New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - J.C. Penney Company Inc. ($JCP)

J.C. Penney Company Inc.

May 15, 2020

Let’s be clear about something right off the bat. Encino Man, Captain America and Austin Powers could all suddenly surface from being entombed in ice for decades and even THEY wouldn’t be surprised that Texas-based J.C. Penney Company Inc. (and 17 affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

There are a couple of ways to look at this one.

First, there’s the debtors’ way. Not one to squander a solid opportunity, the debtors dive under “COVID Cover”:

“Before the pandemic, the Company had a substantial liquidity cushion, was improving its operations, and was proactively engaging with creditors to deleverage its capital structure and extend its debt maturities to build a healthier balance sheet. Unfortunately, that progress was wiped out with the onset of COVID-19. And now, the Company is unable to maintain its upward trajectory through its “Plan for Renewal.” Moreover, following the temporary shutdown of its 846 brick-and-mortar stores, the Company is unable to responsibly pay the upcoming debt service on its over-burdened capital structure.”

The debtors note that since Jill Soltau became CEO on October 2, 2018, the debtors have been off to the races with their “Plan for Renewal” strategy. This strategy was focused on getting back to JCP’s fundamentals. It emphasized (a) offering compelling merchandise, (b) delivering an engaging experience, (c) driving traffic online and to stores (including providing buy online, pickup in store or curbside pickup — the latest in retail technology that literally everyone is doing), (d) fueling growth, and (e) developing a results-minded culture. The debtors are quick to point out that all of this smoky verbiage is leading to “meaningful progress” — something they define as “…having just achieved comparable store sales improvement in six of eight merchandise divisions in the second half of 2019 over the first half, and successfully meeting or exceeding guidance on all key financial objectives for the 2019 fiscal year.” The debtors further highlight:

The five financial objectives were: (a) Comparable stores sales were expected to be down between 7-8% (stores sales were down 7.7%); (b) adjusted comparable store sales, which excludes the impact of the Company’s exit from major appliances and in-store furniture categories were expected to be down in a range of 5-6% (adjusted comparable store sales down 5.6%); (c) cost of goods sold, as a rate of net sales was expected to decrease 150-200 basis points (decreased approximately 210 basis points over prior year, which resulted in improved gross margin); (d) adjusted EBITDA was $583 million (a 2.6% improvement over prior year); and (e) free cash flow for fiscal year 2019 was $145 million, beating the target of positive.

Not exactly the highest bar in certain respects but, sure, progress nonetheless we suppose. The debtors point out, on multiple occasions, that prior to COVID-19, its “…projections showed sufficient liquidity to maintain operations without any restructuring transaction.” Maintain being the operative word. Everyone knows the company is in the midst of a slow death.

To prolong life, the focus has been on and remains on high-margin goods (which explains the company getting out of low-margin furniture and appliances and a renewed focus on private label), reducing inventory, and developing a new look for JCP’s stores which, interestingly, appears to focus on the “experiential” element that everyone has ballyhooed over the last several years which is now, in a COVID world, somewhat tenuous.

Which gets us to the way the market has looked at this. The numbers paint an ugly picture. Total revenues went from $12.87b in fiscal year ‘18 to $12b in ‘19. Gross margin also declined from 36% to 34%. In the LTM as of 2/1/20 (pre-COVID), revenue was looking like $11.1b. Curious. But, yeah, sure COGs decreased as has SG&A. People still aren’t walking through the doors and buying sh*t though. A fact reflected by the stock price which has done nothing aside from slowly slide downward since new management onboarded:

All of this performance has also obviously called into question the debtors’ ability to grow into its capital structure:

Here’s a more detailed look at the breakdown of unsecured funded debt:

And yet, prior to COVID, the debt stack has more or less held up. Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘23 5.875% $500mm senior secured first lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘25 8.624% $400mm second lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

And here is our absolute favorite: JCP’s ‘97 7.625% $500mm senior unsecured notes:

The fact that these notes were in the 20s mere months ago is mind-boggling.

We talk a lot about how bankruptcy filings are a way to tell a story. And, here, the debtors, while not trying to hide their stretched balance sheet nor the pains of brick-and-mortar department stores with a 846-store footprint, are certainly trying to spin a positive story about management and the new strategic direction — all while highlighting that there are pockets of value here. For instance, of those 846 stores, 387 of them are owned, including 110 operating on ground leases. The private brand portfolio — acquired over decades — represents 46% of total merchandise sales. The debtors also own six of their 11 distribution centers and warehouses.

