⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. ($DO)⛽️

Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc.

April 26, 2020

Houston-based Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. and 14 affiliates (the “debtors”), a contract drilling services provider to the oil and gas industry filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. The company has 15 offshore drilling rigs: 11 semi-submersibles and four ultra-deepwater drillships deployed around the world (primarily in the Gulf of Mexico, Australia, Brazil and UK). Offshore drilling was already challenged due to excess supply of rigs — and has been since 2014. Recent events have made matters much much worse.

Thanks MBS. Thanks Putin. Thanks…uh…debilitating pandemic. The left-right combination of the Saudi/OPEC/Russia oil price war and COVID-19 has the entire oil and gas industry wobbling against the ropes. The pre-existing reality for offshore services companies “worsened precipitously” because of all of this. And so many companies will fall. The question is at what count and at what strength will they be able to get back on their feet. Given that this is a free-fall into bankruptcy with no pre-negotiated deal with lenders, it seems that nobody knows the answer. How could they? More on this below.

Unfortunately, the services segment the debtors play in is particularly at risk. “Almost all” of the debtors’ customers have requested some form of concessions on $1.4b of aggregate contract backlog. One customer, Beach Energy Ltd. ($BEPTF), “recently sought to formally terminate its agreement with the Company” (an action that is now the subject of an adversary proceeding filed in the bankruptcy cases). The debtors have been immersed in negotiations with their contract counter-parties to navigate these extraordinary times. It doesn’t help when business is so concentrated. Hess Corporation ($HES) is 30% of annual revenue; Occidental Petroleum Corporation ($OXY) is 21%; and Petrobras ($PBR) is 20%. BP PLC ($BP) and Royal Dutch Shell ($RDS.A) are other big customers.

With the writing on the wall, the debtors smartly drew down on their revolving credit facility — pulling $436mm out from under Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC). WFC must’ve loved that. Times like these really give phrases like “relationship banking” entirely new meaning. The debtors also elected to forgo a $14mm interest payment on its 2039 senior notes. Yep, you read that right: the company previously issued senior notes that weren’t set to mature until 2039. Not exactly Argentina but holy f*ck that expresses some real optimism (and froth) in the markets (and that issuance isn’t even the longest dated maturity but let’s not nitpick here)!

Yeah, so about that capital structure. In total, the debtors have $2.4b in funded debt. In addition to their $442mm of drawing under their revolving credit facility, the debtors have:

• $500mm of 5.7% ‘39 senior unsecured notes;

• $250mm of 3.45% ‘23 senior unsecured notes;

• $750mm of 4.875% ‘43 senior unsecured notes; and

• $500mm of 7.785% ‘25 senor unsecured notes.

As we’ve said time and time again: exploration and production is a wildly capital intensive business.

So now what? As we said above, there’s no deal here. The debtors note:

The Debtors determined to commence these Chapter 11 Cases to preserve their valuable contract backlog, and preserve their approximately $434.9 million in unrestricted cash on hand while avoiding annual interest expense of approximately $140.1 million under the Revolving Credit Facility and the Senior Notes, and to stabilize operations while proactively restructuring their balance sheet to successfully compete in the changing global energy markets. The Debtors and their Advisors believe cash on hand provides adequate funding at the outset of these cases. The Debtors are well-positioned to successfully emerge from bankruptcy with a highly marketable fleet, a solid backlog of activity, a strong balance sheet and liquidity position, and a differentiated approach and set of capabilities. Despite the volatile and current uncertain market conditions, the Debtors remain confident in the need for their industry, its importance around the world, and the critical services they provide.

We suspect the debtors will hang out in bankruptcy for a bit. After all, placing a value on how “critical” these services are in the current environment is going to be a challenge (though the relatively simple capital structure makes that calculation significantly easier…assuming the value extends beyond WFC). One thing seems certain: Loews Corporation ($L) is gonna have to write-down the entirety of its investment here.

*****

We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight that, similar to Whiting Petroleum’s execs, the debtors’ executives here got paid nice bonuses just prior to the bankruptcy filing. PETITION Note: We don’t have data to back this up but there appeared to be a much bigger uproar in Whiting’s case about this than here. Which is not to say that people aren’t angry — totally factually incorrect — but angry:

Because equity-based comp doesn’t exactly serve as “incentive” when the equity is worth bupkis, the debtors paid $3.55mm to employees a week before the filing and intend to file a motion to seek bankruptcy court approval of their go-forward employee programs.

