⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Rosehill Resources Inc. ($ROSE)⛽️

Rosehill Resources Inc. ($ROSE)

July 27, 2020

Stop us if you’ve heard this before: Rosehill Resources Inc. ($ROSE), a Texas-based independent E&P company focused, via a fellow-debtor operating company, Rosehill Operating Company LLC (“ROC”), on the Permian Basin (and, more specifically, the Delaware Basin), filed for bankruptcy because of the usual suspects that literally every oil and gas company blames. Seriously, it’s like everyone is just copying and pasting Arya Stark’s hitlist at this point: “Vladimir Putin, Mohammad Bin Salman Al Saud, COVID-19, the competition, too much debt, etc. etc.” Never mind: we’ll stop ourselves. We’ve all heard this before. Many. MANY. Times.

Speaking of the debt, here is what the capital structure looks like and this is what will happen to it pursuant to the prepackaged plan of reorganization that’s already on file:

©️PETITION LLC

That should be pretty self-explanatory but there are a few things to highlight:

• The $235mm exit RBL actually represents a decreased borrowing base. The original RCF had a maximum commitment of $500mm with a most recent borrowing base of $340mm. That borrowing base amount created a deficiency/liability the company struggled — when coupled with service obligations related to the RCF, secured notes and preferred stock — to make.

• The DIP will run at 8% PIK which is better than the 10% cash pay under the secured notes.

In terms of operations, Rosehill operates or owns working interests in 133 oil and gas wells of which 128 are producing or are capable of production. And here’s what that production looks like:

Is that interesting? Not particularly. We include only to demonstrate that we’re not the only ones who are capable of highly unfortunate and irritating typographical errors. More interesting is the fact that Rosehill earned $302.3mm in revenue in ‘19 against $239mm of operating expense. Revenue was basically flat from ‘18 whereas the company’s operating expense increased. On the plus side, the company had some favorable hedge agreements in place which, upon monetization, resulted in $87.6mm in proceeds that the company ultimately used to paydown its RCF immediately prior to the filing. Actually, who are we kidding? That’s not particularly interesting either.

Given how boring this bankruptcy is, the last thing we’ll mention — again because we and the entire world of finance seems to be obsessed with the topic — is that the company emanated out of … wait for it … wait for it … a SPAC!! While the company was originally incorporated in 2015 as a SPAC under the name KLR Energy Acquisition Corporation — sponsored by the KLR Group’s Edward Kovalik, Stephen Lee and Reid Rubinstein — the business corporation that ultimately became Rosehill Resources Inc. occurred in April 2017.

The rest, as they say, is now history. Perhaps we should start taking a running tally: new SPAC IPOs vs. old SPACs that have now filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy!

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: $226.5mm RCF, $106.1mm second lien secured notes,

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (David Feldman, Matthew Kelsey, Dylan Cassidy, Hillary Holmes, Shalla Prichard, Michael Neumeister, Ashtyn Hemendinger) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Kelli Norfleet, Arsalan Muhammad)

  • Financial Advisor: Opportune LLP

  • Investment Banker: Jefferies Group LLC (Jeffrey Finger)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Admin Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Mark Holmes) & Bracewell LLP (Jason Cohen)

  • Admin Agent to the Secured Note Purchase Agreement: US Bank NA

    • Legal: Shipman & Goodwin LLP (Kimberly Cohen, Robert Borden)

  • Second Lien Noteholders & Series B Preferred Stockholderes & Majority DIP Lenders: EIG Management Company LLC

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Chad Husnick, Christopher Koenig, Mary Kogut Brawley) & Zack A. Clement PLLC (Zach Clement)

  • Tax Receivable Claimant & Preferred and Common Stockholder: Tema Oil & Gas Company

    • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (James Kapp III, Brandon White, Nathan Coco, Fred Levenson, Michael Boykins)
      
      
      

🌎 New Chapter 11 Filing - Lakeland Tours LLC (d/b/a WorldStrides) 🌎

Lakeland Tours LLC (d/b/a WorldStrides)

July 20, 2020

Virginia-based Lakeland Tours LLC (d/b/a WorldStrides) and 22 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York, the latest in a relatively small group of COVID-related victims to end up in bankruptcy court. Similar to other pure-play filings (e.g., several Latin American airlines and Hertz Corporation $HTZ)), the debtors are in the travel industry; they are a provider of educational travel experiences in the US and abroad; they are the US’ largest accredited travel program serving hundreds of thousands of students and hundreds of universities annually. And they were doing well before the pandemic: in fiscal ‘19, the company generated approximately $650mm in net revenue and management projected $840mm in net revenue in ‘20. As we all know, “experiences” are all the rage these days and international student travel is far more common today than it was even five years ago (PETITION Note: seriously, folks, the company doesn’t even try to hide the social element to this … the above photo just screams “Pay us for an experience racked with non-stop selfies!). According to StudentUniverse and Skift, “[t]he student traveler represents fully one-fifth of all international arrivals in the travel industry, today. They command a market value of some $320 billion….”

A worldwide travel shutdown will obviously negatively impact that trend. And, by extension, obliterate the company’s projections. Indeed, the debtors were “decimated” by the worldwide shutdown of nonessential travel. Revenue? Lost. Future bookings? Crushed. Refund requests? Voluminous. The “negative net bookings” must have been off the charts. All in, these factors created a $200mm liquidity hole for the debtors.

This need for new capital, when coupled with the debtors’ burdensome capital structure ($768mm of funded debt), precipitated the need for a restructuring. And, alas, the debtors have a restructuring support agreement (the “RSA”) agreed to by the debtors’ prepetition secured lenders, their hedge provider and their equity sponsors, Eurazeo North America and Primavera Capital Limited. The RSA commits these consenting stakeholders to, among other things, a $200mm new capital infusion (exclusive of fees) split 50/50 between the consenting lenders and the sponsors which will roll into exit debt and equity.* Here are the highlights:

• The $100mm provided by the lenders will roll into an exit facility;

• The $150mm roll-up will roll into a second-out term loan take-back facility; and

• The $100mm provided by the equity sponsors will convert into 100% of the common stock of the reorganized debtors (subject to dilution from a management incentive plan).

• Holders of $126mm in subordinated seller notes will get wiped out along with existing equity interests.

• General unsecured creditors will ride-through paid in full.

• The major parties to the RSA will get releases under the proposed plan: creditors who vote to reject the plan will need to affirmatively opt-out of the releases.

The debtors already commenced solicitation and hope to confirm the plan on or about August 19. The post-reorg capital structure will look like this:

The above graphic is the biggest “tell” that the filing is predominantly about access to fresh capital. The deleveraging (of only $100mm) is rather secondary and inconsequential relative to the $200mm cash infusion. Which begs the question: if the debtors perform dramatically under business plan in coming years — perhaps, uh, due to a decrease in international student travel — will the company be in need of another restructuring? PETITION Note: as we write this, a talking head is pontificating on CNBC that business travel will be significantly lower in coming years than it had been — confirming the premise of this Bloomberg piece. If parents aren’t traveling for work, will they let their children travel for school?

The debtors certainly acknowledge the risks. In the “risk factors” section of their Disclosure Statement, they note that a “second wave” of COVID-19 could impact results (PETITION Note: we need to conquer the “first wave” to get to the “second wave,” but, yeah, sure.). They state:

The Debtors cannot predict when any of the various international or domestic travel restrictions will be eased or lifted. Moreover, even when travel advisories and restrictions are lifted, demand for study abroad and student travel may remain reduced for a significant length of time, and the Debtors cannot predict if and when demand will return to pre-pandemic levels. Due to the discretionary nature of educational travel spending, the Debtors’ revenues are heavily influenced by the condition of the U.S. economy and economies in other regions of the world. Unfavorable conditions in these broader economies have resulted, and may result in the future, in decreased demand for educational travel, changes in booking practices and related policies by the Debtors’ competitors, all of which in turn have had, and may have in the future, a strong negative effect on the Debtors’ business. In particular, the Debtors’ bookings may be negatively impacted by the adverse changes in the perceived or actual economic climate, including higher unemployment rates, declines in income levels and loss of personal wealth resulting from the impact of COVID-19. The Debtors’ bookings may also be impacted by continued and prolonged school closings.

And they add:

This is the first time since September 11, 2001 that the Debtors have suspended their tours, and is the first time the Debtors have completely suspended their tours for an extended period of time. As a result of these unprecedented circumstances, the Debtors are not able to predict the full impact of such a suspension. In particular, the Debtors cannot predict the impact on financial performance and cash flows required for cash refunds of fares for cancelled tours as a result of a suspension of tours if such suspensions are prolonged further than anticipated, as well as the public’s concern regarding the health and safety of travel, and related decreases in demand for travel. Depending on the length of the suspension and level of customer acceptance of future tour credits, the Debtors may be required to provide additional cash refunds for a substantial portion of the balance of deferred tours, as customers who have opted to defer tours may request a cash refund.

And so it looks like the debtors are conservatively projecting $367.9mm of revenue in fiscal year 2021, slightly more than half of what they did in ‘19. They don’t expect to revert back to projected ‘20 numbers until at least 2024. Yes, 2024.

Now, generally, projections are almost always worthless. As the debtors’ risk factors suggest here, they may be even more worthless than usual depending upon how COVID shakes out. At least management appears to be realistic here that the business will not return to pre-COVID levels for some time. Let’s hope that a vaccine comes and they’re positioned to surprise to the upside.**

_____

*$150mm of pre-petition secured debt will roll-up into the DIP.

**Houlihan Lokey pegs valuation between approximately $625mm and $745mm as of September 30, 2020.

---

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Garrity)

• Capital Structure: $642mm RCF/TL/LOCs, $126mm subordinated seller notes

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Nicole Greenblatt, Jennifer Perkins, Susan Golden, Whitney Fogelberg, Kimberly Pageau, Elizabeth Jones)

  • DIrectors: Bob Gobel, Lisa Mayr (ID)

  • Financial Advisor: KPMG LLP (James Grace, Thomas Bibby)

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Sam Handler, Stephen Spencer)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition & DIP Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Adam Goldberg, Hugh Murtagh)

  • Seller Noteholders: Metalmark Capital Holdings LLC & Silverhawk Capital Partners

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Michael Davis)

  • Sponsors: Eurazeo North America & Primavera Capital Limited

    • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz) & Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Michael Torkin)

    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

  • Ad Hoc Group of Consenting Lenders

    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Scott Greenberg, Steven Domanowski, Jeremy Evans)

    • Financial Advisor: Rothschild & Co.

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN)

Jason Industries Inc.

June 24, 2020

Wisconsin-based Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN) and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) filed a long-anticipated (prepackaged) chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday — the latest in a line of manufacturers (e.g., Pyxus International Inc., Libbey Glass Inc., Exide Holdings Inc., Pace Industries LLC) to wind its way into bankruptcy court.

The company is an amalgam of decades of growth by acquisition: it launched its components and seating businesses with acquisitions in ‘93 and ‘95, respectively. Everything appeared to be hunky-dory heading into the Great Financial Crisis when things took a turn for the worse.

And so this isn’t the company’s first rodeo in distress. Back in ‘08-’09, the company engaged in a recapitalization transaction supported by Falcon Investment Advisors LLC and Hamilton Lane Advisors; it persevered through the downturn and ultimately sold to a special-purpose-acquisition-company (Quinpairo Acquisition Corp.) in 2014 for $538.6mm. The acquisition was financed through a combination of (i) the $172.5mm raised by the SPAC in its ‘13 IPO, (ii) rollover equity from the aforementioned sponsors (and management), and (iii) $420mm of first and second lien debt. Stick a pin in that last number: it comes back to haunt the debtors. 👻

In the years since, the company streamlined its operations — selling off assets (i.e., its fiber solutions business and a metal components business) and consolidating around two primary business segments. Through their industrial segment, the debtors manufacture a bunch of stuff used for industrial and infrastructure applications; and through their engineered components segment, the debtors manufacture (a) motorcycle seats, (b) operator seats for construction, agriculture, law and turf care and other industrial equipment markets, and (c) seating for the power sports market. Said another way, the company is heavily indexed to the automotive, heavy truck, steel and construction markets. Powered by approximately 700 employees in the US, the company did $338mm in net sales in 2019.

And that is part of the problem. $338mm in net sales represented an 8.2% ($30.1mm) dropoff from 2018. Adjusted EBITDA declined from $36.7mm in ‘18 to $24.8mm in ‘19. Both segments have been underperforming for years. The question is why?

The debtors cite a dramatic dropoff in demand in ‘19. They note:

This reduction was largely caused by reduced end market demand in key industries across the portfolio, specifically, weak economic conditions in Europe and Asia, lower industrial production in North America, and softening end market demand from OEM customers. For example, since as early as the first quarter of 2019, the Company has experienced reduced OEM build and channel inventory destocking. These problems were exacerbated by the operational disruption and demand reduction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, the debtors busted out the standard playbook to try and manage liquidity (while parallel-tracking a fruitless pre-petition sale and marketing effort). They (a) intensified focus on growing market segments, (b) reduced capital investment in non-core businesses, (c) cut/furloughed labor and instituted pay reductions for execs and other employees (and eliminated a 401(k) match program), (d) closed plants and manufacturing facilities and deferred rent payments or negotiated reduced rent at leased properties, (e) accelerated the consolidation of plants acquired in a recent acquisition, and (f) invested in automation at their facilities to reduce future operating costs (read: replace expensive human beings) and expand margins. Still, the debtors struggled.

…the pandemic’s impact on orders and revenues, combined with preexisting fixed costs and debt service requirements, have constrained available working capital, reduced profitability and cash flow, and significantly impaired the Company’s ability to adequately finance operations.

Which gets us back to the capital structure:

Given where EBITDA numbers were coming in, this thing’s leverage ratio was through the roof. More to the point, the debtors deferred a March 31 second lien interest payment and had been operating under a series of forbearance agreements ever since. Luckily, the capital structure isn’t all-too-complicated and lends itself well to a prepackaged bankruptcy. And so here we are with a restructuring support agreement and proposed prepackaged plan which will effectively turn the company over to the first lien term lenders and, but for some warrants, wipe out the second lien term lenders. Here’s how the above capital structure breaks down:

Source: PETITION LLC

A couple of notable features here:

• Drop it Likes its Hot. There’s a “first lien put option” baked into the plan pursuant to which any first lien term lender who doesn’t want to own equity or the junior converts can “put” its pro rata share of that equity/converts to a first lien lender, Pelican Loan Advisors III LLC (or lenders as the case may be), which has agreed to backstop this baby. Pelican is managed by Monomoy Capital Partners.

• F*ck You Pay Me. Those first lien lenders who consented to forbearances all of those months are about to get paaaaaaayyyyyyyyydd. They’ll receive a pro rated share of and interest in $10mm worth of open market purchases by the debtors of first lien credit agreement claims held by consenting first lien lenders AND a forbearance fee equal to 4.00% of the principal amount of the first lien credit agreement loans held by the consenting lenders as of a date certain. The open market purchases were, presumably, accomplished prior to the filing with 2% of the fee already paid and the remaining 2% to be paid-in-kind on the earlier of the termination date of the RSA or the plan effective date.

• It’s a Trap! Warrants are technically going to be issued to the first lien term lenders and “gifted” to the second lien lenders. But only if they vote to accept the plan. Given the midpoint total enterprise value of $200mm and resultant deficiency claim, this is a nice absolute priority rule workaround. As reflected in the graphic above, the allowed deficiency claim of $64.9mm is obviously impaired and will get a big fat 🍩.

