🚢 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Speedcast International Limited 🚢

Speedcast International Limited

April 22, 2020

This is a fun one.

Speedcast International Limited, a publicly-traded Australian company headquartered in Houston and 32 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed rare freefall bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas earlier this week. In a week where another 4.4mm people filed for unemployment, one thing seems abundantly clear: the Texas’ bankruptcy courts are going to need help. While Delaware has also been extremely busy, both the Northern District and Southern District of Texas are seeing rock solid bankruptcy flow these days. If the judges got volume bonuses, they’d be rolling in it.

Who’s the big loser? Well, with all of these bankruptcy hearings conducted telephonically, we reckon it’s the city of Houston. In normal times, there’d be a steady stream of suits flushing through the local economy there: staying at the hotels, eating at the restaurants, drinking at the bars. Brutal. But we digress. 🤔

One thing the restructuring industry gives us is an open window into how one domino can topple over others. For instance, the energy and cruise industries are clearly effed currently and so it stands to reason that service providers to those industries would also feel pain. This is where Speedcast comes in: it is a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses. They plug a hole: they offer telecom services to users in remote parts around the world, “primarily where there is limited or no terrestrial network.” Picture some evildoer in some decked out yacht-lair somewhere plotting to take over the world Austin Powers-style. He is probably leveraging Speedcast for IT solutions (PETITION Note: we’re just painting a picture folks; we’re not suggesting that the company merely deals with shady-a$$ mofos. Don’t @ us.). The business is truly international in scope.

Putting aside yacht-loving villains, Speedcast has high profile clients. Carnival Corp. ($CCL), for instance, contracted with Speedcast in December 2018 — long before any of Carnival’s customers contracted with the coronavirus. Cruisers streaming reports about their horrific cruise-going experiences likely used Speedcast product to get the word out. 😬 This was a growing business segment. Revenue increased by $36.5mm from fiscal year 2018 to 2019.

Likewise, the debtors’ energy business had also been growing. The debtors provide “high-bandwidth remote communication services to all segments of the global energy industry, including companies involved in drilling and exploration, floating production storage, offloading, offshore service, general service, engineering, and construction.” Revenue there increased from $158.3mm in FY18 to $164.5mm. We’re pretty sure we know which direction that number is heading in FY20.

Similarly, the debtors’ other business segments — Enterprise & Emerging Markets and Government — demonstrated growth between ‘18 and ‘19. All in, this is a $722.3mm revenue business. Unfortunately, it also had net losses of $459.8mm in FY19. So, yeah. There’s that. The debtors’ rapid expansion over the years apparently didn’t lead to immediate synergistic realization and the debtors suffered from margin compression, revenue declines from specific business lines, and other ails that affected performance and liquidity.

While there have been operational issues for some time now, those were just jabs. COVID-19 and the attendant global shutdown body slammed the company. The debtors note:

Further, the lasting and distressed market conditions in the maritime and oil and gas industries, and the recent and dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, have impacted all players in the global marketplace. The Company has been particularly hard hit by these adverse market conditions. The outsized impact on the Company’s Maritime Business and Energy Business customers has manifested in a dramatic reduction in cash receipts. This macroeconomic downturn, along with the above-mentioned headwinds that contributed to the lower than expected FY19 financial results, made clear that the Company would not satisfy the Net Leverage Covenant under the Credit Agreement.

Right. The debt. $689.1mm of it, to be exact (exclusive of financing arrangements) — of which approximately $590mm is a term loan. With a capital structure this simple, one would think that this is a case that is ripe for a prearranged deal memorialized via a pre-petition restructuring support agreement. But no. There isn’t one here. Why not?

The term lenders argue that the debtors engaged them too late in the game. Therefore, there wasn’t enough time to conduct due diligence on the business, they say. Surely quarantine ain’t helping matters on that front. Nor is the fact that the company is international in nature.

And so this is a traditional freefall balance sheet and operational restructuring — something you don’t really see much of anymore. This case looks headed towards either a sale — which we’re guessing is the term lenders preferred outcome (par plus accrued baby!) — or a plan that would equitize the term lenders and put the go-forward financing needs of the debtors on the shoulders of the term lenders. A plan would preserve the debtors’ net operating losses which, as noted above, could be meaningful.

