🛰New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - OneWeb Global Limited🛰

OneWeb Global Limited

March 27, 2020

We have been complaining for months about how bankruptcy was getting boring. There are only so many retail, oil and gas, biopharma or mass tort cases to write about before things start to get really … and we mean REALLY … monotonous. And so a shout out to Softbank’s Masa Son: as always, you’ve supplied some much needed novelty to the mix! Amidst countless stories of one Softbank portfolio company after another getting a new directive, fresh discipline or retraded on deals (cough, WeWork), portfolio company OneWeb Global Limited and eighteen affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy.

As far as Softbank investments go, the debtors are SOOOOOOOO on brand. It is almost literally a “moonshot,” an uber-ambitious project aiming to deploy “the world’s first global satellite communications network to deliver high-throughput, high-speed, low-latency Internet connectivity services, having an ability of channeling 50 megabits per second, with a latency of less than 50 millisecond, and capable of connecting everywhere, to everyone.” Since 2012, the debtors have been developing a low-Earth orbit satellite constellation system and associated ground infrastructure “capable of delivering communication services for use by consumers, businesses, governmental entities, and institutions, including schools, hospitals, and other end-users whether on the ground, in the air, or at sea.” This means they have started mass producing small satellites, acquiring various authorizations and spectrum icenses (i.e., the use of Ku-band and Ka-band radio-frequency spectrum on a global basis) and domestic market access/services authorizations; they have also completed three launches of 70 satellites in the last year. “OneWeb was well on its way to growing its constellation to 648 satellites with the goal of beginning customer service demonstrations in late 2020 and providing full global commercial coverage by late 2021 or early 2022.” Right. Just like Uber Inc. ($UBER) is delivering autonomous cars and WeWork is sustainably spreading its community-first mission across the world. You have to hand it to Masa Son: the man has some vision. Some entrepreneurial spirit. Eventually, though, there has to be money to support the ambition.

Right. So, about the money. The debtors have raised a lot of it — no surprise considering the capital intensive nature of the business. The raises include:

• A $500mm equity raise backed by Airbus Group Inc. Hughes Network Systems LLC, Intelsat Corporation, Qualcomm Incorporated and Virgin Group Ltd.

• A $1.2b equity raise, $1b of which came from Softbank Group Corp. and the other $200mm from existing investors.

• A $408mm note issuance to Softbank as administrative and collateral agent.

• A $1.56b senior note issuance (and corresponding warrant issue) secured by substantially all of the debtors’ assets including share pledges and rights to radiofrequency authorizations. This issuance rolled-up the $408mm note.

In total, the debtors has over $1.73b in funded debt outstanding as of the petition date on top of the $1.7b of equity raised.

And yet it is in bankruptcy first and foremost because of liquidity issues. As a development stage company, it is what the venture capitalists would call “pre-revenue.” Worse than that, development is time-consuming and expensive and the build out of the debtors’ systems “exhausted [their] existing equity and debt financing.” Again, this is Softbank: massive cash burn is part of its playbook. We’ve all seen this movie before. There’s always tons of money until — poof! — suddenly there’s not. Since 2019, the debtors have been seeking investments from existing and new investors but nobody would bite. It seems that investors hesitated to throw good money after bad; it is also safe to presume that, by this point, a certain level of post-WeWork-fiasco Softbank taint burdened the process. Investors are leery of lighting good money on fire after bad.

Toss in COVID-19 and we’ve got ourselves a combustible situation. Per the debtors:

OneWeb had been hopeful to achieve an out of court solution to its deteriorating liquidity position. After several due diligence meetings during the first and second weeks of March 2020, the Company believed that it was going to be able to secure a long-term funding arrangement from existing shareholders. However, on March 12, 2020, as the markets began to feel the impact of COVID-19, OneWeb was notified that its current investors would not commit to a long term solution. On March 16, 2020, OneWeb entered into a term sheet for bridge financing to be consummated by March 26, 2020. On March 21, 2020, the Company was notified that the bridge financing offer was unavailable. Unfortunately, the anticipated funding opportunities OneWeb pursued were significantly and precipitously impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting shuttering of the global economy. OneWeb, in an effort to preserve liquidity during these difficult social, political, and economic times, began shutting down nonessential aspects of its business in order to preserve the value of its existing assets.