And so this is what the capital structure will look upon emergence:

The first lien lenders have consented to the use of their cash collateral to fund the cases.*

* ⚡️July 15, 2020 Update: The Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee, however, filed a limited objection to the cash collateral motion on the basis that a final order should (a) limit any credit bid to their collateral (noting that a material amount of assets — including 35% of the equity in foreign subs — are excluded from the first lien lenders’ collateral package, and (b) require a finding that there’s diminution of value of the first lien lenders’ collateral such that they, despite providing no new financing, ought to be granted a superpriority lien on previously unencumbered assets. The Committee also previewed objections it will have to the plan of reorganization. For a purportedly “prepackaged” chapter 11, this one looks like it could be more contentious than most. A final hearing on the cash collateral motion is set for July 22, 2020.⚡️

---

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Laura Krucks, Dan Latona, Jake Gordon, Yates French)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Rebecca Roof)

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Large equityholder: Wynnefield Capital Management LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Creditors (Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Voya CLO Ltd., American Money Management Corp., First Eagle Alternative Credit LLC, Angel Island Capital Services LLC, Monomoy Capital Partners LP, Z Capital Partners LLC)

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Ryan Preston Dahl, Alexander Welch)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • First Lien Agent: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Gregg Bateman)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders: Corre Partners Management LLC, Newport Global Advisors

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steve Pohl, Shari Dwoskin, Kenneth Aulet)

    • Financial Advisor: DC Advisory LLC

Update July 17, 2020

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Akorn Inc. ($AKRX) 💊

Akorn Inc.

May 20, 2020

Akorn Inc. ($AKRX), a specialty pharmaceutical company based in Illinois that develops, manufactures and markets generic and branded prescription pharmaceuticals, finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Why “finally?” Well, back in January 2019 the company, in conjunction with an announcement of new executive and board appointments, noted that restructuring professionals (Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, PJT Partners LP and AlixPartners LLP)* were assisting with the formulation of a business plan and discussions with stakeholders. In December 2019, the publicly-traded company acknowledged in an SEC filing that bankruptcy was on the table, sending the stock into a 33% freefall. Subsequently, in February 2020, the company announced in connection with its Q4 and annual earnings that it had reached an agreement with its lenders to execute a sale of the business “potentially using Chapter 11 protection.” A sale, however, could not generate sufficient value to cover the outstanding funded indebtedness under the company’s term loan credit agreement. Shortly thereafter in March, the company defaulted under said agreement and the company and its lenders pivoted to discussions about a credit bid with an ad hoc group of term lenders serving as stalking horse purchaser of the assets in chapter 11. Alas, here we are. The company and 16 affiliates (the “debtors”) “FINALLY” find themselves in court with recently inked asset purchase and restructuring support agreements in tow. The debtors will use the bankruptcy process to further their sale process and market test bids against the term lenders’ proposed $1.05b credit bid; they hope to have an auction in the beginning of August with a mid/late-August sale hearing.

The sale process, however, is not where the excitement is here.

We are now in an age — post COVID-19 — where M&A deals falling apart is becoming commonplace news and debates about force majeure and “material adverse effect” rage on in the news and, eventually, in the courts. In that respect, Akorn was ahead of the curve.

In April 2017, Akorn and Fresenius Kabi AG ($FSNUY), a massive German healthcare company, announced a proposed merger with Akorn shareholders set up to receive $34/share — a sizable premium to the then prevailing stock price in the high-20s. (PETITION Note: for purposes of comparison, the stock was trading at $1.26/share on the aforementioned announcement of annual earnings). Akorn shareholders approved the merger but then the business began to suffer. Per the debtors:

…Akorn began to experience a steep and sustained drop-off in financial performance drive by a variety of factors, including, among other things: consolidation of buyer power leading to price reductions; the FDA’s expedition of its review and approval process for generic drugs, leading to increased competition and resultant additional price and volume erosion; and legislative attempts to reduce drug prices.

Almost exactly a year later — after all kinds of shady-a$$ sh*t including anonymous letters alleging data integrity and regulatory deficiencies at Akron facilities and sustained poor financial performance — Fresenius was like “we out.” Lawsuits ensued with Akorn seeking to enforce the merger and Fresenius parrying with “material adverse effect” defenses. The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with Fresenius.

This is America so lawsuits beget lawsuits and Fresenius’ announcement that the merger was at risk spawned (i) federal class action litigation against Akron and certain of its present and former directors and officers and (ii) federal and state law derivative litigation. Akorn ultimately settled the class action litigation but four groups of hedge funds opted out and continue to pursue claims against Akorn. Meanwhile, Akorn lost its appeal of the Delaware Chancery Court decision and a decision on Fresenius’ claims for damages remain reserved. Fresenius has at least a $74mm claim.

This litigation overhang — coupled with the debtors’ $861.7mm in term loans (emanating out of strategic acquisitions in 2014) — is what drives this bankruptcy. The debtors believe that, upon resolution of these issues, it is well-positioned to thrive. They had $682mm revenue in ‘19 and $124mm of adjusted EBITDA. In Q1 ‘20, the company achieved adjusted EBITDA of $59mm (PETITION Note: “adjusted” being an operative word here). Large wholesale distributors like AmerisourceBergen Corporation ($ABC), Cardinal Health Inc. ($CAH), and McKesson Corporation ($MCK) are large customers. The U.S. healthcare system is shifting towards generics and big brand-name pharmaceuticals are rolling off-patent and “driving generic opportunities.” Pre-petition efforts to find a buyer who shares the debtors’ optimism, however, proved unfruitful.

Armed with a $30mm DIP commitment from certain of the term lenders in the ad hoc group, the debtors will swiftly determine whether the prospect of owning these assets “free and clear” will generate any higher or better offers.

*Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in its quest for 32,892,239% restructuring market share, ultimately displaced Cravath.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

• Capital Structure: $861.7mm ‘21 Term Loans (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Nicole Greenblatt, Gregory Pesce, Christopher Hayes) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Mark Buschmann)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Term Loan & DIP Agent ($30mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

  • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher (Scott Greenberg, Steven Domanowski, Jeremy Evans, Michael J. Cohen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady)

    • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. LLC (Neil Augustine)

  • Large equityholders: Blackrock Inc., The Vanguard Group, Akorn Holdings LP, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. ($HOSS)⛽️

Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc.

May 19, 2020

Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. and 13 affiliates (the “debtors”), providers of marine transportation services to petroleum exploration and production, oilfield service, offshore construction and US military customers, filed prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcies in the Southern District of Texas. Judge Isgur and Judge Jones must be thinking “Thank G-d”: for the judges, “prepackaged” is the operative word here and a quickie case amidst some of these melting ice cubes (e.g., J.C. Penney) must be a welcome breath of fresh air.

Hornbeck is one of those companies that people have been watching ever since 2015 — mostly on account of (i) the idea that offshore drilling had become prohibitively expensive in a falling commodity price environment and (ii) thanks to years of capital-intensive vessel construction programs and vessel acquisitions, an over-levered balance sheet. The good news is that, because of those programs/acquisitions, the company is relatively well-positioned with a nimble and younger fleet (76 vessels in total) — a fact that’s surely recognized by the company’s future equity holders. The bad news is that, with this much debt, even Hornbeck couldn’t postpone the inevitable bankruptcy ad infinitum when oil is where it is. Per the company:

Despite the Company’s relative strengths in its core markets, recent industry trends have had a materially adverse impact on the offshore energy industry and on the Company in particular. While the Company is accustomed to, and built for, the cyclical nature of the oilfield services industry, the recent downturn in the industry has lasted nearly six years, much longer than any previous cycles in the deepwater era, and has put pressure on the Company’s ability to repay or refinance its significant debt obligations.

This is what the funded debt looks like:

Despite that ghastly capital structure and the unfriendly market, Hornbeck, unlike other players in the space like Tidewater Inc. and GulfMark Offshore Inc., managed to stay out of bankruptcy. To do so, it pulled every lever in the book:

• Stacking of vessels to right-size the size of the available fleet relative to demand? ✅

• Defer drydocking costs? ✅

• Onshore and offshore personnel pay cuts? ✅

• Selectively taking on assignments, avoiding long-term Ks and insurance risk? ✅

This is all great but of course there’s still that monstrosity of a balance sheet. In tandem with the operational restructuring, the company has been pursuing strategic balance sheet transactions since 2017 — some more successful than others. The most recent attempt of out-of-court exchange offers and consent solicitations was in early February and though it got a super-majority of support from holders of the ‘20 and ‘21 notes, it failed to meet the required 99% threshold to consummate the deal. On March 23, the date of the bottom of the stock market (irrelevant…just a fun fact), the company terminated the offers. After a long road over many years, bankruptcy became more of a reality.

And so here we are. With the amount of support indicated on the offers, this thing set up nicely for a prepackaged plan. Regarding the plan, there’s a whole lot going on there because of the way the exit facilities are contemplated and the fact that there are Jones Act compliance issues but suffice it to say that the plan treats the first lien lenders as the fulcrum security. The second lien lenders will get a tip and the unsecured noteholders essentially walk away with a small equity kiss and warrants. The company will require liquidity on the back end of the chapter 11 and so the plan also contemplates a $100mm rights offering in exchange for 70% of the reorganized equity.

The debtors will fund the cases via a $75mm DIP credit facility which includes $56.25 million funded by certain secured lenders and $18.75 million funded by certain unsecured noteholders.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: $50mm ABL (Wilmington Trust NA), $350mm first lien facility (Wilmington Trust NA), $121.2mm second lien facility (Wilmington Trust NA), $224.3mm ‘20 unsecured notes, $450mm ‘21 unsecured notes

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Ryan Blaine Bennett, Ameneh Bordi, Debbie Farmer, Emily Flynn, Michael Lemm, Benjamin Rhode) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Kristhy Peguero, Jennifer Wertz, Veronica Polnick)

  • Financial Advisor: Portage Point Partners LLC

  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent ($75mm): Wilmington Trust NA

  • Counsel to the Consenting Secured Lenders

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Darren Klein, Stephanie Massman)

  • Counsel to Consenting Unsecured Notes

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Gerard Uzzi, Brett Goldblatt, James Ball)

  • Large equityholders: Cyrus Capital Partners LP, Fine Capital Partners LP, William Hurt Hunt Trust Estate

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - J.C. Penney Company Inc. ($JCP)

J.C. Penney Company Inc.

May 15, 2020

Let’s be clear about something right off the bat. Encino Man, Captain America and Austin Powers could all suddenly surface from being entombed in ice for decades and even THEY wouldn’t be surprised that Texas-based J.C. Penney Company Inc. (and 17 affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

There are a couple of ways to look at this one.

First, there’s the debtors’ way. Not one to squander a solid opportunity, the debtors dive under “COVID Cover”:

“Before the pandemic, the Company had a substantial liquidity cushion, was improving its operations, and was proactively engaging with creditors to deleverage its capital structure and extend its debt maturities to build a healthier balance sheet. Unfortunately, that progress was wiped out with the onset of COVID-19. And now, the Company is unable to maintain its upward trajectory through its “Plan for Renewal.” Moreover, following the temporary shutdown of its 846 brick-and-mortar stores, the Company is unable to responsibly pay the upcoming debt service on its over-burdened capital structure.”

The debtors note that since Jill Soltau became CEO on October 2, 2018, the debtors have been off to the races with their “Plan for Renewal” strategy. This strategy was focused on getting back to JCP’s fundamentals. It emphasized (a) offering compelling merchandise, (b) delivering an engaging experience, (c) driving traffic online and to stores (including providing buy online, pickup in store or curbside pickup — the latest in retail technology that literally everyone is doing), (d) fueling growth, and (e) developing a results-minded culture. The debtors are quick to point out that all of this smoky verbiage is leading to “meaningful progress” — something they define as “…having just achieved comparable store sales improvement in six of eight merchandise divisions in the second half of 2019 over the first half, and successfully meeting or exceeding guidance on all key financial objectives for the 2019 fiscal year.” The debtors further highlight:

The five financial objectives were: (a) Comparable stores sales were expected to be down between 7-8% (stores sales were down 7.7%); (b) adjusted comparable store sales, which excludes the impact of the Company’s exit from major appliances and in-store furniture categories were expected to be down in a range of 5-6% (adjusted comparable store sales down 5.6%); (c) cost of goods sold, as a rate of net sales was expected to decrease 150-200 basis points (decreased approximately 210 basis points over prior year, which resulted in improved gross margin); (d) adjusted EBITDA was $583 million (a 2.6% improvement over prior year); and (e) free cash flow for fiscal year 2019 was $145 million, beating the target of positive.

Not exactly the highest bar in certain respects but, sure, progress nonetheless we suppose. The debtors point out, on multiple occasions, that prior to COVID-19, its “…projections showed sufficient liquidity to maintain operations without any restructuring transaction.” Maintain being the operative word. Everyone knows the company is in the midst of a slow death.

To prolong life, the focus has been on and remains on high-margin goods (which explains the company getting out of low-margin furniture and appliances and a renewed focus on private label), reducing inventory, and developing a new look for JCP’s stores which, interestingly, appears to focus on the “experiential” element that everyone has ballyhooed over the last several years which is now, in a COVID world, somewhat tenuous.

Which gets us to the way the market has looked at this. The numbers paint an ugly picture. Total revenues went from $12.87b in fiscal year ‘18 to $12b in ‘19. Gross margin also declined from 36% to 34%. In the LTM as of 2/1/20 (pre-COVID), revenue was looking like $11.1b. Curious. But, yeah, sure COGs decreased as has SG&A. People still aren’t walking through the doors and buying sh*t though. A fact reflected by the stock price which has done nothing aside from slowly slide downward since new management onboarded:

All of this performance has also obviously called into question the debtors’ ability to grow into its capital structure:

Here’s a more detailed look at the breakdown of unsecured funded debt:

And yet, prior to COVID, the debt stack has more or less held up. Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘23 5.875% $500mm senior secured first lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘25 8.624% $400mm second lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

And here is our absolute favorite: JCP’s ‘97 7.625% $500mm senior unsecured notes:

The fact that these notes were in the 20s mere months ago is mind-boggling.

We talk a lot about how bankruptcy filings are a way to tell a story. And, here, the debtors, while not trying to hide their stretched balance sheet nor the pains of brick-and-mortar department stores with a 846-store footprint, are certainly trying to spin a positive story about management and the new strategic direction — all while highlighting that there are pockets of value here. For instance, of those 846 stores, 387 of them are owned, including 110 operating on ground leases. The private brand portfolio — acquired over decades — represents 46% of total merchandise sales. The debtors also own six of their 11 distribution centers and warehouses.

With that in mind, prior to COVID, management and their advisors were trying to be proactive about the balance sheet — primarily the term loans and first lien secured notes maturing in 2023. In Q3 ‘19, the debtors engaged with their first lien noteholders, term lenders and second lien noteholders on proposals that would, among other things, address those maturities, promote liquidity, and reduce interest expense. According to the debtors, they came close. A distressed investor was poised to purchase more than $750mm of the term loans and, in connection with a new $360mm FILO facility, launch the first step of a broader process that would have kicked maturities out a few years. In exchange, the debtors would lien up unencumbered collateral (real estate). Enter COVID. The deal went up in smoke.

There’s a new “deal” in its stead. A restructuring support agreement filed along with the bankruptcy papers contemplates a new post-reorg operating company (“New JCP”) and a new REIT which will issue new common stock and new interests, respectively. Beyond that, not much is clear from the filing: the term sheet has a ton of blanks in it:

There’s clearly a lot of work to do here. There’s also the “Market Test” element which entails, among other things, running new financing processes, pursuing potential sale/leaseback transactions, and pursuing a sale of the all or part of the debtors’ assets. If the debtors don’t have a business plan by July 14 and binding commitments for third-party financing by August 15, the debtors are required to immediately cease pursuing a plan and must instead pursue a 363 of all of their assets. Said another way, if the economy continues to decline, consumer spending doesn’t recover, and credit markets tighten up, there’s a very good chance that JCP could liquidate. Remember: retail sales sunk to a record low in April. Is that peak pain? Or will things get worse as the unemployment rate takes root? Will people shop at JC Penney if they even shop at all? There are numerous challenges here.

