📺New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - MobiTV Inc.📺

MobiTV Inc.

On Monday, Emeryville, California-based MobiTV, Inc. and an affiliated debtor filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. MobiTV is “a creative thinking technology company making TV better.” Which is funny because we’re willing to bet that literally nobody thinks about MobiTV when they think about whether they enjoy their television-watching user experience. Anyway, what that actually means is MobiTV sells a white-label software application to cable providers that allows consumers to stream programming on (i) streaming devices like Roku, Apple TV, Amazon Fire TV, XBox or (ii) a smart TV, without the need for a set-top cable box. Key customers include T-Mobile USA Inc. ($TMUS) and over 120 cable/broadband television providers to deliver content to over 300k end user subscribers. In other words, if you’re streaming HBO via T-Mobile, your experience may very well be powered by MobiTV.

MobiTV has been around since 2000 and had gone through several shifts in its fortunes and business model. In 2020, MobiTV generated $13M in revenue with an operating loss of approximately $34M. That is a long fall from grace for a company that filed for an IPO in 2011 with reported 2010 sales of $67M. At the time, MobiTV was entirely focused on providing licensed TV programming to the personal devices of customers on wireless networks with AT&T Inc. ($T)Sprint, and T-Mobile accounting for almost all of the company’s revenues. MobiTV had raised over $110M from investors like Menlo VenturesRedpoint VenturesAdobe Ventures, and Hearst Ventures.

But despite its rosy trajectory, MobiTV withdrew its IPO filing a few months later citing unfavorable market conditions. In hindsight, there were obviously deeper problems with the business model. Broadcast TV viewing on mobile devices failed to take off in the way the company predicted and MobiTV pivoted away from serving wireless carriers.

Its new target customer was midsize cable providers. Set-top boxes have long been at the center of consumers interactions with cable providers. But these boxes have plenty of drawbacks:

Pay-TV providers (and their consumers) are looking for a way beyond set-top boxes, which can be expensive for consumers to buy, costly to maintain for the pay-TV providers and often limited in their functionality. Their clunkiness, in fact, has made them ripe for disruption, and many now opt for lighter options like Fire TV or Apple TV to bypass those services altogether. In other words, pay-TV providers need to find other routes to providing services to customers that can compete better with the newer generation of video services. (emphasis added)

MobiTV saw the shift towards streaming devices and smart TVs and aimed to position itself as a “television as a service provider” to midsized cable providers like C SpireDirectLink, and Citizens Fiber. These companies lack the R&D budgets of the likes of Comcast Corporation ($CMCSA) to invest in user interface and software applications in their set-top boxes. In 2017, MobiTV raised $21M from Oak Investment Partners and Ally Bank ($ALLY) (at a reported ~$400M valuation!) to develop its MobiTV ConnectTM Platform, “a product for pay TV and on-demand TV providers to stream broadcast TV and offer other services, like catch-up and recording, without the need of a set-top box.

The idea was to capture some of the “customer ownership” that was slipping from cable set-top boxes to streaming devices and services. In 2019, MobiTV raised $50M more from Oak Investment Partners and Ally Bank as well as Cedar Grove Partners to fund further growth. At the time, MobiTV had about 90 cable providers signed up as customers.

Middlemen can make good money and at first glance it seemed like MobiTV might have been able to carve out a position for itself. MobiTV offered cable providers a small way to stem the tide of cord cutting and the proliferation of streaming services like HBO MaxNetflix Inc ($NFLX)Hulu, and the rest. As TechCrunch laid out, “The pitch that MobiTV makes to pay TV providers goes something like this:”

…set-top-box-free pay TV services gives operators a wider array of channels and potentially more flexibility in how they are provisioned. At the same time, a solution like MobiTV’s potentially lowers the total cost of ownership for providers by removing the need for the set-top boxes.

That’s not to say that some of its customers are not using both, though: they can provide a certain set of channels directly through boxes, and the MobiTV service gives them the option of having another set that are offered on top of that.

By 2020, MobiTV’s customer base had grown to about 120 midsize cable TV operators as well as legacy T-Mobile customers. Revenue was growing and its subscribers and customers bases were both increasing. So what the hell happened here? 🤔

An agnostic software solution for cable providers to capture some of the shift towards streaming? Coupled with more people stuck at home from a pandemic? If this product were ever going to work, one would think it would have been during the last year. From the First Day Declaration:

That’s the entirety of section D. Maybe we are dense but it would be interesting to know what exactly about the COVID-19 pandemic and related stay-at-home orders materially impaired the Company’s growth opportunities. Seems like that should have been good for business, no?

But we can speculate.

As every content provider has rolled out their own streaming service over the last twelve months, MobiTV was probably in the worst position in the entire television streaming value chain. On the supply side, content providers are focused on promoting their own streaming services and have little reason to give any sort of pricing concessions to a niche service provider like MobiTV. This surely kept MobiTV’s licensing costs at an elevated level.