Consequently, the debtors laid off 90% of their workforce and halted development. With the consensual use of Softbank’s cash collateral, the debtors filed chapter 11 “to provide them with the necessary breathing space to wait-out the current instability of the financial markets as they respond to COVID-19 pandemic and to adequately market and monetize their assets.”

Given the volatility currently in the market, there’s no telling how long they’ll have to wait.

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge )

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, William Schumacher, Andrew Leblanc, Tyson Lomazow, Lauren Doyle)

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Softbank

    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Gary Lee, Todd Goren)

  • Collateral Agent: GLAS

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Jonathan Levine)

  • EchoStar Operating LLC and Hughes Network Systems LLC

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Harrison Denman, John Ramirez)

  • Airbus DS Satnet LLC and Airbus Group Proj B.V.

    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Ronald Silverman, Christopher Bryant, M. Hampton Foushee, Craig Ulman)
      

New Chapter 11 Filing - GCX Limited

GCX Limited

September 15, 2019

GCX Limited and 15 affiliated debtors filed a prepackaged bankruptcy this week in pursuit of a dual-track restructuring that will, either through a debt-for-equity swap or a sale, extinguish over $150mm of debt. In the swap scenario, the company will hand the keys over to senior secured noteholders; in the sale scenario, the noteholders will gladly take their cash payout and get the f*ck out of dodge. Either way, the company will be under new ownership with a significantly deleveraged capital structure. Certain consenting senior secured noteholders will provide $54.5mm in DIP financing.

The debtors are a global data communications provider; they operate one of the world’s largest fiber networks (PETITION Note: we’re old enough to remember when fiber was the future!). They provide undersea and terrestrial cables and landing stations and provide managed network services all across the globe. In English, this means they help power, among other things, major telecomms companies and streaming media.

Unfortunately, the debtors have declining revenues. Among other reasons for that sad state of affairs, the debtors cite (i) newly developed and planned cable systems along the debtors’ existing and planned network routes, (ii) financial distress at the parent level, (iii) ongoing disputes with banks that have applied setoff rights against the debtors’ cash, and (iv) high fixed costs and less certain recurring revenue due to clients newfound refusal to enter into long-term arrangements. For all of these reasons, the debtors have been unable to refinance their senior secured notes and the notes matured on July 31. Obviously — considering this thing is now in bankruptcy court — the debtors’ issues prevented them from paying off the debt as it became due. Instead, the debtors have operated under a forbearance agreement since July, during which time it formulated its go-forward plan and solicited the support, via a restructuring support agreement, of a meaningful amount of senior unsecured noteholders. The forbearance expired on the filing date.

Now the bankers, Lazard & Co., will have their work cut out for them. The debtors hope to run an expedited sales process (though, in the bankers’ favor is the fact that the pool of interested parties for assets like these is likely limited) and conduct an auction within 42 days of the filing. Absent that, the debtors will proceed with the debt-for-equity swap with an eye towards confirmation within 75 days and going effective before the end of the year (subject to requisite regulatory approvals, i.e., FCC and CFIUS).

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

• Capital Structure: $365.8mm 7% ‘19 senior secured notes (The Bank of New York Mellon)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Chris Dickerson, Brendan Gage, Robert Dixon Jr., Todd Schwartz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Jaime Luton Chapman)

  • Board of Directors: Rodney Riley, Donald Mallon, Alan Carr

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Katzenstein, Don Harer)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard & Co. (Ken Ziman)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Wilmington Trust NA

    • Legal: Duane Morris LLP (Christopher Winter, Jarret Hitchings)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Secured Noteholders

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Brian Pfeiffer, William Guerrieri, Varoon Sachdev) & Farnan LLP (Brian Farnan, Michael Farnan)

🇲🇽New Chapter 22 Bankruptcy Filing - Maxcom USA Telecom Inc.🇲🇽

Maxcom USA Telecom Inc.

August 19, 2019

We’re all for a reprieve from retail and energy distress but, sheesh, couldn’t have been more interesting than this?

Maxcom USA Telecom Inc. is a telecommunications provider deploying “smart-build” approaches to “last mile” connectivity (read: modems, handsets and set-up boxes) for enterprises, residential customers and governmental entities in Mexico — which is really just a fancy way of saying that it provides local and long-distance voice, data, high speed, dedicated internet access and VoIP tech, among other things, to customers.* It purports to be cutting edge and entrepreneurial, claiming “a history of being the first providers in Mexico to introduce new services,” including (a) the first broadband in 2005, (b) the first “triple-play” (cable, voice and broadband) in 2005, and (c) the first paid tv services over copper network using IP…in 2007. That’s where the “history” stops, however, which likely goes a long way — reminder, it’s currently the year 2019 — towards explaining why this f*cker couldn’t generate enough revenue to service its ~$103.4mm in debt.** Innovators!!

And speaking of that debt, it’s primarily the $103.4mm in “Old Notes” due in 2020 that precipitated this prepackaged bankruptcy filing (in the Southern District of New York).***

The Old Notes derive from a prior prepackaged bankruptcy — in 2013 (PETITION Note: not a “Two-Year Rule” violation) — and were exchanged for what were then outstanding 11% senior notes due in 2014. These Old Notes have a “step-up interest rate,” which means that, over time, the interest rate…uh…steps up…as in, increases upward/up-like. The rate currently stands at 8%. Unfortunately, the company doesn’t have revenue step-ups/upwardness/upseedayzee to offset the interest expense increase; rather, the company “…incurred losses of $4.9 million for the three months ended June 30, 2019, as compared to losses of $2.9 million for the three months ended June 30, 2018, and losses of $16 million for the year ended December 31, 2018, compared to losses of $.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2017….” Compounding matters are, among other things, the negative effects of decreased interest income and foreign currency exchange rates (the dollar is too damn strong!).**** The closure of the residential segment also, naturally, affected net revenue.

To make matters worse, the company’s debt actually has limitations (remember those?). Per the company:

In order to expand its network and strengthen its market share, the Debtors require additional capital. But, the Old Notes Indenture prohibits Maxcom Parent from incurring additional indebtedness (other than permitted indebtedness) unless certain leverage coverage ratios are satisfied, and the increased interest burden under the Old Notes seriously constrains the Debtors’ ability to take the actions required under its business plan to strengthen and expand their operations.

The purpose of this bankruptcy filing, therefore, is to effectuate a consent solicitation and exchange offer whereby the Old Notes will be swapped (and extinguished) for new “Senior Notes,” new “Junior PIK Notes” and cash consideration. The cash consideration will be covered by a new equity injection of $15mm. This transaction will bolster the company’s liquidity and shed approximately $36mm of debt from the balance sheet (PETITION Note: carry the one, add the two, that’s roughly $2.88mm in annual interest savings before taking into account the PIK notes, which won’t be cash-pay, obviously).

Prior to the bankruptcy filing, the company obtained the requisite amount of support to jam non-consenting creditors (PETITION Note: in bankruptcy, a debtor needs 2/3 in amount and half in number of a particular class of debt to bind a class. Here, the company nailed down acceptances of the plan from 84.75% of the holders of Old Notes holding 66.73% of principal amount in Old Notes). And there is one large group of non-consenting holders, apparently. Cicerone Advisors LLC, a financial advisor to three holders of the Old Notes, Moneda Asset Management, Megeve Investments and UBS Financial Services, Inc., attempted to engage the company on better terms than that offered under the plan. It did not, however, ultimately provide a proposal; instead, it demanded terms, including confidentiality and an agreement to pay fees and expenses of financial and legal advisors. Here’s the thing, though: they miscalculated their leverage: with only 30% of Old Notes represented, they don’t have a “blocking position” that could thwart the company’s proposal. Absent an additional 4%, these guys are dead in the water.

This should be…should be…a very quick trip through bankruptcy.*****

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*The company is shutting down its residential segment, which “involves the gradual closure of residential clusters and mass disconnection of residential customers.” Apparently, people don’t need the company’s services anymore. At least not when they’re carrying $1,000 telecommunications systems in their pants pockets? 🤔

The disruption is real. Indeed, the company’s residential segment operates through an outdated copper network that doesn’t comport with the latest in fiber network technology.

**U.S. Bank NA is the indenture trustee under the Old Notes.

***Oh man, the venue on this one is just quaint. There are two debtors, Maxcom Telecomunicaciones, S.A.B. DE C.V., a Mexican entity and Maxcom USA Telecom Inc., which is 100% owned by the former. What does the latter do? According to Exhibit A of the First Day Declaration it does “[Assorted services in the USA].” Hahaha. This sh*t is so suspect that nobody even bothered to remove the brackets. It might as well say, “[Kinda sorta maybe some random sh*t within US borders and down the street from the SDNY for purposes of ginning up venue”]. Is it a guarantor on the notes? “[Yes].” HAHAHA. Like, is it, or not?? The listed highlight? “Recently created.” Damn straight it was. This year. The service address? “c/o United Corporate Services, Inc., Ten Bank Street, Suite 560, White Plains, NY 10606.” Conveniently happens to fall right in Judge Drain’s lap.

We mean, seriously, folks? People AREN’T EVEN TRYING to be slick about manufacturing venue anymore.

Apropos to the point, Duane Morris LLP’s Frederick Hyman highlights the trend of foreign borrowers with little to no assets in the U.S. filing for chapter 11 to take advantage of the automatic stay here, describing the slippery-slope-creating case of TMT Shipping (which established venue by funding professional retainers in the US).

****Interestingly, people have been voicing concerns about the foreign exchange rates and US-dominated debt in emerging markets. It seems those concerns may be warranted:

…from 2013 to date, the value of the Mexican Peso, as compared to the U.S., has decreased by 53%. Because of such devaluation, Maxcom Parent’s repurchase of the $74.3 million in principal amount of the Old Notes did not decrease the amount that Maxcom Parent’s books and records reflect is owed to the holders of the Old Notes given that Maxcom Enterprise’s revenues are mostly in Mexican Pesos. In other words, while the amount that Maxcom Parent owes on account of the Old Notes has decreased in U.S. Dollars, because the majority of Maxcom Enterprise’s revenues are in Mexican Pesos and the Old Notes are denominated in U.S. Dollars, Maxcom Parent’s liability on account of the Old Notes remains roughly the same on its books and records.

Ruh roh. 🙈 We expect to see many more mentions of exchange-related issues going forward. Mark our words.💥

*****Small victories. The dissenting bondholders were able to successfully push the debtors’ timeline by a week or so at the first day hearing.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: $103.4mm old notes

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Pedro Jimenez, Irena Goldstein)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal Mexico

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA

    • Legal: Thompson Hine LLP (Jonathan Hawkins, Curtis Tuggle)
      

New Chapter 11 Filing - Goodman Networks Inc.

Goodman Networks Inc.

• 3/13/17 Recap: Frisco Texas-based minority-business-enterprise (MBE) and wireless network and satellite television systems servicer filed a prepackaged chapter 11 case to de-lever its balance sheet by $212.5mm. This is a story, in many respects, about a concentrated revenue base and too much debt. 83% of the company's revenue is attributable to AT&T and "substantial completion of AT&T's 4G network build-out has diminished the associated demand for Goodman's services." Consequently, the company wasn't generating enough revenue to sustain its capital structure. Now, holders of the secured debt will receive cash, $112.5mm of new debt, PIK preferred stock and common stock. To preserve the MBE status, current equity will get PIK preferred stock and 50.1% of the common stock. Query whether that level of retained equity is a lesson to those who invested in this MBE structure. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
• Capital Structure: $25mm RCF (MidCap Financial Trust), $325mm '18 12.125 % secured notes (Wells Fargo)
• Company Professionals: 
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Joshua Sussberg, Joseph Graham, Laura Krucks, Alexander Cross) & (local) Haynes & Boone LLP (Stephen Pezanosky, Kelli Norfleet)
  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting (John Debus)
  • Investment Banker: June Creek Interests (Andy Jent)
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Committee of Second Lien Bondholders (Alden Global, AllianceBernstein Global LP, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc., J.P Morgan Chase Bank N.A., Phoenix Investment Advisor LLC, Principal Global Investors LLC, Invesco Senior Secured Management Inc., Sound Point Capital Management LP)
    • Legal: Akin Gump (Michael Stamer, Charles Gibbs, Meredith Lahaie, Sara Brauner)
    • Financial: Greenhill & Co. Inc.
• Wells Fargo
  • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Lloyd Lim, Maura Nuno)
• AT&T Corp.
  • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Brian Lohan)

Updated 3/28/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Avaya Inc.

Avaya Inc.

• 1/19/17 Recap: Late in its transition from a hardware-based business model to a software model, Santa Clara California based communications services provider filed a freefall bankruptcy to address its $6b+ balance sheet and ~$1.45b of pension/OPEB liabilities with the help of a proposed $725mm DIP Facility. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
• Capital Structure: $55mm domestic ABL credit facility (Citigroup USA Inc.), $3.235b prepetition cash flow credit facility (Citigroup USA Inc.), $1b 7% '19 first priority note, $290mm 9% '19 second priority note, $1.384b 10.5% '21 second priority notes (Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company N.A.).   
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jayme Sprayragen, Jonathan Henes, Patrick Nash, Ryan Preston Dahl, Bradley Giordano, Justin Bernbrock, Kan Asimacopoulos, Bern Meyer-Loewy, Carl Pickerill, Asif Attarwala, Ameneh Bordi, Robert Britton, Jeremy Evans, Natasha Hwangpo, Stephen Iacovo, George Klidonas, Christopher Kochman, Justin Mercurio)
  • Financial Advisor: Zolfo Cooper LLC (Eric Koza, Charlie Carnaval, Jesse DelConte, Denise Lorenzo, Conor McShane, Fred Jelks, Andrew Ralph, Adam Searles, Jeff Wooding, Howard Gou, Eugene Lavrov, Rohan Joseph, Chris Baydar)
  • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (John Bosacco)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP Agent: Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Natasha Tsiouris, Aryeh Falk)
  • Ad Hoc First Lien Noteholders' Group (400 Capital Management LLC, Aegon USA Investment Management LLC, Alta Fundamental Advisors LLC, Anchorage Capital Group LLC, Apollo Management LP, Auburn Mesa LLC, Bain Capital Credit LP, Bank of America NA, Barclays Capital Inc., Benefit Street Partners LLC, Bennett Restructuring Fund Inc., Blackrock Financing Management Inc., Blackrock Advisors LLC, Blackrock Institutional Trust Company NA, BlueCrest Capital Management, Candlewood Group Investment Group LP, Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, Carlson Capital LP, Centerbridge Capital LP, Cetus Capital LLC, Columbia Management Investment Advisors LLC, Continental Casualty Company, CQS (US) LLC, Crescent Capital Group LP, CRG Financial LLC, Cyrus Capital Partners LP, Deutsche Bank AG Cayman Islands Branch, Driehaus Capital Management LLC, DW Catalyst Master Fund Ltd., Empyrean Investments LLC, Farallon Capital Partners LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners V LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners II LP, Farallon Capital Offshore Investors II LP, Farallon Capital F5 Master I LP, Farallon Capital (AM) Investors LP, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners III LP, Noonday Offshore Inc., GLG LLC, Graham Capital Management, GSO Capital Partners LP, HG Vora Capital Management LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Investcorp Credit Management US LLC, ISL Loan Trust, ISL Loan Trust II, J.H. Lane Partners LP, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, JP Morgan Investment Management LLC, Lord Abbett & Co. LLC, Mariner Glen Oaks LP, Medtronic Holding Switzerland GMBH, Merced Capital LP, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., Midtown Acquisitions LP, MJX Asset Management LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Napier Park Global Capital, Newfleet Asset Management LLC, New Mexico State Investment Council, Nut Tree Capital Management LP, NYL Investors LLC, OZ Management LP, OZ Management II LP, OFI Global Asset Management Inc., Onex Credit Partners LLC, OSK V LLC, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP, Putnam Investments, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Sentinel Dome Partners LLC, Shenkman Capital Management Inc., Silver Point Capital LP, Standard General LP, Taconic Capital Advisors LP, Talamod Asset Management LLC, Telos Asset Management LLC, THL Credit, Voya CLO, Wayzata Opportunities Fund III, Wayzata Opportunities Fund Offshore III LP, Wells Fargo Bank NA, Whitebox Advisors LLC, Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Limited, Z Capital Credit Partners)
    • Legal: Akin Gump Straus Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin)
    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP 
  • Ad Hoc Crossover Noteholders' Group (Alden Global Capital LLC, AllianceBernstein LP, Avenue Capital Management II LLP, Benefit Street Partners, Susquehanna Advisors Group Inc., Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, Greenlight Capital Inc., Highland Capital Management LP, PGIM Inc., Symphony Asset Management LLC)
  • Updated Ad Hoc Crossover Noteholders' Group (Less: Benefit Street Partners)
    • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kris Hansen, Sayan Bhattacharyya, Gabriel Sasson)
    • Financial Advisor: Rothschild
  • Communications Workers of America
    • Legal: Saul Ewing LLP (Sharon Levine)
  • Successor Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Doerr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Nancy Manzer)
  • First Lien Notes Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Glenn Siegel, Joshua Dorchak, Rachel Jaffe Mauceri)
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Todd Goren, Erica Richards, Benjamin Butterfield, Rahman Connelly, Andrew Kissner, James Newton)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (David Miller, Byron Smyl, Marc Alms, Laureen Ryan, Rich Newman, Andrea Gonzalez, Hamish Allanson, Leslie Lambert, Vance Yudell, Jeff Gunsel, Steve Coverick)
    • Investment Banker: Jefferies LLC (Leon Szlezinger)

Updated 5/31/17

New Chapter 15 Filing - Architel Systems Corporation

Architel Systems Corporation

• 12/21/16 Recap: Architel Systems Corporation, Nortel Communications Inc., and Northern Telecom Canada Limited commenced Chapter 15 cases ancillary to to their pre-existing Canadian CCAA proceedings.
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Monitor's Professionals:
  • Legal: Allen & Overy LLP (Ken Coleman, Jonathan Cho) & (local) Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney (Mary Caloway, Kathleen Murphy)

Updated 12/31/16

New Filing - Limitless Mobile LLC

Limitless Mobile LLC

• 12/5/16 Recap: Pennsylvania-based 3G/4G LTE network provider of mobile phone and home internet services to retail customers in rural areas filed chapter 11 to restructure its debt, winddown its retail operations and attempt to continue its wholesale business pursuant to a $4mm Tower Bridge DIP loan. Basically this thing is an investment cesspool: after a $9+mm loan and $25.2mm grant from the US government and a $30mm equity (and spectrum) infusion from Tower Bridge, the company determined that it had an "extended runway to profitability." Who modeled this for the US Government before doling out the grant?
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $9.2mm debt (Rural Utilities Service - United States) & $9mm (Tower Bridge LLM Partners LLC)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Dilworth Paxson LLP (Catherine Pappas, Martin Weis, Jesse Silverman, Lawrence McMichael, Erik Coccia)
  • Claims Agent: Rust Omni (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Tower Bridge LLM Partners LLC
    • Legal: Gellert Scali Busenkill & Brown LLC (Ronald Gellert, Evan Rassman)
  • Unsecured Creditors Committee
    • Legal: Saul Ewing LLC (Lucian Murley, Sharon Levine)
    • Financial Advisor: Gavin/Solmonese LLC (Edward Gavin)

Updated 12/29/16