With that in mind, prior to COVID, management and their advisors were trying to be proactive about the balance sheet — primarily the term loans and first lien secured notes maturing in 2023. In Q3 ‘19, the debtors engaged with their first lien noteholders, term lenders and second lien noteholders on proposals that would, among other things, address those maturities, promote liquidity, and reduce interest expense. According to the debtors, they came close. A distressed investor was poised to purchase more than $750mm of the term loans and, in connection with a new $360mm FILO facility, launch the first step of a broader process that would have kicked maturities out a few years. In exchange, the debtors would lien up unencumbered collateral (real estate). Enter COVID. The deal went up in smoke.

There’s a new “deal” in its stead. A restructuring support agreement filed along with the bankruptcy papers contemplates a new post-reorg operating company (“New JCP”) and a new REIT which will issue new common stock and new interests, respectively. Beyond that, not much is clear from the filing: the term sheet has a ton of blanks in it:

There’s clearly a lot of work to do here. There’s also the “Market Test” element which entails, among other things, running new financing processes, pursuing potential sale/leaseback transactions, and pursuing a sale of the all or part of the debtors’ assets. If the debtors don’t have a business plan by July 14 and binding commitments for third-party financing by August 15, the debtors are required to immediately cease pursuing a plan and must instead pursue a 363 of all of their assets. Said another way, if the economy continues to decline, consumer spending doesn’t recover, and credit markets tighten up, there’s a very good chance that JCP could liquidate. Remember: retail sales sunk to a record low in April. Is that peak pain? Or will things get worse as the unemployment rate takes root? Will people shop at JC Penney if they even shop at all? There are numerous challenges here.

The debtors will use cash collateral for now and later seek approval of a $900mm DIP credit facility of which $450mm will be new money (L+11.75% continues the trend of expensive retail DIPs). It matures in 180 days, giving the debtors 6 months to get this all done.

*****

A few more notes as there are definitely clear winners and losers here.

Let’s start with the losers:

1. The Malls. It’s one thing when one department store files for bankruptcy and sheds stores. It’s an entirely different story when several of them go bankrupt at the same time and shed stores. This is going to be a bloodbath. Already, the debtors have a motion on file seeking to reject 20 leases.

2. Nike Inc. ($NKE) & Adidas ($ADDYY). Perhaps they’re covered by 503(b)(9) status or maybe they can slickster their way into critical vendor status (all for which the debtors seek $15.1mm on an interim basis and $49.6mm on a final basis). Regardless, showing up among the top creditors in both the Stage Stores Inc. bankruptcy and now the J.C. Penney bankruptcy makes for a horrible week.

3. The Geniuses Who Invested in JCP Debt that Matures in 2097. As CNBC’s Michael Santoli noted, “This JC Penney issue fell only 77 years short of maturing money-good.”

4. Bill Ackman & Ron Johnson. This.

And here are the winners:

1. The New York Times. Imperfect as it may be, their digitalization efforts allow us all to read and marvel about the life of James Cash Penney, a name that so befitting of a Quentin Tarantino movie that you can easily imagine JC chillin with Jack Dalton on some crazy Hollywood adventure. We read it with sadness as he boasts of the Golden Rule and profit-sharing. Profits alone would be nice, let alone sharing.

2. Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Seriously. These guys are smoking it and have just OWNED retail. In the past eight days alone the firm has filed Stage Stores Inc., Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC and now JCP. It’s a department store hat trick. Zoom out from retail and add in Ultra Petroleum Corp. and Intelsat SA and these folks are lucky they’re working from home. They can’t afford to waste any billable minutes on a commute at this point.

3. Management. They’re getting what they paid for AND, consequently, they’re getting paid. No doubt Kirkland marched in there months ago and pitched/promised management that they’d secure lucrative pay packages for them if hired and … BOOM! $7.5mm to four members of management!

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Christopher Marcus, Aparna Yenamandra, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Allyson Smith Weinhouse, Jake William Gordon) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

  • OpCo (JC Penney Corporation Inc.) Independent Directors: Alan Carr, Steven Panagos

    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Steven Reisman)

  • PropCo (JCP Real Estate Holdings LLC & JC Penney Properties LLC) Independent Directors: William Transier, Heather Summerfield

    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (James Mesterharm, Deb Reiger-Paganis)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke, Michael Weitz)

  • Store Closing Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

  • Real Estate Consultants: B. Riley Real Estate LLC & Cushman & Wakefield US Inc.