The debtors will use cash collateral for now and later seek approval of a $900mm DIP credit facility of which $450mm will be new money (L+11.75% continues the trend of expensive retail DIPs). It matures in 180 days, giving the debtors 6 months to get this all done.

*****

A few more notes as there are definitely clear winners and losers here.

Let’s start with the losers:

1. The Malls. It’s one thing when one department store files for bankruptcy and sheds stores. It’s an entirely different story when several of them go bankrupt at the same time and shed stores. This is going to be a bloodbath. Already, the debtors have a motion on file seeking to reject 20 leases.

2. Nike Inc. ($NKE) & Adidas ($ADDYY). Perhaps they’re covered by 503(b)(9) status or maybe they can slickster their way into critical vendor status (all for which the debtors seek $15.1mm on an interim basis and $49.6mm on a final basis). Regardless, showing up among the top creditors in both the Stage Stores Inc. bankruptcy and now the J.C. Penney bankruptcy makes for a horrible week.

3. The Geniuses Who Invested in JCP Debt that Matures in 2097. As CNBC’s Michael Santoli noted, “This JC Penney issue fell only 77 years short of maturing money-good.”

4. Bill Ackman & Ron Johnson. This.

And here are the winners:

1. The New York Times. Imperfect as it may be, their digitalization efforts allow us all to read and marvel about the life of James Cash Penney, a name that so befitting of a Quentin Tarantino movie that you can easily imagine JC chillin with Jack Dalton on some crazy Hollywood adventure. We read it with sadness as he boasts of the Golden Rule and profit-sharing. Profits alone would be nice, let alone sharing.

2. Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Seriously. These guys are smoking it and have just OWNED retail. In the past eight days alone the firm has filed Stage Stores Inc., Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC and now JCP. It’s a department store hat trick. Zoom out from retail and add in Ultra Petroleum Corp. and Intelsat SA and these folks are lucky they’re working from home. They can’t afford to waste any billable minutes on a commute at this point.

3. Management. They’re getting what they paid for AND, consequently, they’re getting paid. No doubt Kirkland marched in there months ago and pitched/promised management that they’d secure lucrative pay packages for them if hired and … BOOM! $7.5mm to four members of management!

---

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Christopher Marcus, Aparna Yenamandra, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Allyson Smith Weinhouse, Jake William Gordon) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

  • OpCo (JC Penney Corporation Inc.) Independent Directors: Alan Carr, Steven Panagos

    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Steven Reisman)

  • PropCo (JCP Real Estate Holdings LLC & JC Penney Properties LLC) Independent Directors: William Transier, Heather Summerfield

    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (James Mesterharm, Deb Reiger-Paganis)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke, Michael Weitz)

  • Store Closing Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

  • Real Estate Consultants: B. Riley Real Estate LLC & Cushman & Wakefield US Inc.

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent: GLAS USA LLC

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer

  • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Otterbourg PC & Bracewell LLP (William Wood)

    • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners (Mo Meghli)

  • TL Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

  • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

  • Ad Hoc Group of Certain Term Loan Lenders & First Lien Noteholders & DIP Lenders (H/2 Capital Partners, Ares Capital Management, Silver Point Capital, KKR, Whitebox Advisors, Sculptor Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management, Apollo, Owl Creek Asset Management LP, Sixth Street Partners)

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Thomas Kreller, Brian Kinney) & Porter Hedges LLP

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian)

  • Second Lien Noteholders (GoldenTree Asset Management, Carlson, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Littlejohn & Co.)

    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kris Hansen) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Kelli Norfleet, Charles Beckham)

    • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

  • Large equityholder: BlackRock Inc. (13.85%)

🥾New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Stage Stores Inc. ($SSI) 🥾

Stage Stores Inc.

April 10, 2020

Houston-based Stage Stores Inc. ($SSI) marks the second department store chain to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy in Texas this week, following on the heals of Neiman Marcus. With John Varvatos and J.Crew also filing this week, the retail sector is clearly starting to buckle. All of these names — with maybe the exception of Varvatos — were potentially headed towards chapter 11 pre-COVID. As were J.C. Penney Corp. ($JCP) and GNC Holdings Inc. ($GNC), both of which may be debtors by the end of this week. Sh*t is getting real for retail.

We first wrote about Stage Stores in November ‘18, highlighting dismal department store performance but a seemingly successful experiment converting 8 department stores to off-price. At the time, its off-price business had a 9.9% comp sales increase. Moreover, the company partnered with ThredUp, embracing the secondhand apparel trend. While we have no way of knowing whether this drove any revenue, it, in combination with the conversions, showed that management was thinking outside the box to reverse disturbing retail trends.

By March ‘19, the company was on record with plans to close between 40-60 department stores. In August ‘19, it became public knowledge that Berkeley Research Group was working with the company. The company reported Q2 ‘19 results that — the hiring of a restructuring advisor with a lot of experience with liquidating retailers, aside — actually showed some promise. We wrote:

Thursday was a big day for the company. One one hand, some big mouths leaked to The Wall Street Journal that the company retained Berkeley Research Group to advise on department store operations. That’s certainly not a great sign though it may be a positive that the company is seeking assistance sooner rather than later. On the other hand, the company reported Q2 ‘19 results that were, to some degree, somewhat surprising to the upside. Net sales declined merely $1mm YOY and comp sales were 1.8%, a rare increase that stems the barrage of consecutive quarters of negative turns. Off-price conversions powered 1.5% of the increase. The company reported positive trends in comps, transaction count, average transaction value, private label credit card growth, and SG&A. On the flip side, COGs increased meaningfully, adjusted EBITDA declined $2.1mm YOY and interest expense is on the rise. The company has $324mm of debt. Cash stands at $25mm with $66mm in ABL availability. The company’s net loss was $24mm compared to $17mm last year.

Some of the reported loss is attributable to offensive moves. The company’s inventory increased 5% as the company seeks to avoid peak shipping expense and get out ahead of tariff risk (PETITION Note: see a theme emerging here, folks?). There are also costs associated with location closures: the company will shed 46 more stores.

What’s next? Well, the company raised EBITDA guidance for fiscal ‘19: management is clearly confident that the off-price conversion will continue to drive improvements. No analysts were on the earnings call to challenge the company. Restructuring advisors will surely want to pay attention to see whether management’s optimism is well-placed.

As we wrote in February ‘20, subsequent results showed that “management’s optimism was, in fact, misplaced.” Now, three months later, the company is in court.

We should take a second to note that this is a potential sale case. The first day papers, therefore, are meant to paint a picture that will draw interest from potential buyers. And so it’s all about the successful conversion of stores. Indeed, the company asserts that its transformation WAS, in fact, taking hold as it moved beyond the initial small batch of store conversions to a more wholesale approach to off-price. By September 2019, 82 store transitions had been completed. And, to date, 233 department stores have been converted to the Gordmans off-price model (PETITION Note: the company acquired Gordmans out of bankruptcy. The company also deigns to suggest that the stock price increase from under a dollar in January ‘19 to $9.50 in early ‘20 is indicative of the market’s support of the off-price conversion and the potential for success post-conversion — as if stock prices mean sh*t in this interest rate environment.). The company now has 289 off-price stores in total (including the Gordmans acquisition) and 437 department stores.

Enter COVID-19 here. No operations = no liquidity. The company’s conversion plan stopped in its tracks. Like every other retailer in the US, the company stopped paying rent and furloughed thousands of employees. “Combined with zero revenue and uncertainty associated with consumer demand in the coming months, Stage Stores, like so many others, is in the middle of a perfect storm.”

The company’s plan in bankruptcy appears to be to leave open any and all optionality. One one hand, it will liquidate inventory, wind-down operations and close stores. On the other hand, it will pursue a sale process, managing inventory in such a way “…to increase the likelihood of a going-concern transaction and, to the extent one materializes … pivot to cease store closings at any stores needed to implement the going-concern transaction.” To aid this plan, the company will seek court latitude as it relates to post-petition rent. These savings, coupled with cash collateral, will avail the company of liquidity needed to finance this dual-path approach (PETITION Note: the company suggests that, if needed, the company will explore a DIP credit facility at a later time).

We should note that Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC) is the company’s lender and has permitted the use of over $10mm for cash collateral. We previously wrote:

Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC) is the company’s administrative agent and primary lender under the company’s asset-based credit facility. Prior to Destination Maternity’s ($DEST) chapter 11 filing, Wells Fargo tightened the screws, instituting reserves against credit availability to de-risk its position. It stands to reason that it is doing the same thing here given the company’s sub-optimal performance and failure to meet projections. Said another way, WFC has had it with retail. Unlike oil and gas lending, there are no pressures here to play ball in the name of “relationship banking” when, at the end of the day, so many of these “relationships” are getting wiped from the earth.

Looks like they’re at least providing a little bit of leash here to give the company at least some chance of locating a White Knight that will provide value above and beyond liquidation value (however you calculate that these days)* and keep this thing alive. Which is to say that none of this is likely to give much solace to the staggering $173mm worth of unsecured trade debt here. 😬

Not that the unsecureds should be the only concerned parties here. With first day relief totaling over $2mm, employee wage obligations running potentially as high as $8mm, and high-priced professionals, this thing could very well be administratively insolvent from the get-go.

*Perhaps news coming out of T.J. Maxx (TJX) will help spark interest from a buyer. There are also some potentially valuable NOLs here.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: $178.6mm RCF (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $47.4mm Term Loan (Wells Fargo Bank, Pathlight Capital LLC)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Neil Herman, Joshua Altman, Kevin McClelland, Jeremy Fielding) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

  • CRO: Elaine Crowley

  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Stephen Coulombe)

  • Investment Banker: PJ Solomon LP (Mark Hootnick)

  • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners

  • Liquidation Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Jaime Koff, Brendan Recupero, Paul Bekkar, Steven Fox) & Winstead PC (Sean Davis, Matthew Bourda)

  • Term Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Mark Silva) & Winstead PC (Sean Davis, Matthew Bourda)

  • Large equityholder: Axar Capital Management LP

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

May 7, 2020

Dallas-based Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, Bergdorf Goodman Inc. and 22 other debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas late this week. If anyone is seeking an explanation as to why that may be outside the obvious pandemic-related narrative, look no farther than this monstrosity:

A quick reality check: that $5b capital structure isn’t attached to an international enterprise with hundreds or thousands of stores. You know, like Forever21. Rather, that horror show backs a 68 store business (43 Neiman Marcus, 2 Bergdorf, 22 Last Call). Ah….gotta love the good ol’ $5b leveraged buyout.

This case is all about “BIG.”

Big capital structure stemming from a big LBO by two big PE funds, Ares Capital Management and CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

Big brands with big price tags. PETITION Note: top unsecured creditors include Chanel Inc., Gucci America, Dolce and Gabbana USA Inc., Stuart Weitzman Inc., Theory LLC, Christian Louboutin, Yves Saint Laurent America Inc., Burberry USA, and more. There is also a big amount allocated towards critical vendors: $42.5mm. Nobody messes with Gucci, folks. Here’s a live shot of a representative walking out of court confident that they’ll get their money:

Big fees. More on this below.

Big, complicated — and controversial — multi-year re-designation and asset stripping transactions that were part of the debtors’ (and now non-debtors’) elaborate strategy to restructure out-of-court by kicking the can down the road. This is undoubtedly going to stir a big fight in the case. More on this below too.

Big value destruction.

Here is what will happen to the pre-petition capital structure under the proposed term sheet and restructuring support agreement filed along with the chapter 11 papers — a deal that has the support of 78% of the term lenders, 78% of the debentures, 99% of the second lien notes, 70% of the third lien notes, and 100% of the private equity sponsors:

The Asset-Based Revolving Credit Facility and FILO Facility will get out at par. There’ll be a $750mm exit facility. Beyond that? All that red constitutes heaps and heaps of value that’s now essentially an option. It’s a bet that there is a place in the future for brick-and-mortar luxury department stores. Pursuant to the deal, the “Extended Term Loans” will get the lion’s share of equity (87.5%, subject to dilution). The rest of the capital structure will get small slivers of reorganized equity. General unsecured creditors will get “their pro rata share of a cash pool.” The private equity sponsors will get wiped out but for their hoped-for liability releases.

Back to those big fees. The biggest issue for this week was the debtors’ proposed $675mm new money DIP credit facility (that comes in junior to the existing ABL in priority…in other words, no roll-up here). The DIP is essentially 13% paper chock full of fees (including a backstop fee payable in “NewCo equity” at 30% discount to plan value). One disgruntled party, Mudrick Capital Management, a holder of $144mm of the term loan, appears to have beef with Pimco and other DIP backstop parties — saying that the backstop agreement is inappropriate and the DIP fees are outrageous, likening the fee grab to a COVID hoarding mentality — and therefore felt compelled to cross-examine the debtors’ banker as to the reasonableness of it all. If you’ve ever imagined a kid suing other kids for not picking him for their dodgeball team, it would look something like this did.

And so Lazard’s testimony basically boiled down to this:

“Uh, yeah, dude, nobody knows when the economy will fully open up. The company only has $100mm of cash on the petition date. And IT’S NOT OPERATING. That money is enough for maybe 3 weeks of cash burn given that the debtors intend to continue paying rent (unlike most other retailers that have filed for bankruptcy lately). Damn pesky high-end landlords. Anyway, so we’ll burn approximately $300mm between now and when stores are projected to reopen in July/August. No operating cash flow + meaningful cash burn = risky AF lending environment. It’s unprecedented to lend into a situation with a cash burn that, while it pales in comparison to something like Uber, is pretty damn extreme. Look at the J.Crew DIP: it ain’t exactly cheap to lend in this market. There are no unencumbered assets; there certainly isn’t a way to get junior financing. And a priming fight makes no sense here given the impossibility of showing an equity cushion. So stop being an entitled little brat. There’s no obligation on anyone to cut you into the deal. And if you’re going to cry over spilled milk, take up your beef with Pimco and f*ck right off. Alternatively, you can subscribe to your pro rata portion of the DIP and enjoy all of the fees other than the backstop fee.”

The Judge was convinced that the above rationale constituted good business judgment and approved the DIP on an interim basis.

The hearing also foreshadowed another contentious issue in the case: the myTheresa situation. See, the Debtors’ position is the following: “The ‘17 MyTheresa designation as unrestricted subs + the ‘18 distribution of the myTheresa operating companies to non-debtor Neiman Marcus Group Inc. (a/k/a the “asset stripping” transaction) + a ‘19 wholesale amend-and-extend + cost-saving initiatives + comparable same store sales growth for 7 of 10 quarters + “significantly expanded margins” during the holiday period = rocket ship future growth but for the damn pandemic. On the flip side, Marble Ridge Capital LP takes the position that:

…the Debtors’ financial troubles were entirely foreseeable well before recent events. The Company has operated at leverage multiples more than twice its peers since at least 2018 (prior to the fraudulent transfers described herein). And last year’s debt restructuring increased the Company’s already unsustainable annual interest expense by more than $100 million while only reducing the Company’s debt load by $250 million leaving a fraction of adjusted EBITDA for any capital expenditures, principal repayment, taxes or one-time charges. Sadly, the Debtors’ financial distress will come as no surprise to anyone.

This ain’t gonna be pretty. Marble Ridge has already had one suit for fraudulent transfer dismissed with prejudice at the pleading stage. Now there are defamation and other claims AGAINST Marble Ridge outstanding. And subsequent suits in the NY Supreme Court. Have no fear, though, folks. There are independent managers in the mix now to perform an “independent” investigation into these transactions.