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: $442mm RCF (inclusive of LOC)(Wells Fargo Bank NA). See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Christopher Hopkins, Shamara James, Alice Nofzinger, Jacqueline Rubin, Andrew Gordon, Jorge Gonzalez-Corona) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson, Genevieve Graham)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Nicholas Grossi)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Bracewell LLP

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting

  • Indenture Trustee: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Noteholders

    • Legal: Milbank LLP

    • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

  • Major Equityholder: Loews Corporation

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (James Bromley)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA, National Oilwell Varco LP, Deep Sea Mooring, Crane Worldwide Logistics LLC, Kiswire Trading Inc., Parker Hannifin Corporation, SafeKick Americas LLC

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss, Marty Brimmage, Kevin Eide, Patrick Chen, Matthew Breen)

    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Christopher Kearns)

    • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners LP (Alexander Tracy)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LSC Communications Inc.

LSC Communications Inc.

April 13, 2020

Chicago-based LSC Communications Inc. ($LSC) and 21 affiliated debtors (the “debtors”), a provider of traditional and digital print products, print-related services and office products, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company is the result of a 2016 spinoff from R.R. Donnelley & Sons and though it subsequently diversified its business into logistics, it still deals with old-school categories like print magazines, catalogs, books, directories, various other print-related services, and office products. In fact, it is one of the largest printers of books in the US. All of which is to say that the debtors were ripe for disruption.

Nothing about this ought to be surprising to people who have been paying attention to the retail and media landscape over the last decade. Nevertheless, it is painful to read:

Although the Company is a market leader in the printing and printing related services industries, the Company’s product and service offerings have been adversely impacted by a number of long-term economic trends. Digital migration has substantially impacted print production volume, in particular with respect to printed magazines as advertising spending continues to move away from print to electronic media. Catalogs have experienced volume reductions as retailers and direct marketers allocate more of their spending to online advertising and marketing campaigns and some traditional retailers and director marketers go out of business in the face of increased competition from online retailers. The Company saw an unprecedented drop in demand for magazines and catalogs in 2019, with the faster pace of decline in demand primarily due to the accelerating movement from printed platforms to digital platforms.

Thanks Facebook Inc. ($FB). Clearly all of the Restoration Hardware Inc. ($RH) catalogues in the world couldn’t offset the shift of advertising away from print media and soften this blow.

And then there’s this:

Demand for printed educational textbooks within the college market has been adversely impacted by electronic substitution and other trends such as textbook rental programs and free open source e-textbooks. The K-12 educational sector has seen an increased focus on e-textbooks and e-learning programs, but there has been inconsistent adoption of these new technologies across school systems. Consumer demand for e-books in trade and mass market has impacted overall print book volume, although e-book adoption rates have stabilized and industry-wide print book volume has been growing in recent years.

Apropos to the brief discussion above about Mary Meeker’s presentation, we’ve got news for these guys: these trends away from printed textbooks are going to gather steam post-COVID. And while we’re happy to see an uptick in physical book production, it’s unclear whether that is a short-term trend or a longer-term rebound. Someone is going to have to get comfortable betting on the latter. More on this in a moment.

As if the secular trends weren’t bad enough, the debtors’ attempt to consolidate with Quad/Graphics Inc. ($QUAD) (synergies!) in late 2018 met with resistance. The DOJ filed a civil antitrust lawsuit seeking to block the proposed merger and ultimately the parties agreed to terminate the merger. While LSC received a reverse termination fee that exceeded the amount of transaction costs, the proposed merger (i) hindered the debtors’ ability to make much-needed operational fixes (i.e., plant consolidation and footprint optimization), (ii) affected new business development efforts and strained existing customer relationships, and (iii) created uncertainty among the employee ranks that, in some respects, sparked attrition.

All of the above led to an internal restructuring. The debtors set their sights on nine plant closures and footprint reductions — primarily in magazines and catalog manufacturing; they also renegotiated a number of unprofitable customer contracts. Bear in mind: all of this was pre-COVID. Matters can only have gotten worse.

What does all of this look like from a financial perspective? The debtors filed their annual report in early March and the numbers don’t lie:

LSC Annual Report 3/2/20

Net sales declined 13% and while there was a corresponding decline in the cost of sales, SG&A remained constant and restructuring costs ballooned.* The magazines/catalogues/logistics segment declined 7.3%. The book segment fell 3.6%. Office products were a rare bright spot up 8.1% (PETITION Note: this is a relatively small portion of the debtors’ business and we’ll see how that plays out going forward given that there may be a huge shift there).

Due to this piss poor operating performance, the debtors tripped their consolidated leverage ratio and minimum interest ratio covenants in their credit agreement. That’s right: you didn’t think this story would be complete without a significantly over-levered balance sheet, did you?