The debtors and the ad hoc lenders did nail down a commitment for a multiple-draw super-priority senior secured term loan DIP which includes a $90mm new money portion ($35mm on an interim basis) and a $90mm roll-up ($35mm on an interim basis). Judge Isgur took some exception to the interim roll-up portion of the proposed facility but the debtors and the lenders were hand-in-hand saying that — particularly under the circumstances today — the interim roll-up was necessary and appropriate because the lenders need a “big incentive” to lend and “the lenders’ capital providers are getting squeezed themselves.” 🤔 (PETITION Note: The DIP market sounds vicious — though some of that, here, is attributable to the nature of the assets. Delta Airlines can place senior secured notes right now at around 7% because, well … duh … planes!). Judge Isgur did caution however that he wants no part of professionals throwing this interim roll-up in his face as precedent in an upcoming case (Um, we’ll see how that plays out…this financing environment ain’t exactly reversing overnight). While the ad hoc lenders are clearly in pole position for the DIP commitment, they’re syndicating the loan now (which would obviously affect the roll-up too). The DIP will push the professionals towards a path forward over the next couple of weeks and the hope is for a result to be consummated within six months.

Interestingly, the largest single unsecured creditor is an entity that suffers from its own issues and has reportedly hired bankruptcy professionals for advice: Intelsat SA is owed $44mm. In late March, Intelsat terminated their contract with the debtors in a pretty savage leverage play. We talk about leverage a lot in PETITION. There’s balance sheet leverage and then there is situational leverage. Intelsat flexed its muscles and exercised the latter. In exchange it got critical vendor designation, acknowledgement of the full amount of their pre-petition claim and mutual releases. Significantly, the debtors stressed the importance of the relationship, noting that the IT services were needed more than ever as vessels sail adjusted routes due to COVID (read: boats are circling around because governments won’t let passengers disembark).

We should know within a few weeks what a deal may look like here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $87.7mm RCF, $591.4mm Term Loan, $10.6mm LOC

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Alfredo Perez, David Griffiths, Brenda Funk, Martha Martir, Kelly DiBlasi, Stephanie Morrison, Paul Genender, Amanda Pennington Prugh, Jake Rutherford) & Herbert Smith Freehills LLP

    • Independent Director: Stephe Wilks, Grant Scott Ferguson, Michael Martin Malone, Peter Jackson, Carol Flaton, David Mack)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Healy)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company Co. (Paul Rathborne, Adam Waldman)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders

      • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, David Schiff, Jonah Peppiatt, Jarret Erickson) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • DIP Agent: Credit Suisse AG

      • Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Steven Messina, George Howard, Albert Hogan III, David Wagener)

    • Large Creditor: Intelsat SA

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Steven Serajeddini, Anthony Grossi) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Large Creditor: Inmarsat Global Limited

      • Legal: Steptoe & Johnson LLP (Michael Dockterman) & Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Bob Bruner)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (S. Lee Whitesell, John Beck, David Simonds, Ron Silverman, Michael Hefter) & Husch Blackwell LLP (Randall Rios, Timothy Million)

🏈New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Alpha Entertainment LLC (XFL) 🏈

Alpha Entertainment LLC

April 13, 2020

“This is the future. And the future moves fast.”

Whoa boy does it move fast.

Connecticut-based Alpha Entertainment LLC — the legal entity behind the XFL — is now a chapter 11 debtor, an unfortunate blemish on the creative and investment record of Vincent K. McMahon (100% Class A equityholder, 75.5% Class B) and the World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. ($WWE)(23.5% Class B equityholder). Was this idea destined to fail?

The debtor paints an unfortunate picture. This thing was doing great, they assert, until that pesky COVID-19 thing had to come in and decimate anything and everything involving crowds. They note:

Prior to the Petition Date, the XFL provided high-energy professional football, reimagined for the 21st century with many innovative elements designed to bring fans closer to the players and the game they love, during the time of year when they wanted more football. The league debuted on February 8, 2020 to immediate acclaim. Nearly 70,000 fans attended the opening weekend’s games, and more than 12 million viewers tuned in on television. Just weeks after the first XFL games were played, however, the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic forced every major American sports league to suspend, if not cancel, their seasons. On March 20, 2020, the XFL canceled the remainder of its inaugural season, costing the nascent league tens of millions of dollars in revenue.