On the demand side, consumers likely were not calling in to their cable providers demanding MobiTV considering they could get the same content with a $30 Roku, their streaming subscriptions, and their broadband bill. Cable providers apparently were willing to pay for the service, but not enough to keep the company from losing money.

After 20 years of trying to figure out what its business model was, MobiTV finally threw in the towel and management took COVID cover.

The “tell” that the business issues were more elemental than COVID? The fact that the company has been operating under a series of 17 amendments and forbearance agreements.

At the time of its Ch. 11 filing, MobiTV had ~$25M of debt obligations, owed entirely to its sole pre-petition secured lender, Ally Bank.

In 2017 Ally Bank provided MobiTV a $10M term loan as well as a $5M revolving credit facility which was fully drawn. The original maturity of these loans was February 3, 2019, but following the aforementioned amendments and forbearance agreements, the maturity date was pushed back to January 2021. To fund the business in the interim, Oak Investment Partners threw good money after bad, underwriting three Subordinated Convertible Promissory Notes on August 6, 2020 ($4mm); December 14, 2020 ($1mm); and December 30, 2020 ($0.3mm). As a condition to one of Ally Bank’s credit amendments, MobiTV engaged FTI Capital Advisors LLC to evaluate strategic alternatives. A subsequent marketing effort came up empty: the “alternatives” were non-existent.

Consequently, on January 29, 2021, MobiTV and Ally Bank entered into another amendment and forbearance. T-Mobile — the customer most reliant upon the MobiTV’s services — provided $2.5mm in bridge financing lest they upset thousands of customers right around Super Bowl time. On February 12, 2021, T-Mobile agreed to provide an additional ~$2.3mm and Ally Bank agreed to forbear until February 26, 2021.

Following negotiations with Ally Bank and T-Mobile, the interested parties concluded that a sale process should be implemented through the filing of chapter 11. An affiliate of T-Mobile, TVN Ventures, LLC, has committed to a $15mm DIP credit facility (12%), junior to the pre-existing pre-petition Ally Bank position. As of this writing, management is still seeking a stalking horse bidder to backstop the sale process.

At $13mm of revenue with an operating loss that high, there’s a very good chance that T-Mobile knows it’s buying this thing with that DIP commitment.


Date: March 1, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

Capital Structure: $25mm funded debt

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Debra Grassgreen, Mary Caloway, Maxim Litvak, Nina Hong, Jason Rosell)

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chris LeWand, Catherine Moran, Chris Post, Chris Tennenbaum, Doug Edelman)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Lender: T-Mobile USA Inc. and TVN Ventures LLC

    • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (William Sugden, Jacob Johnson) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Kenneth Enos)

  • Silicon Valley Bank

    • Legal: Morrison Foerster LLP (Alexander Rheaume, Benjamin Butterfield) & Ashby & Geddes LLP (Gregory Taylor, Katharina Earle)

  • Ally Bank

    • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Kenneth Noble, Kristin Wigness, Ha Young Chung) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, David Queroli)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors:

    • Legal: Fox Rothschild LLP (Seth Niederman, Michael Sweet, Gordon Gouveia)

👕 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew) 👕

Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew)

May 4, 2020

If you’re looking for a snapshot of the pre-trade war and pre-COVID US economy look no farther than J.Crew’s list of top 30 unsecured creditors attached to its chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On the one hand there is the LONG list of sourcers, manufacturers and other middlemen who form the crux of J.Crew’s sh*tty product line: this includes, among others, 12 Hong Kong-based, three India-based, three South Korea-based, two Taiwan-based, and two Vietnam-based companies. In total, 87% of their product is sourced in Asia (45% from mainland China and 16% from Vietnam). On the other hand, there are the US-based companies. There’s Deloitte Consulting — owed a vicious $22.7mm — the poster child here for the services-dependent US economy. There’s the United Parcel Services Inc. ($UPS)…okay, whatever. You’ve gotta ship product. We get that. And then there’s Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as the debtors’ pre-petition term loan agent, and Eaton Vance Management as a debtholder and litigant. Because nothing says the US-of-f*cking-A like debt and debtholder driven litigation. ‘Merica! F*ck Yeah!!

Chinos Holdings Inc. (aka J.Crew) and seventeen affiliated debtors (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy early Monday morning with a prearranged deal that is dramatically different from the deal the debtors (and especially the lenders) thought they had at the tail end of 2019. That’s right: while the debtors have obviously had fundamental issues for years, it was on the brink of a transaction that would have kept it out of court. Call it “The Petsmart Effect.” (PETITION Note: long story but after some savage asset-stripping the Chewy IPO basically dug out Petsmart from underneath its massive debt load; J.Crew’s ‘19 deal intended to do the same by separating out the various businesses from the Chino’s holding company and using Madewell IPO proceeds to fund payments to lenders).