The debtors intend to have a plan on file by early June with confirmation in September. Until then, pop your popcorn folks. You can socially distance AND watch these fireworks.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Anup Sathy, Chad Husnick, Matthew Fagen, Austin Klar, Gregory Hesse, Dan Latona, Gavin Campbell, Gary Kavarsky, Mark McKane, Jeffrey Goldfine, Josh Greenblatt, Maya Ben Meir) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

  • Independent Managers of NMG LTD LLC: Marc Beilinson, Scott Vogel

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon, Todd Cosenza, Jennifer Hardy, Joseph Davis, Alexander Cheney)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Dennis Stogsdill)

  • Independent Manager of Mariposa Intermediate Holdings LLC: Anthony Horton

    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

  • Neiman Marcus Inc.

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Jeffrey Bjork)

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinstein, Kyle Richter, Marissa Light)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Andrew Zatz, Rashida Adams) & Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner, Paul Moak, Lydia Webb)

  • FILO Agent: TPG Specialty Lending Inc.

    • Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Abbey Walsh, G. Scott Leonard) & Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain)

  • Pre-petition Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG Cayman Islands Branch

    • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz, Christopher Kelly) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham, Martha Wyrick)

  • Second Lien Note Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

  • Third Lien Note Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

  • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: UMB Bank NA

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer)

  • 2028 Debentures Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

  • Ad Hoc Term Loan Lender Group (Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Sixth Street Partners LLC)

    • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus) & Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Kiran Vakamudi, Paul Heath, Matthew Moran, Katherine Drell Grissel)

    • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

  • Ad Hoc Secured Noteholder Committee

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Belisle Eaton, Claudia Tobler, Diane Meyers, Neal Donnelly, Patricia Walsh, Jeffrey Recher) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Large Creditor: Chanel Inc.

    • Legal: Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (Justin Bernbrock, Michael Driscoll)

  • Large Creditor: Louis Vuitton USA Inc.

    • Legal: Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP (Nathan Rugg)

  • Large Creditor: Moncler USA Inc.

    • Legal: Morrison Cohen LLP (Joseph Moldovan, David Kozlowski)

  • Marble Ridge Capital LP & Marble Ridge Master Fund LP

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Edward Weisfelner, Sigmund Wissner-Gross, Jessica Meyers, Uchechi Egeonuigwe)

  • Mudrick Capital Management LP

    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Michael Rosenthal, Mitchell Karlan, David Feldman, Keith Martorana, Jonathan Fortney)

  • Sponsor: CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

    • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Jasmine Ball, Erica Weisgerber) & Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Hugh Ray, William Hotze, Jason Sharp)

  • Sponsor: Ares Capital Management

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Thomas Kreller)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski) & Cole Schotz PC (Daniel Rosenberg)

    • Financial Advisor: M-III Advisory Partners LP (Mohsin Meghji)

    • Valuation Expert: The Michel-Shaked Group (Israel Shaked)

📺 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) 📺

Frontier Communications Inc.

April 14, 2020

We often highlight how, particularly in the case of oil and gas companies, capital intensive companies end up with a lot of debt and a lot of debt often results in bankruptcy. In the upstream oil and gas space, exploration and production companies need a lot of upfront capital to, among other things, enter into royalty interest agreements with land owners, hire people to map wells, hire people to drill the earth, secure proper equipment, procure the relevant inputs and more. E&P companies literally have to shell out to pull out.

Similarly, telecommunications companies that want to cover a lot of ground require a lot of capital to do so. From 2010 through 2016, Connecticut-based Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) closed a series of transactions to expand from a provider of telephone and DSL internet services in mainly rural areas to a large telecommunications provider to both rural and urban markets across 29 states. It took billions of dollars in acquisitions to achieve this. Which, in turn, meant the company took on billions of dollars of debt to finance said acquisitions. $17.5b, to be exact. Due, in large part, to the weight of that heavy debt load, it, and its 28922932892 affiliates (collectively, the “debtors”), are now chapter 11 debtors in the Southern District of New York (White Plains).*

The debtors underwrote the transactions with the expectation that synergistic efficiencies would be borne out and flow to the bottom line. PETITION readers know how we feel about synergies: more often than not, they prove elusive. Well:

Serving the new territories proved more difficult and expensive than the Company anticipated, and integration issues made it more difficult to retain customers. Simultaneously, the Company faced industry headwinds stemming from fierce competition in the telecommunications sector, shifting consumer preferences, and accelerating bandwidth and performance demands, all redefining what infrastructure telecommunications companies need to compete in the industry. These conditions have contributed to the unsustainability of the Company’s outstanding funded debt obligations—which total approximately $17.5 billion as of the Petition Date.

Shocker. Transactions that were meant to be accretive to the overall enterprise ended up — in conjunction with disruptive trends and intense competition — resulting in an astronomical amount of value destruction.

As a result of these macro challenges and integration issues, Frontier has not been able to fully realize the economies of scale expected from the Growth Transactions, as evidenced by a loss of approximately 1.3 million customers, from a high of 5.4 million after the CTF Transaction closed in 2016 to approximately 4.1 million as of January 2020. Frontier’s share price has dropped … reflecting a $8.4 billion decrease in market capitalization.

😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬

Consequently, the debtors have been in a state of liability management ever since the end of 2018. Subsequently, they (i) issued new secured notes to refinance a near(er)-term term loan maturity, (ii) amended and extended their revolving credit facility, and (iii) agreed to sell their northwest operations and related assets for $1.352b (the “Pacific Northwest Transaction”). The Pacific Northwest Transaction has since been hurdling through the regulatory approval process and seems poised to close on April 30, 2020.**

While all of these machinations were positive steps, there were still major issues to deal with. The capital structure remained robust. And “up-tier” exchanges of junior debt into more senior debt to push out near-term maturities were, post-Windstream***, deemed too complex, too short-term, and too likely to end up the subject of fierce (and costly) litigation**** As the debtors’ issued third quarter financials that were … well … not good, they announced a full drawn down of their revolver, instantly arming them with hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity.

$FTR with the clean sweep - Revs, margins, ebitda, FCF, churn, subs, ARPC all worse sequentially. https://t.co/vn49m5PDPP

— JV (@AyyouEm) November 5, 2019

The company needed reconstructive surgery. Band-aids alone wouldn’t be enough to dam the tide. In many respects, the company ought to be commended for opting to address the problem in a wholesale way rather than piecemeal kick, kick, and kick the can down the road — achieving nothing but short-term fixes to the enrichment of really nobody other than its bankers (and Aurelius).

And so now the company is at the restructuring support agreement stage. Seventy-five percent of the holders of unsecured notes have agreed to an equitization transaction — constituting an impaired consenting class for a plan of reorganization to be put on file within 30 days. Said another way, the debtors are taking the position that the value breaks within the unsecured debt. That is, that the value is at least $6.6b making the $10.949b of senior unsecured notes the “fulcrum security.” Unsecured noteholders reportedly include Elliott Management Corp., Apollo Global Management LLC, Franklin Resources Inc., and Capital Group Cos. They would end up the owners of the reorganized company.

What else is the RSA about?

• Secured debt will be repaid in full on the effective date;

• A proposed DIP (more on this below) would roll into an exit facility;

• The unsecured noteholders would, in addition to receiving equity, get $750mm of seniority-TBD take-back paper and $150mm of cash (and board seats);

• General unsecured creditors would ride through and be paid in full; and

• Holders of secured and unsecured subsidiary debt will be reinstated or paid in full.

The debtors also obtained a fully-committed new money DIP of $460mm from Goldman Sachs Bank USA. This has proven controversial. Though the DIP motion was not up for hearing along with other first day relief late last week, the subject proved contentious. The Ad Hoc First Lien Committee objected to the DIP. Coming in hot, they wrote:

Beneath the thin veneer in which these so-called “pre-arranged” cases are packaged, lies multiple infirmities that, if not properly addressed by the Debtors, will ultimately result in the unraveling of these cases. While the Debtors seek to shroud themselves in a restructuring support agreement (the “RSA”) that enjoys broad unsecured creditor support, the truth is that underlying that support is a fragile house of cards that will not withstand scrutiny as these cases unfold. Turning the bankruptcy code on its head, the Debtors attempt through their RSA to pay unsecured bondholders cash as a proxy for their missed prepetition interest payment, postpetition interest to yet other unsecured creditors of various subsidiaries, and complete repayment to prepetition revolver lenders that are attempting, through the proposed debtor-inpossession financing (the “DIP Loan”), to effectively “roll-up” their prepetition exposure through the DIP Loan, all while the Debtors attempt to deprive their first lien secured creditors of contractual entitlements to default interest and pro rata payments they will otherwise be entitled to if their debt is to be unimpaired, as the RSA purports to require. While those are fights for another day, their significance in these cases must not be overlooked.

Whoa. That’s a lot. What does it boil down to? “F*ck you, pay me.” The first lien lenders are pissed that everyone under the sun is getting taken care of in the RSA except them.

• You want to deny us our default interest. F+ck you, pay me.

• You want a DIP despite having hundreds of millions of cash on hand and $1.3b of sale proceeds coming in? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want a 2-for-1 roll-up where, “as a condition to raising $460 million in debtor-in-possession financing, the Debtors must turn around and repay $850 million to their prepetition revolving lenders, thus decreasing the Debtors’ overall liquidity on a net basis”? F+ck you, pay me.

• You shirking our pro rata payments we’d otherwise be entitled to if our debt is to be unimpaired? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to pay unsecured senior noteholders “incremental payments” of excess cash to compensate them for skipped interest payments without paying us default interest and pro rata payments? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to use sale proceeds to pay down unsecureds when that’s ours under the first lien docs? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to pay interest on the sub debt without giving us default interest? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to do all of this without a proper adequate protection package for us? F+ck you, pay me.

The second lien debtholders chimed in, voicing similar concerns about the propriety of the adequate protection package. For the uninitiated, adequate protection often includes replacement liens on existing collateral, super-priority claims emanating out of those liens, payment of professional fees, and interest. In this case, both the first and second liens assert that default interest — typically several bps higher — ought to be included as adequate protection. The issue, however, was not up for hearing on the first day so all of this is a preview of potential fireworks to come if an agreement isn’t hashed out in coming weeks.

The debtors hope to have a confirmation order within four months with the effective date within twelve months (the delay attributable to certain regulatory approvals). We wish them luck.

______

*Commercial real estate is getting battered all over the place but not 50 Main Street, Suite 1000 in White Plains New York. Apparently Frontier Communications has an office there too. Who knew there was a speciality business in co-working for bankrupt companies? In one place, you’ve got FULLBEAUTY Brands Inc. and Internap Inc. AND Frontier Communications. We previously wrote about this convenient phenomenon here.

**The company seeks an expedited hearing in bankruptcy court seeking approval of it. It is scheduled for this week.

***Here is a Bloomberg video from June 2019 previously posted in PETITION wherein Jason Mudrick of Mudrick Capital Management discusses the effect Windstream had on Frontier and predicted Frontier would be in bankruptcy by the end of the year. He got that wrong. But did it matter to him? He also notes a CDS-based short-position that would pay out if Frontier filed for bankruptcy within 12 months. For CDS purposes, looks like he got that right. By the way, per Moody’s, here was the spread on the CDS around the time that Mudrick acknowledged his CDS position:

Here it was a few months later:

And, for the sake of comparison, here was the spread on the CDS just prior to the bankruptcy filing last week:

Clearly the market was keenly aware (who wasn’t given the missed interest payment?) that a bankruptcy filing was imminent: insurance on FTR got meaningfully more expensive. Other companies with really expensive CDS these days? Neiman Marcus Group (which, Reuters reports, may be filing as soon as this week), J.C. Penney Corporation Inc., and Chesapeake Energy Corporation.

****Notably, Aurelius Capital Management LP pushed for an exchange of its unsecured position into secured notes higher in the capital structure — a proposal that would achieve the triple-frontier-heist-like-whammy of better positioning their debt, protecting the CDS they sold by delaying bankruptcy, and screwing over junior debtholders like Elliott (PETITION Note: we really just wanted to squeeze in a reference to the abominably-bad NFLX movie starring Ben Affleck, an unfortunate shelter-in indulge). On the flip side, funds such as Discovery Capital Management LLC and GoldenTree Asset Management LP pushed the company to file for bankruptcy rather than engage in Aurelius’ proposed exchange.

---

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: $850mm RCF, $1.7b first lien TL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), $1.7b first lien notes (Wilmington Trust NA), $1.6b second lien notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $10.95mm unsecured senior notes (The Bank of New York Mellon), $100mm sub secured notes (BOKF NA), $750mm sub unsecured notes (U.S. Bank Trust National Association)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Chad Husnick, Benjamin Rhode, Mark McKane, Patrick Venter, Jacob Johnston)

  • Directors: Kevin Beebe, Paul Keglevic, Mohsin Meghji

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Carlin Adrianopoli)

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Major equityholders: BlackRock Inc., Vanguard Group Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Management

  • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon

    • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Katelin Morales)

  • Indenture Trustee and Collateral Agent for the 8.500% ‘26 Second Lien Secured Notes

    • Legal: Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP (Joseph Schwartz, Curtis Plaza, Tara Schellhorn)

  • Credit Agreement Administrative Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Nicholas Baker, Jamie Fell)

  • DIP Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut, Stephen Piraino, Samuel Wagreich)

  • Ad Hoc First Lien Committee

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Gregory Laufer, Kyle Kimpler, Miriam Levi)

    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

  • Second lien Ad Hoc Group

    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Susheel Kirpalani, Benjamin Finestone, Deborah Newman, Daniel Holzman, Lindsay Weber)

  • Ad Hoc Senior Notes Group

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss)

    • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

  • Ad Hoc Committee of Frontier Noteholders

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Michael Price)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group of Subsidiary Debtholders

    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Amy Caton, Douglas Mannal, Stephen Zide, Megan Wasson)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Richard Newman)

    • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC (Elizabeth LaPuma)

⚫️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Longview Power LLC⚫️

Longview Power LLC

April 14, 2020

First it was True Religion and now it’s West Virginia-based Longview Power LLC: looks like we’re back to Chapter 22-ville after a long time away. This prepackaged chapter 11 also brings us back to (“clean”) coal country.* #MAGA!! Longview is the owner and operator of coal-filed power generation facility in West Virginia that services the PJM region (P - Pennsylvania, J - Jersey, M - Maryland, among other states). The company generated $28.1mm of EBITDA in 2019 versus $355mm of funded debt. You can do the math on what that means in terms of leverage ratios. 😬

The company attributes the drag on EBITDA to a combination of “…the rapid expansion of natural gas production, the use of natural gas in electric power generation in recent years, and lower energy prices due to a series of unseasonably warm winters has decreased energy price.” Colder winters = higher demand. Damn global warming! The average price per megawatt for electricity sold in the region is less than that of 2018 ($17.65/mwh). Other factors hitting the demand side include proliferation of use of LED light bulbs and solar roofs. Disruption! Given these market challenges, the company turned its attention to its balance sheet with the hope of eliminating interest expense and freeing up liquidity.

Alas, this is a balance sheet restructuring. The capital structure — while arguably not de-levered meaningfully enough after the initial chapter 11 cut $675mm — is at least straight-forward and simple. Longview has a $25mm revolver, $286.5mm term loan B facility and $44.3mm in subordinated notes. The company’s lenders from the 2013 bankruptcy own the equity.

Well, it looks like this will be Groundhog Day for Longview. Certain of the pre-petition term lenders will backstop a $40mm exit term loan and will get 10% of the new common equity with warrants exercisable for 90% of the new common equity provided the lender participates in the exit facility. Another debt for equity swap. Second time’s the charm?