Man, how’s that for sh*tty timing? The post-Week 1 numbers reflect some initial success. Week 2 attendance rose from approximately 70k to 76.2k and Week 3 attendance hit 81.9k. The XFL was actually showing signs of promise until, in late February, attendance took a dive down to 70.2k in Week 4 and to 64.2k in Week 5.* Were people already beginning to hunker down? Given that Seattle and St. Louis proved to be the largest markets and Washington State was the first state in the union to get pummeled by COVID, that seems fairly safe to presume.

Frankly, nobody on the PETITION team has ever watched a minute of XFL football but … to be honest … it sounds like a whole lot of degenerate fun! Quicker games? ✅ In-game access to participants on the field? ✅ Encouraged gambling? ✅ Sounds awesome. What else are we gonna watch in February? Hockey? Please. This actually sounds like it was not, actually, destined to fail. Like a startup it needed time to build a brand and grow. Absent, say, a worldwide once-every-blue-moon pandemic that literally shuts down the world economy, it might have actually made great strides to do so. Alas:

It is estimated that cancellation of the final five weeks of league’s regular season “negated approximately $27 million in fan spending on gameday-related items” such as ticket sales and food, beverage, and merchandise purchases, to say nothing of the revenue from playoff games or the lost opportunities for sponsorship revenue and brand development. With the league shuttered and no games being played (or revenue being generated), the COVID-19 pandemic left the Debtor facing near-term liquidity issues. With the duration of the pandemic uncertain and the Debtor’s operating expenses continuing unabated, the Debtor was left with few viable alternatives outside of chapter 11.

Mr. McMahon provided the company with a $9mm secured bridge loan but, once it became clear that there was no end in sight to the shutdown, he and his advisors concluded that building a bridge without knowing where the end is probably doesn’t make for good business. Per the the chapter 11 filing papers, the bankruptcy, therefore, is intended to find a buyer for the assets — which include all of the teams (this is not a franchise model), equipment and intellectual property. Revenue for the business was $14mm with a net loss of $44mm. Mr. McMahon has committed to provide a $3.5mm DIP credit facility to fund the cases/sale. Given that the debtor has several million of cash on hand, however, Judge Silverstein did not approve the DIP at the debtors’ first day hearing. Likewise, she shelved the debtor’s plan to issue refunds to season ticket holders.

No sale-related pleadings are yet on file. Per the DIP — which, again, was not approved — a sale motion is required to be on file by April 21 and a sale conducted by July 15, 2020. The debtor has already filed motions rejecting all of its player contracts and practice facility and venue use agreements. McMahon, a billionaire, is well-positioned to credit bid his debt here, wipe out all unsecured creditors, and shelve the IP for a time in the future if he wants.

*There is some question as to whether “attendance” is the proper metric given that there were suspicions that the numbers reflect tickets “distributed” rather than tickets “sold” or actual attendance. Whichever way you measure it, the St. Louis BattleHawks “had reportedly sold 45,000 tickets to their next game before the league shut down due to the coronavirus outbreak.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: $9mm pre-petition secured note (Vince McMahon)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Matthew Lunn, Kenneth Enos, Travis Buchanan, Shane Reil, Matthew Milana)

    • Independent Manager: Drivetrain Advisors LLC (John Brecker)

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-Petition & DIP Lender ($3.5mm): Vince McMahon

💩New Chapter 11 Filing - uBiome Inc.💩

uBiome Inc.

September 4, 2019

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Back in our July 4th weekend edition, we wrote the following:

#BustedTech. One year you’re on the Forbes’ 2018 Next Billion-Dollar Startups list and the next year you’re getting raided by the FBI. This is the story of uBiome, a SF-based microbiome startup. Per Forbes:

The new interim CEO of troubled microbiome startup uBiome, Curtis Solsvig, is a longtime turnaround and restructuring expert at financial advisory firm Goldin Associates and the former chief restructuring officer of failed drone startup Lily Robotics.