The company has $972mm of total funded indebtedness broken out among a revolver ($249mm + $50.8mm in outstanding letters of credit), a term loan ($221.9mm) and senior secured notes ($450mm at 8.75%). The term loan requires quarterly principal payments of $10.625mm. While the entire capital structure is secured by an “equal first-priority" ranking with respect to the collateral, the revolver has a “first-out” priority and is entitled first to any proceeds from the collateral while the term loan and the senior secured notes enjoy pari passu status. This is where the rubber meets the road: that’s a lot of parties to get to agree on a transaction.

Before it could agree to anything, however, the debtors needed time and therefore entered into a widely reported forbearance in early March. S&P Global Ratings promptly slapped a downgrade on the company saying that it believed a debt restructuring was likely within 90 days. What a genius call!! While all of this was happening, the debtors continued to deteriorate:

During its March discussions with creditors, the Debtors began to see a significant decrease in their available liquidity, driven in part by the long-term industry trends discussed above and made acute by the severe economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Which begs the question: what is the value of this business? Cleary nobody can agree on that: there is no restructuring support agreement here. Instead, there appears to be an arms-locked resignation that a parallel-path is needed to (i) nail down some DIP financing to shore up liquidity ($100mm at L+6.75%) and buy time, (ii) continue to discuss a balance sheet restructuring, AND (iii) simultaneously market test the business via a strategic marketing process. A lot of people will need to wait and see how this plays out, primarily pensioners owed over $50mm and various trade creditors including the bankruptcy-familiar RR Donnelley & Sons Co. ($RRD), Eastman Kodak Company ($KODK) and Verso Paper Holding LLC.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Lane)

• Capital Structure: $249mm funded RCF (plus $50.8mm LOCs), $221.9mm funded TL (Bank of America NA), $450mm ‘23 8.75% senior secured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, Alexa Kranzley, Christian Jensen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent ($100mm): Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Moore & Van Allen PLLC (David Eades, Charles R. Rayburn III, Zachary Smith)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders: Bardin Hill Investment Partners LP, Eaton Vance Management, HG Vora Capital Management, LLC, Marathon Asset Management, Shenkman Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management LP, and Summit Partners Credit Advisors, L.P.

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Sarah Gryll, Lucas Barrett)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Noteholders: Capital Research and Management Company, Manulife Investment Management, Atlas FRM LLC, TD Asset Management Inc.

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Eaton, Claudia Tobler)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Frank Merola, Brett Lawrence, Erez Gilad, Harold Olsen, Gabriel Sasson)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - White Star Petroleum Holdings LLC⛽️

White Star Petroleum Holdings LLC

May 28, 2019

Hey look. It’s Tuesday. It must be time for another oil and gas bankruptcy filing! White Star Petroleum Holdings LLC is the latest oil and gas company to make an oh-so-2015-like appearance in bankruptcy court. No need to knock your skull or check your watch: yes, it is very much 2019.*

The company, formerly known as American Energy — Woodford LLC, was originally formed in 2013 by American Energy Partners LP, a shared services platform founded by Aubrey McClendon, the eccentric wildcatter who plowed his life (literally) and billions of dollars of cash into the exploration and production business. In 2014, The Energy & Minerals Group LP (“EMG”) and other investors cut an equity check and, in this case, it didn’t take Mr. McClendon as long as usual to fail: by 2016, the company and its businesses were separated from American Energy to become White Star, a standalone company independent of the American Energy platform. Of course, in typical McClendon fashion, the company sprayed and prayed for a while prior to the transition, gobbling up Mississippian Lime and Woodford Shale assets along the way.

Which is not to say that, post separation/transition, the company just sat on its hands. In 2016 and thereafter, the company extended its shopping spree. First it acquired additional Mississippian Lime and Woodford Shale assets from Devon Production Company LP for approximately $200mm (funded in part by equity from ESG and borrowings under the company’s revolving credit facility). Then it acquired Lighthouse Oil and Gas LP (which was 49.4% minority owned by EMG, but whatevs) through a combination of equity and more borrowings under the credit facility. Finally, the company expanded its portfolio into the Sooner Trend Anadarko Canadian Kingfisher area with borrowings under its credit facility. If you’ve been paying attention, yes, E&P is a capital intensive business: there’s a reason why so many of these companies are levered up the wazoo.

