monday, Emeryville, California-based MobiTV, Inc. and an affiliated debtor filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. MobiTV is “a creative thinking technology company making TV better.” Which is funny because we’re willing to bet that literally nobody thinks about MobiTV when they think about whether they enjoy their television-watching user experience. Anyway, what that actually means is MobiTV sells a white-label software application to cable providers that allows consumers to stream programming on (i) streaming devices like Roku, Apple TV, Amazon Fire TV, XBox or (ii) a smart TV, without the need for a set-top cable box. Key customers include T-Mobile USA Inc. ($TMUS) and over 120 cable/broadband television providers to deliver content to over 300k end user subscribers. In other words, if you’re streaming HBO via T-Mobile, your experience may very well be powered by MobiTV.

MobiTV has been around since 2000 and had gone through several shifts in its fortunes and business model. In 2020, MobiTV generated $13M in revenue with an operating loss of approximately $34M. That is a long fall from grace for a company that filed for an IPO in 2011 with reported 2010 sales of $67M. At the time, MobiTV was entirely focused on providing licensed TV programming to the personal devices of customers on wireless networks with AT&T Inc. ($T)Sprint, and T-Mobile accounting for almost all of the company’s revenues. MobiTV had raised over $110M from investors like Menlo VenturesRedpoint VenturesAdobe Ventures, and Hearst Ventures.

But despite its rosy trajectory, MobiTV withdrew its IPO filing a few months later citing unfavorable market conditions. In hindsight, there were obviously deeper problems with the business model. Broadcast TV viewing on mobile devices failed to take off in the way the company predicted and MobiTV pivoted away from serving wireless carriers.

Its new target customer was midsize cable providers. Set-top boxes have long been at the center of consumers interactions with cable providers. But these boxes have plenty of drawbacks:

Pay-TV providers (and their consumers) are looking for a way beyond set-top boxes, which can be expensive for consumers to buy, costly to maintain for the pay-TV providers and often limited in their functionality. Their clunkiness, in fact, has made them ripe for disruption, and many now opt for lighter options like Fire TV or Apple TV to bypass those services altogether. In other words, pay-TV providers need to find other routes to providing services to customers that can compete better with the newer generation of video services. (emphasis added)

MobiTV saw the shift towards streaming devices and smart TVs and aimed to position itself as a “television as a service provider” to midsized cable providers like C SpireDirectLink, and Citizens Fiber. These companies lack the R&D budgets of the likes of Comcast Corporation ($CMCSA) to invest in user interface and software applications in their set-top boxes. In 2017, MobiTV raised $21M from Oak Investment Partners and Ally Bank ($ALLY) (at a reported ~$400M valuation!) to develop its MobiTV ConnectTM Platform, “a product for pay TV and on-demand TV providers to stream broadcast TV and offer other services, like catch-up and recording, without the need of a set-top box.

The idea was to capture some of the “customer ownership” that was slipping from cable set-top boxes to streaming devices and services. In 2019, MobiTV raised $50M more from Oak Investment Partners and Ally Bank as well as Cedar Grove Partners to fund further growth. At the time, MobiTV had about 90 cable providers signed up as customers.

Middlemen can make good money and at first glance it seemed like MobiTV might have been able to carve out a position for itself. MobiTV offered cable providers a small way to stem the tide of cord cutting and the proliferation of streaming services like HBO MaxNetflix Inc ($NFLX)Hulu, and the rest. As TechCrunch laid out, “The pitch that MobiTV makes to pay TV providers goes something like this:”

…set-top-box-free pay TV services gives operators a wider array of channels and potentially more flexibility in how they are provisioned. At the same time, a solution like MobiTV’s potentially lowers the total cost of ownership for providers by removing the need for the set-top boxes.

That’s not to say that some of its customers are not using both, though: they can provide a certain set of channels directly through boxes, and the MobiTV service gives them the option of having another set that are offered on top of that.

By 2020, MobiTV’s customer base had grown to about 120 midsize cable TV operators as well as legacy T-Mobile customers. Revenue was growing and its subscribers and customers bases were both increasing. So what the hell happened here? 🤔

An agnostic software solution for cable providers to capture some of the shift towards streaming? Coupled with more people stuck at home from a pandemic? If this product were ever going to work, one would think it would have been during the last year. From the First Day Declaration:

That’s the entirety of section D. Maybe we are dense but it would be interesting to know what exactly about the COVID-19 pandemic and related stay-at-home orders materially impaired the Company’s growth opportunities. Seems like that should have been good for business, no?

But we can speculate.

As every content provider has rolled out their own streaming service over the last twelve months, MobiTV was probably in the worst position in the entire television streaming value chain. On the supply side, content providers are focused on promoting their own streaming services and have little reason to give any sort of pricing concessions to a niche service provider like MobiTV. This surely kept MobiTV’s licensing costs at an elevated level.

On the demand side, consumers likely were not calling in to their cable providers demanding MobiTV considering they could get the same content with a $30 Roku, their streaming subscriptions, and their broadband bill. Cable providers apparently were willing to pay for the service, but not enough to keep the company from losing money.

After 20 years of trying to figure out what its business model was, MobiTV finally threw in the towel and management took COVID cover.

The “tell” that the business issues were more elemental than COVID? The fact that the company has been operating under a series of 17 amendments and forbearance agreements.

At the time of its Ch. 11 filing, MobiTV had ~$25M of debt obligations, owed entirely to its sole pre-petition secured lender, Ally Bank.

In 2017 Ally Bank provided MobiTV a $10M term loan as well as a $5M revolving credit facility which was fully drawn. The original maturity of these loans was February 3, 2019, but following the aforementioned amendments and forbearance agreements, the maturity date was pushed back to January 2021. To fund the business in the interim, Oak Investment Partners threw good money after bad, underwriting three Subordinated Convertible Promissory Notes on August 6, 2020 ($4mm); December 14, 2020 ($1mm); and December 30, 2020 ($0.3mm). As a condition to one of Ally Bank’s credit amendments, MobiTV engaged FTI Capital Advisors LLC to evaluate strategic alternatives. A subsequent marketing effort came up empty: the “alternatives” were non-existent.

Consequently, on January 29, 2021, MobiTV and Ally Bank entered into another amendment and forbearance. T-Mobile — the customer most reliant upon the MobiTV’s services — provided $2.5mm in bridge financing lest they upset thousands of customers right around Super Bowl time. On February 12, 2021, T-Mobile agreed to provide an additional ~$2.3mm and Ally Bank agreed to forbear until February 26, 2021.

Following negotiations with Ally Bank and T-Mobile, the interested parties concluded that a sale process should be implemented through the filing of chapter 11. An affiliate of T-Mobile, TVN Ventures, LLC, has committed to a $15mm DIP credit facility (12%), junior to the pre-existing pre-petition Ally Bank position. As of this writing, management is still seeking a stalking horse bidder to backstop the sale process.

At $13mm of revenue with an operating loss that high, there’s a very good chance that T-Mobile knows it’s buying this thing with that DIP commitment.


Date: March 1, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

Capital Structure: $25mm funded debt

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Debra Grassgreen, Mary Caloway, Maxim Litvak, Nina Hong, Jason Rosell)

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chris LeWand, Catherine Moran, Chris Post, Chris Tennenbaum, Doug Edelman)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Lender: T-Mobile USA Inc. and TVN Ventures LLC

    • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (William Sugden, Jacob Johnson) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Kenneth Enos)

  • Silicon Valley Bank

    • Legal: Morrison Foerster LLP (Alexander Rheaume, Benjamin Butterfield) & Ashby & Geddes LLP (Gregory Taylor, Katharina Earle)

  • Ally Bank

    • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Kenneth Noble, Kristin Wigness, Ha Young Chung) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, David Queroli)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors:

    • Legal: Fox Rothschild LLP (Seth Niederman, Michael Sweet, Gordon Gouveia)

🛰New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - OneWeb Global Limited🛰

OneWeb Global Limited

March 27, 2020

We have been complaining for months about how bankruptcy was getting boring. There are only so many retail, oil and gas, biopharma or mass tort cases to write about before things start to get really … and we mean REALLY … monotonous. And so a shout out to Softbank’s Masa Son: as always, you’ve supplied some much needed novelty to the mix! Amidst countless stories of one Softbank portfolio company after another getting a new directive, fresh discipline or retraded on deals (cough, WeWork), portfolio company OneWeb Global Limited and eighteen affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy.

As far as Softbank investments go, the debtors are SOOOOOOOO on brand. It is almost literally a “moonshot,” an uber-ambitious project aiming to deploy “the world’s first global satellite communications network to deliver high-throughput, high-speed, low-latency Internet connectivity services, having an ability of channeling 50 megabits per second, with a latency of less than 50 millisecond, and capable of connecting everywhere, to everyone.” Since 2012, the debtors have been developing a low-Earth orbit satellite constellation system and associated ground infrastructure “capable of delivering communication services for use by consumers, businesses, governmental entities, and institutions, including schools, hospitals, and other end-users whether on the ground, in the air, or at sea.” This means they have started mass producing small satellites, acquiring various authorizations and spectrum icenses (i.e., the use of Ku-band and Ka-band radio-frequency spectrum on a global basis) and domestic market access/services authorizations; they have also completed three launches of 70 satellites in the last year. “OneWeb was well on its way to growing its constellation to 648 satellites with the goal of beginning customer service demonstrations in late 2020 and providing full global commercial coverage by late 2021 or early 2022.” Right. Just like Uber Inc. ($UBER) is delivering autonomous cars and WeWork is sustainably spreading its community-first mission across the world. You have to hand it to Masa Son: the man has some vision. Some entrepreneurial spirit. Eventually, though, there has to be money to support the ambition.

Right. So, about the money. The debtors have raised a lot of it — no surprise considering the capital intensive nature of the business. The raises include:

  • A $500mm equity raise backed by Airbus Group Inc. Hughes Network Systems LLC, Intelsat Corporation, Qualcomm Incorporated and Virgin Group Ltd.

  • A $1.2b equity raise, $1b of which came from Softbank Group Corp. and the other $200mm from existing investors.

  • A $408mm note issuance to Softbank as administrative and collateral agent.

  • A $1.56b senior note issuance (and corresponding warrant issue) secured by substantially all of the debtors’ assets including share pledges and rights to radiofrequency authorizations. This issuance rolled-up the $408mm note.

In total, the debtors has over $1.73b in funded debt outstanding as of the petition date on top of the $1.7b of equity raised.

And yet it is in bankruptcy first and foremost because of liquidity issues. As a development stage company, it is what the venture capitalists would call “pre-revenue.” Worse than that, development is time-consuming and expensive and the build out of the debtors’ systems “exhausted [their] existing equity and debt financing.” Again, this is Softbank: massive cash burn is part of its playbook. We’ve all seen this movie before. There’s always tons of money until — poof! — suddenly there’s not. Since 2019, the debtors have been seeking investments from existing and new investors but nobody would bite. It seems that investors hesitated to throw good money after bad; it is also safe to presume that, by this point, a certain level of post-WeWork-fiasco Softbank taint burdened the process. Investors are leery of lighting good money on fire after bad.

Toss in COVID-19 and we’ve got ourselves a combustible situation. Per the debtors:

OneWeb had been hopeful to achieve an out of court solution to its deteriorating liquidity position. After several due diligence meetings during the first and second weeks of March 2020, the Company believed that it was going to be able to secure a long-term funding arrangement from existing shareholders. However, on March 12, 2020, as the markets began to feel the impact of COVID-19, OneWeb was notified that its current investors would not commit to a long term solution. On March 16, 2020, OneWeb entered into a term sheet for bridge financing to be consummated by March 26, 2020. On March 21, 2020, the Company was notified that the bridge financing offer was unavailable. Unfortunately, the anticipated funding opportunities OneWeb pursued were significantly and precipitously impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting shuttering of the global economy. OneWeb, in an effort to preserve liquidity during these difficult social, political, and economic times, began shutting down nonessential aspects of its business in order to preserve the value of its existing assets.

Consequently, the debtors laid off 90% of their workforce and halted development. With the consensual use of Softbank’s cash collateral, the debtors filed chapter 11 “to provide them with the necessary breathing space to wait-out the current instability of the financial markets as they respond to COVID-19 pandemic and to adequately market and monetize their assets.

Given the volatility currently in the market, there’s no telling how long they’ll have to wait.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, William Schumacher, Andrew Leblanc, Tyson Lomazow, Lauren Doyle)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Softbank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Gary Lee, Todd Goren)

    • Collateral Agent: GLAS

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Jonathan Levine)

    • EchoStar Operating LLC and Hughes Network Systems LLC

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Harrison Denman, John Ramirez)

    • Airbus DS Satnet LLC and Airbus Group Proj B.V.

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Ronald Silverman, Christopher Bryant, M. Hampton Foushee, Craig Ulman)

🌑New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Murray Energy Holdings Co.🌑

Murray Energy Holdings Co.

October 20, 2019

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Ohio-based Murray Energy Holdings Co. and its 90+ affiliated debtors are now part of a not-so-exclusive club: the Bankrupted Coal Company Club (the “BCCC”)! Unlike some more recent small(er) coal bankruptcy filings, this one is a behemoth: the debtors own and operate 13 active mines in Ohio, West Virginia, eastern and western Kentucky, Alabama, Illinois, and Utah*; their primary product is thermal coal used for electricity (though, with recent acquisitions, the debtors are also now in the steel-making business). To give you a sense of the magnitude of this company, here are some key figures:

  • Produced 53mm tons of bituminous coal in 2018;

  • Employs 5,500 people, including 2,400 active union members EXCLUSIVE of folks employed through the debtors’ partnership with soon-to-be-BCCC-member Foresight Energy LP ($FELP);

  • Generated $2.5b in coal sales and $542.3mm of EBITDA in 2018; and

  • Carries $2.7b of funded debt on balance sheet, $298mm of annual interest and amort expenses, AND $8b+ in actual or potential liability obligations under various pension and benefit plans. In 2018, the debtors’ statutory or CBA-related employee and retiree obligations totaled approximately $160mm. These are key factors that explain why, ultimately, despite every effort to hold out, this company capitulated into bankruptcy.

This is a story of unfettered expansion and spending, hubris, misplaced trust in new Washington on the part of Robert Murray, and utterly savage disruption.

The disruption side of the equation is compelling. Per the company:

“The thermal coal markets that Murray traditionally serves have been meaningfully challenged over the past three to four years, and deteriorated significantly in the last several months. This sector-wide decline has been driven largely by (a) the closure of approximately 93,000 megawatts of coal-fired electric generating capacity in the United States, (b) a record production of inexpensive natural gas, and (c) the growth of wind and solar energy, with gas and renewables, displacing coal used by U.S. power plants.”

Interestingly, this one statement ties together so much of what we’ve all been seeing in the restructuring space. Over the last several years, there have been a number of power company bankruptcies and through bankruptcy or otherwise, capacity has been cut considerably (indeed, FirstEnergy is a recipient of Murray Energy coal and undoubtedly took measures to cut back on coal supply). Fracking across the US has led to a deluge of natural gas — so much so that producers are flaring excess natural gas due to a lack of pipe infrastructure with which to transport it. Despite structural challenges, natural gas exports are on the rise. From the U.S. Energy Information Administration just yesterday:

“From January through June of 2019, U.S. net natural gas exports averaged 4.1 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), more than double the average net exports in 2018 (2.0 Bcf/d), according to data in the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Natural Gas Monthly. The United States became a net natural gas exporter (exported more than it imported) on an annual basis in 2017 for the first time in almost 60 years.”

And as this odd illustration shows, the US is becoming increasingly dependent — in large part due to federal and state emissions standards — upon solar and wind for its electricity needs. The debtors highlight:

“…coal-fired installed capacity as a percentage of total installed capacity has fallen from 26 percent in 2013 to 20 percent in 2019, with coal-fired generation as a percentage of total generation falling from 35 percent in 2013 to 27 percent in early 2019. Natural gas and renewables installed electricity generation capacity in the United States as a percentage of total installed capacity has increased from 59 percent in 2013 to 67 percent in 2019, and natural gas and renewables generation as a percentage of total generation increased from 42 percent in 2013 to 48 percent in early 2019.”

YIKES. That is a DRAMATIC change. They continue:

“During its peak in 2007, coal was the power source for half of electricity generation in the United States and by early 2019, coal-fired electricity generation fell to approximately 27 percent. These challenges have intensified recently as (i) certain electric utility companies have filed for bankruptcy protection and others have sought, and received, subsidies for their nuclear generation capacity to avoid bankruptcy, at the expense of coal-fired facilities, (ii) domestic natural gas prices hit 20-year lows this past summer, and (iii) overall demand for electricity in the United States has declined two percent in 2019, further depleting demand for coal at domestic utilities.”

MAGA!!

The international story, though, ain’t much better, with the company noting a “perfect storm of negative forces” that includes:

“…low liquefied natural gas prices; a recent trade war driving Russia to increase exports; mild weather across the Northern Hemisphere led to a reduction in demand for heating in both Europe and Asia; higher freight costs; and a prolonged monsoon season in India which kept demand depressed while conditions cleared for a record eight months.”

As if all of that isn’t bad enough, the competitive landscape has been horrific and while we suppose its admirable to try and holdout to avoid the embarrassment and stigma of bankruptcy, that strategy clearly becomes untenable when literally every other competitor in the US has already joined the BCCC and stripped themselves of burdensome debt and pension obligations. The company acknowledges as much:

“…while Murray has historically been able to navigate the challenges of the coal marketplace, these rapidly deteriorating industry conditions have caused more than 40 coal companies to file for bankruptcy since 2008, with more than half a dozen major operators filing in the last year alone. These bankruptcies have affected thousands of workers across the United States, and they have left their mark on Murray. Competitors have used bankruptcy to reduce debt and lower their cost structures by eliminating cash interest obligations and pension and benefit obligations, leaving them better positioned to compete for volume and pricing in the current market, while Murray continued to satisfy its significant financial obligations required by the weight of its own capital structure and legacy liability expenses. As a result, Murray generated little cash after satisfying debt service obligations, paying employee health and pension benefits, and maintaining operations.”

That’s a quaint narrative but it’s also a bit misleading.

While every other company was falling apart, Mr. Murray went on a shopping spree, snapping up Consolidation Coal CompanyForesight Energy LP (coming soon to a bankruptcy court near you), Mission Coal Company LLCArmstrong Energy Inc., and certain Colombian assets. This undoubtedly led to increased integration costs and debt. During that time, the debtors deployed every capital structure trick in the book to extend maturities and kick the can down the road. That road has come to an end at the bankruptcy court doors.

Here is that sweet clean capital structure:

Screen Shot 2019-10-29 at 11.56.48 AM.png

Man, that’s a beaut.

Rounding out the company’s extensive liabilities are the obligations to employees under CBAs and pension and benefit plans.

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Pursuant to these CBAs, Murray contributes to three multi-employer retirement plans. If you want a sense of how employer-employee relations have changed since the 1970s, look no farther than the debtors’ obligations under what they’ve dubbed the “1974 Pension Plan.” Per the debtors:

“Following the large wave of chapter 11 filings in 2015 and 2016, more than half a dozen large U.S. coal companies collapsed into bankruptcy over the last several years and withdrew from the 1974 Pension Plan. When an employer withdraws, its vested beneficiaries remain in the 1974 Pension Plan and are referred to as “orphan” beneficiaries. The remaining contributing employers become responsible for the benefits of these orphaned participants who were never their employees. As a result, approximately 95 percent of beneficiaries who currently receive benefits from the 1974 Pension Plan last worked for employers that no longer contribute to the Plan. As of January 2019, 11 employers contribute to the 1974 Pension Plan, compared to over 2,800 in 1984. This has placed significant stress on the 1974 Pension Plan and the small number of contributing employers—Murray most of all. If Murray withdraws from the 1974 Pension Plan, the withdrawal liability could be $6.4 billion or more, with annual estimated payments of approximately $32 to $35 million in perpetuity.”

Whoa. And that’s just one plan: the company is also on the hook for others, not to mention $1.9b in other federally-mandated post-employment benefits, asset retirement obligations and environmental obligations.

“Likely”?!?

The company has a restructuring support agreement with 60% of its “consenting superpriority lenders” and “consenting equityholders” (read: Robert Murray) that outlines the general terms of a path forward: a sale with the superpriority lenders as stalking horse bidder, DIP lender, and funder of administrative expenses. Those lenders committed to provide a $350mm DIP commitment. From here, the clock is ticking.

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The debtors hope to have an auction within 135 days and plan confirmation within 195 days. And within 106 days the debtors want to have a solution their CBA/retiree problem or file a motion seeking to reject those agreements and modify those benefits.

There is, as with most cases, a “cooler talk” aspect to this filing: there’s the Kirkland-is-dominating-with-yet-another-coal-bankruptcy-representation-post-westmoreland-and-mission-coal-and-armstrong-energy-which-means-that-A&M-is-dominating-which-means-that-Prime-Clerk-is-dominating-and-what-the-f*ck-happened-to-Jones-Day-which-used-to-crush-coal-filings-with-Peabody-and-Alpha-Natural-but-now-seems-to-be-unraveling-narrative, but putting aside that inside baseball crap and how much frikken cash this case is going to print for all of the above, it’s the miners themselves — those guys who were in the depths of the earth (as distinct from the white-collar professionals who always talk about “the trenches” and “hard fought” negotiations) — who are very likely to get completely and utterly shafted here. As if getting misled or lied to by Mr. Murray — however good his intentions may have been — and Mr. Trump wasn’t enough, they’re now facing the very real possibility of losing the benefits that they worked especially hard to get. All while the professionals are billing $1650/hour. Bankruptcy is vicious.

To point here is the UMWA’s statement about the bankruptcy:

“Today’s filing by Murray Energy for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization comes as no surprise. This day has been coming for some time.

Coal production in this country continues to decline, due to the glut of natural gas on the market and continued government preference for gas and renewable energy to replace coal-fired power generation. Combined with a recent severe reduction in coal exports, these factors delivered a one-two punch that an over-extended Murray Energy could not withstand.

Now comes the part where workers and their families pay the price for corporate decision-making and governmental actions. Murray will file a motion in bankruptcy court to throw out its collective bargaining agreement with the union. It will seek to be relieved of its obligations to retirees, their dependents and widows. We have seen this sad act too many times before.”

Let’s pour one out for the little guys.

*This number is contradicted in the bankruptcy papers. In one instance, the company’s new CEO indicates that there are 13 owned and operated mines; in another he says 18. Whatevs. What are 5 mines in the scheme of things (we’re kidding…WTF, y’all?). The company also owns and operates a mine in Colombia, South America.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Ohio (Judge Hoffman Jr.)

  • Capital Structure: See Above

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Nicole Greenblatt, Ross Kwasteniet, Joseph Graham, Alexander Nicas, Mark McKane, Tricia Schwallier) & Dinsmore & Shohl LLP (Kim Martin Lewis, Alexandra Horwitz)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Robert Campagna)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

    • Prepetition FILO and DIP FILO Lender: GACP Finance Co. LLC

      • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Jennifer Hagle, Leslie Plaskon, Anna Gumport) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Ronald Gold, Erin Severini

    • Prepetition Superpriority Agent: GLAS Trust Company LLC; DIP Administrative Agent: GLAS USA LLC; DIP Collateral Agent: GLAS Americas LLC

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Douglas Lutz, A.J. Webb, Bryan Sisto)

    • Term Loan Agent: Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLC

      • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi) & Keating Muething & Klekamp PLLC (Robert Sanker)

    • 1.5L Notes Indenture Trustee: U.S. Bank N.A.

    • 2L Notes Indenture Trustee (‘20 and ‘21): The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company N.A.

    • Ad Hoc Group of Superpriority Lenders

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen, James McClammy) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Douglas Lutz, A.J. Webb, Bryan Sisto)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Equityholders (Robert Murray)

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher (Brian Lennon, Matthew Feldman)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Bank of NY Mellon Trust Company NA, CB Mining Inc., Joy Global, RM Wilson Co., UMWA 1974 Pension Trust, United Mine Workers of America International Union, Wheeler Machinery Co.)

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Todd Goren, Jennifer Marines, Erica Richards, Benjamin Butterfield)

      • Investment Banker: Moelis & Co. (William Derrough)

💩New Chapter 11 Filing - uBiome Inc.💩

uBiome Inc.

September 4, 2019

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Back in our July 4th weekend edition, we wrote the following:

#BustedTech. One year you’re on the Forbes’ 2018 Next Billion-Dollar Startups list and the next year you’re getting raided by the FBI. This is the story of uBiome, a SF-based microbiome startup. Per Forbes:

The new interim CEO of troubled microbiome startup uBiome, Curtis Solsvig, is a longtime turnaround and restructuring expert at financial advisory firm Goldin Associates and the former chief restructuring officer of failed drone startup Lily Robotics.

One man’s billion-dollar valuation is another man’s clean-up job. 

And, now, another man’s bankruptcy.

Annnd another man’s sacrifice:

The Debtor filed this Chapter 11 Case to provide an innovative business with a fresh start under new management, and to preserve approximately 100 jobs through a court-supervised sale process that is intended to maximize the value of the Debtor’s assets for the benefit of all stakeholders.

…certain business practices formulated and implemented by the Debtor’s original founders have resulted in cessation of certain aspects of the Debtor’s business, investigations by certain federal and state investigatory bodies (the “Investigations”), loss of revenue and significant potential contingent liabilities.

Godspeed founders. You just got napalmed. AGAIN.

And as they should. The debtor has been in triage for some time now.

The company empowers consumers to access analysis of their DNA/microbiomes via the use of at-home kits. Said another way, people poop in an $89.99 “explorer kit” and the company analyzes the sample through (a) a proprietary gene sequencing process and (b) a cloud-based database of microbiomes to determine what’s what in the customer’s GI system — a much less invasive discovery methodology than the gut-wrenching (pun intended) colonoscopy. The consumer receives results that provide suggestions for diet, weight control, gut inflammation, sleep disorders and non-dietary supplements. Frankly, this all sounds rather bada$$.

The company also had a clinical business. Doctors could prescribe the tests and bill the customers’ insurance. Similarly, the company launched a clinical product geared towards the analysis of vaginal swabs (i.e., STDs, HPV, gyno disorders). Together these clinical products were called “SmartX.”

Suffice it to say, this idea was big. The company’s founders leveraged the open-source results from the Human Microbiome Project (launched by the National Institutes of Health) and built something that could really make a lot of people’s lives easier. The venture capitalists saw the opportunity, and the tech media celebrated the company’s rapid capital raises and increasing valuation: $1.5mm seed in ‘14, $4.5mm in August ‘14 (led by a16z)$15.5mm Series B in October ‘16, and $83mm Series C in September ‘18(PETITION Note: the company now says it raised $17mm in ‘16 and $59mm in ‘18, exclusive of $36.4mm of mostly-now-converted convertible notes, which means that the media appears to have been fed, or reported, wrong numbers).* Valuation? Approx $600mm.

Armed with gobs of money, the company established some valuable IP (including over 45 patents and your poop data, no joke) and commercial assets (its certified labs). On the other side of the ledger, there is $5.83mm of outstanding secured debt and $3.5mm of unsecured debt, ex-contingent liabilities including…wait for it…”[p]otential fines for civil and criminal penalties resulting from the Investigation….” Ruh roh.

The Founders implemented certain business strategies with respect to the SmartX products that were highly problematic, contained significant operational (but not scientific) flaws and, in some instances, were of questionable legality. These issues included improper insurance provider billing practices, improper use of a telemedicine physician network (known as the External Clinical Care Network), overly aggressive and potentially misleading marketing tactics, manipulation of customer upgrade testing, and improper use of customer inducements. Moreover, certain information presented to potential investors during the three rounds of capital raise my have been incorrect and/or misleading. Although uBiome believes the science and technology behind uBiome’s business model in this developing area is sound, these issues – among others – have resulted in significant legal exposure for the Debtor.

Score one for VC due diligence! The USA for the ND of California, the FBI, the DOJ and the SEC are all up in the company poop now. This investigation, much like the opioid crisis, also calls into question the ethical practices of doctors. Because we really ought not trust anybody these days.

Anyway, the company has since taken measures to right the ship. The board suspended and then sh*tcanned the founders and recruited new independents. They’ve verified that the company suffered from bad business practices rather than bad science or lab practices (Elizabeth Holmes, holla at us!!). And they’ve hired bankers to market the company’s assets (no stalking horse bidder at filing, though). The company received a commitment from early investor 8VC for a $13.83mm DIP of which $8mm in new money; it will take slightly more than 60 days to see if a buyer emerges. One selling point according to the company: it plans for its Explorer Kits to be in CVS Health Corp. ($CVS)! That’d be great if CVS planned for that too. Womp womp.

Anyway, the way bankruptcy is going these days chapter 11 probably ought to be renamed chapter 363.

*There are many reasons why d-bag startup founders hype their own raises. First, it promotes an aura of success which can help acquire new customers. Second, they love the adulation (see Elizabeth Holmes). Third, it helps with recruiting. And, fourth, the VCs must like it and use it for subsequent fundraising (given that they never correct the record).

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: $5.83mm credit facility (Silicon Valley Bank)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Joseph Barry, Andrew Magaziner, Joseph Mulvihill, Jordan Sazant)

    • Board of Directors: Kimberly Scotti, L. Spencer Wells, D.J. (Jan) Baker

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Goldin Associates LLC (Curtis

    • Investment Banker: GLC Advisors & Co LLC

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: Silicon Valley Bank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Alexander Rheaume, Todd Goren, Benjamin Butterfield) & Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Katharina Earle)

    • DIP Participants: 8VC Fund I LP, 8VC Entrepreneurs Fund I LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Matthew Williams, Eric Wise, Jason Zachary Goldstein) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

🌑New Chapter 11 Filing - Cloud Peak Energy Inc.🌑

In what ought to come as a surprise to absolutely no one, Cloud Peak Energy Inc. ($CLD) and a slate of affiliates FINALLY filed for bankruptcy.

Let’s take a moment of silence for coal country, shall we? If this is what MAGA looks like, we’d hate to see what happens when a global downturn eventually hits. There’s gonna be blood in the water.

Sounds like hyperbole? Note that since 2016, there have been a slate of coal-related bankruptcies, i.e., Westmoreland Coal CompanyMission Coal Company LLC, and now Cloud Peak Energy Inc. Blackhawk Mining LLC appears to be waiting in the wings. We suppose it could be worse: we could be talking about oil and gas country (and we will be, we certainly will be…and SOON.).

Cloud Peak is an impressive company. Since its formation in 2008, it has become one of the largest (subbituminous thermal coal) coal producers in the US — supplying enough coal to satisfy approximately 2% of the US’ electricity demand. Its three surface mines are located in the Powder River Basin in Wyoming and Montana; it sold approximately 50mm tons of coal in 2018 to 46 domestic and foreign end users.*

In the scheme of things, Cloud Peak’s balance sheet isn’t overly complicated. We’re not talking about billions of dollars of debt here like we saw with Walter EnergyPeabody Energy, Arch Coal, Patriot Coal or Alpha Natural Resources. So, not all coal companies and coal company bankruptcies are created equal. Nevertheless, the company does have $290.4mm of ‘21 12% secured notes (Wilmington Trust NA) and $56.4mm of ‘24 6.375% unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust NA as successor trustee to Wells Fargo Bank NA) to contend with for a total of $346.8mm in funded debt liability. The company is also party to a securitization facility. And, finally, the company also has reclamation obligations related to their mines and therefore has $395mm in third-party surety bonds outstanding with various insurance companies, backed by $25.7mm in letters of credit. Coal mining is a messy business, homies.

So why bankruptcy? Why now? Per the company:

The Company’s chapter 11 filing, however, was precipitated by (i) general distress affecting the domestic U.S. thermal coal industry that produced a sustained low price environment that could not support profit margins to allow the Company to satisfy its funded debt obligations; (ii) export market price volatility that caused decreased demand from the Company’s customers in Asia; (iii) particularly challenging weather conditions in the second quarter of 2018 that caused spoil failure and significant delays in coal production through the remainder of 2018 and into 2019, which reduced cash inflows from coal sales and limited credit availability; and (iv) recent flooding in the Midwestern United States that has significantly disrupted rail service, further reducing coal sales.

To summarize, price compression caused by natural gas. Too much regulation (which, in turn, favors natural gas over coal). Too much debt. And, dare we say, global warming?!? Challenging weather and flooding must be really perplexing in coal country where global warming isn’t exactly embraced with open arms.

Now, we may be hopping to conclusions here but, these bits are telling — and are we say, mildly ironic in a tragic sort of way:

In addition to headwinds facing thermal coal producers and export market volatility, the Company’s mines suffered from unusually heavy rains affecting Wyoming and Montana in the second quarter of 2018. For perspective, the 10-year average combined rainfall for May, June, and July at the Company’s Antelope Mine is 6.79 inches. In 2018, it rained 10.2 inches during that period. While certain operational procedures put in place following heavy flooding in 2014 functioned effectively to mitigate equipment damage, the 2018 rains interrupted the Company’s mining operations considerably.

It gets worse.

The problem with rain is that the moisture therefrom causes “spoil.” Per the company:

Spoil is the term used for overburden and other waste rock removed during coal mining. The instability in the dragline pits caused wet spoil to slide into the pits that had to be removed by dragline and/or truck-shovel methods before the coal could be mined. This caused significant delays and diverted truck-shovel capacity from preliminary stripping work, which caused additional production delays at the Antelope Mine. The delays resulting from the spoil failure at the Antelope Mine caused the Company to have reduced shipments, increased costs, and delayed truck-shovel stripping in 2018. Consequently, the reduced cash inflows from coal sales limited the Company’s credit availability under the financial covenants in the Amended Credit Agreement prior to its termination, and limited access to any new forms of capital.

But, wait. There’s more:

Additionally, the severe weather affecting the Midwest region of the United States in mid-March 2019 caused, among other things, extensive flooding that damaged rail lines. One of Cloud Peak’s primary suppliers of rail transportation services – BNSF – was negatively impacted by the flooding and has been unable to provide sufficient rail transportation services to satisfy the Company’s targeted coal shipments. As of the Petition Date, BNSF’s trains have resumed operations, but are operating on a less frequent schedule because of repairs being made to rail lines damaged by the extensive flooding. As a result, the Company’s coal shipments have been materially impacted, with cash flows significantly reduced through mid-June 2019.

Riiiiiiiight. But:

More about Moore here: the tweet, as you might expect, doesn’t tell the full story.

Anywho.

The company has been burning a bit over $7mm of liquidity a month since September 2018. Accordingly, it sought strategic alternatives but was unable to find anything viable that would clear its cap stack. We gather there isn’t a whole lot of bullishness around coal mines these days.

To buy itself some time, therefore, the company engaged in a series of exchange transactions dating back to 2016. This enabled it to extinguish certain debt maturing in 2019. And thank G-d for the public markets: were it not for a February 2017 equity offering where some idiot public investors hopped in to effectively transfer their money straight into noteholder pockets, this thing probably would have filed for bankruptcy sooner. That equity offering — coupled with a preceding exchange offer — bought the company some runway to continue to explore strategic alternatives. The company engaged J.P. Morgan Securities LLC to find a partner but nothing was actionable. Ah….coal.

Thereafter, the company hired a slate of restructuring professionals to help prepare it for the inevitable. Centerview Partners took over for J.P. Morgan Securities LLC but, to date, has had no additional luck. The company filed for bankruptcy without any prospective buyers lined up.

Alas, the company filed for bankruptcy with a “sale and plan support agreement” or “SAPSA.” While this may sound like a venereal disease, what it really means is that the company has an agreement with a significant percentage of both its secured and unsecured noteholders to dual track a sale and plan process. If they can sell the debtors’ assets via a string of 363 sales, great. If they have to do a more fulsome transaction by way of a plan, sure, that also works. These consenting noteholders also settled some other disputes and support the proposed $35mm DIP financing

*Foreign customers purchased approximately 9% of ‘18 coal production.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: $290mm 12% ‘21 secured debt (Wilmington Trust NA), $56.4mm unsecured debt (BOKF NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Paul Heath, David Meyer, Jessica Peet, Lauren Kanzer, Matthew Moran, Steven Zundell, Andrew Geppert, Matthew Pyeatt, Matthew Struble, Jeremy Reichman) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, John Knight)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Alan Boyko)

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (Marc Puntus, Ryan Kielty, Johannes Preis)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Major shareholders: Renaissance Technologies LLC, The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Dimensional Fund Advisors LP, Kopernik Global Advisors, Blackrock Inc.

    • DIP Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Aryeh Ethan Falk, Christopher Robertson) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Curtis Miller, Paige Topper)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey

    • Prepetition Secured Noteholder Group (Allianz Global Investors US LLC, Arena Capital Advisors LLC, Grace Brothers LP, Nomura Corporate Research and Asset Management Inc. Nuveen Alternatives Advisors LLC, Wexford Capital LP, Wolverine Asset Management LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Aryeh Ethan Falk, Christopher Robertson) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Curtis Miller, Paige Topper)

    • Indenture Trustee: BOKF NA

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Jordana Renert) & (local) Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Matthew Ward)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (BOKF NA, Nelson Brothers Mining Services LLC, Wyoming Machinery Company, Cummins Inc., ESCO Group LLC, Tractor & Equipment Co., Kennebec Global)

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Jennifer Marines, Todd Goren, Daniel Harris, Mark Lightner) & Morris James LLP (Carl Kunz III, Brya Keilson, Eric Monzo)

      • Investment Banker: Jefferies LLC (Leon Szlezinger)

Update: 7/7/19 #379

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Achaogen Inc.

Achaogen Inc.

April 15, 2019

Biopharma is where it’s at!!

San Francisco-based Achaogen Inc. ($AKAO) is the latest in a slate of biopharma debtors who have found their way into bankruptcy court — here, the District of Delaware. Achaogen is focused on “the development and commercialization of innovative antibiotic treatments against multi-drug resistant gram-negative infections.” To date, its operations have been centered around the discovery, development and commercialization of products, making it as far as clinical trials in certain instances. As if inspired by the fact that its filing came on the heels of the much-anticipated Game of Thrones (final) Season 8 premiere, the company colorfully notes its primary purpose:

Achaogen designed its lead product, ZEMDRI® (plazomicin), to fight what the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) calls a “nightmare bacteria” and has listed as the highest category threat of “urgent.” ZEMDRI can be used to treat patients who have limited or no alternative treatment options from infections with these nightmare bacteria. Even with its current financial situation, Achaogen continues to commercialize ZEMDRI, in part because Achaogen believes that ZEMDRI can save lives for patients who may literally have no alternative.

Nightmare bacteria!! Sheesh that’s chilling.

Even more chilling is the company’s discussion of gram-negative bacteria — found “everywhere, in virtually all environments on Earth that support life.” These bacteria are becoming increasingly resistant to common antibiotics. Achaogen calls this “a global crisis…we take for granted.” The company’s core (patented) product, ZEMDRI, is designed to “retain its effectiveness in killing these more resistant bacteria.” While ZEMDRI received FDA approval for IV-treatment of patients with complicated urinary tract infections in July 2018, the FDA rejected ZEMDRI for treatment of patients with bloodstream infections, citing a lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness.

What does the company have going for it? Again, as of July 2018, it has a commercially viable product in the United States. It also has global commercialization rights. And patent protect in the US through approximately 2031 or 2032. It sells to either specialty distributors or physician-owned infusion centers. It has agreements with Hovione Limited and Pfizer for the manufacturing of its product. Finally, it has another product in development, C-Scape, which is an oral antibiotic for treatment of patients suffering from urinary tract infections caused by a particular bacteria.

So, what’s the issue? As PETITION readers have come to learn, the development and manufacture of biopharma products is a time and capital intensive process. Indeed, the company has an accumulated deficit of $559.4mm as of December 31, 2018. This bit is especially puzzling given the company’s position that the world confronts a “global crisis”:

In the past year, there has been a dramatic downturn in the availability of financing from both the debt and equity markets for companies in the anti-infective field, based in part on the withdrawal from the space by certain large pharmaceutical companies. For example, Novartis recently announced that it is shutting down its antibacterial and antiviral research, which was followed by similar moves from Eli Lilly, Bristol-Myers Squibb and AstraZeneca.3 Allergan has also recently announced its intention to divest its anti-infective business, consisting of three commercialized products. This “big pharma flight” from antiinfective research, development and commercialization has created significant challenges for early-stage biotech companies seeking to develop and commercialize novel and much needed drugs in this sector, as opportunities for partnerships, joint R&D relationships, and merger/acquisition transactions have diminished. This sector-wide trend has negatively affected not just Achaogen but many of its competitors. Achaogen, however, has been especially impacted because it has reached the point in its life cycle where it needs substantial capital infusion to drive commercialization of its recently FDA approved drug, ZEMDRI.

Look: we don’t take everything debtors say as gospel. After all, first day pleadings are an opportunity to frame the story and set the tone of a case. But if the company is right about what it’s saying and nobody appears to give two sh*ts, well, color us a wee bit concerned. Why isn’t anybody talking about this?

Anyway, in February 2018, the company entered into a loan and security agreement with Silicon Valley Bank for $50mm. The original agreement provided SVB with a security interest in virtually all of the company’s assets — including proceeds of intellectual property — but not a security interest in the IP itself. $15mm remains outstanding under the loan. In November 2018, the company retained Evercore Group LLP to run a strategic sale process but no viable purchaser emerged. It’s not worth saving the world unless you can make some dinero, we suppose.

After engaging in various liquidity maximization efforts (including job cuts), fundraising initiatives (including an insufficient equity raise), and licensing discussions with entities abroad, the company ultimately decided that nothing would generate enough liquidity for the company to avoid chapter 11. The company notes, “although Achaogen’s out-of-court sale process did not yield any acceptable bids, many parties had expressed interest in bidding at any potential 363 auction sale, where it could pursue the Assets free and clear of existing liabilities.” The company, therefore, filed for chapter 11 to pursue a new sale process; it has no stalking horse bidder teed up. To market its assets, the company has replaced Evercore with Cassel Salpeter & Co. LLC.

In support of the bankruptcy case, SVB committed to provide the company with a $25mm DIP credit facility of which $10mm is new money and $15mm is a roll-up of the aforementioned pre-petition debt. In exchange, SVB now gets a security interest in the company’s IP.

The company’s unsecured debt is comprised of lease obligations, minimum purchase requirements under its manufacturing contract, a success fee tied to the company’s FDA approval, and $18.7mm of trade debt. New Enterprise Associates Inc., a reputed Silicon Valley venture capital firm, is the company’s largest equity holder with approximately 10.76% of the company’s shares. Prior to its 2014 IPO, the company had raised $152.1mm starting with its Series A round in August 2004: it IPO’d at a valuation of $200.4mm, having issued 6.9mm shares at $12/share to the public. It’s equity is likely worth f*ck all. Well, not exactly: we suppose this isn’t ENTIRELY “f*ck all”:

Screen Shot 2019-04-15 at 2.48.04 PM.png

But it’s pretty darn close. Now the issue is what price the IP will fetch in a bankruptcy sale process. It will have to be tens of millions of dollars for NEA to have any sort of recovery.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

  • Capital Structure: $15mm secured debt (Silicon Valley Bank)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Erin Brady, Richard Wynne, Christopher Bryant, John Beck) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Andrew Remming, Matthew Talmo, Paige Topper)

    • Financial Advisor: Meru LLC

    • Investment Banker: Cassel Salpeter & Co., LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Professionals:

    • Prepetition & DIP Lender ($25mm): Silicon Valley Bank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP ( Alexander Rheaume, Todd Goren, Benjamin Butterfield, David Ephraim) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Stacy Newman)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Hovione Limited, EsteveQuimica SA, Solar Capital Ltd.,. Crystal BioScience, World Courier)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Windstream Holdings Inc.

Windstream Holdings Inc.

February 25, 2019

See here for our write-up on Winstream Holdings Inc.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: see below.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Stephen Hessler, Ross Kwasteniet, Marc Kieselstein, Brad Weiland, Cristine Pirro Schwarzman, John Luze, Neda Davanipour)

    • Legal (Board of Directors): Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Louis Strubeck Jr., James Copeland, Kristian Gluck)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender ($500mm TL, $500mm RCF): Citigroup Global Markets Inc.

    • Prepetition 10.5% and 9% Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Jason Angelo)

    • Prepetition TL and RCF Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Nicholas Baker, Jamie Fell)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Term Lenders

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Andrew Rosenberg, Samuel Lovett, Michael Rudnick)

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore

    • Midwest Noteholders

      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP

    • Uniti Group Inc.

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Huebner, Eli Vonnegut, James Millerman)

      • Financial Advisor: Rothschild & Co.

    • Large Unsecured Creditor: AT&T Corp.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Brian Lohan, Ginger Clements, Peta Gordon) & AT&T (James Grudus)

    • Large Unsecured Creditor: Verizon Communications Inc.

      • Legal: Stinson Leonard Street LLP (Darrell Clark, Tracey Ohm)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (AT&T Services Inc., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO CLC, VeloCloud Networks Inc., Crown Castle Fiber, LEC Services Inc., UMB Bank)

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Brett Miller, Todd Goren, Jennifer Marines, Erica Richards)

Screen Shot 2019-02-25 at 9.04.55 PM.png

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LBI Media Inc.

LBI Media Inc.

November 21, 2018

Happy Thanksgiving y’all!! LBI Media Inc. and several affiliates FINALLY filed for bankruptcy today in the District of Delaware after years of questions about its financial health. The company is a privately held minority-owned Spanish-language broadcaster that owns or licenses 27 Spanish-language television and radio stations in the largest US markets; it services the largest media markets in the nation, including Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, Miami, Houston and Dallas. It is also a victim of disruption.

The company notes that it has “faced the market pressures that have broadly affected U.S. television and radio broadcasters, including the 2008 recession and the diversion of advertising spend by companies to digital media.” Insert Facebook Inc. ($FB) here. That’s not all, though, of course: the company is also hampered by “a substantial debt load and corresponding interest expense obligations” which has stunted LBI’s financial performance, ability to invest and grow, and liquidity.

To address this situation, the company obtained an investment from its now-DIP lender, HPS Investment Partners, in April 2018 for a new first lien credit facility. This provided the company with much needed liquidity and, in turn, briefly extended the company’s runway out of bankruptcy court. The “make-whole” provision attached to the facility, however, became the subject of much controversy and an ad hoc group of second lien noteholders sued in New York state court for an injunction to hinder the transaction. Ultimately, the state court denied the noteholders.

But…but…the noteholders persisted. And this, apparently, left a bitter taste in the mouth’s of company management (and its counsel). Junior Noteholders, meet bus. 🚌🚌 The company notes:

Following the closing of the transaction, LBI sought to continue its growth efforts. However, such efforts were weakened by the Junior Noteholder Group, which continued to litigate against the Company, its founder and CEO, and HPS, the Company’s sole senior lender. The Junior Noteholder Group commenced multiple lawsuits, and threatened several more, distracting management from operations. These actions and threats not only hindered the Debtors’ efforts to improve their operations, but certain actions, including seeking to enjoin the first lien financing, risked pushing LBI into a precipitous freefall bankruptcy.

When coupled with the Debtors’ tightening liquidity (which was exacerbated by the expense of the Junior Noteholder Group litigation), the Junior Noteholder Group’s actions made it substantially more difficult for LBI to achieve the growth it had hoped for, and the Company determined that a comprehensive reorganization may be necessary.

Thereafter, settlement talks with the Junior Noteholders proved unsuccessful and, now, therefore, the company marches into bankruptcy court with a Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”) in hand with HPS whereby, subject to a “fiduciary out,” HPS will serve as (prearranged but hardly set in stone) Plan sponsor and swap its $233mm first lien senior secured notes for a majority equity interest in the company. The Plan — which at the time of this writing isn’t on the docket yet — reportedly provides for recoveries for other “supporting” constituencies. What’s that we hear? IT’S A (DEATH) TRAP!?!

(PETITION NOTE: for the uninitiated, a “death trap plan” is an inartful term for when the Debtor proposes and the senior lenders allows a recovery to trickle down the “priority waterfall” to junior lenders but only on account of said junior lenders’ support of, or vote for, the proposed Plan. In essence, its consideration for dispensing with “holdup value.” A “fiduciary out” gives the Debtor flexibility to, despite the RSA, agree to an alternative transaction that bests the HPS transaction without penalty or the need to pay a “break-up fee.”).

The plan provides the company with 75-day period to run a marketing process. While the company will market the company to potential strategic and financial investors, it is also making overtures to the Junior Noteholders to take out HPS’ claim(s) (without needing to satisfy the make-whole) and become the Plan sponsor such that it could walk away with 100% equity in the company.

All of which is to say: don’t let the terms “RSA” and “Plan” fool you. This is far from a consensual case being presented to the Bankruptcy Court Judge wrapped up in a shiny bow. The Junior Noteholders have been fighting the company and HPS for months: there is no reason to suspect that that will stop now merely because the company is a chapter 11 debtor.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Lane)

  • Capital Structure: $233mm 10% ‘23 senior secured notes, $262mm 11.5/13.5 ‘20 PIK toggle second priority secured notes, $27.95mm 11% ‘22 PIK unsecured Intermediate senior Holdco notes (TMI Trust Company), $8.46mm 11% ‘17 unsecured Holdco notes (U.S. Bank NA)    

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Garrett Fail, David J. Cohen) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi)

    • Board of Directors: Jose Liberman, Lenard Liberman, Winter Horton, Rockard Delgadillo, Peter Connoy, Neal Goldman

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition First Lien & DIP Lender: HPS Investment Partners LLC ($38mm)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jeffrey Safferstein, Sarah Harnett) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, M. Blake Cleary)

    • First Lien Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster (Jonathan Levine) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (William Bowden)

    • Collateral Trustee for First Lien Notes: Credit Suisse AG

      • Legal: Locke Lorde LLP (Juliane Dziobak)

    • Ad Hoc Group of (Junior) Second Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Rachel Strickland)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Holdco Noteholders

      • Legal: Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Matthew McGuire)

Updated 11/21/18 at 8:27 CT

🔥New Chapter 11 Filing - Westmoreland Coal Company🔥

Westmoreland Coal Company

October 9, 2018

In our April piece entitled "🌑Trouble Brews in Coal Country🌑," we noted how Westmoreland Coal Company ($WLB) was headed towards a bankruptcy filing. Subsequently, in May, the company obtained a small round of financing ($90mm) to bridge itself to a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Alas, we're upon that filing — a “Chapter 33,” of sorts, for good measure.

And it’s an…interesting…one. The company’s First Day Declaration leads with “What is Coal” and then goes on to mansplain what coal is. It’s beautiful. It’s educational. It’s…odd. Per the Declaration:

Coal is a fossil fuel that forms from the remains of vegetation as long as 400 million years ago. The plants from eons ago captured energy through photosynthesis to create compounds (carbon) in plant tissue. When those plants and trees died, they ultimately sank to the bottom of swamps and formed a dense material called peat, which progressively carbonized under the earth’s pressure and changing temperatures and eventually became a combustible sedimentary and metamorphic rock, which is referred to as coal.

There are at least four ranks of coal, depending on the carbon content: lignite; subbituminous; bituminous; and anthracite. Some estimate that 90 percent of the coal in America is bituminous (i.e., soft) coal, which is primarily used to make electricity through combustion in boilers to make steam that is used to generate power (called steam or thermal coal) and coke for the steel industry (metallurgical or coking coal). The Debtors mine lignite, subbituminous, and bituminous coal.

We are thankful for the explanation. After all, there haven’t been many opportunities over the last decade to explore the intersection of coal and bankruptcy. Oh…wait. Hang on. Right. Ok, sure, there was Peabody Energy. Ah, yeah, and Alpha Natural Resources. And Edison Mission Energy, Patriot Coal (x2), Walter Energy, Arch Coal, Xinergy, Armstrong Energy and James River Coal. To name a few. But we digress.

Anyway, THIS bankruptcy implicates Westmoreland (with affiliates, “WLB”), a thermal coal producer that sells coal to “investment grade power plants under long-term cost-protected contracts, as well as to industrial customers and barbeque charcoal manufacturers.” The company’s mines are located in Montana, North Dakota, Texas, Ohio and New Mexico, of which only 4 of a total of 23 are active. The company’s strategy generally revolves around focusing on coal markets where the company can leverage geographic proximity to power plants, some of which were specifically designed to use the company’s coal. Close proximity also permits the company to avoid onerous transportation costs, which, in turn, provides the company with flexibility to be a low(er) cost provider. There is a bit of an export business as well.

The problem is that “[t]he American coal industry is intensely competitive.” The company adds:

In addition to competition from other coal producers, the Debtors compete with producers of alternative fuels used for electrical power generation, such as nuclear energy, natural gas, hydropower, petroleum, solar, and wind. Costs and other factors such as safety, environmental, and regulatory considerations related to alternative fuels affect the overall demand for coal as a fuel. Political dynamics in the United States and Canada have additionally resulted in a reduction of the market demand for coal-based energy solutions.

Tack on a hefty chunk of debt:

And then mix in that the company is (i) subject to 7 collective bargaining agreements and, (ii) in addition to a multi-employer pension plan, that it also provides defined benefit pension plans to qualified employees — which, naturally, are underfunded by approximately $29mm and carry a termination liability of approximately $77.3mm. But wait, there’s more. The company also has, among other things, approximately (i) $1.3mm in retiree medical obligations, (ii) $18.2mm in federal regulatory Black Lung Act obligations, (iii) $334mm of “other post-employment benefit” obligations and (iv) asset retirement obligations of approximately $474.5mm. Why anyone would want to get into the coal business is beyond us. That all sounds outright depressing.

The company blames the following for its bankruptcy filing: (a) a challenging macro environment (⬇️ production and ⬇️demand); (b) a capital intensive business model; (c) the rise of natural gas as a lower cost alternative to coal (score one for the frackers!); and (d) regulation which, as you can see from the panoply of liabilities noted above, helps create a quite a heavy hitter lineup of economic obligations. Per the company:

When coupled with the external pricing pressure, increased regulation, political opposition to coal in the United States and Canada, and other costs associated with WLB’s businesses, these liabilities have hindered WLB’s ability to operate competitively in the current market environment.

And so the company has filed its chapter 11 bankruptcy with the consent of 76% of its term lenders, 57.9% of its senior secured noteholders and 79.1% of its bridge lenders to pursue a dual-track sale of its core assets to an entity to be formed on behalf of the senior secured noteholders and term lenders, subject to highest or best offers for the core assets at an auction. The sale will be consummated through a plan to, among other things, preserve tax benefits. The company will also continue to market its non-core assets. Likewise, the master limited partnership 94% owned by the company (“WMLP”) is for sale. Notably, with no prospect of a restructuring on the horizon, there is no deal in place with the unions and retirees and WLB may have to proceed on a non-consensual basis.

The company marched in to court with a commitment for a $110mm DIP. It will roll-up the bridge loan and fund the cases while the sale processes progress.

Update: In “Grocery Workers, Miners, and Who Ain’t Getting Paid (Short #MAGA),” we noted how coal miners employed by Westmoreland Coal Company were, due to a recent decision by Judge Jones in the Southern District of Texas, in for a world of hurt. Now the company has officially filed its motion seeking to reject certain collective bargaining agreements and modify certain retiree benefits pursuant to sections 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code. #MAGA!!

Update: On January 21, 2019, the company filed a “Notice of Cancellation of Auction and Designation of Successful Bidder” after the company didn’t receive any qualified bids for its core assets other than the original stalking horse bid. The company’s Buckingham Mine, a non-core asset, did, in contrast, receive some interest and the company, therefore, will seek to sell that mine in due time.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Edward Sassower, Stephen Hessler, Michael Slade, Greg Pesce, Anna Rotman, Christopher Koenig, Gerardo Mijares-Shafai, Timothy Bow) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Legal Conflicts Counsel to Westmoreland Resource Partners LP and the Conflicts Committee of the Board of Directors of Westmoreland Resources GP LLC: Jones Day (Heather Lennox, Timothy Hoffman, Oliver Zeltner)

    • Financial Advisor to Westmoreland Resource Partners LP and the Conflicts Committee of the Board of Directors of Westmoreland Resources GP LLC: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Robert Campagna)

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners LLC (Marc Puntus)

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • WMLP Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (David Hillman, Kristine Manoukian, Lucy Kweskin, Kelly Knight) & (local) Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain, Mark Mintz)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc.

    • Administrative Agent under Bridge Loan & DIP Agreements: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & (local) Okin Adams LLP (Matthew Okin, David Curry Jr.)

    • WMB Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Thomas Mayer, Stephen Zide)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Todd Goren, Jennifer Marines, Dimitra Doufekias) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Michael Warner, Felice Yudkin, Nicholas Brannick, Benjamin Wallen)

    • United States Trustee

      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (M. Natasha Labovitz, Erica Weisgerber) & (local) Zach Clement PLLC

New Chapter 11 Filing - EBH Topco LLC (a/k/a Element Behavioral Health Inc.)

EBH Topco LLC (a/k/a Element Behavioral Health Inc.)

5/23/18 

Behavioral health services and residential drug and alcohol addition treatment provider in 13 treatment centers across 8 states filed for bankruptcy. If that sounds boring: it's because it is. Which would explain why the Wall Street Journal felt compelled to drop in that its also the facility that treated Britney Spears and Lindsay Lohan. SEO just shot through the roof. Anyway, the company stated,

While the Company has had ongoing financial difficulties, the overall census of the facilities and revenue has declined since 2017. The decline in out-of-network admissions, lower reimbursement rates by insurance providers and the decline in the average length of stay were all contributing factors to the financial losses of the Company. While the Company attempted to increase census through ongoing marketing efforts of its in-house sales team and internet advertising, the increased cost of these efforts did not result in the increase in revenue to improve the financial results of the Company and offset the Company’s cash burn. Financial performance for the fiscal year 2017 was $103.7 million in revenue, $129.6 million in expenses, and EBITDA of $(25.9) million with a total net income/(loss) of $(51.2) million.

Given that the company started in 2008 and then pursued an acquisition-based growth strategy, it seems like they didn't underwrite to current conditions. Ouch. 

Just a few weeks ago, Project Build Behavioral Health, LLC purchased the first lien paper and after an initial buyer of the assets fell through, agreed to be the company' stalking horse bidder in bankruptcy subject to an expedited sale process (the sale hearing is slated for late June); it intends to credit bid its debt. The company has a proposed $14.2 million DIP credit facility lined up to fund the cases. 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)
  • Capital Structure: $76mm '19 first lien term loan and revolver debt (Madison Capital Funding LLC), $29mm '20 second lien term loan (Cortland Capital Market Services LLC)
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Shani Katona, Stephen Astringer, Jeremy Johnson)
    • CRO/Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Martin McGahan)
    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.
    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender/Stalking Horse Bidder: Project Build Behavioral Health, LLC
      • Legal: McDonald Hopkins LLC (David Agay, Scott Opincar, Michael Kaczka) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders
      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, Daniel Harris)
    • Equity sponsors: NEA, Frazier Healthcare Ventures, Formation Capital

New Chapter 11 Filing - R.E. Gas Development LLC (a/k/a Rex Energy)

R.E. Gas Development LLC

5/18/18

Pennsylvania-based R.E. Gas Development LLC and its affiliates are independent publicly-traded ($REXX) oil and gas companies operating in the Appalachian Basin with a focus on drilling and exploration activity in the Marcellus Shale, Utica Shale and Upper Devonian Shale, mostly throughout Western Pennsylvania. Like most other exploration and production companies that have found their way in bankruptcy court over the last several years, the sudden steep decline in crude oil and nat gas prices that began in 2014 significantly affected the company's liquidity and ability to manage its balance sheet. After all, this company isn't operating in the Permian. Revenues for 2017 were $205.3 million. 

After months and months of foreplay, the company enters bankruptcy court with a restructuring support agreement ("RSA") in tow: it provides for a dual path pursuant to which the company will, in agreement with its secured lenders, pursue a sale of substantially all assets or, in the absence of qualified bids, pursue a plan process pursuant to which the first lien lenders (i.e., Angelo Gordon) will swap (DIP) debt for equity in the reorganized company. The RSA purportedly has the support of 100% of the first lien lenders and 71.8% of the outstanding second lien notes.

To fund the company throughout the dual process, the company seeks a $411 million DIP credit facility, the proceeds of which will be used to (i) roll up $261 million of prepetition loans and (ii) settle the "makewhole provision" under the first lien credit agreement to the tune of $50 million. The makewhole was put into place at the time of the issuance of the first lien loan just short of a year ago.  For the uninitiated, the makewhole entitles the lender to certain economics in the event the lenders are "repaid in whole or in part prior to the maturity date or the outstanding indebtedness under the facility is accelerated for any reason." The economics are calculated "based on the sum of remaining interest payments and certain fees due on all loans for the remainder of the make whole period, which terminates on October 28, 2019." In other words, Angelo Gordon structured this to give themselves the utmost economics in the (highly likely) case of an event of default and eventual bankruptcy. Solid planning on their part -- assuming, in particular, that the assets fetch a purchase price that will clear the first lien debt and makewhole amount. Respect. 

So, lo and behold, there was an event of default called in February for failure to deliver quarterly financial statements (which led to other defaults as well). In April, the lenders, after a short forbearance period, issued a notice of acceleration. Cha ching! Makewhole!!