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent: GLAS USA LLC

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer

  • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Otterbourg PC & Bracewell LLP (William Wood)

    • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners (Mo Meghli)

  • TL Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

  • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

  • Ad Hoc Group of Certain Term Loan Lenders & First Lien Noteholders & DIP Lenders (H/2 Capital Partners, Ares Capital Management, Silver Point Capital, KKR, Whitebox Advisors, Sculptor Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management, Apollo, Owl Creek Asset Management LP, Sixth Street Partners)

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Thomas Kreller, Brian Kinney) & Porter Hedges LLP

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian)

  • Second Lien Noteholders (GoldenTree Asset Management, Carlson, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Littlejohn & Co.)

    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kris Hansen) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Kelli Norfleet, Charles Beckham)

    • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

  • Large equityholder: BlackRock Inc. (13.85%)

🌑New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Murray Energy Holdings Co.🌑

Murray Energy Holdings Co.

October 20, 2019

Ohio-based Murray Energy Holdings Co. and its 90+ affiliated debtors are now part of a not-so-exclusive club: the Bankrupted Coal Company Club (the “BCCC”)! Unlike some more recent small(er) coal bankruptcy filings, this one is a behemoth: the debtors own and operate 13 active mines in Ohio, West Virginia, eastern and western Kentucky, Alabama, Illinois, and Utah*; their primary product is thermal coal used for electricity (though, with recent acquisitions, the debtors are also now in the steel-making business). To give you a sense of the magnitude of this company, here are some key figures:

• Produced 53mm tons of bituminous coal in 2018;

• Employs 5,500 people, including 2,400 active union members EXCLUSIVE of folks employed through the debtors’ partnership with soon-to-be-BCCC-member Foresight Energy LP ($FELP);

• Generated $2.5b in coal sales and $542.3mm of EBITDA in 2018; and

• Carries $2.7b of funded debt on balance sheet, $298mm of annual interest and amort expenses, AND $8b+ in actual or potential liability obligations under various pension and benefit plans. In 2018, the debtors’ statutory or CBA-related employee and retiree obligations totaled approximately $160mm. These are key factors that explain why, ultimately, despite every effort to hold out, this company capitulated into bankruptcy.

This is a story of unfettered expansion and spending, hubris, misplaced trust in new Washington on the part of Robert Murray, and utterly savage disruption.

The disruption side of the equation is compelling. Per the company:

“The thermal coal markets that Murray traditionally serves have been meaningfully challenged over the past three to four years, and deteriorated significantly in the last several months. This sector-wide decline has been driven largely by (a) the closure of approximately 93,000 megawatts of coal-fired electric generating capacity in the United States, (b) a record production of inexpensive natural gas, and (c) the growth of wind and solar energy, with gas and renewables, displacing coal used by U.S. power plants.”

Interestingly, this one statement ties together so much of what we’ve all been seeing in the restructuring space. Over the last several years, there have been a number of power company bankruptcies and through bankruptcy or otherwise, capacity has been cut considerably (indeed, FirstEnergy is a recipient of Murray Energy coal and undoubtedly took measures to cut back on coal supply). Fracking across the US has led to a deluge of natural gas — so much so that producers are flaring excess natural gas due to a lack of pipe infrastructure with which to transport it. Despite structural challenges, natural gas exports are on the rise. From the U.S. Energy Information Administration just yesterday:

“From January through June of 2019, U.S. net natural gas exports averaged 4.1 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), more than double the average net exports in 2018 (2.0 Bcf/d), according to data in the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Natural Gas Monthly. The United States became a net natural gas exporter (exported more than it imported) on an annual basis in 2017 for the first time in almost 60 years.”

And as this odd illustration shows, the US is becoming increasingly dependent — in large part due to federal and state emissions standards — upon solar and wind for its electricity needs. The debtors highlight:

“…coal-fired installed capacity as a percentage of total installed capacity has fallen from 26 percent in 2013 to 20 percent in 2019, with coal-fired generation as a percentage of total generation falling from 35 percent in 2013 to 27 percent in early 2019. Natural gas and renewables installed electricity generation capacity in the United States as a percentage of total installed capacity has increased from 59 percent in 2013 to 67 percent in 2019, and natural gas and renewables generation as a percentage of total generation increased from 42 percent in 2013 to 48 percent in early 2019.”

