🔥New Chapter 22 Bankruptcy Filing - Remington Outdoor Company Inc.🔥

Remington Outdoor Company

July 27, 2020

To read our summary of the case, please go here.


Jurisdiction: N.D. of Alabama (Judge Jessup)

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Nancy Mitchell, Stephen Warren, Karen Rinehart, Diana Perez, Jennifer Taylor) & Burr & Forman LLP (Derek Meek, Hanna Lahr)

  • Post-Reorg Board of Directors: Anthony Acitelli, Alex Zyngier, George Wurtz III, G.M. McCarroll, Ron Coburn, Ken D’Arcy, Gene Davis)

  • Legal to Restructuring Committee: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Sarah Schultz)

  • Financial Advisor: M-III Advisory Partners LP (Colin Adams)

  • Investment Banker: Ducera Partners LLC (Bradley Meyer)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*Click on case name above for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • Priority Term Loan Lender: Whitebox Advisors LLC

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Andreas Andromalos) & Balch & Bingham LLP (Jeremy Retherford)

  • Priority Term Loan Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities

    • Christian & Small LLP (Daniel Sparks, Bill Bensinger)

  • FILO Lender: Franklin Advisors Inc.

    • Legal: Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Joshua Morse, Andrew Alfano) & Christian & Small LLP (Daniel Sparks, Bill Bensinger)

  • FILO Term Loan Agent: Ankura Trust Company

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Donald Bernstein, Joanna McDonald) & Hand Arendall Harrison Sale LLC (Benjamin Goldman)

  • Largest Equityholders (in order): Cede & Co., Schultze Master Fund, Antora Peak Credit Opportunities, BMR Funding LLC, Whitebox Asymmetric Partners LP, Whitebox Multi Strategy Partners LP, JNL Series TR - JNL/PPM America, Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Ltd., SG-Financial LLC, W.R. Stephens Jr. Trust A., Eastland CLO Ltd., JMP Credit Advisors CLO IV Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO Ltd., JMP Credit Advisors CLO III(R) Ltd., Voya CLO 2015-1 Ltd., Voya CLO 2014-4 Ltd., Voya CLO 2014-2 Ltd., Voya CLO 2013-3 Ltd., Voya CLO 2013-1 Ltd., Eastspring Investments US Bank Loan, PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd., Commonwealth Fixed Interest Fund 17, National Railroad Retirement, Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.

🧀 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - CEC Entertainment Inc. 🧀

CEC Entertainment Inc.

June 24, 2020

For our rundown, please go here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $1.089b funded debt ($760mm TL, $108 RCF, $6mm LOC, $215.7mm notes)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Alfredo Perez, Andrew Citron, Rachael Foust, Scott Bowling)

    • Board of Directors: David McKillips, Andrew Jhawar, Naveen Shahani, Allen Weiss, Peter Brown, Paul Aronzon

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chad Coben)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie O’Connell)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • PE Sponsor: Queso Holdings Inc./AP VIII CEC Holdings, L.P. (Apollo)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP

    • First Lien Credit Agreement Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders: American Money Management Corp, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Arena Capital Advisors LLC, Ares Management LLC, Bank of Montreal, BlueMountain Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, Catalur Capital Management LP, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank New York, Fidelity Management & Research Co., Fortress Investment Group LLC, GS Capital Partners LP, Hill Path Capital, Indaba Capital Fund LP, ICG Debt Advisors, Jefferies Financ LLC, J.H. Lane Partners Master Fund LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, MSD Capital LP, MSD Partners LP, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, Par Four Investment Management LLC, RFG-Clover LLC, Second Lien LLC, UBS AG, Wazee Street Capital Management, Western Asset Management Company LLC, WhiteStar Asset Management, ZAIS Group LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Jason Rubin, Marty Brimmage Jr., Lacy Lawrence)

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Jason Angelo)

    • Ad Hoc Group of ‘22 8% Senior Noteholders (Longfellow Investment Management Co. LLC, Prudential Financial Inc., Resource Credit Income Fund, Westchester Capital Management)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Matthew Warren, Lindsey Henrikson, Michael Rupe)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Wilmington Trust NA, The Coca-Cola Company, National Retail Properties, Performance Food Group, Washington Prime Group, NCR Corporation, Index Promotions

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel & Womble Bond Dickinson LLP (Matthew Ward)

7/17/20 Dkt. 352.

