🚜New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Tea Olive I LLC (d/b/a Stock+Field)🚜

Tea Olive I LLC (d/b/a Stock+Field)

The #retailapocalypse is indiscriminate. Sometimes it likes to take down big prey like J.C. Penney or J. Crew but other times it just wants to snag some low hanging fruit via the path of least resistance. That means that a number of retailers those of us in our bubbles in major coastal cities have maybe never heard of will find their way into a bankruptcy court. And a bankruptcy court outside of Delaware or Texas no less.

Like Tea Olive I LLC (d/b/a Stock+Field) for instance. The Minnesota-based “farm, home and outdoor retailer” operates 25 stores across the mid-West. It only sells “a small amount of products…online.” While that’s obviously pretty lame, this place seems like a smorgasbord of fun: in one fell swoop you can go in and pick up, among other things, some dog food, a kayak, some beekeeping equipment, some lawn fertilizer, workwear and apparel, a grill, paint, a new HVAC unit, auto parts, food, toys and firearms! A Christmas bonanza, this place must be! Earl Jr. can get himself a little toy gun while Big Earl can get himself a grenade launcher and AR-15. Everybody wins!

Well, not everybody. Unfortunately, the place is liquidating, a sad post-holidays result for the 1,000 full and part-time employees that work there.

In 2018, the debtor did $176mm of revenue and adjusted EBITDA of $5.1mm. In 2019, to differentiate itself from other unrelated “Big R” entities in the US, the debtor changed its name from “Big R Stores” to “Stock+Field” expecting some short-term drops in performance but expecting those drops to be mere blips on the road to a stronger future. And, in fact, the company did suffer a small drop in performance: it did $173.9mm in revenue and $1.6mm in adjusted EBITDA. 2020 was supposed to be the year.

Spoiler alert: it wasn’t. Not for literally anybody on the planet (well, other than maybe Elon Musk, Joseph Biden, fans of Brexit…ah…you get the idea…there are exceptions to literally everything). Per the company:

In the beginning of 2020, the Debtor continued its rebranding efforts and expected the business to grow throughout the year. However, the Covid-19 pandemic unexpectedly upset all expectations for 2020. All of the Debtor’s 25 stores were open under strict capacity and operating hour restrictions due to the pandemic. Additionally, the pandemic itself has altered the shopping behaviors of the Debtor’s consumers, with some customers not feeling comfortable entering physical stores to shop. While the Debtor sells some products online, the majority of its products are sold solely in stores.

😬Apparently they didn’t get the omni-channel memo. For fiscal year 2020, therefore, the debtor estimates $141.5mm in revenue and -$2.2mm in adjusted EBITDA. Consequently, the company hired restructuring professionals to pursue a financing options and/or a sale. But had no luck. The company then hired Tiger Capital Group to pursue liquidation. Get ready for…

The debtor owes $29.7mm to its senior secured lender, CIT Northbridge Credit LLC pursuant to a credit agreement entered into in early March 2020. Query how seriously the various parties were taking COVID-19 given the timing. Still, the debtor estimates its inventory value to be $45.6mm and it also has $734k of A/R and prepaid assets against $26.5mm in trade debt (inclusive of approximately $1mm in 503(b)(9) claims).* The size of general unsecured creditor recoveries — certain to be less than 100% — will definitely depend on whether there are shoppers out there who are willing to risk contracting COVID-19 simply to hit the bid on that alleged $45.6mm in inventory value.

One question that also arises with retail cases is what happens with gift cards? It appears the debtor intends to honor outstanding gift cards until February 8, 2021. Hurry out, y’all, and get yourself some new toys and firearms just in time for the Civil War.

*For the uninitiated, the Bankruptcy Code provides that suppliers of goods delivered to a debtor in the ordinary course of business in the 20 days prior to a petition date be allowed as administrative expenses.