YIKES. That is a DRAMATIC change. They continue:

“During its peak in 2007, coal was the power source for half of electricity generation in the United States and by early 2019, coal-fired electricity generation fell to approximately 27 percent. These challenges have intensified recently as (i) certain electric utility companies have filed for bankruptcy protection and others have sought, and received, subsidies for their nuclear generation capacity to avoid bankruptcy, at the expense of coal-fired facilities, (ii) domestic natural gas prices hit 20-year lows this past summer, and (iii) overall demand for electricity in the United States has declined two percent in 2019, further depleting demand for coal at domestic utilities.”

MAGA!!

The international story, though, ain’t much better, with the company noting a “perfect storm of negative forces” that includes:

“…low liquefied natural gas prices; a recent trade war driving Russia to increase exports; mild weather across the Northern Hemisphere led to a reduction in demand for heating in both Europe and Asia; higher freight costs; and a prolonged monsoon season in India which kept demand depressed while conditions cleared for a record eight months.”

As if all of that isn’t bad enough, the competitive landscape has been horrific and while we suppose its admirable to try and holdout to avoid the embarrassment and stigma of bankruptcy, that strategy clearly becomes untenable when literally every other competitor in the US has already joined the BCCC and stripped themselves of burdensome debt and pension obligations. The company acknowledges as much:

“…while Murray has historically been able to navigate the challenges of the coal marketplace, these rapidly deteriorating industry conditions have caused more than 40 coal companies to file for bankruptcy since 2008, with more than half a dozen major operators filing in the last year alone. These bankruptcies have affected thousands of workers across the United States, and they have left their mark on Murray. Competitors have used bankruptcy to reduce debt and lower their cost structures by eliminating cash interest obligations and pension and benefit obligations, leaving them better positioned to compete for volume and pricing in the current market, while Murray continued to satisfy its significant financial obligations required by the weight of its own capital structure and legacy liability expenses. As a result, Murray generated little cash after satisfying debt service obligations, paying employee health and pension benefits, and maintaining operations.”

That’s a quaint narrative but it’s also a bit misleading.

Several years ago, Bob Murray declared he would be the last man standing in coal. In the years since he expanded the company significantly and took on a lot of debt to do so: https://t.co/5HjPiUonzv pic.twitter.com/90h9IVyHig

— ⚡Taylor Kuykendall (@taykuy) October 29, 2019

While every other company was falling apart, Mr. Murray went on a shopping spree, snapping up Consolidation Coal Company, Foresight Energy LP (coming soon to a bankruptcy court near you), Mission Coal Company LLC, Armstrong Energy Inc., and certain Colombian assets. This undoubtedly led to increased integration costs and debt. During that time, the debtors deployed every capital structure trick in the book to extend maturities and kick the can down the road. That road has come to an end at the bankruptcy court doors.

Here is that sweet clean capital structure:

Man, that’s a beaut.

Rounding out the company’s extensive liabilities are the obligations to employees under CBAs and pension and benefit plans.

Pursuant to these CBAs, Murray contributes to three multi-employer retirement plans. If you want a sense of how employer-employee relations have changed since the 1970s, look no farther than the debtors’ obligations under what they’ve dubbed the “1974 Pension Plan.” Per the debtors:

“Following the large wave of chapter 11 filings in 2015 and 2016, more than half a dozen large U.S. coal companies collapsed into bankruptcy over the last several years and withdrew from the 1974 Pension Plan. When an employer withdraws, its vested beneficiaries remain in the 1974 Pension Plan and are referred to as “orphan” beneficiaries. The remaining contributing employers become responsible for the benefits of these orphaned participants who were never their employees. As a result, approximately 95 percent of beneficiaries who currently receive benefits from the 1974 Pension Plan last worked for employers that no longer contribute to the Plan. As of January 2019, 11 employers contribute to the 1974 Pension Plan, compared to over 2,800 in 1984. This has placed significant stress on the 1974 Pension Plan and the small number of contributing employers—Murray most of all. If Murray withdraws from the 1974 Pension Plan, the withdrawal liability could be $6.4 billion or more, with annual estimated payments of approximately $32 to $35 million in perpetuity.”