📺 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) 📺

Triple Frontier.gif

We often highlight how, particularly in the case of oil and gas companies, capital intensive companies end up with a lot of debt and a lot of debt often results in bankruptcy. In the upstream oil and gas space, exploration and production companies need a lot of upfront capital to, among other things, enter into royalty interest agreements with land owners, hire people to map wells, hire people to drill the earth, secure proper equipment, procure the relevant inputs and more. E&P companies literally have to shell out to pull out.

Similarly, telecommunications companies that want to cover a lot of ground require a lot of capital to do so. From 2010 through 2016, Connecticut-based Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) closed a series of transactions to expand from a provider of telephone and DSL internet services in mainly rural areas to a large telecommunications provider to both rural and urban markets across 29 states. It took billions of dollars in acquisitions to achieve this. Which, in turn, meant the company took on billions of dollars of debt to finance said acquisitions. $17.5b, to be exact. Due, in large part, to the weight of that heavy debt load, it, and its 28922932892 affiliates (collectively, the “debtors”), are now chapter 11 debtors in the Southern District of New York (White Plains).*

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The debtors underwrote the transactions with the expectation that synergistic efficiencies would be borne out and flow to the bottom line. PETITION readers know how we feel about synergies: more often than not, they prove elusive. Well:

Serving the new territories proved more difficult and expensive than the Company anticipated, and integration issues made it more difficult to retain customers. Simultaneously, the Company faced industry headwinds stemming from fierce competition in the telecommunications sector, shifting consumer preferences, and accelerating bandwidth and performance demands, all redefining what infrastructure telecommunications companies need to compete in the industry. These conditions have contributed to the unsustainability of the Company’s outstanding funded debt obligations—which total approximately $17.5 billion as of the Petition Date.

Shocker. Transactions that were meant to be accretive to the overall enterprise ended up — in conjunction with disruptive trends and intense competition — resulting in an astronomical amount of value destruction.

As a result of these macro challenges and integration issues, Frontier has not been able to fully realize the economies of scale expected from the Growth Transactions, as evidenced by a loss of approximately 1.3 million customers, from a high of 5.4 million after the CTF Transaction closed in 2016 to approximately 4.1 million as of January 2020. Frontier’s share price has dropped … reflecting a $8.4 billion decrease in market capitalization.

😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬

Consequently, the debtors have been in a state of liability management ever since the end of 2018. Subsequently, they (i) issued new secured notes to refinance a near(er)-term term loan maturity, (ii) amended and extended their revolving credit facility, and (iii) agreed to sell their northwest operations and related assets for $1.352b (the “Pacific Northwest Transaction”). The Pacific Northwest Transaction has since been hurdling through the regulatory approval process and seems poised to close on April 30, 2020.**

While all of these machinations were positive steps, there were still major issues to deal with. The capital structure remained robust. And “up-tier” exchanges of junior debt into more senior debt to push out near-term maturities were, post-Windstream***, deemed too complex, too short-term, and too likely to end up the subject of fierce (and costly) litigation**** As the debtors’ issued third quarter financials that were … well … not good, they announced a full drawn down of their revolver, instantly arming them with hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity.

The company needed reconstructive surgery. Band-aids alone wouldn’t be enough to dam the tide. In many respects, the company ought to be commended for opting to address the problem in a wholesale way rather than piecemeal kick, kick, and kick the can down the road — achieving nothing but short-term fixes to the enrichment of really nobody other than its bankers (and Aurelius).

And so now the company is at the restructuring support agreement stage. Seventy-five percent of the holders of unsecured notes have agreed to an equitization transaction — constituting an impaired consenting class for a plan of reorganization to be put on file within 30 days. Said another way, the debtors are taking the position that the value breaks within the unsecured debt. That is, that the value is at least $6.6b making the $10.949b of senior unsecured notes the “fulcrum security.” Unsecured noteholders reportedly include Elliott Management Corp., Apollo Global Management LLC, Franklin Resources Inc., and Capital Group Cos. They would end up the owners of the reorganized company.

What else is the RSA about?

  • Secured debt will be repaid in full on the effective date;

  • A proposed DIP (more on this below) would roll into an exit facility;

  • The unsecured noteholders would, in addition to receiving equity, get $750mm of seniority-TBD take-back paper and $150mm of cash (and board seats);

  • General unsecured creditors would ride through and be paid in full; and

  • Holders of secured and unsecured subsidiary debt will be reinstated or paid in full.

The debtors also obtained a fully-committed new money DIP of $460mm from Goldman Sachs Bank USA. This has proven controversial. Though the DIP motion was not up for hearing along with other first day relief late last week, the subject proved contentious. The Ad Hoc First Lien Committee objected to the DIP. Coming in hot, they wrote:

Beneath the thin veneer in which these so-called “pre-arranged” cases are packaged, lies multiple infirmities that, if not properly addressed by the Debtors, will ultimately result in the unraveling of these cases. While the Debtors seek to shroud themselves in a restructuring support agreement (the “RSA”) that enjoys broad unsecured creditor support, the truth is that underlying that support is a fragile house of cards that will not withstand scrutiny as these cases unfold. Turning the bankruptcy code on its head, the Debtors attempt through their RSA to pay unsecured bondholders cash as a proxy for their missed prepetition interest payment, postpetition interest to yet other unsecured creditors of various subsidiaries, and complete repayment to prepetition revolver lenders that are attempting, through the proposed debtor-inpossession financing (the “DIP Loan”), to effectively “roll-up” their prepetition exposure through the DIP Loan, all while the Debtors attempt to deprive their first lien secured creditors of contractual entitlements to default interest and pro rata payments they will otherwise be entitled to if their debt is to be unimpaired, as the RSA purports to require. While those are fights for another day, their significance in these cases must not be overlooked.

Whoa. That’s a lot. What does it boil down to? “F*ck you, pay me.” The first lien lenders are pissed that everyone under the sun is getting taken care of in the RSA except them.

  • You want to deny us our default interest. F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want a DIP despite having hundreds of millions of cash on hand and $1.3b of sale proceeds coming in? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want a 2-for-1 roll-up where, “as a condition to raising $460 million in debtor-in-possession financing, the Debtors must turn around and repay $850 million to their prepetition revolving lenders, thus decreasing the Debtors’ overall liquidity on a net basis”? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You shirking our pro rata payments we’d otherwise be entitled to if our debt is to be unimpaired? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to pay unsecured senior noteholders “incremental payments” of excess cash to compensate them for skipped interest payments without paying us default interest and pro rata payments? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to use sale proceeds to pay down unsecureds when that’s ours under the first lien docs? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to pay interest on the sub debt without giving us default interest? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to do all of this without a proper adequate protection package for us? F+ck you, pay me.

The second lien debtholders chimed in, voicing similar concerns about the propriety of the adequate protection package. For the uninitiated, adequate protection often includes replacement liens on existing collateral, super-priority claims emanating out of those liens, payment of professional fees, and interest. In this case, both the first and second liens assert that default interest — typically several bps higher — ought to be included as adequate protection. The issue, however, was not up for hearing on the first day so all of this is a preview of potential fireworks to come if an agreement isn’t hashed out in coming weeks.

The debtors hope to have a confirmation order within four months with the effective date within twelve months (the delay attributable to certain regulatory approvals). We wish them luck.

______

*Commercial real estate is getting battered all over the place but not 50 Main Street, Suite 1000 in White Plains New York. Apparently Frontier Communications has an office there too. Who knew there was a speciality business in co-working for bankrupt companies? In one place, you’ve got FULLBEAUTY Brands Inc. and Internap Inc. AND Frontier Communications. We previously wrote about this convenient phenomenon here.

**The company seeks an expedited hearing in bankruptcy court seeking approval of it. It is scheduled for this week.

***Here is a Bloomberg video from June 2019 previously posted in PETITION wherein Jason Mudrick of Mudrick Capital Management discusses the effect Windstream had on Frontier and predicted Frontier would be in bankruptcy by the end of the year. He got that wrong. But did it matter to him? He also notes a CDS-based short-position that would pay out if Frontier filed for bankruptcy within 12 months. For CDS purposes, looks like he got that right. By the way, per Moody’s, here was the spread on the CDS around the time that Mudrick acknowledged his CDS position:

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Here it was a few months later:

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And, for the sake of comparison, here was the spread on the CDS just prior to the bankruptcy filing last week:

Screen Shot 2020-04-19 at 9.35.24 AM.png

Clearly the market was keenly aware (who wasn’t given the missed interest payment?) that a bankruptcy filing was imminent: insurance on FTR got meaningfully more expensive. Other companies with really expensive CDS these days? Neiman Marcus Group (which, Reuters reports, may be filing as soon as this week), J.C. Penney Corporation Inc., and Chesapeake Energy Corporation.

****Notably, Aurelius Capital Management LP pushed for an exchange of its unsecured position into secured notes higher in the capital structure — a proposal that would achieve the triple-frontier-heist-like-whammy of better positioning their debt, protecting the CDS they sold by delaying bankruptcy, and screwing over junior debtholders like Elliott (PETITION Note: we really just wanted to squeeze in a reference to the abominably-bad NFLX movie starring Ben Affleck, an unfortunate shelter-in indulge). On the flip side, funds such as Discovery Capital Management LLC and GoldenTree Asset Management LP pushed the company to file for bankruptcy rather than engage in Aurelius’ proposed exchange.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $850mm RCF, $1.7b first lien TL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), $1.7b first lien notes (Wilmington Trust NA), $1.6b second lien notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $10.95mm unsecured senior notes (The Bank of New York Mellon), $100mm sub secured notes (BOKF NA), $750mm sub unsecured notes (U.S. Bank Trust National Association)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Chad Husnick, Benjamin Rhode, Mark McKane, Patrick Venter, Jacob Johnston)

    • Directors: Kevin Beebe, Paul Keglevic, Mohsin Meghji

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Carlin Adrianopoli)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Major equityholders: BlackRock Inc., Vanguard Group Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Management

    • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Katelin Morales)

    • Indenture Trustee and Collateral Agent for the 8.500% ‘26 Second Lien Secured Notes

      • Legal: Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP (Joseph Schwartz, Curtis Plaza, Tara Schellhorn)

    • Credit Agreement Administrative Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Nicholas Baker, Jamie Fell)

    • DIP Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut, Stephen Piraino, Samuel Wagreich)

    • Ad Hoc First Lien Committee

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Gregory Laufer, Kyle Kimpler, Miriam Levi)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Second lien Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Susheel Kirpalani, Benjamin Finestone, Deborah Newman, Daniel Holzman, Lindsay Weber)

    • Ad Hoc Senior Notes Group

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Ad Hoc Committee of Frontier Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Michael Price)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group of Subsidiary Debtholders

      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Amy Caton, Douglas Mannal, Stephen Zide, Megan Wasson)

      • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Richard Newman)

      • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC (Elizabeth LaPuma)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - FULLBEAUTY Brands Holdings Corp.

FULLBEAUTY Brands Holdings Corp.

February 3, 2019

We’re going to regurgitate our report about FULLBEAUTY Brands Holdings Corp. from January 6th after the company publicly posted its proposed plan of reorganization and disclosure statement and issued a press release about its proposed restructuring. What follows is what we wrote then:


FULLBEAUTY Brands Inc., an Apax Partners’ disaster…uh, “investment”…will, despite earlier reports of an out-of-court resolution to the contrary, be filing for bankruptcy after all in what appears to be either a late January or an early February filing after the company completes its prepackaged solicitation of creditors. Back in May in “Plus-Size Beauty is a Plus-Size Sh*tfest (Short Apax Partners’ Fashion Sense),” we wrote:

Here’s some free advice to our friends at Apax Partners: hire some millennials. And some women. When you have 23 partners worldwide and only 1 of them is a woman (in Tel Aviv, of all places), it’s no wonder that certain women’s apparel investments are going sideways. Fresh off of the bankruptcies of Answers.com and rue21, another recent leveraged buyout by the private equity firm is looking a bit bloated: NY-based FullBeauty Brands, a plus-size direct-to-consumer e-commerce and catalogue play with a portfolio of six brands (Woman Within, Roamans, Jessica London, Brylane Home, BC Outlet, Swimsuits for All, and Eilos).

Wait. Hold up. Direct-to-consumer? Check. E-commerce? Check. Isn’t that, like, all the rage right now? Yes, unless you’re levered to the hilt and have a relatively scant social media presence. Check and check.

Per a press release on Thursday, the company has an agreement with nearly all of its first-lien-last out lenders, first lien lenders, second lien lenders and equity sponsors on a deleveraging transaction that will shed $900mm of debt from the company’s balance sheet. It also has a commitment for $30mm in new liquidity in the form of a new money term loan with existing lenders. Per Bloomberg:

About 87.5 percent of the common reorganized equity would go to first-lien lenders, 10 percent to second liens, and 2.5 percent to the sponsor, according to people with knowledge of the plan who weren’t authorized to speak publicly.