*The company has already built one clean coal facility with an eye towards a second facility. The company also has plans for natural-gas-fired combined cycle plants and solar panel complexes.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

• Capital Structure: $25mm RCF, $286.5mm TL (Deutsche Bank Trust Company), $44.3mm subordinated notes

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (David Seligman, Joseph Graham, Laura Krucks, Brenton Rogers, Stephen Hackney) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro)

  • Financial Advisor: 3Cubed Advisory Services LLC

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Ad Hoc Group of Prepetition Term Lenders

    • Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (Kaitlin MacKenzie, James Millar, Laura Appleby, Kyle Kistinger)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Whiting Petroleum Corporation ($WLL)⛽️

Whiting Petroleum Corporation

April 1, 2020

Denver-based Whiting Petroleum Corporation ($WLL) and four affiliates (the “debtors”), independent oil-focused upstream exploration and production companies focused primarily on the North Dakota and Rocky Mountain regions, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. This is a story that requires an understanding of the debtors’ impressively-levered capital structure to understand what’s going on:

• $1.072b ‘23 RBL Facility (JPMorgan Chase Bank NA)(springing maturity to 12/20 if the ‘21 notes below are not paid in full by 12/20)

• $189.1mm ‘20 1.25% convertible senior unsecured notes due 2020 (Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.)

• $773.6mm ‘21 5.75% senior unsecured notes

• $408.3mm ‘23 6.25% senior unsecured notes

• $1b ‘26 6.625% senior unsecured notes

You’ve heard us talk about the capital intensive nature of E&P companies so … yeah … the above $3.443b of debt shouldn’t come as much of a surprise to you. The company is also publicly-traded. The stock performance over the years has been far from stellar:

What’s interesting here is that EVERYONE knows that oil and gas has been a value-destructive sh*t show for years. There’s absolutely ZERO need to belabor the point. Yet. That doesn’t stop the debtors’ CRO from doing precisely that. Here, embedded in the First Day Declaration, is a chart juxtaposing a $100 investment in WLL versus a $100 investment in an S&P 500 index and a Dow Jones U.S. E&P Index:

We should also add that the spike reflected in the above chart in the 2017 timeframe isn’t on account of some stellar improvement of operating performance; rather, it reflects a November 2017 1-to-4 reverse stock split which inflated the reflected price of the shares. Just to be clear.

Notwithstanding the hellacious performance since 2014, the debtors take pains to paint a positive picture that was thrown into disarray by “drastic and unprecedented global events, including a ‘price war’ between OPEC and Russia and the macroeconomic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic….” In fact, the debtors come in HOT in the introduction to the First Day Declaration:

The Debtors ended 2019 standing on solid ground. While the Debtors had more than $1 billion in unsecured bond debt set to mature prior to December 2020, the Debtors had significant financial flexibility to restructure their capital structure. Most importantly, the Debtors began 2020 with a committed revolving credit facility that provided them with committed financing of up to $1.75 billion—more than enough liquidity to service the Debtors’ 2020 maturities and fund anticipated capital expenditure needs throughout the year. For these reasons, the Debtors secured a “clean” audit report as recently as February 27, 2020.

And to be fair, the debt was doing just fine until the middle of February. Indeed, the unsecured notes didn’t hit distressed levels until right after Valentine’s Day. Check out this freefall:

Who needs open amusement parks when you can just follow that price action?

Already focused on “liability management” (take a drink!) given the looming ‘21 notes maturity and the corresponding RBL springing maturity, the debtors’ retained professionals shifted over to restructuring talks with an ad hoc committee of noteholders. The debtors also drew down $650mm on their revolver to ensure adequate go-forward liquidity (and, cough, avoid the need for a relatively more expensive DIP credit facility). After what sounds like serious deliberation (and opposition from the ad hoc committee), the debtors also opted to forgo the $190mm maturity payment on the convertible notes due April 1.

The debtors filed the case with the framework of a restructuring support agreement (aka a term sheet). That framework would equitize the converts and the unsecured notes, giving them 97% of the equity (for now … debt is also still under consideration). Unsecured claims will be paid in full. Existing equity would receive 3% of post-reorg equity and warrants. Post-reorg management will get 8% of the post-reorg equity. In total, this would amount to the evisceration of over $2b worth of debt. 😬

Speaking of management, a lot of people were up in arms over this bit in the debtors’ Form 8-K filed to announce the bankruptcy filing and term sheet:

That’s right. A nice immediately-payable bonus to management.

Remember that story of Lehman Brothers CEO Dick Fuld getting punched the day after Lehman’s bankruptcy on a treadmill in the corporate gym?

Fees like something like that may be coming soon to $WLL headquarters... 👀

— EnergyCynic (@EnergyCynic) April 1, 2020

We’d love to hear how this ISN’T a subversion of code provisions regarding KEIPS/KERPS. Seriously, write us: petition@petition11.com. Ensure stability huh? Tell us: WHERE THE F*CK ARE THESE GUYS GOING TO GO IN THIS ENVIRONMENT? But at least they’re passing up their (WILDLY WORTHLESS) equity awards and bonus payments. FFS.

Ok, fine. Maybe there were contractual provisions that needed to be taken into account. And maybe the alternative — sh*tcanning management and rejecting the employment contracts — doesn’t fit the construct of leaving an umimpaired class of unsecured creditors. Equity is wildly out-of-the-money and getting a tip here anyway. This, therefore, is just a transfer of value from the noteholders to the management. We have to assume that the noteholders, then, were aware of this before it happened. If not, they should be pissed. And the Directors — who make between $180,000 and $305,000 a year — ought to be questioned by said noteholders about potential breaches of duties.

---

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of TX (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure:

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Brian Schartz, Gregory Pesce, Anna Rotman) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Veronica Polnick)

  • CRO: Stein Advisors LLC (Jeffrey Stein)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Julie Hertzberg)

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • RBL Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

  • Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Beslisle Eaton, Michael Turkel, Omid Rahnama) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, Genevieve Graham)

    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

  • Creditor: Caliber North Dakota LLC

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Alfredo Perez, Brenda Funk)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA Filing - Pier 1 Imports Inc. ($PIR)

Pier 1 Imports Inc.

February 17, 2020

Fort Worth, Texas-based Pier 1 Imports Inc. and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) have fulfilled their obvious destiny and finally fallen into bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Virginia. Contemporaneously, the debtors filed a CCAA proceeding in Canada to effectuate the closure of all Canadian operations. Color us pessimistic but we’re not feeling so great about the debtors’ go-forward chances in the US either.

We’ve covered the debtors ad nauseum in previous editions of PETITION. Here — supported by an ode to “Anchorman” — we described the debtors’ recent HORRIFIC financial performance and noted how a bankruptcy would be sure to confuse a peanut gallery accustomed to spouting regular (and sometimes inaccurate) hot takes about how private equity is killing retail.* We wrote:

The reaction to this surely-imminent bankruptcy (and, if we had a casino near us, liquidation) is going to be interesting. It is sure to flummox the “Private Equity is Killing Retail” camp because, well, it’s not PE-backed. Similarly it’ll confuse the “You Shouldn’t Put So Much Debt on Retail” cohort because, well, there really isn’t that much debt on the company’s balance sheet. Chuckling in the corner will be “The US is Over-Stored” team … And “The Millennials Aren’t Buying Homes and Furnishing Them With Chinese-Made Tchotchkes” gang (thanks a ton, Marie Kondo) … And the “Management Has Blown Chunks, The Assortment Sucks” bunch … And, finally, “The Amazon Effect” squad….

Over the weekend, The New York Times ran a piece from Austan Goolsbee, an economics professor at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, that — no disrespect to the professor — says many of the same things PETITION has been saying for a LONG LONG time. That is, “The Amazon Effect” is overstated. He argues that “three major economic forces have had an even bigger impact on brick-and-mortar retail than the internet has”: (1) big box stores, (2) income inequality, and (3) the preference shift away from goods towards services. It’s fair to say that these three forces affected the debtors in a big big way.**

Who’s actually surprised #Pier1 is closing when they charge like $100 for a decorative pillow? $60 for a vanilla candle that’s also at Walmart for $5? PASS. People still shopping at a Pier 1 clearly haven’t heard of Home Goods or TJ Maxx

— Nicole (@Choley2007) February 17, 2020

Surely, e-commerce has a lot to do with it too. As one PETITION advisor said about the debtors’ wares yesterday:

“You can just order that sh*t online. You don’t need to try it on.”

It’s a fair point.

Another fair point that Mr. Goolsbee omits from his analysis is the role of management. It’s safe to say that the US is suffering from an epidemic of retail ineptitude.

Also management sucks

— TheHappySoul Goddess (@Yahiness11) February 17, 2020

And like the coronavirus, it keeps spreading from one retailer to the next.***

This has to be one of the most under-covered aspects of the #retailapocalypse: just a revolving door of execs moving from one troubled retailer to the next and everyone hoping and praying that that person can suddenly conjure up an answer. $ASNA $FRANhttps://t.co/5lmoMJFEAE

— 💥PETITION💥 (@petition) February 14, 2020

But we digress.

The business has clearly suffered:

From fiscal years 2014 to 2018, the company’s net income dropped from $108 million to about $11.6 million and in fiscal year 2019 Pier 1 experienced a $198.8 million loss.

So, what’s the upshot here? The debtors announced a plan support agreement and intend to use the chapter 11 bankruptcy process to (a) continue to shutter the previously announced ~450 stores (read: get ready for a lot of lease rejections) and (b) pursue a sale pursuant to a chapter 11 plan of reorganization of what remains of the debtors’ business. Frankly, this was masterful messaging: the announcement relating to a plan support agreement and potential plan of…wait for it…”reorganization”(!) head-faked the entire market into thinking this thing might actually be salvageable. That’s where the fine print comes in.

The debtors have dubbed this an “all weather” chapter 11 plan because it provides for either a sale or the equitization of the term loan at the term lenders’ election. This begs the question: will Pathlight Capital LP want to own this thing?🤔 This bit was eye-catching:

“To be clear, the term loan lenders have made no decision at this point, but instead support the process as outlined in the plan support agreement.”

Yeah, we bet they do. Qualified bids will be due on or before March 23 and the lenders have until March 27 to make their election. Which way will the winds blow?

Note that “the process” isn’t currently supported by a stalking horse purchaser. 🤔

Note further that the debtors are required under the DIP to distribute informational packages and solicitations for sale of the debtors’ assets on a liquidation basis to liquidators by March 9.🤔 🤔

It seems reasonably clear from the Pier 1 bankruptcy papers that none of the Debtors, the professionals nor the lenders expect this turd to actually find a buyer outside of the liquidator type.

— 💥PETITION💥 (@petition) February 18, 2020

It looks like we’ll know the answer very soon.

To finance the cases, the debtors obtained a committed for a $256mm DIP credit facility. The facility includes a $200mm revolving loan commitment and a $15mm first in last out term loan, each provided 50/50 by Bank of America N.A. and Wells Fargo National Association, and a $41.2mm term loan from Pathlight. This was the pre-petition capital structure:

The DIP effectively just rolls up much of the pre-petition debt. There is no new money. The messaging here, then, is also critical: the DIP facility ought to provide customers, vendors and employees comfort that there is access to liquidity if needed. Cash collateral usage, however, is the main driver here: the debtors believe that operating cash flow will suffice to handle working capital needs and bankruptcy expenses.

To summarize, we have another distressed retailer that is scratching and clawing to live. They’ve taken all of the usual steps to extend runway: cost cuts, footprint minimalization, new management. Bankruptcy is a last-ditch effort to survive: the debtors take pains to try and convince some prospective buyer that there is life left in the debtors’ brick-and-mortar business:

The remaining go-forward stores achieved superior sales and customer metrics in the last twelve months compared to the closing stores, including approximately 15% greater sales per square foot on average.

And if that doesn’t do it, there’s the argument that there’s an e-commerce play here. The debtors similarly go to great lengths to state OVER AND OVER AGAIN that e-commerce represents 27% of total sales. They’re practically screaming, “Look at me, look at me! We can be interesting to you [Insert Authentic Brands Group here]!”

Pathlight is sure as hell hoping someone bites.

---

*Kirkland & Ellis…uh…we mean, the “debtors” appear to agree, stating, in reference to private equity, that “[t]oo many pundits have sought to point in too many wrong directions,” citing pieces in RetailDive and The Wall Street Journal. THAT ladies and gentlemen, is client advocacy!

**It’s also fair to say that Professor Goolsbee does his readers a disservice by neglecting the overall picture which, no doubt, also includes over-expansion, too much retail per capita, private equity and over-levered balance sheets. These cowboys are closing 400+ stores for a reason.

Of course, long time PETITION readers know that we’ve been arguing for a LOOOOONG time that the “perfect storm” hitting retail is a confluence of factors that cannot just be lazily summarized as “private equity” or “The Amazon Effect.” It’s good to see that the folks at Kirkland & Ellis agree:

In the face of the longest bull run in U.S. history (close to 3,000 days and counting), a myriad of factors have collectively changed the ways in which consumers and retailers interact—creating for retailers what is tantamount to a perfect storm—and directly contributing to the struggles retailers face in a shifting marketplace.5

Then it’s as if they lifted this footnote straight out of previous PETITION briefings:

***Not to cast aspersions, but the resume of the current PIR CEO is…uh…interesting: prior experience includes FullBeauty Brands, HHGregg, and Marsh Supermarkets. Any of those names sound familiar to bankruptcy professionals?

---

• Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Huennekens)

• Capital Structure: $140mm RCF + $47.3mm LOC, $189mm Term Loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $9.9mm industrial revenue bonds

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Emily Geier, AnnElyse Scarlett Gains, Joshua Altman) & Kutak Rock LLP (Michael Condyles, Peter Barrett, Jeremy Williams, Brian Richardson)

  • Canadian Legal: Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP

  • Independent Directors: Steven Panagos & Pamela Corrie

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Holly Etlin)

  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Durc Savini)

  • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners LLC

  • Liquidation Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

    • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox, Anthony Stumbo)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, and Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP

  • DIP ABL Term Agent: Pathlight Capital LP

    • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (John Ventola, Jonathan Marshall) and Troutman Sanders LLP (Andrew Buxbaum)

  • Ad Hoc Term Lender Group: Eaton Vance Management, Insight North America LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, MJX Asset Management LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC, ZAIS Group LLP

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Startk, Uchechi Egeonuigwe, Steven Pohl, Sharon Dwoskin) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge, Corey Booker)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

  • Large Equityholders: Charles Schwab Investment Management, Dimensional Fund Advisors LLP

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Bhati & Company, Synergy Home Furnishings LLC, United Parcel Services Inc., Brixmor Operating Partnership LP, Brookfield Property REIT Inc.

    • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Erika Morabito, Brittany Nelson, Timothy Mohan) & Cole Schotz PC (Seth Van Aalten)

    • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. (Paul Huygens, Sanjuro Kietlinski, Walter Bowser, Paul Navid, Shane Payne, Courtney Clement)

😷New Chapter 15 Filing - China Hospitals Inc.😷

China Hospitals Inc.

November 24, 2019

So, this is, uh, ONE. HELL. OF. A. FACT. PATTERN.

Back in 2014, Classroom Investments Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board (!), entered into a share purchase and subscription agreement and shareholder’s agreement with Frank Hu, the founder, director and majority shareholder of an entity called China Hospitals. Pursuant to the agreement, Classroom Investments Inc. would acquire 20% of China Hospitals in exchange for $175mm.

We know what you must be thinking: what crazy earth-bending technology must China Hospitals have possessed such that Classroom Investments Inc. felt compelled to make such an investment — an investment imputing a valuation of ~$875mm on China Hospitals? Was the cure for cancer uncovered by China Hospitals?!? Did that solve male pattern baldness?!??

Spoiler alert: nope. Actually, the proceeds were supposed to be used to roll-up four hospitals — Puyang Oilfield General Hospital, Qingfeng People’s Hospital, Anqiu People’s Hospital and Shouguang People’s Hospital (in addition to general corporate purposes). Pursuant to the understanding, China Hospitals was to IPO within 30 months.

Of course, even that surprising goal wasn’t achieved. Why? Because Frank Hu apparently fat-fingered the funds to a different bank account under his control. Okay, okay…more like sticky-fingered. But that wasn’t all: Hu engaged in a string of shady transactions that “effectively stripped Classroom of its bargained-for economic interest in China Hospitals….” Said another way, Mr. Hu did basically none of what he was supposed to; he simply absconded with the money.