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Date: January 10, 2020

Jurisdiction: D. of Minnesota (Judge Fisher)

Capital Structure: $29.7mm funded secured debt (Second Avenue Capital Partners LLC)

Company Professionals:

• Legal: Fredrikson & Byron PA (Clinton Cutler, James Brand, Steven Kinsella, Samuel Andre)

• Restructuring Advisor: Clear Thinking Group (Michael Wesley)

• Liquidator: Tiger Capital Group LLC

• Investment Banker: Steeplechase Advisors LLC (James Cullen, Dan O’Rourke, David Burke, Nate Anderson, Eddie Doherty, Amy Rose)

• Claims Agent: Donlin Recano (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

• Secured Loan Agent: Second Avenue Capital Partners LLC

• Secured Lender: CIT Northbridge Credit LLC

  • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Stein Mart Inc. ($SMRT)

Stein Mart Inc.

Man. This story sucks. Stein Mart Inc. ($SMRT), a publicly-traded specialty off-price retailer with 281 stores across the Southeast, Texas, Arizona and California is the latest retailer to file bankruptcy (along with two affiliates).

To set the stage, imagine Han and Lando taking a fun little ride on a desert skiff. Suddenly a riot breaks out and amidst the confusion Lando falls off the skiff. Luckily, Han is able to grab Lando’s hand so that Lando doesn’t plummet into the gnarley tentacles of some strange sand beast that randomly happens to be there. As Han pulls Lando up out of reach of the beast, all of the sudden some crazy space virus flows through the airspace and smacks Han straight in the lungs. As he clutches his throat struggling to breathe, he releases Lando who consequently hurls straight down towards the beast and suffers a horrific death.

Now replace (a) Han with Kingswood Capital Management LLC, (b) Lando with Stein Mart, and (c) the “crazy space virus” with COVID-19 and you’ve basically got the story of Stein Mart’s collapse into bankruptcy court. Like many other retailers in this macro climate, Stein Mart was teetering pre-COVID. Sales have been on the decline since 2016. But then in January, Kingswood — along with an entity managed by the Chairman of the company — offered a roughly 20% premium over SMRT’s then-stock price ($0.90/share) to take Stein Mart private. Stein Mart, which had been on distressed watch lists around that time, seemed to be on the receiving end of a much-needed and wildly opportune lifeline. Of course, COVID ended that. Take a look at this mind-boggling decline in YOY performance:

Ab. So. Lutely. Brutal. Just brutal.

Kingswood agreed. Per the company:

…on April 16, 2020, the Merger Agreement was terminated prior to closing because the COVID19 pandemic forced the Company to close all of its stores and the Company was unable to satisfy the minimum liquidity closing condition in the merger agreement.

Was that the definitive end of the deal? No! The parties continued to discuss new deal parameters but then we, as a country, couldn’t get our sh*t in order. With the country averaging 1000+ deaths a day and tens of thousands of new daily COVID infections, Kingswood got skittish:

The Company has subsequently engaged in discussions with Kingswood regarding sale of the Company as a going-concern in recent months pursuant to a bankruptcy sale; however, a transaction presently appears unlikely given the COVID-19 resurgence.

The resurgence is notable because the company has a significant number of stores in Florida, Texas and California. Consequently,…

The Company’s updated financial projections, following the July resurgence of COVID-19, indicated that the Company would not have sufficient liquidity to continue operating the business in the ordinary course consistent with past practice.

So now the company is liquidating. The company projects $250mm in gross recovery from the liquidation of inventory, equipment, fixtures, leases IP and other assets. As of the petition date, it owes its senior secured lender, Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC), $84mm; it also owed its term lender, Gordon Brothers Finance Company, $35mm. Tack on administrative expenses for the professionals administering the case and recoveries for those creditors owed a sum total of $770mm in total liabilities begins to look a bit bleak.

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A couple of additional notes:

First, this company appears to have been addicted to factoring. Among the companies top six general unsecured creditors are CIT Commercial Services, Wells Fargo Trade Capital Services, and White Oak Commercial Finance.