Which, in English, means that Oaktree Capital Group LLCGoldman Sachs Group Inc., and Voya Financial Inc. will end up owning this retailer. Your plus-sized clothing, powered by hedge funds. Apax and Charlesbank Capital, the other PE sponsor, stand to maintain 2.5% of the equity which, from our vantage point, appears rather generous (PETITION Note: there must be a decent amount of cross-holdings between the first lien and second lien debt for that to be the case). Here is the difference in capital structure:

Screen Shot 2019-02-04 at 7.06.26 PM.png

What’s the story here? Simply put, it’s just another retail with far too much leverage in this retail environment.

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Of course, there’s the obligatory product strategy, inventory control, and e-commerce excuses as well. Not to mention…wait for it…Amazon Inc ($AMZN)!

“In addition to these operational hurdles, FullBeauty has also faced competition from online retail giant Amazon, Inc. and retail chains, including Walmart Inc. and Kohl’s Corporation, that have recently entered the plus-size clothing space.”

Kirkland & Ellis LLPPJT Partners ($PJT) and AlixPartners represent the company.


We give bankruptcy professionals grief all of the time for what often appears to be fee extraction in various cases. In our view, there have been some pretty egregious examples of inefficiency in the system and, considering a number of our readers are management teams of distressed companies, we feel it’s imperative that we cure for a blatant information dislocation and help educate the masses. This, though, appears to be an extraordinary case. In the other direction.

The company’s professionals here propose to confirm the company’s plan of reorganization at the first day hearing of the case. As Bloomberg noted on Monday, this would “set a new record for emerging from court protection in under 24 hours.” Bloomberg reports:

The previous record for the fastest Chapter 11 process is held by Blue Bird Body Co., which exited bankruptcy in 2006 in less than two days. Fullbeauty and its advisers aim to beat that mark.

“We structured this deal as if bankruptcy never happened for our trade creditors, vendors and employees to avoid further disruption to the company,” attorney Jon Henes at Kirkland & Ellis, the company’s legal counsel, said in an interview. “In this situation, every day in court is another day of costs without any corresponding benefit.”

In fact, this case would be so quick that, as you read this (on Wednesday), Judge Drain may have already given the plan his blessing. This makes Roust Corporation Inc. (6 days) and Southcross Holdings (13 days) look like child’s play. For that reason — and that reason alone — we’ll forgive the company’s professionals for their blatant victory lap: it’s curious that Bloomberg had a completed interview ready to go at 9:26am on the morning of the company’s bankruptcy filing. Clearly Kirkland & Ellis LLP, PJT Partners LP ($PJT) and Houlihan Lokey Capital ($HL) want to milk this extraordinary result for all it’s worth. We can’t really blame them, truthfully. That is, unless and/or until the company violates the “Two Year Rule” a la Charlotte Russe.

Anyway, why so quick? Well, because they can: the entire capital structure is on board with the proposed plan and trade will ride through unimpaired and paid. All contracts will be assumed. There are no brick-and-mortar stores to deal with: this is a web and catalogue-based business. Like we said, this case is extraordinary. Per the Company:

It is in the best interest of the estates that the Debtors remain in bankruptcy for as short a time-period as possible. If FullBeauty is forced to remain in chapter 11 longer than necessary, it may be required to seek debtor in possession financing, which would cost the Debtors unnecessary bank fees and professional expenses. In addition, although January has been relatively smooth in terms of vendor outreach, FullBeauty expects that trade could contract very quickly if the company remains in chapter 11 longer than necessary—particularly because many vendors are in foreign jurisdictions and they do not understand the nuances of prepackaged cases versus longer prearranged or traditional chapter 11 cases. Every day that FullBeauty remains in chapter 11 results in cash spent that could go to developing the business.

Indeed, for once, it appears that the best interests of the debtor company were, indeed, heeded.*

*Which is not to say that we believe the out-of-court bills will be light.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $mm debt     

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, George Klidonas, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Nicole Greenblatt)

    • Independent Director: Mohsin Meghji

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie Baird)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Financial Sponsor (69.6%): Apax Partners LLP

      • Legal: Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP (Elisha Graff, Nicholas Baker)

    • Financial Sponsor (26.4%): Charlesbank Capital Partners LLC

      • Legal: Goodwin Proctor LLP (William Weintraub, Joseph Bernardi Jr.)