In 2015, Classroom took the matter to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and the arbitration tribunal issued a “final award” holding China Hospitals and Mr. Hu jointly and severally liable “in the amount of $231,805,125.09, comprising the sum of (a) Classroom’s original investment of $175,000,000, (b) interest accrued from January 29, 2014 to June 15, 2018 in the amount of $45,969,863.01 as well as post-award interest at a rate of 8% from June 15, 2018 until complete payment, and (c) costs in the amount of $10,835,262.08 (collectively, the “Arbitration Award”).” Any guesses as to whether Classroom got paid? Spoiler alert: of course not. This left Classroom apoplectic.

Classroom next petitioned the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands to prevent the dissipation of China Hospitals’ assets. The Grand Court appointed a liquidator and the liquidator has been winding down the business since. The liquidators, however, would like to get access to a Bank of America account that is believed to hold — or, at least, held as of March 30, 2016 — over $202mm in cash. Given all of the accusations of malfeasance here, Classroom is obviously of the view that the $202mm constitutes its money. To hinder anyone from doing anything with those proceeds — to the extent they exist (🤔) the liquidators filed a Chapter 15 in the Southern District of New York. Per The Wall Street Journal:

During a hastily scheduled hearing Monday, lawyers for the liquidators asked Judge Shelley Chapman to allow them to use the U.S. proceeding to seek more information about an American bank account potentially holding more than $200 million and to bar anyone from removing funds from the account.

The judge granted those requests and scheduled another hearing in the chapter 15 case for Dec. 16.

Who wants to bet that the money is still there? 😬

*****

The greatest question this ridiculousness leaves us with is this: what the bloody f*ck was the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board doing investing in this particular man for this particular purpose? The OTPP is an organization responsible for administering the defined-benefit pensions for school teachers in Ontario. School teachers, people. What kind of return were they expecting on a $175mm investment on a Chinese hospital roll-up that was supposed to, in short order, IPO? And why? Who got fired for this nonsense?

The investment is not, as it turns out, terribly out of form. The OTPP owns and manages a portfolio of Canadian and international assets including real estate, infrastructure (airports, railways), national lotteries (in the UK and Ireland), a Spanish funeral provider, and a minority interest in the New York Yankees’ regional sports network (YES). So, yeah, sure, in the ever-present need for large-yield-wielding assets, why not invest in a shady-a$$ Chinese hospital rollup?!? 👍

When a downturn eventually does occur, we’re likely to see a number of private equity deals by pension funds go sideways (callback to iPic Entertainment Inc., now owned by the Teachers’ Retirement System of Alabama and the Employees’ Retirement System of Alabama). It’s going to be fun to see, with the benefit of hindsight, the quality of due diligence!

Top of cycle due diligence

pic.twitter.com/qk2grCyrdv

— Brent Beshore (@BrentBeshore) November 26, 2019

Or lack thereof.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Chapman)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Christopher Marcus, Lauren Friedman, W. Benjamin Winger)

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management

New Chapter 11 Filing - Anna Holdings Inc. (a/k/a Acosta Inc.)

Anna Holdings Inc. (a/k/a Acosta Inc.)

DATE

Back in September 2018’s “Trickle-Down Disruption from Retail Malaise (Short Coupons),” we noted a troubled trio of “sales and marketing agencies.” We wrote:

With the “perfect storm” … of (i) food delivery, (ii) the rise of direct-to-consumer CPG brands, (iii) increased competition from private-brand focused German infiltrators Aldi and Lidl, and (iv) the increasingly app-powered WholeFoods, there are a breed of companies that are feeling the aftershocks. Known as “sales and marketing agencies” (“SMAs”), you’d generally have zero clue about them but for the fact that you probably know someone who is addicted to coupon clipping. Or you’re addicted to coupon clipping. No shame in that, broheim. Anyway, that’s what they’re known for: coupons (we’re over-simplifying: they each perform other marketing, retailing, and data-oriented services too). The only other way you’d be familiar is if you have a private equity buddy who is sweating buckets right now, having underwritten an investment in one of three companies that are currently in distress. Enter Crossmark Holdings Inc., Acosta Inc., and Catalina Marketing (a unit of Checkout Holding Corp.). All three are in trouble.

What’s happened since? Catalina Marketing filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. Crossmark Holdings Inc. effectuated an out-of-court exchange transaction, narrowing averting a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. And, as of last week, Acosta Inc. launched solicitation of a prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. It will be in bankruptcy in the District of Delaware very very soon. We’ve basically got ourselves an SMA hat-trick.

Before we dive into what the bloody hell happened here — and it ain’t pretty — let’s first put some more meat on those SMA bones. In doing so, mea culpa: we WAY over-simplified what Acosta Inc. does in that prior piece. So, what do they do?

Acosta has two main business lines: “Sales Services” and “Marketing Services.” In the former, “Acosta assists CPG companies in selling new and existing products to retailers, providing business insights, securing optimal shelf placement, executing promotion programs, and managing back-office order-to-cash and claims deduction management solutions. Acosta also works with clients in negotiations with retailers and managing promotional events.” They also provide store-level merchandising services to make sure sh*t is properly placed on shelves, stocks are right, displays executed, etc. The is segment creates 80% of Acosta’s revenue.

The other 20% comes from the Marketing Services segment. In this segment, “Acosta provides four primary Marketing Services offerings: (i) experiential marketing; (ii) assisted selling and training; (iii) content marketing; and (iv) shopper marketing. Acosta offers clients event-based marketing services such as brand launch events, pop-up retail experiences, mobile tours, large events, and trial/demo campaigns. Acosta also provides Marketing Services such as assisted selling, staffing, associate training, in-store demonstrations, and more. Under its shopping marketing business, Acosta advises clients on consumer promotions, package designs, digital shopping, and other shopper marketing channels.”

In the past, the company made money through commission-based contracts; they are now shifting “towards higher margin revenue generation models that allow the Company to focus on aligning cost-to-serve with revenue generation to better serve clients and maximize growth.” Whatever the f*ck that means.

We’re being flip because, well, let’s face it: this company hasn’t exactly gotten much right over the last four years so we ought to be forgiven for expressing a glint of skepticism that they’ve now suddenly got it all figured out. Indeed, The Carlyle Group LP acquired the company in 2014 for a staggering $4.75b — a transaction that “ranked … among the largest private-equity purchases of that year.” Score for Thomas H. Lee Partners LP (which acquired the company in 2011 from AEA Investors LP for $2b)!! This was after the Washington DC-based private equity firm reportedly lost out on its bid to acquire Advantage Sales & Marketing, a competitor which just goes to show the fervor with which Carlyle pursued entry into this business. Now they must surely regret it. Likewise, the company: nearly all of the company’s $3b of debt stems from that transaction. The company’s bankruptcy papers make no reference to management fees paid or dividends extracted so it’s difficult to tell whether Carlyle got any bang whatsoever for their equity buck.*

Suffice it to say, this isn’t exactly a raging success story for private equity (calling Elizabeth Warren!). Indeed, since 2015 — almost immediately after the acquisition — the company lost $631mm of revenue and $193mm of EBITDA. It gets worse. Per the company:

“Revenue contributions from the top twenty-five clients in 2015 have declined at approximately 14.6 percent per year since fiscal year 2015. Furthermore, adjusted EBITDA margins have decreased year-over-year since fiscal year 2015 from over 19 percent to approximately 16 percent as of the end of fiscal year 2018.”

When you’re losing this money, it’s awfully hard to service $3b of debt. Not to state the obvious. But why did the company’s business deteriorate so quickly? Disruption, baby. Disruption. Per the company:

Acosta’s performance was disrupted by changes in consumer behavior and other macroeconomic trends in the retail and CPG industries that had a significant impact on the Company’s ability to generate revenue. Specifically, consumers have shifted away from traditional grocery retailers where Acosta has had a leadership position to discounters, convenience stores, online channels, and organic-focused grocers, where Acosta has not historically focused.

Just like we said a year ago. Let’s call this “The Aldi/Lidl/Amazon/Dollar Tree/Dollar Store Effect.” Other trends have also taken hold: (a) people are eating healthier, shying away from center-store (where all the Campbell’s, Kellogg’s, KraftHeinz and Nestle stuff is — by the way, those are, or in the case of KraftHeinz, were, all major clients!); and (b) the rise of private label.

Moreover, according to Acosta, consumer purchasing has declined overall due to the increased cost of food (huh? uh, sure okay). The company adds:

These consumer trends have exposed CPG manufacturers to significant margin pressure, resulting in a reduction in outsourced sales and marketing spend. In the years and months leading to the Petition Date, several of Acosta’s major clients consolidated, downsized, or otherwise reduced their marketing budgets.

By way of example, here is Kraft Heinz’ marketing spend over the last several years:

Compounding matters, competition in the space is apparently rather savage:

“Acosta also faced significant pressure as a result of the Company’s heavy debt load. Clients have sought to diversify their SMA providers to decrease perceived risk of Acosta vulnerability. In fact, certain of Acosta’s competitors have pointed to the Company’s significant indebtedness, contrasting their own de-levered balance sheets, to entice clients away from Acosta. Over time, these factors have tightened the Company’s liquidity position and constrained the Company from making necessary operational and capital expenditures, further impacting revenue.”

So, obviously, Acosta needed to do something about that mountain of debt. And do something it did: it’s piling it up like The Joker, pouring kerosene on it, and lighting that sh*t on fire. The company will wipe out the first lien credit facility AND the unsecured notes — nearly $2.8b of debt POOF! GONE! What an epic example of disruption and value destruction!

So now what? Well, the debtors clearly cannot reverse the trends confronting CPG companies and, by extension, their business. But they can sure as hell napalm their balance sheet! The plan would provide for the following:

• Provide $150mm new money DIP provided by Elliott, DK, Oaktree and Nexus to satisfy the A/R facility, fund the cases, and presumably roll into an exit facility;

• First lien lenders will get 85% of the new common stock (subject to dilution from employee incentive plan, the equity rights offering, the direct investment preferred equity raise, etc.) + first lien subscription rights OR cash subject to a cap.

• Senior Notes will get 15% of new common stock + senior notes subscription rights OR cash subject to a cap.

• They’ll be $325mm in new equity infusions.

So, in total, over $2b — TWO BILLION — of debt will be eliminated and swapped for equity in the reorganized company. The listed recoveries (which, we must point out, are based on projections of enterprise value) are 22-24% for the holders of first lien paper and 10-11% for the holders of senior notes.

We previously wrote about how direct lenders — FS KKR Capital Corp. ($FSK), for instance — are all up in Acosta’s loans. Here’s what KKR had to say about their piece of the first lien loan:

We placed Acosta on nonaccrual due to ongoing restructuring negotiations during the quarter and chose to exit this position after the quarter end at a gain to our third quarter mark.

HAHAHAHA. Now THAT is some top-notch spin! Small victories, we guess. 😬😜

*There have been two independent directors appointed to the board; they have their own counsel; and they’re performing an investigation into whether “any matter arising in or related to a restructuring transaction constituted a conflict matter.” There is no implication, however, that this investigation has anything to do with potential fraudulent conveyance claims. Not everything is Payless, people.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

• Capital Structure:

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Joshua Sussberg, Christopher Greco, Spencer Winters, Derek Hunter, Ameneh Bordi, Annie Dreisbach, Josh Greenblatt, Yates French, Jeffrey Goldfine) & Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti, Michael Yurkewicz, Sally Veghte)

  • Independent Directors: Gary Begeman, Marc Beilinson

    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners Inc. (Paul Sheaffer)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • A/R Facility Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

  • Admin Agent and Collateral Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss, Sara Coelho) & Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (Patrick Jackson)

  • First Lien Credit Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer US LLP (Scott Talmadge, Samantha Braunstein) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, David Queroli)

  • First Lien Lender Group

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Stephen Piraino, Jacob Weiner)

    • Financial Advisor: Centerview Partners

  • Minority First Lien Lenders

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Seith Kleinman, Sarah Gryll) & Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Stratton)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

  • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

  • Backstop Parties: Elliott Management Corporation & Oaktree Capital Management LP

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Michael Shepherd, Joseph Pack, Jason Zakia, Kimberly Havlin) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLC (Marc Abrams, Richard Riley)

  • Backstop Parties: Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP & Nexus Capital Management LP

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Alison Ressler, Ari Blaut, James Bromley) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Christopher Samis, Aaron Stulman)

  • Sponsor: Carlyle Partners VI Holdings LP (78.47% equity)

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Andrew Parlen)
      
      

🌑New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Murray Energy Holdings Co.🌑

Murray Energy Holdings Co.

October 20, 2019

Ohio-based Murray Energy Holdings Co. and its 90+ affiliated debtors are now part of a not-so-exclusive club: the Bankrupted Coal Company Club (the “BCCC”)! Unlike some more recent small(er) coal bankruptcy filings, this one is a behemoth: the debtors own and operate 13 active mines in Ohio, West Virginia, eastern and western Kentucky, Alabama, Illinois, and Utah*; their primary product is thermal coal used for electricity (though, with recent acquisitions, the debtors are also now in the steel-making business). To give you a sense of the magnitude of this company, here are some key figures:

• Produced 53mm tons of bituminous coal in 2018;

• Employs 5,500 people, including 2,400 active union members EXCLUSIVE of folks employed through the debtors’ partnership with soon-to-be-BCCC-member Foresight Energy LP ($FELP);

• Generated $2.5b in coal sales and $542.3mm of EBITDA in 2018; and

• Carries $2.7b of funded debt on balance sheet, $298mm of annual interest and amort expenses, AND $8b+ in actual or potential liability obligations under various pension and benefit plans. In 2018, the debtors’ statutory or CBA-related employee and retiree obligations totaled approximately $160mm. These are key factors that explain why, ultimately, despite every effort to hold out, this company capitulated into bankruptcy.

This is a story of unfettered expansion and spending, hubris, misplaced trust in new Washington on the part of Robert Murray, and utterly savage disruption.

The disruption side of the equation is compelling. Per the company:

“The thermal coal markets that Murray traditionally serves have been meaningfully challenged over the past three to four years, and deteriorated significantly in the last several months. This sector-wide decline has been driven largely by (a) the closure of approximately 93,000 megawatts of coal-fired electric generating capacity in the United States, (b) a record production of inexpensive natural gas, and (c) the growth of wind and solar energy, with gas and renewables, displacing coal used by U.S. power plants.”

Interestingly, this one statement ties together so much of what we’ve all been seeing in the restructuring space. Over the last several years, there have been a number of power company bankruptcies and through bankruptcy or otherwise, capacity has been cut considerably (indeed, FirstEnergy is a recipient of Murray Energy coal and undoubtedly took measures to cut back on coal supply). Fracking across the US has led to a deluge of natural gas — so much so that producers are flaring excess natural gas due to a lack of pipe infrastructure with which to transport it. Despite structural challenges, natural gas exports are on the rise. From the U.S. Energy Information Administration just yesterday:

“From January through June of 2019, U.S. net natural gas exports averaged 4.1 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), more than double the average net exports in 2018 (2.0 Bcf/d), according to data in the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Natural Gas Monthly. The United States became a net natural gas exporter (exported more than it imported) on an annual basis in 2017 for the first time in almost 60 years.”

And as this odd illustration shows, the US is becoming increasingly dependent — in large part due to federal and state emissions standards — upon solar and wind for its electricity needs. The debtors highlight:

“…coal-fired installed capacity as a percentage of total installed capacity has fallen from 26 percent in 2013 to 20 percent in 2019, with coal-fired generation as a percentage of total generation falling from 35 percent in 2013 to 27 percent in early 2019. Natural gas and renewables installed electricity generation capacity in the United States as a percentage of total installed capacity has increased from 59 percent in 2013 to 67 percent in 2019, and natural gas and renewables generation as a percentage of total generation increased from 42 percent in 2013 to 48 percent in early 2019.”