Second, you can add SMRT to the list of companies that tapped PPP funds yet couldn’t avoid a bankruptcy filing. It received $10mm from Harvest Small Business Finance LLC.

Third, we’re back to borderline collusion among the liquidation firms. The company’s financial advisor issued RFPs to five liquidation consultants. It received two bids back: one from SB360 Capital Partners LLC and one from a Hilco Merchant Resources-led joint venture that included three — that’s right, three — competitors. Per the company:

The Debtors are of the view that in the current environment, where numerous large retailers are being simultaneously liquidated, joint venture liquidation bids are common because a single liquidation firm may not have the resources to staff and manage the entire project. (emphasis added)

Said another way, the retail industry is such an utter dumpster fire right now that liquidators simply don’t have the bandwidth to manage mandates like these on their own (or so the story goes).

While liquidation sales launch, the company will also seek to sell its leases and IP. Except…

…substantial doubt exists as to whether any buyers will be found for leases given the current depressed condition of the retail real estate market.

And they…

…do not anticipate the sale of intellectual property will produce substantial value.

Right. In case you haven’t noticed, the rubber meets the road with these retailers with the IP. That’s why there was the law suit in the Neiman Marcus matter. That’s why there was the asset stripping transaction in the J.Crew matter. But Stein Mart? IP? Brand? Hahahahaha. The company’s bankers tried selling this turd for over 2.5 years. The only buyer was Kingswood, a small LA-based PE fund with a portfolio of four companies and, well, Stein himself. The IP only had value to him. Go figure. And this is after three — yes, three — separate sale and marketing processes.

Is there a chance a buyer emerges from the shadows? Sure. Miracles happen. If not, Wells and Gordon Brothers will be fine. The professionals will get paid. The unsecured creditors will get hosed. Equity will…well forget about it. At least the equity market is finally getting these right (though reasonable minds could certainly question why the stock is trading as high as it is):

The greater likelihood is that this sucker ends in structured dismissal or a conversion to chapter 7.

It’s crazy. Eight months ago the company was headed for a new chapter. Instead the book shut closed.

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August 12, 2020

Jurisdiction: M.D. of FL (Judge Funk)

Capital Structure: see above

Company Professionals:

• Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Gardner Davis, John Wolfel, Neda Sharifi, Richard Guyer, Mark Wolfson, Marcus Helt)

• Financial Advisor: Clear Thinking Group (Patrick Diercks)

• Liquidators: Hilco Merchant Resources LLC, Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC, Great American Group LLC, Tiger Capital Group LLC, SB360 Capital Partners LLC

• Claims Agent: Stretto (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

• RCF Lender: Wells Fargo Bank NA

  • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Daniel Fiorillo, Chad Simon) & Smith Hulsey & Busey (John Thomas, Stephen Busey)

⚾️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Modell's Sporting Goods Inc.

Modell's Sporting Goods Inc.

March 11, 2020

There’s nothing particularly new or interesting about another liquidating retailer — especially when it’s just another in a long line of companies in its business segment to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy. Sorry to be callous: we get that Modell’s Sporting Goods Inc. is a family-owned establishment with 134 stores and thousands of employees. We get that people aren’t shopping at brick-and-mortar locations, that Walmart Inc. ($WMT), Target Inc. ($TGT), Amazon Inc. ($AMZN), and, in this category, Dick’s Sporting Goods Inc. ($DKS) are crushing the competition, and that there’s a “decline in sports team participation among youth and teens.” Here’s the number of tackle football participants over the age of six years old in the United States:

This trend in football, however, is not pervasive. Participation in high school baseball, for instance, is on the rise. Most other major high school sports are pretty static, soccer being an exception as that, too, is increasing in popularity. So, sure, okay. We’ll just take the company’s word for it.

But the company doesn’t just blame the youths for its demise; it blames global warming (“warm winter weather in the Northeastern states, which negatively affected the sales of cold-weather goods and items and overall store traffic…”), the crappy-a$$ New York Knicks and disappointing Philadelphia Eagles (“lower than anticipated sales of licensed goods in the fourth quarter of 2019 based on local professional team performance”), and inventory disruption from creditors who’ve gotten sick and tired of getting regularly screwed over by administratively insolvent retailers.

It doesn’t really blame its model. For instance, it doesn’t have any private label apparel. Nor does it own any of its real estate. It is completely beholden to its vendors and foot traffic at strip malls and shopping malls. It leases everything. Apparel merchandise expenses were roughly $225mm/year and rental expenses totaled approximately $95mm/year, constituting approximately 46% and 19% of gross sales ($490mm), respectively. In addition, it has unionized employees. The company is on the hook (jointly with a non-debtor entity) for a pension plan underfunded by $25.8mm.

Of course the company also has debt. It has a unitranche revolving credit facility and term loan with JPMorgan Chase Bank NA and Wells Fargo Bank NA, respectively. As of the petition date, the company owes approximately $39mm under the facility. But as operating performance deteriorated, JPM and WFC became skittish and increased discretionary reserves by $18mm — the nail in the coffin as the company no longer had sufficient liquidity to continue to operate (PETITION Note: Wells Fargo has been particularly savage when it comes to aggressively increasing reserves on its retail clients. We’ve seen this movie before with Pier 1 Imports Inc. and Destination Maternity Inc.). This, despite the company started stretching its vendors and landlords. Rent for February and March went unpaid. The company projects $100mm in general unsecured claims, ex-lease breakage claims.

While the business suffered, multiple attempts to achieve an out-of-court restructuring and/or a sale to a strategic buyer failed. The company will now undertake a coordinated wind down to maximize recoveries for stakeholders. Absent some White Knight swooping in here at the 13th hour, pour one out for Modell’s Sporting Goods Inc.

• Jurisdiction: D. of New Jersey (Judge Papalia)

• Capital Structure: $29.5mm RCF (JPMorgan Chase Bank NA), $9.225mm Term Loan (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Cole Schotz PC (Michael Sirota, David Bass, Felice Yudkin)

  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Robert Duffy)

  • Investment Banker: RBC Capital Markets

  • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners LLC

  • Liquidation Consultant: Tiger Capital Group LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Daniel Fiorillo, Chad Simon) & Norris McLaughlin PA (Morris Bauer, Allison Arotsky)

  • Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox)

  • Local 1102 RWDSU UFCW, Local 1102 Retirement Trust, and Local 1102 Health and Benefit Fund

    • Legal: Rothman Rocco Laruffa LLP (Matt Rocco) & Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Kenneth Rosen)
      

New Chapter 11 Filing - The Gymboree Corporation

The Gymboree Corporation

• 6/12/17 Recap: Yawn...another private equity owned retailer in bankruptcy. Why? Standard fare for everyone following the retail story at this point: a substantial brick-and-mortar presence (1300 stores) in need of rightsizing, higher expenses than web-based competitors, an underdeveloped wholesale operation, an underdeveloped web presence, insufficient "omnichannel" capabilities (the go-to buzzword for retailers these days), and more debt than competitors like Children's Place and the Gap. In other words, private equity, that's why (here, Bain Capital Private Equity LP). Notably, "[a]pproximately 35% of their domestic real estate space is concentrated with Simon Property Group, Inc. and GGP Inc. (previously General Growth Properties, Inc.)" ($SPG, $GGP) and, in the first instance, the company is seeking to close 450 stores. Hmmm. The Company will operate under a $105mm DIP term loan credit facility ($35mm new money) and a $273.5mm DIP revolving credit facility; it will also seek to avail itself of $80mm in new equity capital by way of a fully-backstopped rights offering. The upshot of all of this financial mumbo-jumbo is that the term lenders will own the majority of the company. 
• Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia
• Capital Structure: $81mm '17 ABL RCF (Bank of America NA), $47.5mm '17 ABL Term Loan (Pathlight Capital LLC), 788.8mm '18 TL (Credit Suisse), $171mm '18 unsecured notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Joshua Sussberg, Steven Serajeddini, Matthew Fagen, Laura Elizabeth Krucks, Timothy Bow, Gabor Balassa, Ben Tyson) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael Condyles, Peter Barrett, Jeremy Williams)
  • Legal (Special Committee): Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Thomas Wolper, Seth Goldman, Kevin Allred)
  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (James Mesterharm, Liyan Woo)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke)
  • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
  • Liquidators: Tiger Capital Group LLC and Great American Group LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Consenting Term Loan Lenders & DIP Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Boehm, K. Elizabteh Sieg)
    • Financial Advisor: Rothschild & Co.
  • DIP ABL Administrative Agent
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Julia Frost-Davies, Robert A.J. Barry, Amelia Clark Joiner) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Justin Paget)
  • DIP ABL Term Agent
    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jennifer Fenn) & (local) Whiteford Taylor Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
  • Sponsor: Bain Capital Private Equity LP 
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Robert Lemons) & (local) Wolcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Unsecured Noteholders
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, Jason Rubin)
  • Pathlight Capital
    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jonathan Marshall) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
  • Indenture Trustee: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
    • Legal: Moses & Singer LLP (Alan Gamza, Kent Kolbig, Jessica Boneque) & (local) Hirschler Fleischer PC (Robert Westermann, Rachel Greenleaf)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Hahn & Hessen LLP (Mark Power, Mark Indelicato, Janine Figueiredo, Alison Ladd) & (local) Tavenner & Beran PC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

Updated 7/11/17 at 7:25 pm CT

New Chapter 11 & CCAA Filing - Payless Shoesource Inc.

Payless Shoesource Inc.

• 4/4/17 Recap: Private equity backed Kansas-based discount footwear retailer with over 4000 stores filed for bankruptcy because, well, right, it's a private equity backed retailer. Golden Gate Capital and Blum Capital Partners are the sponsors and we've previously covered their methods, uh, we mean "value-add" proposition. We probably won't even bother to read the filing documents because we're 98.9% confident they say the same sh*t every other retail case has said, e.g., poor e-commerce...blah blah...Amazon...blah blah...mall-based retail...blah blah...bad weather...blah blah...Showtime's Billions sucks...wait, what?...whatever, it does (who cares if that's relevant?)...millennial shopping habits...blah blah...bleeding top line and depressed comp store sales...blah blah...dividend recaps...blah blah blah. Apparently the retailer is going to close nearly 400 stores while it attempts to reorganize around what remains - all in accordance to a plan support agreement that the company has entered into with 2/3 of its term loan lenders and with the support of a $385mm DIP facility (of which $80mm is new money). Meanwhile, we'll see what kind of cascading effect this will have on (a) China's manufacturing sector which, apparently, has seen significant stretching of payables (up to 100 days) - a fact evidenced by the top 50 creditors list, and (b) our lovely "A" malls (notably, Simon Property Group made a notice of appearance before the first day pleadings were even completely filed). Finally, the CEO dropped the fact that the new business plan will focus on, among other things, "omnichannel expansion" and since that is the retail buzzword/phrase of the moment, we guess there's really nothing to see here: all will be fine. 
• 4/6/17 Update: We read the documents and, generally speaking, everything we said above applies. Two other factors apparently worth mentioning as causes for the filing: inventory management issues (compounded by the West Coast port strikes) and foreign exchange issues.
• Jurisdiction: E.D. of Missouri
• Capital Structure: $300 ABL ($187mm out - Wells Fargo), $520mm '21 TL ($506mm out), $145mm '22 second lien TL (Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Nicole Greenblatt, William Guerrieri, Christine Pirro, Jessica Kuppersmith) & (local) Armstrong Teasdale LLP (Steven Cousins, Erin Edelman) & (Canadian counsel) Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP 
  • Legal to Independent Director: Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Thomas Walper, Seth Goldman, Kevin Allred)
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Robert Campagna)
  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Morgan Suckow)
  • Real Estate: RCS Real Estate Advisors (Ivan Friedman)
  • Liquidators: Great American Group LLC & Tiger Capital Group LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free court docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Committee of First Lien Term Lenders (Alden Global Opportunities Master Fund, Credit Suisse Asset Management, GSO Capital Partners, Hawkeye Capital Management, Invesco Senior Secured Management, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, AIC Finance, Axar Capital Management)
    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Michael Rupe, Christopher Boies, Jeffrey Pawlitz, Austin Jowers, Michael Handler)
    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.
  • DIP ABL Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA
    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Douglas Gooding, Jonathan Marshall) & (local) Thompson Coburn LLP (Mark Bossi)
  • First Lien Agent & DIP TL Agent: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc. & Cortland Products Corp.
    • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Stephen Castro, David Rosenzweig, Danielle Ledford, Tim Walsh)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Robert Feinstein, Jeffrey Pomerantz, Bradford Sandler) & (local) Polsinelli PC (Matthew Layfield, Christopher Ward, Shanti Katona)
    • Financial Advisor: Province Inc.

Updated 4/18/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Gordmans Stores Inc.

Gordmans Stores Inc.

• 3/13/17 Recap: Clearly Warren Buffett doesn't own this dog. The Omaha, NE-based publicly-traded (GMAN) specialty retailer (apparel and home fashions) with 72 stores in 16 states (according to PE sponsor Sun Capital Partners) or 106 stores in 22 states (according to the company) filed bankruptcy to continue the 5-month long evisceration of Sun Capital Partners' retail portfolio. Oh, and liquidate. Choice quote: "It is likely that other retailers may commence chapter 11 cases in the near term, as retail is set to replace the troubled oil and gas industry as the most distressed sector this year." Just in case anyone is scratching their heads as to how this liquidation could possibly be happening, note that e-commerce made up less than 1-percent of the Company's sales. This REALLY begs the question: what value was Sun Capital Partners bringing to the table? Do they not have operating partners? Sheesh.
• Jurisdiction: D. of Nebraska
• Capital Structure: $68.75mm RCF (Wells Fargo) + $31.25mm RCF (PNC Bank NA) of which $29mm in total outstanding, $30mm TL (Wells Fargo - $15mm, Pathlight - $7.5mm & Gordon Brothers Finance - $7.5mm)($27.9mm outstanding). 
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jayme Sprayragen, Patrick Nash, Brad Weiland, Jamie Netznik, Alexandra Schwarzman) & Kutak Rock LLP (Lisa Peters, Jeffrey Wegner)
  • Financial Advisor: Clear Thinking Group LLC (Joseph Marchese)
  • Investment Banker: Duff & Phelps Securities LLC (Joshua Benn)
  • Proposed Stalking Horse Liquidators: Tiger Capital Group LLC & Great American Group LLC
  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Wells Fargo Bank, NA
    • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Donald Rothman, Steven Fox) & Greenberg Traurig LLP (Jeff Wolf) & (local) Croker Huck Kasher DeWitt Anderson & Gonderinger LLP (Robert, Gonderinger, David Skalka)
  • Sponsor: Sun Capital Partners
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Neil Herman)
  • Potential Bidder: Hilco Merchant Resources LLC & Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC
    • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Chris Dickerson, Matthew Murphy, Marc Carmel) & (local) Telpner Peterson Law Firm LLP (Charles Smith, Nicole Hughes)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Frost Brown Todd LLC (Ronald Gold, Douglas Lutz, Adam J. (A.J.) Webb) & (local) Koley Jessen PC (Brian Koenig)
    • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. (Paul Huygens)

Updated 4/14/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Gander Mountain Company

Gander Mountain Company

• 3/10/17 Recap: Preppers alert! The Minneapolis-based outdoor retailer that specializes in guns guns and more guns has run out of "dry powder" (score!) and finds itself in chapter 11. This comes around the same time that the Cabela's/Bass merger looks to be hanging by a thread. Tough time for outdoor retail. On the brightside, folks who are so scared by the recent election can now get a break on MREs and other survival gear as they go off-grid or to Canada. So, there's that.
• 5/3/17 Update: The company has sold to Camping World Inc. and, attendant to the sale, entered into an agency agreement with a JV of liquidating firms noted below to handle the assets left out of the sale. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Minnesota
• Capital Structure: $390mm ABL (Wells Fargo Bank NA) & $35mm TL (Pathlight Capital LLC) debt
• Company Professionals: 
  • Legal: Fredrikson & Byron PA (Ryan Murphy, Clinton Cutler, Cynthia Moyer, James Brand, Sarah Olson, Steven Kinsella)
  • Financial Advisor: Lighthouse Management Group (Timothy Becker, James Bartholomew)
  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Stephen Spencer)
  • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC (Ryan Lawlor)
  • Liquidators: Tiger Capital Group LLC (Dan Kane, Michael McGrail), Great American Group LLC (Scott Carpenter, Alan Forman), Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC (Mackenzie Shea), Hilco Merchant Resources LLC (Ian Fredricks)
    • Legal for Liquidators: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Scott Charles, Neil Snyder) & Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox)
  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano (*click on the company above for free docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Prepetition ABL & DIP Lender: Wells Fargo Bank NA
    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Sean Monahan, Kevin Simard)
  • Term Loan Agent: Pathlight Capital LLC
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Mark Silva, Julia Frost-Davis, Amelia Joiner)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Jeffrey Cohen, Keara Waldron, Barry Bazian) & (local) Barnes & Thornburg LLP (Connie Lahn, Peter Clark, Christopher Knapp, Roger Maldonado)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting LLC (Steven Simms, Dewey Imhoff, Matt Diaz, Timothy Gaines, Jessica Jedynak, Clement Chiun)
  • Buyer: Camping World Inc.
    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Zachary Judd, Caroline Reckler, Matthew Warren, Jason Gott)

Updated 5/3/17

New Chapter 22 Filing - General Wireless Operations Inc. (f/k/a Radio Shack)

General Wireless Operations Inc.

• 3/8/17 Recap: We're exasperated. Let's revisit history. In February 2015, Radio Shack filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan of reorganization in October 2015 and it went effective just five days later. So...six...wait, carry the one...yeah, sixteen months later the successor entity General Wireless Operations is now in bankruptcy looking to shut the lights and/or pass this toad on to another sucker as Standard General pulls the chute. Why did this all happen? Well, because Sprint sucks, apparently ("[w]hile the retail business progressed, the Sprint relationship did not yield the benefits that the Debtors expected"). The arrangement out of bankruptcy was for the reinvented Radio Shack to have co-branded stores with Sprint for the purpose of selling Sprint mobile devices that nobody wants (note: 78+mm Apple iphones were sold last quarter). Sprint was obligated to pay rent for the space it occupied as well as commissions above a certain threshold level of sales ($60mm). Hahahaha...above a threshold level of sales? Yeah, never got there (wait what? erroneous projections? you don't say!).  Absent that cash inflow, the company had insufficient funds to continue to operate as a going concern. Hence, the Scarlet 22.  
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $75mm revolver and term loan debt ($25.5mm funded) (Royal Bank of Canada & GACP Finance Co. LLC) & $88mm second lien revolver and term loan debt ($39.7mm funded)(Standard General Master Fund LP, Cortland Capital Market Services LLC, Prisma Capital Partners LP) & $23mm IP term loan (Kensington Technology Holdings LLC)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Scott Greenberg, Mark Cody) & Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier, Evelyn Meltzer, Michael Custer, Kay Kress)
  • Financial Advisor: Loughlin Management Partners & Company Inc.
  • Liquidation Consultant: Tiger Capital Group LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Sprint
    • Legal: McGuire Woods LLP (David Swan, James Van Horn) & (local) K&L Gates LLP (Steven Caponi)
  • Kensington Technology Holdings LLC
    • Legal: Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP (Joseph Sgroi)
  • GACP Finance Co. LLC
    • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Andrew Tenzer, Leslie Plaskon, Michael Comerford) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Justin Rucki, Allison Mielke)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Michael Yurkewicz)

Updated 3/21/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Vanity Shop of Grand Forks Inc.

Vanity Shop of Grand Forks Inc.

• 3/1/17 Recap: As malls empty out across the country, the dominoes are starting to fall. If there is nothing but vacancy and tumbleweed around you, foot traffic will stall. If foot traffic stalls, revenue stalls. If revenues stall, landlords can't get paid. And if landlords can't get paid, well, say hello to the Grim Reaper. Okay, that's a little dramatic, but, to be fair, this does generally describe mall-based retail these days. And the latest chapter in this sad story is the liquidation of Vanity Shop's 137 stores - the affect of which in smaller geographies like North Dakota can't be underestimated (not to mention any ripple effect: 60% of the company's inventory came from US suppliers). In addition to the (now) regular laundry list of prior companies who have had a similar fate in the retail space, e.g., The Limited Brands, THIS was probably the most interesting disclosure in the company's filing: "The Debtor initially contemplated soliciting a bid from Hilco Merchant Resources, LLC (who has routinely performed inventory appraisals and liquidation analyses of Debtor's assets every six months) but was advised that Hilco is currently unavailable to take on another liquidation project at this time." (emphasis added). Now THAT is telling.
• Jurisdiction: D. of North Dakota
• Capital Structure: $4.3mm debt (Wells Fargo), $5mm subordinated debt   
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Vogel Law (Jon Brakke, Caren Stanley)
  • Liquidator: Tiger Capital Group LLC
    • Legal: Cohen Tauber Spievack & Wagner PC (Robert Boghosian)
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Wells Fargo
    • Legal: Riemer Braunstein LLP (Donald Rothman, Alexander Rheaume)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Washington Prime Group Inc., GGP Limited Partnership, Simon Property Group Inc.)
    • Legal: Fox Rothschild LLP (Mette Kurth, Paul Labov, Ellie Barragry, L. John Bird)
    • Financial Advisor: BGA Management LLC (Michael Knight)

Updated 4/27/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Michigan Sporting Goods Distributors Inc.

Michigan Sporting Goods Distributors, Inc.

• 2/14/17 Recap: Happy Valentine's Day, honey, your favorite midwestern sporting goods store is going out of business and I picked up some sweet Nike kicks for you at (an alleged) 60% off. Great for you. Great for me. Not so great for the 1300 employees, Nike (who is owed $3.8mm), Under Armour (owed $2.4mm), and the company CEO who owns 86% of the equity. Berkeley Research Group is at the helm of another liquidation: never before has a single firm's use of "tombstones" been so literal. 
• Jurisdiction: W.D. of Michigan
• Capital Structure: $49.4mm funded secured ABL debt (Wells Fargo)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Warner Norcross & Judd LLP (Stephen Grow, R. Michael Azzi)
  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Steve Coulombe)
  • Investment Banker: Stout Risius Ross Advisors LLC (Michael Krakovsky)
  • Liquidators: Tiger Capital Group LLC and Great American Group LLC
  • Intellectual Property Disposition Consultant: Hilco IP Services LLC (Gabriel Fried)
  • Real Estate Advisors: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Michael Jerbich)
    • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Neil Snyder) & (local) Dickinson Wright PLLC (Allison Bach)
  • Claims Agent: Rust Consulting/Omni Bankruptcy (*click company name above for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Wells Fargo NA
    • Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Jonathan Marshall, Katherine Reynolds, Kevin Simard) & (local) Bodman PLC (Mark Bakst)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Cooley LLP (Cathy Herschkopf, Seth Van Aalten, Robert Winning, Evan Lazerowitz)
  • Phoenix Capital Management Co.
    • Legal: Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Hammer LLP (S. Jason Teele, Nicole Stefanelli)

Updated 4/2/17