Whoa. And that’s just one plan: the company is also on the hook for others, not to mention $1.9b in other federally-mandated post-employment benefits, asset retirement obligations and environmental obligations.

Murray Energy has filed for bankruptcy. This is terrible if not surprising news for thousands of retired coal miners — Murray was basically the last big employer keeping their pension plan afloat. Now Murray will very likely try to shed pension obligations in bankruptcy court.

— Dave Jamieson (@jamieson) October 29, 2019

“Likely”?!?

The company has a restructuring support agreement with 60% of its “consenting superpriority lenders” and “consenting equityholders” (read: Robert Murray) that outlines the general terms of a path forward: a sale with the superpriority lenders as stalking horse bidder, DIP lender, and funder of administrative expenses. Those lenders committed to provide a $350mm DIP commitment. From here, the clock is ticking.

The debtors hope to have an auction within 135 days and plan confirmation within 195 days. And within 106 days the debtors want to have a solution their CBA/retiree problem or file a motion seeking to reject those agreements and modify those benefits.

Murray Energy, the largest coal company in the United States, filed for bankruptcy. If Murray rejects the UMWA pension plan obligations in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the UMWA pension fund will be insolvent by 2020. Before last night it was projected to be insolvent by 2022.

— Senator Joe Manchin (@Sen_JoeManchin) October 29, 2019

There is, as with most cases, a “cooler talk” aspect to this filing: there’s the Kirkland-is-dominating-with-yet-another-coal-bankruptcy-representation-post-westmoreland-and-mission-coal-and-armstrong-energy-which-means-that-A&M-is-dominating-which-means-that-Prime-Clerk-is-dominating-and-what-the-f*ck-happened-to-Jones-Day-which-used-to-crush-coal-filings-with-Peabody-and-Alpha-Natural-but-now-seems-to-be-unraveling-narrative, but putting aside that inside baseball crap and how much frikken cash this case is going to print for all of the above, it’s the miners themselves — those guys who were in the depths of the earth (as distinct from the white-collar professionals who always talk about “the trenches” and “hard fought” negotiations) — who are very likely to get completely and utterly shafted here. As if getting misled or lied to by Mr. Murray — however good his intentions may have been — and Mr. Trump wasn’t enough, they’re now facing the very real possibility of losing the benefits that they worked especially hard to get. All while the professionals are billing $1650/hour. Bankruptcy is vicious.

To point here is the UMWA’s statement about the bankruptcy:

“Today’s filing by Murray Energy for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization comes as no surprise. This day has been coming for some time.

Coal production in this country continues to decline, due to the glut of natural gas on the market and continued government preference for gas and renewable energy to replace coal-fired power generation. Combined with a recent severe reduction in coal exports, these factors delivered a one-two punch that an over-extended Murray Energy could not withstand.

Now comes the part where workers and their families pay the price for corporate decision-making and governmental actions. Murray will file a motion in bankruptcy court to throw out its collective bargaining agreement with the union. It will seek to be relieved of its obligations to retirees, their dependents and widows. We have seen this sad act too many times before.”

Let’s pour one out for the little guys.

*This number is contradicted in the bankruptcy papers. In one instance, the company’s new CEO indicates that there are 13 owned and operated mines; in another he says 18. Whatevs. What are 5 mines in the scheme of things (we’re kidding…WTF, y’all?). The company also owns and operates a mine in Colombia, South America.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Ohio (Judge Hoffman Jr.)

• Capital Structure: See Above

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Nicole Greenblatt, Ross Kwasteniet, Joseph Graham, Alexander Nicas, Mark McKane, Tricia Schwallier) & Dinsmore & Shohl LLP (Kim Martin Lewis, Alexandra Horwitz)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Robert Campagna)

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition ABL Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

  • Prepetition FILO and DIP FILO Lender: GACP Finance Co. LLC

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Jennifer Hagle, Leslie Plaskon, Anna Gumport) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Ronald Gold, Erin Severini

  • Prepetition Superpriority Agent: GLAS Trust Company LLC; DIP Administrative Agent: GLAS USA LLC; DIP Collateral Agent: GLAS Americas LLC

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Douglas Lutz, A.J. Webb, Bryan Sisto)

  • Term Loan Agent: Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLC

    • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi) & Keating Muething & Klekamp PLLC (Robert Sanker)

  • 1.5L Notes Indenture Trustee: U.S. Bank N.A.