Here is the debtors’ capital structure. It is key to understanding what (i) the 2019 deal was supposed to accomplish and (ii) the ownership of J.Crew will look like going forward:

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.38.16 PM.png

Late last year, the debtors and their lenders entered into a Transaction Support Agreement (“TSA”) with certain pre-petition lenders and their equity sponsors, TPG Capital LP and Leonard Green & Partners LP, that would have (a) swapped the $1.33b of term loans for $420mm of new term loans + cash and (b) left general unsecured creditors unimpaired (100% recovery of amounts owed). As noted above, the cash needed to make (a) and (b) happen would have come from a much-ballyhooed IPO of Madewell Inc.

Then COVID-19 happened.

Suffice it to say, IPO’ing a brick-and-mortar based retailer — even if there were any kind of IPO window — is a tall order when there’s, like, a pandemic shutting down all brick-and-mortar business. Indeed, the debtors indicate that they expect a $900mm revenue decline due to COVID. That’s the equivalent of taking Madewell — which earned $602m of revenue in ‘19 after $614mm in ‘18 — and blowing it to smithereens. Only then to go back and blow up the remnants a second time for good measure.* Source of funds exit stage left!

The post-COVID deal is obviously much different. The term lenders aren’t getting a paydown from Madewell proceeds any longer; rather, they are effectively getting Madewell itself by converting their term loan claims and secured note claims into approximately 82% of the reorganized equity. Some other highlights:

  • Those term loan holders who are members of the Ad Hoc Committee will backstop a $400mm DIP credit facility (50% minimum commitment) that will convert into $400mm of new term loans post-effective date. The entire plan is premised upon a $1.75b enterprise value which is…uh…interesting. Is it modest considering it represents a $1b haircut off the original take-private enterprise value nine years ago? Or is it ambitious considering the company’s obvious struggles, its limited brand equity, the recession, brick-and-mortar’s continued decline, Madewell’s deceleration, and so forth and so on? Time will tell.

  • Syndication of the DIP will be available to holders of term loans and IPCo Notes (more on these below), provided, however, that they are accredited institutional investors.

  • The extra juice for putting in for a DIP allocation is that, again, they convert to new term loans and, for their trouble, lenders of the new term loans will get 15% additional reorganized equity plus warrants. So an institution that’s in it to win it and has a full-on crush for Madewell (and the ghost of JCrew-past) will get a substantial chunk of the post-reorg equity (subject to dilution).

Query whether, if asked a mere six months ago, they were interested in owning this enterprise, the term lenders would’ve said ‘yes.’ Call us crazy but we suspect not. 😎

General unsecured creditors’ new deal ain’t so hot in comparison either. They went from being unimpaired to getting a $50mm pool with a 50% cap on claims. That is to say, maybe…maybe…they’ll get 50 cents on the dollar.

That is, unless they’re one of the debtors’ 140 landlords owed, in the aggregate, approximately $23mm in monthly lease obligations.** The debtors propose to treat them differently from other unsecured creditors and give them a “death trap” option: if they accept the TSA’s terms and get access to a $3mm pool or reject and get only $1mm with a 50% cap on claims. We can’t imagine this will sit well. We imagine that the debtors choice of venue selection has something to do with this proposed course of action. 🤔

We’re not going to get into the asset stripping transaction at the heart of the IPCo Note issuance. This has been widely-covered (and litigated) but we suspect it may get a new breath of life here (only to be squashed again, more likely than not). In anticipation thereof, the debtors have appointed special committees to investigate the validity of any claims related to the transaction. They may want to take up any dividends to their sponsors while they’re at it.

The debtors hope to have this deal wrapped up in a bow within 130 days. We cannot even imagine what the retail landscape will look like that far from now but, suffice it to say, the ratings agencies aren’t exactly painting a calming picture.

*****

*Curiously, there are some discrepancies here in the numbers. In the first day papers, the debtors indicate that 2018 revenue for Madewell was $529.2mm. With $602mm in ‘19 revenue, one certainly walks away with the picture that Madewell is a source of growth (13.8%) while the J.Crew side of the business continues to decline (-4%). This graph is included in the First Day Declaration:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

The Madewell S-1, however, indicates that 2018 revenue was $614mm.

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.58.35 PM.png

With $268mm of the ‘18 revenue coming in the first half, this would imply that second half ‘18 revenue was $346mm. With ‘19 revenue coming in at $602mm and $333mm attributable to 1H, this would indicate that the business is declining rather than growing. In the second half, in particular, revenue for fiscal ‘19 was $269mm, a precipitous dropoff from $333mm in ‘18. Even if you take the full year fiscal year ‘18 numbers from the first day declaration (529.2 - 268) you get $261mm of second half growth in ‘18 compared to the $269mm in ‘19. While this would reflect some growth, it doesn’t exactly move the needle. This is cause for concern.