One man’s billion-dollar valuation is another man’s clean-up job. 

And, now, another man’s bankruptcy.

Annnd another man’s sacrifice:

The Debtor filed this Chapter 11 Case to provide an innovative business with a fresh start under new management, and to preserve approximately 100 jobs through a court-supervised sale process that is intended to maximize the value of the Debtor’s assets for the benefit of all stakeholders.

…certain business practices formulated and implemented by the Debtor’s original founders have resulted in cessation of certain aspects of the Debtor’s business, investigations by certain federal and state investigatory bodies (the “Investigations”), loss of revenue and significant potential contingent liabilities.

Godspeed founders. You just got napalmed. AGAIN.

And as they should. The debtor has been in triage for some time now.

The company empowers consumers to access analysis of their DNA/microbiomes via the use of at-home kits. Said another way, people poop in an $89.99 “explorer kit” and the company analyzes the sample through (a) a proprietary gene sequencing process and (b) a cloud-based database of microbiomes to determine what’s what in the customer’s GI system — a much less invasive discovery methodology than the gut-wrenching (pun intended) colonoscopy. The consumer receives results that provide suggestions for diet, weight control, gut inflammation, sleep disorders and non-dietary supplements. Frankly, this all sounds rather bada$$.

The company also had a clinical business. Doctors could prescribe the tests and bill the customers’ insurance. Similarly, the company launched a clinical product geared towards the analysis of vaginal swabs (i.e., STDs, HPV, gyno disorders). Together these clinical products were called “SmartX.”

Suffice it to say, this idea was big. The company’s founders leveraged the open-source results from the Human Microbiome Project (launched by the National Institutes of Health) and built something that could really make a lot of people’s lives easier. The venture capitalists saw the opportunity, and the tech media celebrated the company’s rapid capital raises and increasing valuation: $1.5mm seed in ‘14, $4.5mm in August ‘14 (led by a16z)$15.5mm Series B in October ‘16, and $83mm Series C in September ‘18(PETITION Note: the company now says it raised $17mm in ‘16 and $59mm in ‘18, exclusive of $36.4mm of mostly-now-converted convertible notes, which means that the media appears to have been fed, or reported, wrong numbers).* Valuation? Approx $600mm.

Armed with gobs of money, the company established some valuable IP (including over 45 patents and your poop data, no joke) and commercial assets (its certified labs). On the other side of the ledger, there is $5.83mm of outstanding secured debt and $3.5mm of unsecured debt, ex-contingent liabilities including…wait for it…”[p]otential fines for civil and criminal penalties resulting from the Investigation….” Ruh roh.

The Founders implemented certain business strategies with respect to the SmartX products that were highly problematic, contained significant operational (but not scientific) flaws and, in some instances, were of questionable legality. These issues included improper insurance provider billing practices, improper use of a telemedicine physician network (known as the External Clinical Care Network), overly aggressive and potentially misleading marketing tactics, manipulation of customer upgrade testing, and improper use of customer inducements. Moreover, certain information presented to potential investors during the three rounds of capital raise my have been incorrect and/or misleading. Although uBiome believes the science and technology behind uBiome’s business model in this developing area is sound, these issues – among others – have resulted in significant legal exposure for the Debtor.

Score one for VC due diligence! The USA for the ND of California, the FBI, the DOJ and the SEC are all up in the company poop now. This investigation, much like the opioid crisis, also calls into question the ethical practices of doctors. Because we really ought not trust anybody these days.

Anyway, the company has since taken measures to right the ship. The board suspended and then sh*tcanned the founders and recruited new independents. They’ve verified that the company suffered from bad business practices rather than bad science or lab practices (Elizabeth Holmes, holla at us!!). And they’ve hired bankers to market the company’s assets (no stalking horse bidder at filing, though). The company received a commitment from early investor 8VC for a $13.83mm DIP of which $8mm in new money; it will take slightly more than 60 days to see if a buyer emerges. One selling point according to the company: it plans for its Explorer Kits to be in CVS Health Corp. ($CVS)! That’d be great if CVS planned for that too. Womp womp.

Anyway, the way bankruptcy is going these days chapter 11 probably ought to be renamed chapter 363.

*There are many reasons why d-bag startup founders hype their own raises. First, it promotes an aura of success which can help acquire new customers. Second, they love the adulation (see Elizabeth Holmes). Third, it helps with recruiting. And, fourth, the VCs must like it and use it for subsequent fundraising (given that they never correct the record).

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: $5.83mm credit facility (Silicon Valley Bank)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Joseph Barry, Andrew Magaziner, Joseph Mulvihill, Jordan Sazant)

    • Board of Directors: Kimberly Scotti, L. Spencer Wells, D.J. (Jan) Baker

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Goldin Associates LLC (Curtis

    • Investment Banker: GLC Advisors & Co LLC

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: Silicon Valley Bank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Alexander Rheaume, Todd Goren, Benjamin Butterfield) & Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Katharina Earle)

    • DIP Participants: 8VC Fund I LP, 8VC Entrepreneurs Fund I LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Matthew Williams, Eric Wise, Jason Zachary Goldstein) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - New Cotai Holdings LLC

New Cotai Holdings LLC

May 1, 2019

New Cotai Holdings LLC and three affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York on the basis of New Cotai Ventures LLC, a NY LLC, having cash held in a bank account in White Plains New York (as of when, we wonder). The debtors were formed for the purpose of investing in Studio City International Holdings Limited, have no employees, and are otherwise managed by sponsor, Silver Point Capital LP. The declarant supporting the debtors’ chapter 11 filing is an independent director who was put into place literally 2 days before the filing. Yup, 2 whole days.

Studio City International Holdings Limited is a wretched hive of scum and villany. Sorry, that’s not right. That’s us trying to make this more interesting than it is. In truth, its an “integrated resort comprising entertainment, retail, hotel and gaming facilities” located in Macau (that’s China, people). The project has made it past Phase I of construction but has stalled out there: the rest of the project will require several more years. In October 2018, the company IPO’d 28.75mm American Depository Shares at $12.50/share.

To further capitalize the project, two of the debtors, as co-issuers, issued $380mm of 10.625% PIK Notes in 2013 due May 2019. Curious to know how 10.625% PIK adds up? The current principal balance of the notes is now $856mm.

Now, not to state the obvious, but to paydown Notes on maturity, you kinda need to have some moolah. And considering that the project is only past Phase I with much more work to do…well, you see where we are going here. The company notes:

The Debtors’ ability to satisfy their obligations under the Notes is directly tied to the development and success of the Studio City project. Due to delays in the development of the Studio City project, a reduced allocation of gaming tables from the government, and some unanticipated declines in the Macau gaming market, the Investment has not yet achieved sufficient market value in light of the highly illiquid and unreliable market conditions that have developed following the IPO, making a refinancing impracticable. Therefore, through no fault of their own, the Debtors were unable to satisfy the Notes obligations by their maturity.

Listen guys: you ain’t getting Matt Damon, George Clooney and other whales at your tables if you don’t have VIP tables. Obvi. Second, it sounds like the project hired the quintessential New York City-based general contractor. “Yeah, sure, the project will cost $30mm and take 1 month” only to cost “an additional $300 million” and take literally years. Of course “[c]onstruction costs came in greater than expected.” Isn’t that par for the course in hotel development? The company now has until 2021 to finish Phase II of the project. It sounds like it will need it.

Of course, you have to admire the entrepreneurial enthusiasm:

Notwithstanding the aforementioned challenges, the Debtors believe that the Investment continues to represent a significant economic opportunity—the value of which is not accurately represented in the current market prices of the ADS. Indeed, should the Studio City project continue to develop on its currently anticipated timeframe, the Debtors expect the Investment to generate sufficient value to repay the Notes in full.

The debtors must NOT be expecting a downturn. Gaming usually doesn’t fare too well during one of those. And Chinese growth hasn’t exactly been at levels enjoyed over the last decade or so. But, fingers crossed.

The debtors are negotiating with an Ad Hoc Group of noteholders in an effort to address this state of affairs. They have latitude: Silver Point has committed to a $6.25mm DIP with, among other favorable terms to the debtors, no milestones and a 12-month maturity (with an option to extend a subsequent 12 months). This DIP was not marketed and so the early part of the case will be spent presumably searching for alternatives. Because lenders surely love the idea of providing a DIP, the main purpose of which is to pay Skadden Arps’ and the Ad Hoc Group’s fees.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $856mm (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Jay Goffman, Mark McDermott, Evan Hill)

    • Managing Member: Drivetrain Advisors LLC (John Brecker)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Beth Brownstein)

    • Sponsor: Silver Point Capital LP

New Chapter 11 Filing - 4 West Holdings LLC

4 West Holdings LLC

3/6/18 

Texas-based licensed operator or manager of 42 skilled nursing facilities in 7 states has filed a prearranged bankruptcy. The company blames "the performance of the current group of operating Facilities has been negatively impacted by industry headwinds, regulatory actions at certain Facilities, and an inefficient geographic footprint in certain regions in the United States" for its filing.

Similar to HCR Manorcare which filed for bankruptcy earlier this week, 4 West and its affiliates emanate out of a sale leaseback transaction with a publicly-traded REIT counterparty, Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. ($OHI). And, similarly, this business suffers from many of the same problems, 

Since 2015, the Debtors have faced significant liquidity constraints caused principally by: (a) unfavorable commercial agreements and certain liabilities assumed as part of Merger, including regulatory and personal liability claims; (b) historical losses at certain of the Debtors’ previously-operated facilities, (c) a decline in performance within the current portfolio for a variety of industry-wide developments; and (d) significant capital expenditure needs. Further, the Debtors also faced rent payment obligations to the Omega Parties under the Master Leases, which were significantly higher than their operating income could support.

Consequently, the debtor has entered into a restructuring support agreement with Omega that is predicated upon two parts: (i) a transaction whereby certain unprofitable facilities will transition to a designee of Omega and (ii) a transfer of the more successful facilities to the Plan Sponsor, SC-GA 2018 Partners LLC, which is injecting the company with $225mm of new liquidity by way of $195mm in cash and $30mm note. The Omega Parties will provide a $30mm DIP credit facility to fund the cases. 

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Hale)

  • Capital Structure: $14.2mm funded RCF (Sterling National Bank), secured Master Leases (Omega), $15mm funded LOC (OHI Asset RO, LLC), $6.2mm secured note (New Ark Mezz Holdings, LLC), $1.1mm unsecured promissory note (SA Mezz Holdings, LLC)

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Thomas Califano, Daniel Simon, Dienna Corrado, Andrew Zollinger, David Avraham)

    • Financial Advisor: Crowe Horwath LLP

    • Restructuring Advisor/CRO: Ankura Consulting (Louis Robichaux, Ben Jones, Chris Hebard)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Andrew Turnbull, Ryan Sandahl, Angus Schaller, Adam Montague)

    • Independent Director: Drivetrain Advisors LLC (John Brecker)

    • Healthcare Ombudsman: Melanie Cyganowski

      • Legal: Otterbourg P.C. (Keith Costa)

    • Claims Agent: Rust Consulting/Omni Bankruptcy (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: OHI Asset RO, LLC

      • Legal: Bryan Cave LLP (Keith M. Aurzada, Michael P. Cooley, Mark Duedall, Leah Fiorenza McNeill, David Unseth)

    • Plan Sponsor: SC-GA 2018 Partners, LLC

      • Legal: Nelligan LLP (Patrick Nelligan, James Muenker)

    • Sterling National Bank

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Arthur Steinberg, Scott Davidson, Bradley Giordano, Edward Ripley)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Pharmerica Corporation, Healthcare Services Group, Medline Industries, Alana Healthcare, Ominicare Inc., Joerns Healthcare LLC, Regional Ambulance

      • Legal: Pepper Hamilton LLP (Francis Lawall, Donald Detweiler, Joanna Cline) & (local) Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Louis Strubeck Jr., Ryan Manns, Elizabeth Boydston)

      • Financial Advisor: CohnReznick LLP (Clifford Zucker)

Updated 5/18/18