    • ABL Agent & FILO Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Darren Klein, Aryeh Falk)

    • First Lien Agent & Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Shipman & Goodman LLP (Nathan Plotkin, Eric Goldstein, Marie Pollio)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Term Loan Lenders

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Gerard Uzzi, Nelly Almeida)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Term Loan Lenders

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Elizabeth McColm, Christopher Hopkins)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Saul Burian)

Updated 2/4/19 at 7:03 CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Specialty Retail Shops Holding Corp. (Shopko)

Specialty Retail Shops Holding Corp. (Shopko)

January 16, 2019

Sun Capital Partners’-owned, Wisconsin-based, Specialty Retail Shops Holding Corp. (“Shopko”) filed for bankruptcy on January 16, 2019 in the District of Nebraska. Yes, the District of Nebraska. Practitioners in Delaware must really be smarting over that one. That said, this is not the first retail chapter 11 bankruptcy case shepherded by Kirkland & Ellis LLP in Nebraska (see, Gordman’s Stores circa 2017). K&E must love the native Kool-Aid. Others, however, aren’t such big fans: the company’s largest unsecured creditor, McKesson Corporation ($MCK), for instance. McKesson is a supplier of the company’s pharmacies and is a large player in the healthcare business, damn it; they spit on Kool-Aid; and they have already filed a motion seeking a change of venue to the Eastern District of Wisconsin. They claim that venue is manufactured here on the basis of an absentee subsidiary. How dare they? Nobody EVER venue shops. EVER!

Anyway, we’ve gotten ahead of our skis here…

The company operates approximately 367 stores (125 bigbox, 235 hometown, and 10 express stores) in 25 states throughout the United States; it employs…

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  • Jurisdiction: D. of Nebraska

  • Capital Structure: see report.    

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Patrick Nash Jr., Jamie Netznik, Travis Bayer, Steven Serajeddini, Daniel Rudewicz) & (local) McGrath North Mullin & Kratz P.C. LLO (James Niemeier, Michael Eversden, Lauren Goodman)

    • Board of Directors: Russell Steinhorst (CEO), Casey Lanza, Donald Roach, Mohsin Meghji, Steve Winograd

    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Stephen Spencer)

    • Liquidation Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

      • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox)

    • Real Estate Consultant: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Special Committee of the Board of Directors

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP

    • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Chad Simon) & (local) Baird Holm LLP (Brandon Tomjack)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (HanesBrands Inc., Readerlink Distribution Services LLC, Home Products International NA, McKesson Corp., Notations Inc., LCN SKO OMAHA (MULTI) LLC, Realty Income Corporation)

      • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Jeffrey Pomerantz, Bradford Sandler, Alan Kornfeld, Robert Feinstein) & (local) Goosmann Law Firm PLC (Joel Carney)

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Conor Tully)

      • Expert Consultant: The Michel-Shaked Group (Israel Shaked)

Updated 3/9/19

New Chapter 11 Filing - Nine West Holdings Inc.

Nine West Holdings Inc.

April 6, 2018

Nine West Holdings Inc., the well-known footwear retailer, has finally filed for bankruptcy. The company will sell its Nine West and Bandolino brands to Authentic Brands Group and reorganize around its One Jeanswear Group, The Jewelry Group, the Kasper Group, and Anne Klein business segments. The company has a restructuring support agreement in hand to support this dual-process. 

More on the situation here

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Chapman)

  • Capital Structure: See below.

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, James Stempel, Joseph Graham, Angela Snell, Anna Rotman, Jamie Aycock, Justin Alphonse Mercurio, Alyssa Russell)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Ralph Schipani III, Julie Hertzberg, Holden Bixler, Amy Lee, Richard Niemerg, Theodore Langer, Stuart Loop, Thomas Koch, Michael Dvorak)

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Alexander Lees)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Ari Lefkovits, David Hales, Mike Weitz, Nikhil Angelo, Okan Kender, Abigail Gay, Drew Deaton) & Consensus Advisory Services LLC

    • Authorized Officers: Stefan Kaluzny, Peter Morrow, Harvey Tepner, Alan Miller

    • Legal to the Authorized Officers: Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Seth Goldman, Kevin Allred, Thomas Walper)

    • Financial Advisor to the Authorized Officers: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Jay Borow)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Stalking Horse Bidder/Buyer: Authentic Brands Group

      • Legal: DLA Piper LLP (Richard Chesley, Ann Lawrence, Rachel Ehrlich Albanese)

    • Prepetition ABL and FILO Agent: Wells Fargo NA

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Matthew Ziegler, Julia Frost-Davies, Amelia Joiner)

    • Administrative Agent for the prepetition secured and unsecured Term Loan Facilities: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

    • Indenture Trustee for 3 series of Unsecured Notes: US Bank NA

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (J. Christopher Shore, Philip Abelson) & Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Arlene Alves)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders (Farmstead Capital Management LLC, KKR Credit Advisors (US) LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Huebner, Darren Klein, Adam Shpeen)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Lenders (Alden Global Capital LLC, Carlson Capital LP, CVC Credit Partners LLC, Silvermine Capital Management LLC, Trimaran Advisors)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Michael Rupe, Jeffrey Pawlitz, Michael Handler, Bradley Giordano)

      • Financial Advisor: Guggenheim Securities LLC

    • Brigade Capital Management, LP

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Douglas Mannel, Rachael Ringer)

      • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Company

    • Ad Hoc Group of 2019 Unsecured Noteholders (Whitebox Advisors LLC, Scoggin Management LP, Old Bellows Partners LP, Wazee Street Opportunities Fund IV)

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Rachel Strickland)

    • Ad Hoc Group of 2034 Unsecured Noteholders

      • Legal: Jones Day

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey

    • Administrative Agent for $247.5mm DIP ABL Facility

    • Administrative Agent for $50mm DIP TL Facility

    • Sponsor: Sycamore Partners LP

      • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Mark Thomas, Peter Young, Michael Mervis, Jared Zajac, Chantel Febus, Alyse Stach)

    • KKR Asset Management

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc)

    • Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC and Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

      • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi, Gregg Weiner)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Aurelius Capital Master Ltd., GLAS Trust Company LLC, PBGC, Simon Property Group, Stella International Trading (Macao Commercial Offshore) Ltd., Surefield Limited, U.S. Bank NA)

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, David Zensky, Deborah Newman, Arik Preis, Jason Rubin, Anthony Loring, Michael Byun, Patrick Chen)

      • Legal Conflicts Counsel: Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP (David Rosner, Howard Schub)

      • Financial Advisor: Protiviti Inc. (Guy Davis, Suzanne Roski, Heather Williams, John Eldred, Justin Koehler, Brian Taylor, Russell Brooks, Matthew Smith, Blake Parker, Lee Slobodien, Omkar Vale, Lok Lam, Sean Sterling) & Province Inc. (Michael Atkinson, Jason Crockett, Eunice Min, Byron Groth)

      • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Saul Burian, Surbhi Gupta, Chris Khoury, Tejas Kullarwar, Matt Ender, Brendan Wu)

Updated 11/3/18 at 6:42 am CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - Keystone Tube Company LLC (A.M. Castle & Co.)

Keystone Tube Company LLC (A.M. Castle & Co.)

  • 6/18/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($CASL) Illinois-based specialty metals distribution company with customers in some hard hit sectors of late, e.g., oil and gas, retail, mining, defense, filed a prepackaged bankruptcy case to de-lever its balance sheet. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
  • Capital Structure: $112mm first lien debt (Cantor Fitzgerald Securities), $177mm
  • 18 12.75% second lien notes (US Bank NA), $22.3mm '19 5.25% convertible third lien notes (US Bank NA)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski, Jeffrey Pomerantz, Maxim Litvak, John Lucas, Peter Keane)
    • Financial Advisor & Investment Banker: Imperial Capital LLC (Joseph Kazanovski)
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Lender Committee (At Filing: Corre Partners Management LLC, Highbridge Capital Management LLC, SGF Inc., Pandora Select Partners LP, Whitebox Advisors LLC, Wolverine Asset Management Ltd.)
      • Legal (except SGF Inc.): Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Jacob Adlerstein, Michael Rudnick) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Joel Waite, Ian Bambrick)
      • Legal (SGF Inc): Goodwin Proctor LLP (Michael Goldstein, Gregory Fox) & (local) Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier, John Schanne)
      • Financial Advisor: Ducera LLC
    • Prepetition First Lien Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities
      • Legal: Shipman & Goodwin LLP
    • Prepetition Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA
      • Legal: Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Robert Mallard, Alessandra Glorioso)
    • Administrative Agent: PNC Bank NA
      • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd (Jacob Marshall, Danielle Juhle) & (local) Blank Rome LLP (Josef Mintz)
    • Bank of America NA
      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Jody Barillare, Rachel Jaffe Mauceri)
    • Nantahala Capital Management
      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Arthur Steinberg) & (local) The Rosner Law Group LLC (Frederick Rosner)