**To make matters worse for landlords, the debtors are also seeking authority to shirk post-petition rent obligations for 60 days while they evaluate whether to shed their leases. We get that the debtors were nearing a deal that COVID threw into flux, but this bit is puzzling: “Beginning in early April 2020, after several weeks of government mandated store closures and uncertainty as to the duration and resulting impact of the pandemic, the Debtors began to evaluate their lease portfolio to, among other things, quantify and realize the potential for lease savings.” Beginning in early April!?!?


  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $311mm ABL (Bank of America NA), $1.34b ‘21 term loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $347.6 IPCo Notes (U.S. Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Candace Arthur, Daniel Gwen) & Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry P Long III, Nathan Kramer)

    • JCrew Opco Special Committee: D.J. (Jan) Baker, Chat Leat, Richard Feintuch, Seth Farbman

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co.

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, G. Mark Edgarton) & McGuireWoods LLP (Douglas Foley, Sarah Boehm)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan & DIP Agent ($400mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP

    • Ad Hoc Committee

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Andrew LeBlanc, Matthew Brod) & Tavenner & Beran PLC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners Inc.

    • Large common and Series B preferred stock holders: TPG Capital LP (55% and 66.2%) & Leonard Green & Partners LP (20.7% and 24.8%)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jacob Adlerstein, Eugene Park, Irene Blumberg) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge Jr., Corey Booker)

    • Large Series A preferred stock holders: Anchorage Capital Group LLC (25.6%), GSO Capital Partners LP (26.1%), Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (15.5%)

🚗New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Pace Industries LLC🚗

Pace Industries LLC

April 12, 2020

Arkansas-based Pace Industries LLC and ten affiliates (the “debtors”) — fully-integrated suppliers and manufacturers of aluminum, zinc, and magnesium die cast and finished products in service of several industries (auto, powersports, lawn & garden, lighting & electric, appliances & industrial motors etc.) — filed fully-accepted prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware over the holiday weekend. The plan features one impaired class which voted 100% to equitize pre-petition debt.

A quick digression before we delve into what happened here. COVID-19 provides the ultimate cover for any and all businesses that file for chapter 11 over the next several months. You’re going to see all kinds of companies “clean out the junk” over earnings reports. It will be important, therefore, to parse through company messaging to determine whether they’re just massaging matters or whether, on the other hand, there were fundamental problems confronting the business prior to COVID-19 rearing its ugly head and shutting down the US economy. Where a company discloses that problems existed prior to March, there is absolutely no reason NOT to believe them. So it’s important that the collective we — newsletters writers, journalists, the twitterverse — get things right when talking about the carnage created by COVID-19.

And this case is only partially a COVID-19 story. Given the rush to sensationalize headlines and tweets, this is something we now feel compelled to note with each new bankruptcy filing. While the debtors, like everyone else, have been affected by the virus, it was not the catalyst to the debtors’ filing. The debtors have been seeking new capital sources since the summer of 2018; they initially sought an equity investment but when that couldn’t get done, the debtors shifted towards a sale and marketing process. Any and all initial interest in the debtors’ assets dissipated, however, when the debtors suffered from a poor Q4 ‘19. Interestingly, the disappointing performance was attributable to lower demand in the lighting, BBQ grill and appliance markets. To make matters worse, General Motors Inc’s ($GM) employees went on strike further compressing decreasing automobile production volumes. Moreover, the company self-inflicted some wounds: production inefficiencies relating to new products also hurt performance. Bankruptcy lawyers and advisors were hired in January — long before COVID stormed through and complicated matters further.

The debtors solicited their plan prior to their filing making this a true prepackaged plan. In other words, old school. None of this new solicitation technology; no straddle stuff. The only impaired class, the pre-petition noteholders, voted to accept the plan pursuant to which they would swap $232.1mm in notes for (i) equity in a reorganized LLC (subject to dilution from a management incentive plan AND warrants issued to the debtors’ post-petition DIP term loan lenders) and (ii) take-back term loan paper. This means the new owners will be TCW and Cerberus.

The cases feature a roll-up DIP ABL (which will ultimately be refi’d out through an exit facility) and a post-petition DIP term loan that will be refi’d out via a new term loan exit facility. The aforementioned warrants could amount to 51% of the new post-reorg equity.