YIKES. That is a DRAMATIC change. They continue:

“During its peak in 2007, coal was the power source for half of electricity generation in the United States and by early 2019, coal-fired electricity generation fell to approximately 27 percent. These challenges have intensified recently as (i) certain electric utility companies have filed for bankruptcy protection and others have sought, and received, subsidies for their nuclear generation capacity to avoid bankruptcy, at the expense of coal-fired facilities, (ii) domestic natural gas prices hit 20-year lows this past summer, and (iii) overall demand for electricity in the United States has declined two percent in 2019, further depleting demand for coal at domestic utilities.”

MAGA!!

The international story, though, ain’t much better, with the company noting a “perfect storm of negative forces” that includes:

“…low liquefied natural gas prices; a recent trade war driving Russia to increase exports; mild weather across the Northern Hemisphere led to a reduction in demand for heating in both Europe and Asia; higher freight costs; and a prolonged monsoon season in India which kept demand depressed while conditions cleared for a record eight months.”

As if all of that isn’t bad enough, the competitive landscape has been horrific and while we suppose its admirable to try and holdout to avoid the embarrassment and stigma of bankruptcy, that strategy clearly becomes untenable when literally every other competitor in the US has already joined the BCCC and stripped themselves of burdensome debt and pension obligations. The company acknowledges as much:

“…while Murray has historically been able to navigate the challenges of the coal marketplace, these rapidly deteriorating industry conditions have caused more than 40 coal companies to file for bankruptcy since 2008, with more than half a dozen major operators filing in the last year alone. These bankruptcies have affected thousands of workers across the United States, and they have left their mark on Murray. Competitors have used bankruptcy to reduce debt and lower their cost structures by eliminating cash interest obligations and pension and benefit obligations, leaving them better positioned to compete for volume and pricing in the current market, while Murray continued to satisfy its significant financial obligations required by the weight of its own capital structure and legacy liability expenses. As a result, Murray generated little cash after satisfying debt service obligations, paying employee health and pension benefits, and maintaining operations.”

That’s a quaint narrative but it’s also a bit misleading.

Several years ago, Bob Murray declared he would be the last man standing in coal. In the years since he expanded the company significantly and took on a lot of debt to do so: https://t.co/5HjPiUonzv pic.twitter.com/90h9IVyHig

— ⚡Taylor Kuykendall (@taykuy) October 29, 2019

While every other company was falling apart, Mr. Murray went on a shopping spree, snapping up Consolidation Coal Company, Foresight Energy LP (coming soon to a bankruptcy court near you), Mission Coal Company LLC, Armstrong Energy Inc., and certain Colombian assets. This undoubtedly led to increased integration costs and debt. During that time, the debtors deployed every capital structure trick in the book to extend maturities and kick the can down the road. That road has come to an end at the bankruptcy court doors.

Here is that sweet clean capital structure:

Man, that’s a beaut.

Rounding out the company’s extensive liabilities are the obligations to employees under CBAs and pension and benefit plans.

Pursuant to these CBAs, Murray contributes to three multi-employer retirement plans. If you want a sense of how employer-employee relations have changed since the 1970s, look no farther than the debtors’ obligations under what they’ve dubbed the “1974 Pension Plan.” Per the debtors:

“Following the large wave of chapter 11 filings in 2015 and 2016, more than half a dozen large U.S. coal companies collapsed into bankruptcy over the last several years and withdrew from the 1974 Pension Plan. When an employer withdraws, its vested beneficiaries remain in the 1974 Pension Plan and are referred to as “orphan” beneficiaries. The remaining contributing employers become responsible for the benefits of these orphaned participants who were never their employees. As a result, approximately 95 percent of beneficiaries who currently receive benefits from the 1974 Pension Plan last worked for employers that no longer contribute to the Plan. As of January 2019, 11 employers contribute to the 1974 Pension Plan, compared to over 2,800 in 1984. This has placed significant stress on the 1974 Pension Plan and the small number of contributing employers—Murray most of all. If Murray withdraws from the 1974 Pension Plan, the withdrawal liability could be $6.4 billion or more, with annual estimated payments of approximately $32 to $35 million in perpetuity.”

Whoa. And that’s just one plan: the company is also on the hook for others, not to mention $1.9b in other federally-mandated post-employment benefits, asset retirement obligations and environmental obligations.

Murray Energy has filed for bankruptcy. This is terrible if not surprising news for thousands of retired coal miners — Murray was basically the last big employer keeping their pension plan afloat. Now Murray will very likely try to shed pension obligations in bankruptcy court.

— Dave Jamieson (@jamieson) October 29, 2019

“Likely”?!?

The company has a restructuring support agreement with 60% of its “consenting superpriority lenders” and “consenting equityholders” (read: Robert Murray) that outlines the general terms of a path forward: a sale with the superpriority lenders as stalking horse bidder, DIP lender, and funder of administrative expenses. Those lenders committed to provide a $350mm DIP commitment. From here, the clock is ticking.

The debtors hope to have an auction within 135 days and plan confirmation within 195 days. And within 106 days the debtors want to have a solution their CBA/retiree problem or file a motion seeking to reject those agreements and modify those benefits.

Murray Energy, the largest coal company in the United States, filed for bankruptcy. If Murray rejects the UMWA pension plan obligations in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the UMWA pension fund will be insolvent by 2020. Before last night it was projected to be insolvent by 2022.

— Senator Joe Manchin (@Sen_JoeManchin) October 29, 2019

There is, as with most cases, a “cooler talk” aspect to this filing: there’s the Kirkland-is-dominating-with-yet-another-coal-bankruptcy-representation-post-westmoreland-and-mission-coal-and-armstrong-energy-which-means-that-A&M-is-dominating-which-means-that-Prime-Clerk-is-dominating-and-what-the-f*ck-happened-to-Jones-Day-which-used-to-crush-coal-filings-with-Peabody-and-Alpha-Natural-but-now-seems-to-be-unraveling-narrative, but putting aside that inside baseball crap and how much frikken cash this case is going to print for all of the above, it’s the miners themselves — those guys who were in the depths of the earth (as distinct from the white-collar professionals who always talk about “the trenches” and “hard fought” negotiations) — who are very likely to get completely and utterly shafted here. As if getting misled or lied to by Mr. Murray — however good his intentions may have been — and Mr. Trump wasn’t enough, they’re now facing the very real possibility of losing the benefits that they worked especially hard to get. All while the professionals are billing $1650/hour. Bankruptcy is vicious.

To point here is the UMWA’s statement about the bankruptcy:

“Today’s filing by Murray Energy for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization comes as no surprise. This day has been coming for some time.

Coal production in this country continues to decline, due to the glut of natural gas on the market and continued government preference for gas and renewable energy to replace coal-fired power generation. Combined with a recent severe reduction in coal exports, these factors delivered a one-two punch that an over-extended Murray Energy could not withstand.

Now comes the part where workers and their families pay the price for corporate decision-making and governmental actions. Murray will file a motion in bankruptcy court to throw out its collective bargaining agreement with the union. It will seek to be relieved of its obligations to retirees, their dependents and widows. We have seen this sad act too many times before.”

Let’s pour one out for the little guys.

*This number is contradicted in the bankruptcy papers. In one instance, the company’s new CEO indicates that there are 13 owned and operated mines; in another he says 18. Whatevs. What are 5 mines in the scheme of things (we’re kidding…WTF, y’all?). The company also owns and operates a mine in Colombia, South America.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Ohio (Judge Hoffman Jr.)

• Capital Structure: See Above

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Nicole Greenblatt, Ross Kwasteniet, Joseph Graham, Alexander Nicas, Mark McKane, Tricia Schwallier) & Dinsmore & Shohl LLP (Kim Martin Lewis, Alexandra Horwitz)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Robert Campagna)

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition ABL Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

  • Prepetition FILO and DIP FILO Lender: GACP Finance Co. LLC

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Jennifer Hagle, Leslie Plaskon, Anna Gumport) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Ronald Gold, Erin Severini

  • Prepetition Superpriority Agent: GLAS Trust Company LLC; DIP Administrative Agent: GLAS USA LLC; DIP Collateral Agent: GLAS Americas LLC

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Douglas Lutz, A.J. Webb, Bryan Sisto)

  • Term Loan Agent: Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLC

    • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi) & Keating Muething & Klekamp PLLC (Robert Sanker)

  • 1.5L Notes Indenture Trustee: U.S. Bank N.A.

  • 2L Notes Indenture Trustee (‘20 and ‘21): The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company N.A.

  • Ad Hoc Group of Superpriority Lenders

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen, James McClammy) & Frost Brown Todd LLC (Douglas Lutz, A.J. Webb, Bryan Sisto)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Equityholders (Robert Murray)

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher (Brian Lennon, Matthew Feldman)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Bank of NY Mellon Trust Company NA, CB Mining Inc., Joy Global, RM Wilson Co., UMWA 1974 Pension Trust, United Mine Workers of America International Union, Wheeler Machinery Co.)

    • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Todd Goren, Jennifer Marines, Erica Richards, Benjamin Butterfield)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Co. (William Derrough)

🎦New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Deluxe Entertainment Services Group Inc.🎦

Deluxe Entertainment Services Group Inc.

October 3, 2019

Summary to come.

• Jurisdiction: (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: ⬇️

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Jonathan Altman)

  • Board of Directors: Ronald Perelman, Matthew Cantor, Paul Savas

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners Inc. (James Baird)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Existing ABL Agent, Senior Priming Term Loan Agent, Priming Term Loan Agent, and Existing Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG

    • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz, Sarah Rosen) & Norton Rose Fulbright

  • Ad Hoc Committee of the Senior Priming Term Loan,2 the Priming Term Loan, the Existing Term Loan and the DIP Term Facility (see below, as of 10/7/19)

    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kristopher Hansen, Jonathan Canfield, Gabriel Sasson)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

  • MAFCO

    • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Shana Elberg, Mark McDermott)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Sheridan Holding Company II, LLC⛽️

Sheridan Holding Company II, LLC

September 15, 2019

Houston-based Sheridan Holding Company II LLC and 8 affiliated debtors filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of Texas with a nearly-fully-consensual prepackaged plan of reorganization. The plan, once effective, would eliminate approximately $900mm(!) of pre-petition debt. The case is supported by a $100mm DIP credit facility (50% new money).

Why so much debt? While this is an oil and gas story much like scores of other companies we’ve seen march through the bankruptcy court doors, the business model, here, is a bit different than usual. Sheridan II is a “fund”; it invests in a portfolio of working interests in mature onshore producing properties in Texas, New Mexico and Wyoming. Like Matt Damon in “Promised Land,” the debtors scour God’s country in search of properties, acquires working interests in those properties, and then seeks to deploy their special sauce (“application of cost-effective reinvestments, operational improvements, and enhanced recovery programs to the acquired assets”) to eke out product and, ultimately, sell that sh*t at a profit. This, as you might suspect, requires a bunch of capital (and equity from LPs like Warburg Pincus).* Hence the $1.1b of debt on balance sheet. All of this is well (pun intended) and good, provided the commodity environment cooperates. Which, we all know all too well, has not been the case in recent years. Peace out equity. Peace out sub debt.

Interestingly, some of that debt was placed not too long ago. Confronted with the oil and gas downturn, the debtors took the initiative to avoid bankruptcy; they cut off distributions to LPs, took measures to decrease debt, cut opex, capex and SG&A, and engaged in a hedging program. In 2017, the debtors raised $455mm of the subordinated term loan (with PIK interest galore), while also clawing back 50% of distributions previously made to LPs to the tune of $64mm. Everyone needed to have skin in the game. Alas, these measures were insufficient.

Per this plan, that skin is seared. The revolving lenders and term lenders will receive 95% of the common stock in the reorganized entity with the subordinated term lenders getting the remaining 5%. YIKES. The debtors estimate that the subordinated term lenders will recover 2.6% of the amount of their claims under the proposed plan. 2.6% of $514mm = EPIC VALUE DESTRUCTION. Sweeeeeeeeet. Of course, the limited partners are wistfully looking at that 2.6%. Everything is relative.

*****

Some additional notes about this case:

• The hope to have confirmation in 30 days.

• The plan includes the ability to “toggle” to a sale pursuant to a plan if a buyer for the assets emerges. These “toggle” plans continue to be all of the rage these days.

• The debtors note that this was a “hard fought” negotiation. We’ve lost count of how many times professionals pat themselves on the backs by noting that they arrived at a deal, resolving the issues of various constituencies with conflicting interests and positions. First, enough already: this isn’t exactly Fallujah. You’re a bunch of mostly white males (the CEO of the company notwithstanding), sitting around a luxury conference table in a high rise in Manhattan or Houston. Let’s keep some perspective here, people. Second, THIS IS WHAT YOU GET PAID $1000+/hour to do. If you CAN’T get to a deal, then that really says something, particularly in a situation like this where the capital structure isn’t all-too-complex.

• The bulk of the debtors’ assets were purchased from SandRidge Energy in 2013. This is like bankruptcy hot potato.

• Independent directors are really becoming a cottage industry. We have to say, if you’re an independent director across dozens of companies, it probably makes sense to keep Quinn Emanuel on retainer. That way, you’re less likely to see them on the opposite side of the table (and when you do, you may at least temper certain bulldog tendencies). Just saying.

Finally, the debtors’ bankruptcy papers provide real insights into what’s happening in the oil and gas industry today — particularly in the Permian Basin. The debtors’ assets mostly rest in the Permian, the purported crown jewel of oil and gas exploration and production. Except, as previously discussed in PETITION, production of oil out of the Permian ain’t worth as much if, say, you can’t move it anywhere. Transportation constraints, while relaxing somewhat, continue to persist. Per the company:

“Prices realized by the Debtors for crude oil produced and sold in the Permian Basin have been further depressed since 2018 due to “price differentials”—the difference in price received for sales of oil in the Permian Basin as compared to sales at the Cushing, Oklahoma sales hub or sales of sour crude oil. The differentials are largely attributable to take-away capacity constraints caused by increases in supply exceeding available transportation infrastructure. During 2018, Permian Basin crude oil at times sold at discounts relative to sales at the Cushing, Oklahoma hub of $16 per barrel or more. Price differentials have narrowed as additional take-away capacity has come online, but crude oil still sells in the Permian Basin at a discount relative to Cushing prices.”

So, there’s that teeny weeny problemo.

If you think that’s bad, bear in mind what’s happening with natural gas:

“Similarly, the Henry Hub natural gas spot market price fell from a peak of $5.39 per million British thermal units (“MMBtu”) in January 2014 to $1.73 per MMBtu by March 2016, and remains at approximately $2.62 per MMBtu as of the Petition Date. In 2019, natural gas prices at the Waha hub in West Texas have at times been negative, meaning that the Debtors have at times either had to shut in production or pay purchasers to take the Debtors’ natural gas.”

It’s the natural gas equivalent of negative interest rates. 😜🙈

*All in, this fund raised $1.8b of equity. The Sheridan Group, the manager of the debtors, has raised $4.6b across three funds, completing nine major acquisitions for an aggregate purchase price of $5.7b. Only Sheridan II, however, is a debtor (as of now?).