Updated 7/11/17 6:22 pm

Source: First Day Declaration.

Source: First Day Declaration.

New Chapter 11 Filing - Panda Temple Power LLC

Panda Temple Power LLC

  • 4/18/17 Recap: Texas-based gas-operated merchant power generator servicing the ERCOT region filed for bankruptcy because demand projections were too robust (in the face of increasing share serviced by alternative energy sources), depressed natural gas prices crushed revenues, and a regulatory attempt to reform to a capacity market failed, among other reasons. The company had been downgraded and operating pursuant to a forbearance with its lenders. Now, the company is in bankruptcy with a restructuring support agreement that outlines the terms of a transaction that will swap the term loan for 100% of the equity in the company. The company will have a $20mm DIP in play to effectuate the transaction.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $398.7mm funded '22 first lien TL (inclusive of LOC and RCF - Wilmington Trust, NA)  
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Keith Simon, Annemarie Reilly, Marc Zelina) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger (John Knight, Paul Heath, Brendan Schlauch, Christopher De Lillo)
    • Investment Banker: Ducera Partners (Mark Davis)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders (Ares Capital Corporation, Avenue Capital Management II LP, Brigade Capital Management LP, Canaras Capital Management, GSO Capital Partners LP, H.I.G. WhiteHorse Capital LLC, Lord Abbett & Co. LLC, MJX Asset Management LLC, Oaktree Capital Management LP, Siemens Financial Services Inc., SOF-X Credit Holdings LLC (Starwood Credit Advisors LLC), Western Asset Management Company)
      • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Jonathan Canfield, Joanne Lau) & (local) Young Conaway & Stargatt LLP (Edmon Morton, Matthew Lunn, Ashley Jacobs)
      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey
    • 3M Employee Retirement Income Plan Trust
      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (Jeffrey Rhodes, Ira Herman, Stanley Tarr)

Updated 5/3/17 

New Filing - DACCO Transmission Parts (Transtar Holding Company)

DACCO Transmission Parts (Transtar Holding Company)

  • 11/20/16 Recap: Ohio-based global supplier of products related to transmissions and drivetrains files for Chapter 11 to effectuate a prepackaged case handing the company over to the first lien lenders. The cases will be funded by Silver Point Finance LLC as DIP lender ($55mm).
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
  • Capital Structure: $376.6mm first lien TL (RBC), $48mm RCF (RBC), $170mm second lien TL (Cortland Capital Markets)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Replacement Legal: Jones Day LLP (Scott Greenberg, Carl E. Black, Daniel Merrett, Stacey Corr-Irvine)
    • Original Legal: Willkie Farr (Rachel Strickland, Christopher Koenig, Jennifer Hardy, Debra McElligott)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting LLC (Daniel Hugo, Dewey Imhoff, Stuart Gleichenhaus, Joe Lu, Carl Jones, Scott Hoffman, Luke McCrory, Patrick Rauh)
    • Investment Banker: Ducera Partners LLC (Agnes Tang)
    • Lease Consultant: Hilco Real Estate LLC (Ryan Lawlor)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • RBC
      • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Randal Palach, Alexander Bongartz)
    • Ad Hoc Committee of Second Lien Lenders
      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, Matthew Warren)
    • Silver Point Capital (as DIP Lender)
      • Legal: Chapman & Cutler LLP (Steven Wilanowsky, Aaron Krieger)
    • Friedman Fleisher & Lowe LLC (as Sponsor)
      • Legal: Young Conaway (Michael Nestor)
    • Examiner
      • Legal: Jenner & Block LLP (Richard Levin)
    • Octagon Credit Investors LLC and Invesco Ltd.
      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Michael Rupe, Jeffrey Pawlitz)

Updated 3/30/17