This should be a quick case. The DIP terminates in 90 days from the petition date. Given that acceptance was 100% and that general unsecured creditors will be paid in full, this case should, absent other crazy externalities, be in and out of bankruptcy relatively quickly.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $92.1mm ABL, $232.1mm pre-petition notes

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Rachel Strickland, Debra Sinclair, Melany Cruz Burgos) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Edmon Morton, Joseph Mulvihill)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Patrick Flynn, Johnathan Miller)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Revolver Agent ($125mm): Bank of Montreal

      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Wade Kennedy, Alexandra Shipley, Brian Swett) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

    • DIP Term Agent ($50mm): TCW Asset Management Company LLC

      • Legal: Schule Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Kelly Knight) & Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis)

🔌New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Agera Energy LLC🔌

Agera Energy LLC

October 4, 2019

Agera Energy LLC, a retail electricity and natural gas provider to commercial, industrial and residential customers filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company blames, among other things, mismanagement and poor strategy for the run-up to its financial problems: too many low margin fixed contracts in an environment that calls for variable contracts proved to be an albatross. Nevertheless, in September ‘18, sponsor Eli Global LLC agreed to pursue a turnaround plan including any and all capital infusions that might be necessary.

But then the hammer dropped. New management discovered “material balance sheet issues, which led to a restatement of the Debtors’ financials. Specifically, as of August 31, 2018, there was approximately $39 million of over stated receivables, of which $37 million related to unbilled receivables. As a result of the foregoing discovery, the Debtors suddenly found themselves in breach of the Senior Lien Supply Agreement’s $16 million Tangible Net Worth covenant.” WHOOPS.

Thereafter, the company and its lenders operated pursuant to a series of forbearance agreements while Eli Global LLC made millions of dollars of capital contributions. Until they didn’t. In May, Eli Global indicated that it was no longer in a position to inject capital into the business — and it still had $21mm in commitments from that point forward. Without the capital, the company was unable to satisfy, among other things, renewable portfolio standards it is subject to.* This dominoed into a separate liability for the company of approximately $72mm and a slate of enforcement actions from the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission and the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission that threatened the debtors’ ability to sell electricity or natural gas in those states. Consequently, the debtors initiated a strategic alternatives review process which, naturally, included a marketing process for the sale of the debtors. The company now has Exelon Generation Company LLC lined up as a stalking horse purchaser (for the debtors’ contracts) for $24.75mm.

*RPS laws require a certain portion of a state’s electricity consumption to be generated from renewable sources, such as wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, or hydroelectric.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $161.6mm Senior Lien Supply Agreement and Senior Lien ISDA Master Agreement (BP Energy), $35mm Second lien Revolving Credit Facility (Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery (Timothy Walsh, Darren Azman, Ravi Vohra, Debra Harrison)

    • Independent Manager: Stephen Gray

    • Financial Advisor: GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group LLC

    • Investment Banker: Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC & Stifel Nicolaus & Co. Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: BP Energy Company

      • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Kelli Norfleet, Arsalan Muhammad, Kathryn Shurin)

    • Stalking Horse Bidder: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Cecil Martin III)

    • Platinum Partners

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Melanie Cyganowski, Eric Weinick)

10/7/19 #42

😷New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Promise Healthcare Group LLC😷

Promise Healthcare Group LLC

November 5, 2018

Most professionals predicted at the start of 2018 that healthcare would be an active industry for restructuring activity. Instead, there’s only been a few cases here and there — nothing to really stand out from the crowd in terms of volume. And, so just when we’re on the verge of declaring that prediction utterly and emphatically wrong, here is Promise Healthcare Group LLC and its affiliated debtors — another short-term and long-term acute care and nursing facility operator in bankruptcy court (with DLA Piper and FTI Consulting in tow, a seemingly regular occurrence these days in sizable healthcare matters).

Why is another large acute care operator in bankruptcy? The debtors blame the usual deplorables, i.e., reimbursement rate declines, capital-intensive and ultimately-abandoned new business projects, underperforming facilities, and an “unsustainable balance sheet.” Consequently, it undertook performance improvement measures, including the closure of two facilities and the sh*tcanning of 147 full-time equivalent employees. This, collectively, freed up a total of $13.5mm but vendors had begun squeezing the company in such a way that this amount, alone, wasn’t enough to cash flow to sustain the debtors.

The debtors intend to (i) sell non-core assets and real estate to payoff certain secured creditors (including one in Silver Lake, Los Angeles, to the L.A. Downtown Medical Center for $84.15mm) and (ii) otherwise market and sell substantially all of the rest of their assets or, if an equity sponsor emerges, restructure. They intend to do this within six months (anyone want to take the under?). The company has a $85mm DIP commitment ($20mm new money) to fund the process.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware

  • Capital Structure: $61.6mm Revolver, $15mm TL debt, $200mm intercompany debt (two loans)

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis LLP (John Tishler, Katie Stenberg, Blake Roth, Tyler Layne) & (local) DLA Piper LLP (Stuart Brown, Kaitlin MacKenzie Edelman, Erik Stier, Matthew Sarna)

    • CRO/Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Andrew Hinkelman, Jennifer Byrne, Chris Goff)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Andrew Turnbull, Matthew Ryan, Scott Kremeier, Moyo Mamora, Brian Marks, Marc Epstein, Conor Dorgan) and MTS Health Partners LP (Jay Shiland)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Administrative Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Brian Swett, Alexandra Shipley) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

    • Healthcare Services Group Inc.