  • 2L Notes Indenture Trustee (‘20 and ‘21): The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company N.A.

  • Ad Hoc Group of Superpriority Lenders

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen, James McClammy) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Douglas Lutz, A.J. Webb, Bryan Sisto)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Equityholders (Robert Murray)

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher (Brian Lennon, Matthew Feldman)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Bank of NY Mellon Trust Company NA, CB Mining Inc., Joy Global, RM Wilson Co., UMWA 1974 Pension Trust, United Mine Workers of America International Union, Wheeler Machinery Co.)

    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Todd Goren, Jennifer Marines, Erica Richards, Benjamin Butterfield)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Co. (William Derrough)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing -- Fusion Connect Inc.

Fusion Connect Inc.

June 3, 2019

We previously wrote about Fusion Connect Inc. ($FSNN), providers of “Unified Communications-as-a-Service” and “Infrastructure-as-a-Service” in “⛈A Dark "Cloud" on the Horizon⛈.” Therein we marveled at how special Fusion must be…to fail SO SPECTACULARLY in today’s cloud here, cloud there, cloud everywhere, everyone’s gaga for cloud environment. Cloud is SO captivating that it wasn’t until the company filed a piss poor 8-K back in April that a B. Riley FBR ($RILY) analyst FINALLY had an epiphany and declared that the company’s stock ought to be downgraded from “buy” to “neutral” (huh?!?) with a price target of $0.75 — down from $9.75/share. This is despite the fact that the stock hadn’t traded anywhere in the vicinity of $9.75/share in ages — nowhere even close, actually — but whatevs. Clearly, his head was in the cloud(s). This, ladies and gentlemen, demonstrates, in a nutshell, the utter worthlessness of equity analyst reports.🖕

But this isn’t a story about shoddy analyst research. That would be wholly unoriginal. This is a story about synergies and burdensome debt. Because, like, that’s so super original that you won’t read of it again until…well…you scroll below to the next bit of content about FTD!! 🙄

Boiled down to its simplest form, this company is the product of an acquisition strategy (and reverse merger) gone wrong. Like, in a major, major way. Per the company:

The Company pursued the Birch Merger with a vision of leveraging its existing processes and structures to create synergies between Fusion’s and Birch’s joined customer bases, combine network infrastructure assets to improve operational efficiencies, and ultimately drive material growth in Fusion’s and Birch’s combined annual revenue. In connection with the Birch Merger and MegaPath Merger, the Company incurred $680 million in secured debt. (emphasis added)

That reverse merger closed at the end of Q2, 2018. Yet…

Unfortunately, due to underperformance compared to business projections, the Company found itself with limited liquidity and at risk of default under its debt documents by early 2019.

Wait, what? Limited liquidity and risk of default by “early 2019”?!? Who the f*ck diligenced and underwrote this transaction?!? This sitch is so bad, that the company literally didn’t have enough liquidity to make a recent $6.7mm amort payment under the first lien credit agreement and a $300k interest payment on its unsecured debt. This is the company’s pre-petition capital structure:

• $20mm super senior L+10% June 2019 debt

• $43.3mm Tranche A Term Loans L+6.0% May 2022 debt

• $490.9mm Tranche B Term Loans L+8.5% May 2023 debt

• $39mm Revolving Loans L+6.0% May 2022 debt

• $85mm Second Lien L+10.5% November 2023 debt

• $13.3mm Unsecured Debt

Back in April we summed up the situation as follows:

The company’s recent SEC reports constitute a perfect storm of bad news. On April 2, the company filed a Form 8-K indicating that (i) a recently-acquired company had material accounting deficiencies that will affect its financials and, therefore, certain of the company’s prior filings “can no longer be relied upon,” (ii) it won’t be able to file its 10-K, (iii) it failed to make a $7mm interest payment on its Tranche A and Tranche B term loan borrowings due on April 1, 2019, and (iv) due to the accounting errors, the company has tripped various covenants under the first lien credit agreement — including its fixed charge coverage ratio and its total net leverage ratio.

Again, who diligenced the reverse merger?!? 😡

So here we are. In bankruptcy. To what end?