The DIP credit agreement imposes fairly expedited -- but not wholly unreasonable (relative to other recent cases) -- timing on the company, including closing of any sale or confirmation of a plan 170 days after the filing date. 

  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of Pennsylvania (Judge Deller)
  • Capital Structure: see below.
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Tom Howley, Michael Cohen, Anna Kordas, Rachel Biblo Block) & (local) Buchanan Ingersoll and Rooney PC (James Newell, Timothy Palmer, Tyler Dischinger)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Albert Conly)
    • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners (Alexander Tracy)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition First Lien Admin Agent: Angelo Gordon Energy Servicer
      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Michael Torkin) & (local) Duane Morris LLP
      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners
    • Informal Group of 1%/8% Senior Secured Second Lien Notes due 2020 of Rex Energy Corporation
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Michael Stamer, Meredith Lahaie, Stephen Kuhn, Kevin Zuzolo) and (local) Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Maura McIntyre)
      • Financial Advisor: Stephens Inc.
    • Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, Daniel Harris) & (local) Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Maura McIntyre)
    • BOKF, National Association
      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, George Angelich, Jordana Renert) & (local) Federic Dorwart, Lawyers PLLC (Samuel Ory)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Stark, Chelsea Mullarney, Sigmund Wissner-Gross, Brian Rice, Steven Pohl, Andrew Carty, Bennett Silverberg, Chelsea Mullarney, Emily Koruda, Justin Cunningham) & (local) Leech Tishman Fuscaldo & Lampl LLC (Patrick Carothers, David Lampl, John Steiner)
      • Financial Advisor: Conway MacKenzie Inc. (John Young Jr.)
Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

New Chapter 11 Filing - Southeastern Grocers LLC

Southeastern Grocers LLC

3/27/18

Southeastern Grocers LLC, the Jacksonville Florida-based parent company of grocery chains Bi-Lo, Winn-Dixie and others, has filed a prepackaged bankruptcy in the District of Delaware - mere weeks after Tops Holding II Corporation, another grocer, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company notes that, as part of the chapter 11 filing, it intends to "close 94 underperforming stores," "emerge from this process likely within the next 90 days," and "continue to thrive with 582 successful stores in operation." Unlike Tops, it helps when you don't have any collective bargaining agreements.

More to come...

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $385mm ABL (Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch), $425mm 9.25% '19 secured notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB), $522mm 8.625%/9.375% '18 Senior PIK Toggle Notes unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank, NA)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Matthew Barr, Sunny Singh) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel J. DeFranceschi, Paul N. Heath, Amanda R. Steele) 
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.
    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Stephen Goldstein)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Independent Director: Neal Goldman
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Group of Unsecured Noteholders & 9.25% '19 Senior Secured Noteholders
      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Dennis Jenkins, Brett Miller) & (local) Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (Steven Kortanek)
      • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Company LLC
    • Private Equity Sponsor: Lone Star Funds
      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (W. Austin Jowers, Paul Ferdinands)
Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

New Chapter 11 Filing - Tops Holding II Corporation

Tops Holding II Corporation

  • 2/21/18 Recap: When a company's "Overview" in its First Day Declaration basically leads with union metrics (12,300 unionized employees of 14,000 total employees) and collective bargaining agreement numbers (12 of them), you know there's gonna be a war with employees. The fact that the footprint is 169 stores-wide in three states almost seems like a footnote. As does the fact that the business started in the 1920s and seemingly thrived through 2007 when, naturally, private equity got involved and went on a debt-ridden acquisition spree. But hang on: we're getting ahead of our skis here. So, what happened here? Well, clearly, the company has to negotiate with its unions; it also seeks to deleverage its ballooning balance sheet and take care of some leases and supply agreements. The company has secured $265mm in DIP financing to fund the cases; it says that it "intend[s] to remain in chapter 11 for approximately six (6) months." We'll believe it when we see it. Anyway, WHY does it need to take all of these steps? Well, as we stated before: private equity, of course. "Despite the significant headwinds facing the grocery industry, over the past five years, the Company has experienced solid financial performance and has sustained stable market share. The vast majority of the Company’s supermarkets generate positive EBITDA and the Company generates strong operating cash flows. Transactions undertaken by previous private equity ownership, however, saddled the Company with an unsustainable amount of debt on its balance sheet. Specifically, the Company currently has approximately $715 million of prepetition funded indebtedness...." Ah, private equity = a better villain than even Amazon (though Amazon gets saddled with blame here too, for the record). But wait: don't forget about the pensions! "[T]he Company has been embroiled in a protracted and costly arbitration with the Teamsters Pension Fund concerning a withdrawal liability of in excess of $180 million allegedly arising from the Company’s acquisition of Debtor Erie Logistics LLC" from its biggest food supplier, C&S Wholesale Grocers Inc., the 10th largest private company in the US. Moreover, the company has been making monthly pension payments; nevertheless, the pension is underfunded by approximately $393mm. The company continues, "Utilizing the tools available to it under the Bankruptcy Code, the Company will endeavor to resolve all issues relating to the Teamsters Arbitration and address its pension obligations, and the Company will take reasonable steps to do so on a consensual basis." Oy. What a hot mess. We can't even read that without ominous music seemingly popping up out of nowhere. More to come.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York

  • Capital Structure: $112mm RCF (inclusive of a $10mm FILO and $34mm LCs, Bank of America NA), $560mm 8% '22 senior secured notes, $67.5mm 9% '21 opco unsecured notes, $8.6mm 8.75%/9.5% '18 holdco unsecured notes

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Stephen Karotkin, Sunny Singh)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Buenzow, Armen Emrikian, Paul Griffith, Ronnie Bedway, Andy Kopfensteiner)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore (David Ying, Stephen Goldstein, Jeremy Matican, Elliot Ross, Jonathan Kartus, Andrew Kilbourne)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL Agent & DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal Counsel: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Julia Frost-Davies, Amelia Joiner, Matthew Ziegler)

    • Indenture Trustee for Senior Notes due 2018, notes due 2021 and Senior Secured Notes: U.S. Bank NA

      • Legal: Thompson Hine LLP (Irving Apar, Elizabeth Frayer, Derek Wright)

    • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group & DIP TL Lenders (Column Park Asset Management LP, Fidelity Management & Research Company, HG Vora Capital Management LLC, Signature Global Asset Management, Silver Point Capital LP)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Diane Meyers, Lauren Shumejda)

      • Financial Advisor: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • DIP TL Agent: Cortland Capital Markets Services LLC

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Tyler Nurnberg, Alan Glantz)

    • Southpaw Asset Management LP

      • Legal: Cooley LLP (Jeffrey Cohen, Steven Siesser, Sheila Sadighi, Andrew Behlmann)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (PepsiCo, Inc., Valassis Direct Mail, Inc., Osterweis Strategic Income Fund, U.S. Bank N.A., the UFCW Local One Pension Fund, the Teamsters Local 264, and Benderson Development Company, LLC)

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Brett Miller, Dennis Jenkins, Jonathan Levine, Erica Richards)

      • Financial Advisor: Zolfo Cooper LLC

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - REAL ALLOY (Real Industry Inc.)

REAL ALLOY - Real Industry Inc.

  • 11/17/17 Recap: This one is going to be a snorer for those of you who don't like to geek out over the technical intricacies of commodities businesses. Here, REAL ALLOY is a publicly-traded holding company ($RELY) that leverages its substantial net operating losses to improve the free cash flow position of various undervalued businesses that it acquires. The company acquired Real Industry in 2015 from Aleris Corporation (formerly bankrupt) for $554.5mm, substantially leveraging its balance sheet in the process. Post-acquisition, Real Alloy became one of the largest aluminum recyclers in North America and Europe with products and services availed to wrought alloy processers, automotive original equipment manufacturers (read: big car companies), foundries and casters. In other words, the company serves the automotive, consumer packaging, aerospace, building and construction, steel and durable goods industries by processing new scrap, old scrap, and various aluminum byproducts. All of this puts the company squarely into the aluminum recycling supply chain. The company blames the filing on weakness in the steel industry, the strong U.S. dollar creating arbitrage opportunity, operational setbacks (heightened, to some degree, by Hurricane Harvey), and a reduction in credit insurance and tightening supplier terms. The company is seeking approval of a $365mm DIP credit facility to facilitate the case wherein it hopes to preserve the value of its NOLs and pursue a transaction with a new strategic partner.  
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
  • Capital Structure: $96mm ABL (Bank of America, NA), $305mm '19 10% senior secured notes (Wilmington Trust, NA)  
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Gary Lee, Todd Goren, Mark Lightner, Benjamin Butterfield, J. Alexander Lawrence, Geoffrey Peck) & (local) Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Mark Minuti, Monique Bair DiSabatino, Sharon Levine)
    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC
    • Investment Banker: Jefferies LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group
      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, Jason Gott, Ted Dillman) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (MIchael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle)

Updated 11/17/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Armstrong Energy Inc.

Armstrong Energy Inc.

  • 11/1/17 Recap: What a week or so for coal. #MAGA! While oil and gas post-reorg equities have, despite some recent upward movement, had middling results, coal has fared well. Last week Peabody Energy Inc. ($BTU) reported solid numbers and saw its stock pop above $30/share and Arch Coal Inc. ($ARCH) has also enjoyed a nice run. It's up nearly 4% today. While Contura Energy (f/k/a Alpha Natural Resources Inc.) remains in limbo with a pulled-IPO, Armstrong Energy now joins the aforementioned companies as a bankruptcy filer, with the hopes of effectuating a restructuring support agreement-based debt-for-equity transaction that will effectively turn the keys over to a joint venture comprised of the holders of the company's first lien senior secured notes and Knight Hawk Holdings LLC. More to come once the filing is complete.
  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Missouri (Judge Surratt-States)
  • Capital Structure: $200mm 11.75% '19 first lien senior secured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Jonathan Henes, Ross Kwasteniet, William Guerrieri, Travis Bayer, Timothy Bow) & (local) Armstrong Teasdale LLP (Richard Engel Jr., Erin Edelman, John Willard)
    • Financial Advisor: MAEVA Group LLC (Harry J. Wilson)
    • Restructuring Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Alan Boyko, Brian Martin, Christopher Marshall)
    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.
    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA
      • Legal: Loeb & Loeb LLP (Walter Curchack, Vadim Rubinstein) & (local) Spencer Fane LLP (Eric Peterson, Ryan Hardy)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Secured Noteholders (BlueMountain Capital Management LLC, Caspian Capital LP, GoldenTree Asset Management LP, Marathon Asset Management LP, Panning Master Fund LP, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America)
      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Elizabeth McColm, Diane Meyers, Adam Denhoff, Daniel Youngblut) & (local) Carmody MacDonald PC (Christopher Lawhorn, Thomas Riske)
    • Large Creditors: Thoroughbred Holdings GP LLC, Thoroughbred Resources, L.P., Western Mineral Development, LLC, and Ceralvo Holdings, LLC
      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Debra McElligott) & (local) Husch Blackwell LLP (Marshall Turner)
    • Creditor: Kenergy Corp.
      • Legal: Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Kyle Patrick Lane)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Jennifer Marines, Daniel Harris, Rahman Connelly) & (local) Affinity Law Group LLC (J. Talbot Sant Jr.)