      • Legal: Stevens & Lee P.C. (Joseph Huston Jr., Evan Coren, Robert Lapowsky)

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: Select Medical Corporation

      • Legal: Dechert LLP (Brian Greer, Stephen Leitzell, Jonathan Stott) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Sean Greecher)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (HEB Ababa, Ronaldoe Guiterrez and Yolanda Penney, Cardinal Health, Wound Care Management LLC d/b/a MEDCENTRIS, Freedom Medical Inc., Morrison Management Specialists Inc., Efficient Management Resources Systems Inc., Surgical Program Development)

      • Legal: Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. (Andrew Sherman, Boris Mankovetskiy, Rachel Brennan) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Jeffrey Pomerantz, Alan Kornfeld, Bradford Sandler, Maxim Litvak, Colin Robinson)

      • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. (Edward Kim, Paul Huygens, Carol Cabello, Jorge Gonzalez, Carlos Lovera, Paul Navid)

Updated 3/9/18

New Chapter 11 Filing - GST AutoLeather Inc.

GST AutoLeather Inc.

  • 10/3/17 Recap: Disruption, illustrated. The automobile industry is at the beginning of a downturn marked by auto price reductions and a drop in new vehicle production. Automobile output is down 4% over the past year as automobile dealers are placing fewer manufacturing orders and dealing with excess supply. Moreover, auto OEMs are decreasing the leather content in certain new vehicles. Finally, automobiles are lasting longer and "the climbing popularity of ride-sharing services, such as Uber and Lyft...diminish consumers' needs for their own cars." Put simply, there is a demand side decline. Consequently, here, the Southfield Michigan-based supplier of leather interiors filed a freefall bankruptcy with the hope of consummating an expedited (approximately 2-month timeframe) 363 asset sale. The company has secured a $40mm DIP credit facility to fund its bankruptcy; it continues talks with its senior lenders about a stalking horse bid to purchase the company. In addition to the aforementioned macro factors, the company blames its deteriorated financial performance on (i) issues associated with certain new customer launches in Europe, (ii) supply chain issues with a critical Chinese supplier who is using leverage to extract out-of-contract economics from the company and (iii) constraints imposed by significant working capital investments to mitigate supply chain disruption to its customers (which include the likes of major auto OEMs, e.g., Audi, BMW/Mini, Daimler, Fiat Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Hyundai, Honda, Porsche, PSA, Nissan, Kia, Toyota and Volkswagen).
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)
  • Capital Structure: $24mm '19 RCF, $140mm '20 TL-B (Royal Bank of Canada), $32mm mezz debt (Triangle Capital Corp./Alcentra Capital Corp.)
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Ryan Blaine Bennett, Michael Slade, Alexandra Schwarzman, Timothy Bow, Benjamin Rhode, Luke Ruse) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns, Joseph Mulvihill)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jonathan Hickman, Jay Herriman)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Middle Market (Jason A. Cohen)
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Sponsor: Advantage Partners
    • Lender Group (Royal Bank of Canada, as DIP Admin Agent)
      • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Andrew Tenzer, Michael Comerford, Shlomo Maza) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, M. Blake Cleary, Justin Rucki)
      • Financial Advisors: FTI Consulting
    • Mezzanine Lenders:
      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Anne Croteau, Douglas Foley) & (local) Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP (Jennifer Hoover, William Alleman Jr.)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Erika Morabito, Brittany Nelson, John Simon, Richard Bernard, Leah Eisenberg) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLC (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, Kevin Shaw, Christopher Jones, David Gaffey)
      • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Christopher Kearns, Peter Chadwick, Michelle Tran, Kevin Beard, Jay Wu)
      • Investment Banker: Configure Partners LLC (Jay Jacquin)

Updated 11/15/17 7:55 am CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA - Toys "R" Us Inc.

Toys "R" Us Inc.

  • 9/19/17 Recap: So. Much. To. Unpack. Here. We've previously discussed the run-up to this massive chapter 11 bankruptcy filing here and here. Still, suffice it to say that, unlike many of the other retailers that have predictably filed for bankruptcy thus far in 2017, this one was different. This one seemingly came out of nowhere - particularly given the proximity to the holiday shopping season. Before we note what this case is, lets briefly cover what it isn't and clear the noise that is pervasive on the likes of Twitter: this is NOT "RIP" Toys "R" Us. We don't get overly sentimental usually but the papers filed with the bankruptcy court were well-written and touching: this is a store, a brand, that means a lot to a lot of people. And it's not going anywhere (the company will have its challenges to assure people that this is the case). This is a financial restructuring not a liquidation: the company simply hasn't been able to evolve while paying $400mm in annual interest expense on over $5b of private equity infused debt. Plain and simple. Yes, there are other challenges (blah blah blah, Amazon), but with that debt overhang, it appears the company hasn't been able to confront them (PETITION side note: an ill-conceived deal with Amazon 18 years ago is mind-blowing when viewed from the perspective of Amazon's long game). With this filing, the company is signaling that the time for short term band-aids to address its capital structure is over. Now, "[t]he time for change, and reinvestment in operations, has come." Decisive. Management isn't messing around anymore. With a reduction in debt, the company will be unshackled and able to focus on "general upkeep and the condition of...stores, [its] inability to provide expedited shipping options, and [its] lack of a subscription-based delivery service." Indeed, the company intends to use a $3.1b debtor-in-possession credit facility to begin investing in modernization immediately.
  • Interesting Facts:
    • Toy Manufacturers: Mattel ($MAT)(approx $136mm), Hasbro ($HAB) (approx $59mm) & Lego (approx $31.5mm) are among the top general unsecured creditors of the company. Mattel and Hasbro's stock traded down quite a bit yesterday on the rampant news of this filing. Query whether any of the $325mm of requested critical vendor money will apply to these companies.
    • The Power of the Media (read: NOT "fake news"): This CNBC piece helped push the company into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy professionals were retained in July (or earlier in the case of Lazard) to pursue capital structure solutions. In August the company engaged with some of its lenders. But then "...a news story published on September 6, 2017, reporting that the Debtors were considering a chapter 11 filing, started a dangerous game of dominos: within a week of its publication, nearly 40 percent of the Company’s domestic and international product vendors refused to ship product without cash on delivery, cash in advance, or, in some cases, payment of all outstanding obligations. Further, many of the credit insurers and factoring parties that support critical Toys “R” Us vendors withdrew support. Given the Company’s historic average of 60-day trade terms, payment of cash on delivery would require the Debtors to immediately obtain a significant amount—over $1.0 billion—of new liquidity." 
    • Revenue. The company generates 40% of its annual revenue during the holiday season.
    • Footprint. The company has approximately 1,697 stores and 257 licensed stores in 38 countries, plus additional e-commerce sites in various countries. The company has been shedding burdensome above-market leases and combining its Babies and Toys shops under one roof; it intends to continue its review of its real estate portfolio. Read: there WILL be store closures.
    • Eff the Competition. Toys has some choice words for its competition embedded in its bankruptcy papers; it accuses Walmart ($WMT) and Target ($TGT)(the "big box retailers") of slashing prices on toys and using toys as a loss leader to get bodies in doors; it further notes that "retailers such as Amazon are not concerned with making a profit at this juncture, rendering their pricing model impossible to compete with..." ($AMZN). Yikes. 
    • Experiential Retail. The company intends to invest in the "shopping experience" which will include (i) interactive spaces with rooms to use for parties, (ii) live product demonstrations put on by trained employees, and (iii) the freedom for employees to remove product from boxes to let kids play with the latest toys. And...wait for it...AUGMENTED REALITY. Boom. Toysrus.ar and Toysrus.ai here we come. 
  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Phillips)
  • Capital Structure: see below     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jamie Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Edward Sassower, Chad Husnick, Joshua Sussberg, Robert Britton, Emily Geier) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael A. Condyles, 
      Peter J. Barrett, Jeremy S. Williams) & (Canadian counsel) Goodmans LLP
    • Legal to the Independent Board of Directors: Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Jonathan Goulding, Tom Behnke, Cari Turner, Jim Grover, Arjun Lal, Doug Lewandowski, Bobby Hoernschemeyer, Scott Safron, Kara Harmon, Nick Cherry, Adam Fialkowski)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (David Kurtz)
    • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Communications Consultant: Joele Frank Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
  • Other Parties in Interest:
  • ABL/FILO DIP Admin Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Brian Resnick, Eli Vonnegut, Veerle Roovers) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry (Toby) Long III, Justin Paget)
  • DIP Admin Agent (Toys DE Inc). NexBank SSB & Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders (Angelo Gordon & Co LP; Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Roystone Capital Management LP, and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP)
    • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus, Neil Chatani) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Bohm, Douglas Foley)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Taj Noteholders.
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Samuel Lovett, Kellie Cairns) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Jennifer Wuebker)
  • Steering Committee of B-2 and B-3 Lenders (American Money Management, Columbia Threadneedle Investments, Ellington Management Group LLC, First Trust Advisors L.P., MJX Asset Management LLC, Pacific Coast Bankers Bank, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, Sound Point Capital Management, Taconic Capital Advisors LP).
    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, D. Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Rosa Evergreen)
  • 12% ’21 Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust, National Association.
    • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, David Posner, Gianfranco Finizio) & (local) ThompsonMcMullan PC (David Ruby, William Prince IV)
  • Bank of America NA
      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
    • Private Equity Sponsors: Bain Capital Private Equity LP, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. ($KKR), and Vornado Realty Trust ($VNO)
  • Large Creditor: Mattel Inc.
    • Legal: Jones Day (Richard Wynne, Erin Brady, Aaron Gober-Sims) & (local) Michael Wilson PLC (Michael Wilson)
  • Large Creditor: LEGO Systems Inc.
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi) & (local) Walcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
  • Large Creditor: American Greetings Corporation.
    • Legal: Baker & Hosteler LLP (Benjamin Irwin, Eric Goodman)
  • Creditor: River Birch Capital
    • Legal: Andrews Kurth & Kenyon LLP (Paul Silverstein)
  • Creditor: Owl Creek Asset Management
    • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Samantha Martin)
  • TRU Trust 2016-TOYS, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-TOYS acting through Wells Fargo Bank NA
    • Legal: Dechert LLP (Allan Brilliant, Brian Greer, Stephen Wolpert, Humzah Soofi) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
  • Trustee: Tru Taj DIP Notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)
    • Legal: Porter Hedges LLP (Eric English) & (local) Spotts Fain PC (James Donaldson)
  • Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Mattel Inc., Evenflo Company Inc., Simon Property Group, Euler Hermes North America Insurance Co., Veritiv Operating Company, Huffy Corporation, KIMCO Realty, The Bank of New York Mellon, LEGO Systems Inc.)
First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