The company is seeking a dual-path restructuring that is all the rage these days: everyone loves to promote optionality that will potentially result in greater value to the estate. In the first instance, the company proposes, as a form of “stalking horse,” a “reorganization transaction” backed by a restructuring support agreement with certain of its lenders. This transaction would slash $300mm of the company’s $665mm of debt and result in the company’s first lien lenders owning the company. That is, unless a buyer emerges out of the woodwork with a compelling purchase price. To promote this possibility, the company is filing a bid procedures motion with the bankruptcy court with the hope of an eventual auction taking place. If a buyer surfaces with mucho dinero, the company will toggle over to a sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization. This would obviously be the optimal scenario. Absent that (and maybe even with that), we’ve got a jaw-dropping example of value destruction. “Fail fast,” many in tech say. These cloud bros listened!! Nothing like deep-sixing yourself with a misguided poorly-diligenced acquisition. Bravo!!

The company has secured a commitment for a fully-backstopped $59.5mm DIP that subsumes the $20mm in super senior pre-petition bridge financing recently provided by the first lien lenders. Is this DIP commitment good for general unsecured creditors? Is any of this generally good for unsecured creditors? Probably not.

Major creditors include a who’s who of telecommunications companies, including AT&T Inc. ($T) (first Donald Trump and now THIS…rough week for AT&T), Verizon Communications Inc. ($VZ), XO Communications (owned by VZ), Frontier Communications Corp. ($FTR)(which has its own issues to contend with as it sells assets to sure up its own balance sheet), CenturyLink Inc. ($CTL), Level 3 Communications ($LVLT), Time Warner Inc. ($TWX), and….wait for it…bankrupt Windstream Communications ($WINMQ). Because the hits just keep on coming for Windstream….

Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Bernstein)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Sunny Singh, Natasha Hwangpo)

  • Board of Directors: Matthew Rosen, Holcombe Green Jr., Marvin Rosen, Holcombe Green III, Michael Del Guidice, Lewis Dickey Jr., Rafe de la Gueronniere, Neil Goldman)

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Mark Katzenstein)

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners (Brent Herlihy, John Singh)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Ad Hoc First Lien Lender Group

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen)

    • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

  • DIP Lender: Credit Suisse Loan Funding LLC

  • DIP Agent, Prepetition Super Senior Agent & Prepetition First Lien Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Michael Messersmith, Sarah Grylll, Alan Glantz)

  • Prepetition Second Lien Successor Agent: GLAS America LLC & GLAS USA LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of Tranche A Term Loan/Revolving Lenders

    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Soogy Lee, Edward Linden)

  • Second Lien Lenders

    • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Charles Dale, Jon English)

  • Large Unsecured Creditor: AT&T

    • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (David Rosenzweig, Francisco Vazquez)

Updated 6/4/19 at 5:42am

New Chapter 11 Filing - EB Holdings II Inc. (Eco-Bat)

EB Holdings II Inc.

• 5/18/17 Recap: When you fail to repay nearly 1.8 billion Euro on a (PIK) note, you risk getting yo' a$$ involuntaried into bankruptcy court. Which is exactly the game of chicken that EB Holdings II Inc., the parent to lead recycling behemoth Eco-Bat, played with some irritated and aggressive hedge funds like GoldenTree Asset Management and Fortress Investment Group (see list below). The company, though, is of the view that this is all just a charade to avoid discovery in a state court trial to come. Apparently, there have been a variety of lawsuits and countersuits since Summer 2016 including some sexy allegations that sound a whole lot like fraud. So, the PIK lenders filed the involuntary petition to ensure that the company acts as a fiduciary to its creditors and get the benefit of court oversight over a principal they think is shady AF. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Nevada
• Capital Structure: 1.8b EUR PIK debt (GLAS USA LLC)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Garman Turner Gordon (Gregory Garman, Talitha Kozlowski, Gabrielle Hamm)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc PIK Lender Group (GoldenTree Asset Management LP, Alcentra Limited, Fortress Investment Group/Mount Kellett Capital Management, HIG Capital International Advisors LLP/Bayside Capital, Sound Point Capital Management LP, Varde Partners Europe LImited)
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Paul Basta, David Zott, William Guerrieri) & (local) Fox Rothschild LLP (Brett Axelrod)
  • GLAS USA LLC
    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Michael Guipoone, Benjamin Loveland, Charles Platt)

Updated 5/19/17