Updated 11/17/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - 21st Century Oncology Holdings Inc.

21st Century Oncology Holdings Inc.

  • 5/21/17 Recap: People have been talking about an uptick in healthcare-related bankruptcies. Is this the start? Here, Florida-based cancer care provider founded in the early 80s with 179 locations (including some in South America and Latin America) finds itself in bankruptcy court after years of acquisitions (including once-bankrupt Oncure Holdings Inc.) and a perfect storm of causes - most notably, an over-levered balance sheet. Other contributing factors to the company's chapter 11 filing include (i) decreased reimbursements under current insurance programs, (ii) Medicare changes, (iii) a shift from higher revenue per treatment PPO insurance plans to HMO plans, and (iv) government regulations, penalties and settlements. Some government inquiries remain outstanding. The company has a restructuring support agreement in place, a proposed $75mm DIP credit facility, and the plan is to delever the balance sheet by up to $500mm.
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
  • Capital Structure: $599mm TL & $121mm RCF (Morgan Stanley Senior Funding), $35mm MDL Facility (Wilmington Savings Fund Society), $368mm 11% '23 senior unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust National Association), $19mm PIK notes    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Christopher Marcus, William Guerrieri, John Weber, Alexandra Schwarzman, Mark McKane, Michael Esser)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Paul Rundell)
    • Investment Banker: Millco Advisors LP (Brendan Hayes)
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition MDL Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
      • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Matthew Silverman)
    • First Lien Ad Hoc Committee and DIP Lenders (Apex Credit Partners LLC, Black Diamond Capital Management LLC, BlueMountain CLO Management LLC, Carlson Capital LP, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, GMO Credit Opportunities Fund LP, Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP, HPS Investment Partners LLC, IA Clarington Investments Inc., Intermarket Corporation, Key Bank National Association, MJX Asset Management LLC, Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc., Och-Ziff Capital Investments LLC, Q Investments LP, Silver Rock Financial LP, Wazee Street Capital Management LLC, Wells Fargo NA)
      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck, Matthew Brod)
      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP
    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossholder Lenders
      • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP  (Frank Merola, Jayme Goldstein, Matthew Schwartz, Samantha Martin)
      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.
    • Major Equity Holders (Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Vestar Capital Partners V LP)
      • Legal for CPPIB: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Mi Chi To)
    • DIP Administrative Agent: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding
      • Legal: Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Levitin, Richard Stieglitz Jr.)
    • Patient Care Ombudsman
      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Melanie Cyganowski, Keith Costa, Jennifer Feeney)
    • Backstop Parties: Beach Point Capital Management LP, Governors Lane LP, JPMorgan Investment Management Inc., Oaktree Capital Management LP, Roystone Capital Management LP, HPS Investment Partners LLC
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Jonathan Levine, Daniel Harris, Benjamin Butterfield)

Updated 7/11/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.

Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.

  • 5/1/17 Recap: Once publicly-traded Arizona-based environmental solutions provider (obviously) to oil and natural gas shale-oriented energy and exploration companies filed for chapter 11 to delever its balance sheet pursuant to a restructuring support agreement and prepackaged plan of reorganization agreed to by its major lenders. The company seeks approval of a $31.5mm DIP to fund the cases. The term lenders will receive equity, cash, and board seats, the '21 noteholders 99.75% of the reorganized equity and the '18 noteholders will get the remainder (subject to a rights offering post-confirmation and a management incentive plan...of course). And as you might expect, the equityholders stand to recover bupkis. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $24.6mm ABL (funded - Wells Fargo Bank NA), $80mm TL, $327mm 12.5%/10% '21 senior secured second lien notes, $40.4mm '18 9.875% unsecured senior notes (Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA, replaced by Wilmington Trust Savings Fund Society FSB) 
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Douglas Bartner, Fredric Sosnick, Sara Coelho, Stephen Blank) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Kenneth Enos, Jamie Luton Chapman)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLC (Robert Albergotti, Dan Kelsall)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Middle Market LLC (Andrew Torgove)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Group of '21 Supporting Noteholders
      • Legal: Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP (Brad Scheler, Jennifer Rodburg, Carl Stapen) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Peter Keane)
    • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA
      • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Dimitri Karcazes, Gary Zussman, Jacob Marshall) & (local) DLA Piper LLP (Stuart Brown, Daniel Brogan)
    • Trustee to '21 Senior Secured Second Lien Notes & TL Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, James Newton) & (local) Morris James LLP (Eric Monzo) 
    • Term Lenders: Ascribe Capital LLC, Gates Capital Management Inc.
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, Paul Rosenblatt, Jonathan Polonsky, Michael Langford, Lindsey Simon) & (local) Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Richard Cobb, Matthew McGuire, Travis Ferguson, Matthew Pierce)
      • Financial Advisor: Batuta Capital Advisors LLC (Alexandre Zyngier)

Updated 7/13/17 1:56 am CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - Ciber Inc.

Ciber Inc.

  • 4/10/17 Recap: Once publicly-traded Colorado-based IT staffing and consulting services company filed for bankruptcy to pursue a sale of its business to CapGemini S.A., as stalking horse bidder, for at least $50mm plus the assumption of certain liabilities. The sale is subject to a postpetition marketing process. Ciber lists Microsoft and Oracle as major corporate partners; it sells and supports both companies' product offerings. Ciber seems like the quintessential go-big-or-go-home kind of company. It fueled growth over the years with over 60 acquisitions at a cost of more than $1b, never fully integrating the new businesses. This failure to integrate led to some AWESOME results: like the time the company paid $14mm to European consultants for NEGATIVE PERFORMANCE. And we thought Wells Fargo had a monopoly on stupid bonus-based behavior. Speaking of Wells Fargo, it is the lender here and the straw that broke the camel's back was the company's inability to adhere to its Fixed Coverage Charge ratio, triggering a default under its asset-based loan. Now Wells Fargo is providing the DIP facility of $41mm to fund the cases which, by our simple mathematical calculations, amounts to $4.1mm per bankruptcy lawyer who has made a notice of appearance on behalf of the debtors already (see below).
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $60mm ABL (Wells Fargo Bank NA)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Brett Miller, Dennis Jenkins, Daniel Harris, Benjamin Butterfield, Steve Rappoport, Todd Goren) & (local) Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Justin Edelson, Jarrett Vine)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Jonathan Goulding, Matt Covington, Glenn Gilmour)
    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Adam Dunayer, Michael Boone)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition & DIP Lender: Wells Fargo Bank NA
      • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Jeremy Downs, Jacob Marshall)
    • Stalking Horse Bidder: CapGemini SA
      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Mark McDermott, Raquelle Kaye)
    • Actual Buyer: HTC Global Ventures LLC
      • Legal: Plunkett Cooney PC (Scott Lites, David Lerner)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Perkins Coie LLP (John Penn, Schuyler Carroll, Tina Moos) & (local) Shaw Fishman Glantz & Towbin LLC (Thomas Horan)
      • Financial Advisor: BDO Consulting (David Berliner)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Non-Insider Employees
      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (Josef Mintz, John Lucian)

Updated 5/21/17 

  

New Chapter 11 Filing - Sungevity Inc.

Sungevity Inc.

  • 3/13/17 Recap: Oakland California-based designer of residential and commercial solar energy systems in the US, UK and Europe filed for bankruptcy after a failed merger and an inability to service its capital structure. Large equity holders include Apollo Investment Corporation and Lowe's Corporation. The company secured a $20mm DIP facility to pursue a sale to a stalking horse bidder. 
  • 4/17/17 Update: The company received no competitive qualified bids and, therefore, sought approval of the sale to the stalking horse bidder.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $145.6mm of funded debt (Hercules Capital Inc. - $55mm, MMA Energy Capital LLC - $10mm, MHA Trust LLC - $5mm, Wilmington Savings Fund Society - $9.5mm bridge loan, Atalaya Special Opportunities Fund VI LP - $32mm, $34.1mm convertible notes     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, Jennifer Marines, Melissa Hager, Erica Richards, Todd Goren, Rahman Connelly, Andrew Kissner, Stacy Molison) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Jamie Lutonn Chapman, Kenneth Listak)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (Randall Eisenberg, Stephen Spitzer, James Guglielmo, Raju Patel, Allen Wong)
    • Investment Banker: Ducera Securities LLC (Joshua Scherer) & Greentech Capital Advisors (Michael Horwitz)
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender & Stalking Horse Bidder: LSHC Solar Holdings LLC (JV between Northern Pacific Group and Hercules Capital Inc.)
      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Brad Weiland, Christine Pirro) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti)
    • Hercules Capital Inc.
      • Legal: Cole Schotz P.C. (Stuart Komrower, Katharina Earle)
    • Second Lien Lender: MMA Energy Capital LLC
      • Legal: Baker & McKenzie LLP (Debra Dandeneau, Jacob Kaplan) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro)
    • Lowe's Corporation
      • Legal: Hunton & Williams LLP (Gregory Hesse, Nicole Collins)
    • Verengo Inc. (also in Chapter 11)
      • Legal: Bayard PA (Scott Cousins, Evan Miller)
    • Eastern Sun Capital Partners LLC 
      • Legal: Goodwin Proctor LLP (Kizzy Jarashow, David Koch) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steven Pohl, Sunni Beville, Christopher Floyd, Tristan Axelrod, Fouad Kurdi) & (local) Morris James LLP (Jeffrey Waxman, Eric Monzo)
      • Financial Advisor: Goldin Associates LLC (Gary Polkowitz)

Updated 5/31/17