Updated 10/5/17 11:40 am

New Chapter 11 Filing - The Gymboree Corporation

The Gymboree Corporation

  • 6/12/17 Recap: Yawn...another private equity owned retailer in bankruptcy. Why? Standard fare for everyone following the retail story at this point: a substantial brick-and-mortar presence (1300 stores) in need of rightsizing, higher expenses than web-based competitors, an underdeveloped wholesale operation, an underdeveloped web presence, insufficient "omnichannel" capabilities (the go-to buzzword for retailers these days), and more debt than competitors like Children's Place and the Gap. In other words, private equity, that's why (here, Bain Capital Private Equity LP). Notably, "[a]pproximately 35% of their domestic real estate space is concentrated with Simon Property Group, Inc. and GGP Inc. (previously General Growth Properties, Inc.)" ($SPG, $GGP) and, in the first instance, the company is seeking to close 450 stores. Hmmm. The Company will operate under a $105mm DIP term loan credit facility ($35mm new money) and a $273.5mm DIP revolving credit facility; it will also seek to avail itself of $80mm in new equity capital by way of a fully-backstopped rights offering. The upshot of all of this financial mumbo-jumbo is that the term lenders will own the majority of the company. 
  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia
  • Capital Structure: $81mm '17 ABL RCF (Bank of America NA), $47.5mm '17 ABL Term Loan (Pathlight Capital LLC), 788.8mm '18 TL (Credit Suisse), $171mm '18 unsecured notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Joshua Sussberg, Steven Serajeddini, Matthew Fagen, Laura Elizabeth Krucks, Timothy Bow, Gabor Balassa, Ben Tyson) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael Condyles, Peter Barrett, Jeremy Williams)
    • Legal (Special Committee): Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Thomas Wolper, Seth Goldman, Kevin Allred)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (James Mesterharm, Liyan Woo)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke)
    • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
    • Liquidators: Tiger Capital Group LLC and Great American Group LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Consenting Term Loan Lenders & DIP Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch
      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Boehm, K. Elizabteh Sieg)
      • Financial Advisor: Rothschild & Co.
    • DIP ABL Administrative Agent
      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Julia Frost-Davies, Robert A.J. Barry, Amelia Clark Joiner) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Justin Paget)
    • DIP ABL Term Agent
      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jennifer Fenn) & (local) Whiteford Taylor Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
    • Sponsor: Bain Capital Private Equity LP 
      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Robert Lemons) & (local) Wolcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Unsecured Noteholders
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, Jason Rubin)
    • Pathlight Capital
      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jonathan Marshall) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
    • Indenture Trustee: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
      • Legal: Moses & Singer LLP (Alan Gamza, Kent Kolbig, Jessica Boneque) & (local) Hirschler Fleischer PC (Robert Westermann, Rachel Greenleaf)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Hahn & Hessen LLP (Mark Power, Mark Indelicato, Janine Figueiredo, Alison Ladd) & (local) Tavenner & Beran PC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

Updated 7/11/17 at 7:25 pm CT