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

• Capital Structure: $66 RCF (Bank of America NA), $543.1mm Term Loan (Bank of America NA), $514mm ‘22 13.5%/17% PIK Subordinated Term Loans (Wilmington Trust NA) — see below.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Steven Serajeddini, Spencer Winters, Stephen Hackney, Rachael Marie Bazinski, Jaimie Fedell, Casey James McGushin) & Jackson Walker LLP (Elizabeth Freeman, Matthew Cavenaugh)

  • Board of Directors: Alan Carr, Jonathan Foster

    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Administrative agent and collateral agent under the Sheridan II Term Loan Credit Agreements: Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Stephen Piraino, Nathaniel Sokol)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Administrative Agent under the Sheridan II RBL: Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Bradley Foxman, Andrew Geppert)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group of Subordinated Term Loans (Pantheon Ventures US LP, HarbourVest Partners LP)

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Gabriel Morgan, Clifford Carlson)

    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

  • Limited Partner: Wilberg Pincus LLC

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon)

Source: First Day Declaration

⛽️New Chapter 22 Bankruptcy Filing - PES Holdings LLC⛽️

PES Holdings LLC

July 21, 2019

Picture the private equity associate. He’s sitting at his desk, twiddling his thumbs, looking for something to do. All is good in the world: the portfolio is humming along, he hasn’t gotten roped into a lose/lose golf tournament with the senior partners in a while, and he just wants to lay low and ride out the summer if he can. Then, suddenly, on one fateful summer day in June, one of his portfolio companies just up -and-decides to randomly explode — or, as the company puts it, suffer a “historic, large-scale, catastrophic accident.” Suddenly he’s mopping the floor with his jaw.

This sudden turn of events is particularly stupefying when you consider that the portfolio company — PES Holdings LLC, aka Philadelphia Energy Solutions — happens to be a 150 year-old oil refining complex that also happens to be (i) the largest on the United States Eastern seaboard (representing approximately 28% of the crude oil refining capacity on the east coast), and (ii) an employer of 950 employees. What are the possible knee-jerk reactions here? Are they:

1. “Oh sh*t, there goes our portfolio for the year!”

2. “F******ck, did our investment literally just go up in smoke?”

3. “Am I going to have a job tomorrow?”

Then there are likely the secondary considerations:

1. “How will the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia fulfill their energy needs?”

2. “Oh no! Did anyone die??!?”

That’s right: we’re cynical AF. After those two waves of initial thoughts and after a deep breath, we bet these were the next questions:

1. “Do we have to file this thing for ANOTHER bankruptcy now?”

2. “How robust is our insurance coverage? What are our insurance premiums and can we keep paying them to ensure coverage?”

3. “Is this an opportunity? How do we transfer all of the risk and best position ourselves to drive equity value here?”

The latter two considerations — as heartless and lacking in empathy as they may be — are highly realistic. And highly relevant, considering the explosion and attendant fire on June 21 forced the company to shut down its plant. The timing couldn’t have been worse: the explosion took place mere days after the company finalized the implementation of a new intermediation facility. Now, though, all “momentum” is lost: the company is currently inoperable and will require an extensive rebuild: at limited capacity and with massive fixed operational costs, the company would have burned (pun most definitely intended) through $100mm in liquidity within a few weeks. Cue the chapter 22 bankruptcy filing.*

Of course, prior to the filing, the company engaged in dialogue with its insurers:

The Debtors also immediately began a process to engage with their insurers—as it relates to property and business interruption insurance claims for the losses caused by the Girard Point Incident—to advance a dialogue toward an immediate advance and a global resolution that will allow the Debtors to restore their operations. The Debtors have yet to obtain such an advance.

Show us an insurer who is ready and willing to fork over proceeds on a moments notice and we’ll show you a bridge we’re selling.

The Debtors’ goal in the near term remains continuing to preserve the safe operation of the Refining Complex while they seek to recover as quickly as possible on their property and business interruption insurance claims and pursue various transactions to preserve their operations and maximize value.

We’re not talking about peanuts here, folks:

The Debtors have $1.25 billion in property and business interruption insurance coverage to protect against these kinds of losses (in addition to other insurance policies that cover other aspects of the Girard Point Incident). The Debtors are working with the insurers under that program to make the Debtors whole for the physical loss of the refinery and the resulting interruption of the Debtors’ business. These insurance proceeds are the very heart of these chapter 11 cases: the sooner the Debtors can recover, the sooner the business can complete its recovery.

While the company waits for the insurers to cough up some cash, it, obviously, needs to focus on safety issues and fire-related cleanup. To that end, it secured a $100mm DIP commitment from certain of its term loan lenders and continues to engage in discussions with ICBC Standard Bank PLC about a dual-DIP structure that would avail the company of even more liquidity. Ultimately, the company hopes to reorganize as a going concern. The extent to which the insurers play ball will dictate whether that’s possible. Something tells us there are some risk analysts combing through those policies with a fine tooth looking for any and all exemptions that they can pull out of their a$$es.

*According to the company, the first chapter 11 filing: “(i) secured a capital infusion of approximately $260 million; (ii) extended the Debtors’ debt maturities through 2022; (iii) reduced the Debtors’ anticipated debt service obligations by approximately $35 million per year; (iv) provided the Debtors with access to a new intermediation facility; and (v) provided the Debtors with relief from certain regulatory obligations.”

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

• Capital Structure: see below

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Steven Serajeddini, Matthew Fagen, Michael Slade, Allyson Smith Weinhouse, Patrick Venter, Nacif Taousse, Whitney Becker) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, James O’Neill, Peter Keane)

  • CRO: Stein Advisors LLC (Jeffrey Stein)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

🌑New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Blackhawk Mining LLC🌑

Blackhawk Mining LLC

July 19, 2019

What are we averaging? Like, one coal bankruptcy a month at this point? MAGA!!

This week Blackhawk Mining LLC filed prepackaged Chapter 11 cases in the District of Delaware, the effect of which will be the elimination of approximately $650mm of debt from the company’s balance sheet. Unlike other recent bankruptcies, i.e., the absolute and utter train wreck that is the Blackjewel LLC bankruptcy, this case actually has financing and employees aren’t getting left out in the lurch. So, coal country can at least take a deep breath. Small victories!

Before we get into the mechanics of how this deleveraging will work, it’s important to note some of the company’s history. Blackhawk represents opportunism at its best. Founded in 2010 as a strategic vehicle to acquire coal reserves, active mining operations and logistical infrastructure located primarily in the Appalachian Basin, the privately-owned coal producer hit the ground running. Initially the company started with Kentucky thermal coal assets (PETITION Note: thermal coal’s end use is the production of electricity; in contrast, metallurgical coal’s prime use is for the production of steel). It then quickly moved to diversify its product offering with a variety of acquisitions. In 2014, it acquired three mining complexes in the bankruptcy of James River Coal Company (which served as the company’s entry into the production of met coal). Thereafter, in 2015, the company purchased six mining complexes in the bankruptcy of Patriot Coal Company (which has since filed for bankruptcy a second time). This acquisition lofted the company into the highest echelon of US-based met coal production (PETITION Note: met coal drives 76% of the company’s $1.09b in revenue today). The company now operates 19 active underground and 6 active surface mines at 10 active mining complexes in West Virginia and Kentucky. The company has 2,800 employees. 

Naturally, this rapid growth begs some obvious questions: what was the thesis behind all of these acquisitions and how the hell were they financed? 

The investments were a play on an improved met coal market. And, to some degree, this play has proven to be right. Per the company: 

“The Company’s strategic growth proved to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, it significantly increased the Company’s position in the metallurgical coal market at a time when asset prices were depressed relative to today’s prices. The Company continues to benefit from this position in the current market. The price of high volatile A metallurgical coal has risen from $75 per ton to an average of $188 per ton over the last two years, providing a significant tailwind for the Company. On the other hand, the pricing environment for metallurgical coal did not improve until late 2016, and the debt attendant to the Company’s acquisition strategy in 2015 placed a strain on the Company’s ability to maintain its then-existing production profile while continuing to reinvest in the business. During this time, to defer expenses, the Company permanently closed over 10 coal mines (with over 5 million tons of productive capacity), idled the Triad complex, and depleted inventories of spare equipment, parts, and components. Furthermore, once the coal markets began to improve, the Company was forced to make elevated capital expenditures and bear unanticipated increases in costs—for example, employment costs rose approximately 25% between 2016 and 2018—to remain competitive. The confluence of these factors eventually made the Company’s financial position untenable.”

Longs and shorts require the same thing: good timing. 

Alas, the answer to the second question also leads us to the very predicament the company finds itself in today. The company has $1.09b in debt split across, among other things, an ABL facility (’22 $85mm, MidCap Financial LLC), a first lien term loan facility (’22 $639mm, Cantor Fitzgerald Securities), a second lien term loan facility (’21 $318mm, Cortland Capital Markets Services LLC), and $16mm legacy unsecured note issued to a “Patriot Trust” as part of the Patriot Coal asset acquisition. More on this Trust below.

But this is not the first time the company moved to address its capital structure. In a bankruptcy-avoiding move in 2017, the company — on the heals of looming amortization and interest payments on its first and second lien debt — negotiated an out-of-court consensual restructuring with its lenders pursuant to which it kicked the can down the road on the amortization payments to its first lien lenders and deferred cash interest payments to its second lien lenders. If you’re asking yourself, why would the lenders agree to these terms, the answer is, as always, driven by money (and some hopes and prayers). For their part, the first lien lenders obtained covenant amendments, juiced interest rates and an increased principal balance owed while the second lien lenders obtained an interest rate increase. Certain first and second lien lenders also got equity units, board seats and additional voting rights. These terms — onerous in their own way — were a roll of the dice that the environment for met coal would continue to improve and the company could grow into its capital structure. Clearly, that hope proved to be misplaced. 

Indeed, this is the quintessential kick-the-can-down-the-road situation. By spring 2019, Blackhawk again faced a $16mm mandatory amortization payment and $20mm in interest payments due under the first lien term loan. 

Now the first lien lenders will swap their debt for 71% of the reorganized equity and a $225mm new term loan and the second lien lenders will get 29% of the new equity. The “will-met-coal-recover-to-such-a-point-where-the-value-of-the-company-extends-beyond-the-debt?” option play for those second lien lenders has expired. The company seeks to have its plan confirmed by the end of August. The cases will be financed by a $235mm DIP of which $50mm is new money and the remainder will rollup $100mm in first lien term loan claims and $85mm in ABL claims (and ultimately convert to a $90mm exit facility). 

Some other quick notes:

• Kirkland & Ellis LLP represents the company after pushing Latham & Watkins LLP out in a move that would make Littlefinger proud. This is becoming an ongoing trend: as previously reported, K&E also gave das boot to Latham in Forever21. A war is brewing folks. 

• The Patriot Trust will get $500k per a settlement baked into the plan. On a $16mm claim. The “Patriot Trust” refers to the liquidating trust that was established in connection with the Patriot Coal Corporation chapter 11 cases, previously filed in the Eastern District of Virginia. Marinate on that for a second: the creditors in that case fought long and hard to have some sort of recovery, won a $16mm claim and now have to settle for $500k. There’s nothing like getting screwed over multiple times in bankruptcy. 

• But then there’s management: the CEO gets a nice cushy settlement that includes a $500k payment, a seat on the reorganized board of managers (and, presumably, whatever fee comes with that), and a one-year consulting contract. He waives his right to severance. If we had to venture a guess, Mr. Potter will soon find his way onto K&E’s list of “independent” directors for service in other distressed situations too. That list seems to be growing like a weed. 

• Knighthead Capital Management LLC and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP are the primary holders of first lien paper and now, therefore, own the company. Your country’s steel production, powered by hedge funds! They will each have representation on the board of managers and the ability to jointly appoint an “independent” director. 

---

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Ross Kwasteniet, Joseph Graham, Stephen Hessler, Christopher Hayes, Derek Hunter, Barack Echols) & (local) Potter Anderson Corroon LLP (Christopher Swamis, L. Katherine Good) 

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (Marc Puntus)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition ABL & DIP ABL Agent: Midcap Funding IV Trust

    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Deborah Staudinger)

  • Prepetition & DIP Term Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities

    • Legal: Herrick Feinstein LLP (Eric Stabler, Steven Smith)

  • Second Lien Term Loan Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Alex Cota, Gabriel Sasson)

  • Consenting Term Lenders: Knighthead Capital Management LLC, Solus Alternative Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC

    • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Dylan Consla, Daniel Meyer)

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Fredric Sosnick, Ned Schodek)

😷New Chapter 11 Filing - Center City Healthcare LLC (d/b/a Hahnemann University Hospital)😷

Center City Healthcare LLC

June 30, 2019

We take a break from our regularly scheduled oil and gas distress to bring you some regularly scheduled healthcare distress. That’s right: more healthcare distress. Here, Philadelphia Academic Health System LLC and 12 affiliated debtors — including two major hospitals in Philadelphia, St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children (“STC”) and Hahnemann University Hospital (“HUH”) and related physician practices — have filed for bankruptcy in Pennsyl…strike that…in the District of Delaware.* Gotta love venue!

This bankruptcy case likely marks the end of HUH, an academic medical center that (a) is the primary teaching hospital for Drexel University and (b) has been providing healthcare services since 1848.

According to the debtors, their troubles can be traced back to an August 2017 acquisition — consummated in January 2018 — of the assets (i.e., operating entities, non-debtor entities owning the real estate upon which the hospital operate, and certain receivables) from Tenet Business Services Corporation. The debtors’ primary source of funding for the acquisition was a pre-petition credit facility from Midcap Funding IV Trust.

Immediately after the sale, the debtors realized that they bought a lemon. Per the debtors:

Disputes arose between the Debtors and Tenet with regards to, among other things, the “Net Working Capital Adjustment” provided for under the parties’ Asset Sale Agreement, most notably, for overstated amounts of accounts receivable totaling approximately $21 million. The Debtors also learned that approximately $5 million of amounts received by Tenet at closing in order for it to pay certain accounts payable was never in fact paid. These issues resulted in a significant liquidity shortfall that adversely affected the Debtors’ operations almost immediately after closing of the Acquisition.

The parties are now in litigation with Tenet asserting counterclaims. Gotta hate when that happens. And that’s not the end of it:

Disputes also arose between the parties regarding the financial condition of the Debtors’ businesses, wherein the Debtors asserted that they were led to believe during due diligence process for the Acquisition that the business, as a whole, was essentially breaking even through November 2017 on an EBITDA basis. In fact, the business lost more than $6 million during its first full operational month in February 2018, and continues to experience substantial losses. The Debtors and their affiliates have asserted indemnity and fraud claims against Tenet on these grounds, which Tenet disputes.

Basically this is a hot mess. Coupled with (i) disputes with Drexel, (ii) delays in, and reduction of, payments of supplemental payments from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (iii) decreased patient volumes in 2018, (iv) increased losses by certain of the physician groups, (v) material declines in outpatient procedures and surgeries; and (vi) reductions in average daily census, partly due to a reduction in average length of stay and reduced direct admissions, HUH encountered a maelstrom of negative operational issues to the tune of a pre-tax 2018 loss of approximately $69mm. STC is profitable; it, however, is dragged down by the rest of the enterprise. All in, the debtors pre-tax losses in 2018 exceeded $85mm and have not abated in 2019. Due to this piss poor financial performance, the debtors defaulted on their MidCap credit facility.

The debtors intend to use the chapter 11 process to pursue an orderly wind down of HUH while, contemporaneously, pursuing a sale of STC and the related physician practices. No stalking horse bidder is currently lined up. The debtors do, however, have a commitment from Midcap for $65mm of DIP financing, of which it appears less than $7mm will be new money.

Now is an occasion for Philly to, once again, show how tough it can be.

*SCH, HUH and their corporate parent, Philadelphia Academic Health System LLC, are all DE LLCs.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

• Capital Structure: $38.6mm RCF & $20mm TL (Midcap Funding IV Trust)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Monique Bair DiSabatino, Mark Minuti, Jeffrey Hampton, Adam Isenberg, Aaron Applebaum, Jeremiah Vandermark) & Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: EisnerAmper LLP (Allen Wilen)

  • Investment Banker: SSG Advisors LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition & DIP Lender ($65mm): MidCap Funding IV Trust

  • Tenet Business Services Corp.

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Gregory Pesce) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones)