💩New Chapter 11 Filing - uBiome Inc.💩

uBiome Inc.

September 4, 2019

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Back in our July 4th weekend edition, we wrote the following:

#BustedTech. One year you’re on the Forbes’ 2018 Next Billion-Dollar Startups list and the next year you’re getting raided by the FBI. This is the story of uBiome, a SF-based microbiome startup. Per Forbes:

The new interim CEO of troubled microbiome startup uBiome, Curtis Solsvig, is a longtime turnaround and restructuring expert at financial advisory firm Goldin Associates and the former chief restructuring officer of failed drone startup Lily Robotics.

One man’s billion-dollar valuation is another man’s clean-up job. 

And, now, another man’s bankruptcy.

Annnd another man’s sacrifice:

The Debtor filed this Chapter 11 Case to provide an innovative business with a fresh start under new management, and to preserve approximately 100 jobs through a court-supervised sale process that is intended to maximize the value of the Debtor’s assets for the benefit of all stakeholders.

…certain business practices formulated and implemented by the Debtor’s original founders have resulted in cessation of certain aspects of the Debtor’s business, investigations by certain federal and state investigatory bodies (the “Investigations”), loss of revenue and significant potential contingent liabilities.

Godspeed founders. You just got napalmed. AGAIN.

And as they should. The debtor has been in triage for some time now.

The company empowers consumers to access analysis of their DNA/microbiomes via the use of at-home kits. Said another way, people poop in an $89.99 “explorer kit” and the company analyzes the sample through (a) a proprietary gene sequencing process and (b) a cloud-based database of microbiomes to determine what’s what in the customer’s GI system — a much less invasive discovery methodology than the gut-wrenching (pun intended) colonoscopy. The consumer receives results that provide suggestions for diet, weight control, gut inflammation, sleep disorders and non-dietary supplements. Frankly, this all sounds rather bada$$.

The company also had a clinical business. Doctors could prescribe the tests and bill the customers’ insurance. Similarly, the company launched a clinical product geared towards the analysis of vaginal swabs (i.e., STDs, HPV, gyno disorders). Together these clinical products were called “SmartX.”

Suffice it to say, this idea was big. The company’s founders leveraged the open-source results from the Human Microbiome Project (launched by the National Institutes of Health) and built something that could really make a lot of people’s lives easier. The venture capitalists saw the opportunity, and the tech media celebrated the company’s rapid capital raises and increasing valuation: $1.5mm seed in ‘14, $4.5mm in August ‘14 (led by a16z)$15.5mm Series B in October ‘16, and $83mm Series C in September ‘18(PETITION Note: the company now says it raised $17mm in ‘16 and $59mm in ‘18, exclusive of $36.4mm of mostly-now-converted convertible notes, which means that the media appears to have been fed, or reported, wrong numbers).* Valuation? Approx $600mm.

Armed with gobs of money, the company established some valuable IP (including over 45 patents and your poop data, no joke) and commercial assets (its certified labs). On the other side of the ledger, there is $5.83mm of outstanding secured debt and $3.5mm of unsecured debt, ex-contingent liabilities including…wait for it…”[p]otential fines for civil and criminal penalties resulting from the Investigation….” Ruh roh.

The Founders implemented certain business strategies with respect to the SmartX products that were highly problematic, contained significant operational (but not scientific) flaws and, in some instances, were of questionable legality. These issues included improper insurance provider billing practices, improper use of a telemedicine physician network (known as the External Clinical Care Network), overly aggressive and potentially misleading marketing tactics, manipulation of customer upgrade testing, and improper use of customer inducements. Moreover, certain information presented to potential investors during the three rounds of capital raise my have been incorrect and/or misleading. Although uBiome believes the science and technology behind uBiome’s business model in this developing area is sound, these issues – among others – have resulted in significant legal exposure for the Debtor.

Score one for VC due diligence! The USA for the ND of California, the FBI, the DOJ and the SEC are all up in the company poop now. This investigation, much like the opioid crisis, also calls into question the ethical practices of doctors. Because we really ought not trust anybody these days.

Anyway, the company has since taken measures to right the ship. The board suspended and then sh*tcanned the founders and recruited new independents. They’ve verified that the company suffered from bad business practices rather than bad science or lab practices (Elizabeth Holmes, holla at us!!). And they’ve hired bankers to market the company’s assets (no stalking horse bidder at filing, though). The company received a commitment from early investor 8VC for a $13.83mm DIP of which $8mm in new money; it will take slightly more than 60 days to see if a buyer emerges. One selling point according to the company: it plans for its Explorer Kits to be in CVS Health Corp. ($CVS)! That’d be great if CVS planned for that too. Womp womp.

Anyway, the way bankruptcy is going these days chapter 11 probably ought to be renamed chapter 363.

*There are many reasons why d-bag startup founders hype their own raises. First, it promotes an aura of success which can help acquire new customers. Second, they love the adulation (see Elizabeth Holmes). Third, it helps with recruiting. And, fourth, the VCs must like it and use it for subsequent fundraising (given that they never correct the record).

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: $5.83mm credit facility (Silicon Valley Bank)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Joseph Barry, Andrew Magaziner, Joseph Mulvihill, Jordan Sazant)

    • Board of Directors: Kimberly Scotti, L. Spencer Wells, D.J. (Jan) Baker

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Goldin Associates LLC (Curtis

    • Investment Banker: GLC Advisors & Co LLC

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: Silicon Valley Bank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Alexander Rheaume, Todd Goren, Benjamin Butterfield) & Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Katharina Earle)

    • DIP Participants: 8VC Fund I LP, 8VC Entrepreneurs Fund I LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Matthew Williams, Eric Wise, Jason Zachary Goldstein) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Novum Pharma LLC

Novum Pharma LLC

February 3, 2019

Another day, another pharma company that has filed for bankruptcy. Curious, too: we don’t recall seeing any restructuring professionals predicting that pharma would be the hot restructuring industry of choice. But we digress.

Here, Chicago-based Novum Pharma LLC, a special pharmaceutical company which owns and manufactures a portfolio of topical dermatology products, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. The company’s bankruptcy papers are interesting in that they provide a solid overview of the distribution channel for pharma products from the manufacturer to the end user. Disgruntled with all of the players taking a piece of revenues along the way, Novum Pharma attempted to disrupt the status quo by deployment of an alternative business model. Clearly it didn’t achieve the result it had hoped for.

Per the company, here’s how the “traditional” distribution channel typically works:

Source: PETITION LLC

Source: PETITION LLC

As you can see, the PBMs have a significant amount of leverage on account of their ability to determine which pharmaceuticals will be covered by insurance and which won’t. As a result, the company attempted its alternative. This model was predicated upon the concepts of “enhanced patient access” and “hassle free” access. It doesn’t appear that the company achieved that. Here’s how it would work:

Once the healthcare professional writes a script, the patient could get their prescription through one of three ways:

  1. Via a nationwide network of specialty pharmacies like Cardinal Health 105 Inc., a specialty pharmacy division of Cardinal Health Inc., that the company sells its products to and that have agreed to comply with the company’s guidelines;

  2. If 105 Inc. or the other specialty pharmacies cannot fill the prescription because a PBM denied coverage or otherwise, the pharmacy could transfer the prescription to a “consignment hub,” which is a specialty pharmacy that stocks the Debtor’s products on a consignment or bailment basis and will fill a prescription for a nominal fee (paid by the Debtor); or

  3. If a patient seeks to fill the prescription at a pharmacy that doesn’t participate in the company’s network and the PBM denies coverage, the patient will receive the drug for free.

As you might imagine, prescribing physicians are encouraged to provide patients with a hotline number where, no doubt, patients, are encouraged to go route #1. Why? Because the company earns revenue from the specialty pharmacies (read: from Cardinal Health). But, per the company:

In contrast, when a prescription is filled by a pharmacy, the Debtor expends funds to facilitate the transaction. In particular, when a healthcare plan covers some or all of the cost of a Dermatology Product prescription, the Debtor, through its Co-Pay Vendors, pays the amount that is not covered by the healthcare plan. Alternatively, when a healthcare plan rejects a Dermatology Product prescription, the Debtor facilitates the transfer of that prescription to one of its consignment hubs so that the prescription can be filled and mailed to the patient, at no cost to the patient.

Anyone else see the problem with all of this?!? Don’t know about you, but the added friction of calling a hotline and finding some random specialty pharmacy rather than going to the neighborhood CVS is far from “hassle free.”

All of these gymnastics created a company with $19.4mm in assets, the lion’s share of which is its intellectual property. In addition, there are some consulting and sales support contracts and A/R. On the liability side of the balance sheet, the company has $15.2mm due and owing on a secured basis to lender RGP Pharmacap LLC (at a prime plus 9.75% or 14% interest rate, payable in monthly principal installments), and $2.8mm in lease obligations that are secured, in part, by a $500k letter of credit issued by The Huntington National Bank.

Per the company, among the factors that precipitated the company’s bankruptcy were…

…among other things, (i) manufacturing hurdles leading to production delays and product “stock-outs”; (ii) a dispute with Cardinal and CVS regarding the price at which the Dermatology Products can be returned to the Debtor; (iii) managed care actions leading to increased prescription rejection rates for the Dermatology Products; and (iv) market dilution and decreased total prescriptions due to unauthorized generic alternatives being introduced into the market.

In response, the company implemented cost-cutting measures like outsourcing its “back office” function, downsizing its sales force and entering into a more cost-effective lease. But these measures didn’t address the fundamental business challenges confronting the company. The company continued:

The Debtor’s historically low prescription approval rates, compounded by (i) the Debtor’s persistent manufacturing issues which directly damaged the Debtor’s business because the Debtor’s sales force was unable to distribute sample products during a critical product growth period and HCPs were forced to prescribe alternative medications, (ii) the Debtor’s working capital shortages stemming in part from the Cardinal/CVS product return dispute and (iii) generic drug competition (which the Debtor believes is unlawful), led the Debtor to the inevitable conclusion that its business was no longer sustainable and that a restructuring and refinancing of the business would be necessary.

The chapter 11 filing is meant to preserve the company’s assets and provide it with a forum through which to conduct a bankruptcy sale process of the dermatology products to maximize value for the company’s creditors. Based on the various disputes the company has with Cardinal/CVS, there may be some litigation here for an as-of-yet-unformed Creditors’ Committee to pursue as well.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Carey)

  • Capital Structure: $15.2mm of secured debt, $2.8mm in lease obligations

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Cole Schotz PA (David Hurst, Patrick Reilley, Jacob Frumkin)

    • Independent Director: Thomas J. Allison

    • Financial Advisor: CR3 Partners LLC (Thomas O’Donoghue, Layne Deutscher, Cynthia Chan)

    • Investment Banker: Teneo Capital (Chris Boguslaski)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. (Andrew Sherman, Boris Mankovetskiy) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Morton Branzburg, Richard Beck, Sally Veghte)

      • Financial Advisors: Goldin Associates LLC (Gary Polkowitz)

Updated 3/9/19

New Chapter 11 Filing - Sungevity Inc.

Sungevity Inc.

  • 3/13/17 Recap: Oakland California-based designer of residential and commercial solar energy systems in the US, UK and Europe filed for bankruptcy after a failed merger and an inability to service its capital structure. Large equity holders include Apollo Investment Corporation and Lowe's Corporation. The company secured a $20mm DIP facility to pursue a sale to a stalking horse bidder. 
  • 4/17/17 Update: The company received no competitive qualified bids and, therefore, sought approval of the sale to the stalking horse bidder.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $145.6mm of funded debt (Hercules Capital Inc. - $55mm, MMA Energy Capital LLC - $10mm, MHA Trust LLC - $5mm, Wilmington Savings Fund Society - $9.5mm bridge loan, Atalaya Special Opportunities Fund VI LP - $32mm, $34.1mm convertible notes     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jonathan Levine, Jennifer Marines, Melissa Hager, Erica Richards, Todd Goren, Rahman Connelly, Andrew Kissner, Stacy Molison) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Jamie Lutonn Chapman, Kenneth Listak)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (Randall Eisenberg, Stephen Spitzer, James Guglielmo, Raju Patel, Allen Wong)
    • Investment Banker: Ducera Securities LLC (Joshua Scherer) & Greentech Capital Advisors (Michael Horwitz)
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender & Stalking Horse Bidder: LSHC Solar Holdings LLC (JV between Northern Pacific Group and Hercules Capital Inc.)
      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Brad Weiland, Christine Pirro) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti)
    • Hercules Capital Inc.
      • Legal: Cole Schotz P.C. (Stuart Komrower, Katharina Earle)
    • Second Lien Lender: MMA Energy Capital LLC
      • Legal: Baker & McKenzie LLP (Debra Dandeneau, Jacob Kaplan) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro)
    • Lowe's Corporation
      • Legal: Hunton & Williams LLP (Gregory Hesse, Nicole Collins)
    • Verengo Inc. (also in Chapter 11)
      • Legal: Bayard PA (Scott Cousins, Evan Miller)
    • Eastern Sun Capital Partners LLC 
      • Legal: Goodwin Proctor LLP (Kizzy Jarashow, David Koch) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steven Pohl, Sunni Beville, Christopher Floyd, Tristan Axelrod, Fouad Kurdi) & (local) Morris James LLP (Jeffrey Waxman, Eric Monzo)
      • Financial Advisor: Goldin Associates LLC (Gary Polkowitz)

Updated 5/31/17