What did that capital buy? “As of December 31, 2018, the Debtors had proved reserves of approximately 84.4 million barrels of oil equivalent (“boe”) across approximately 315,000 net leasehold acres….” But, to be sure, this is a company that focuses its exploration and production on “unconventional” resource plays. Said another way, it is a horizontal driller and hydraulic fracker: its assets tend to produce in high volume for two or so years and then tail off considerably requiring capital to acquire and develop a steady stream of new wells. Of course, an investment in new wells only works if the commodity environment permits it to. With oil and gas trading where it has been trading, well…suffice it to say…the environment is proving unaccommodating. Per the company:

“Despite controlling significant leasehold and mineral acreage in the MidContinent region, due to the declines in commodity prices in the fourth quarter of 2018 and the Debtors’ financial condition, the Debtors ceased drilling new wells in April 2019 and have not resumed such activities as of the Petition Date.”

Consequently, the company suffered a net loss of $114mm in 2018 after losing $14mm in 2017; it has negative working capital of $61mm as of 12/31/18 and $70mm as of the petition date. This sucker is burning cash.

The company’s capital structure looks as follows:

Source: First Day Declaration

The current capital structure is the result of clear triage undertaken by the company in the midst of a severe commodity downturn. WE CANNOT EMPHASIZE THIS ENOUGH: nearly every oil and gas exploration and production company under the sun was forced into some sort of balance sheet transaction around the 2015 time period — many in-court, others out-of-court in an attempt to stave off bankruptcy. Here, notably, the $10.3mm of unsecured notes represent the remnants of a distressed exchange that took place in 2015 whereby approximately $340mm of unsecured notes (with a 9% cash-pay interest coupon) were exchanged for approximately $348mm 12% second lien notes. Thereafter, in late 2015 and extending through August 2016, the company entered into a series of cash and equity transactions that took out the second lien notes in a cash-draining attempt to strengthen the balance sheet and extend liquidity (by way of reduced interest expense)**. The company was effectively playing whack-a-mole.

Alas, the company is in bankruptcy. That happens when your primary sources of capital are large equity checks, borrowings under a credit facility, and proceeds from producing oil and gas properties in a rough price environment. Of course, not all oil and gas properties are created equal either. This company happens to frack in challenging territory. Per the company:

Independent oil and gas companies, such as the Debtors, with Mississippian Lime-weighted assets in the Mid-Continent region have been particularly hard-hit by volatile market conditions in recent years and the majority of the Debtors’ peers in the region have filed for chapter 11 since 2015. This is in large part due to operational challenges unique to the region, including complex geological characteristics. One of these challenges is the Mississippian Lime’s relatively high ratio of “saltwater” to produced oil and gas. During the normal production of oil and gas, saltwater mixed with hydrocarbon byproducts comes to the surface, and its separation and disposal increases production costs. Low production volumes and higher than expected production costs, together with allegations that increased saltwater injection by the operators in the area caused increased seismic activity, resulted in many operators reducing activity and many capital providers discounting asset values in the region.

Recognizing the dire nature of the situation, the company’s RBL lenders effectuated a debilitating borrowing base redetermination that created a deficiency payment that the company simply couldn’t manage. This triggered a “potential” Event of Default under the facility. Thereafter, the company entered into an amendment with the RBL lenders with the hope of securing some capital to refinance the RBL. Spoiler alert: the company couldn’t get it done. The amendment also dictated that the company attempt to secure a buyer so as to repay the debt. To chapter 11 filing is meant to aid that marketing and sale process.*** To aid this process, the company has a commitment from MUFG Union Bank NA, its prepetition RBL Agent, for a DIP credit facility of $28.5mm as well as the use of cash collateral.

*We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight that in the “AlixPartners 14th Annual Turnaround & Restructuring Experts Survey” released in February 2019, oil and gas was listed as the second most likely sector to face distress, with 36% of respondents predicting it would be a hot and heavy sector (up from 31% the in 2018).

**The company also refinanced its RBL, sold midstream and non-strategic properties and adjusted midstream pipeline commitments.

***Some trigger happy creditors beat the company to the punch here. On May 24, five “purported” creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the company in the Western District of Oklahoma. Considering Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations Inc. ($GE) is among the top 5 largest creditors, we can’t say we’re that surprised.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, Alexa Kranzley) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnel LLP (Derek Abbott, Gregory Werkheiser, Tamara Mann, Joseph Barsalona)

  • Independent Director: Patrick Bartels Jr.

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Ed Mosley)

  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • RBL Agent: MUFG Union Bank NA

    • Legal: Winston & Strawn LLP (Justin Rawlins)

  • TL Agent: EnLink Oklahoma Processing LP

  • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA
    

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Pernix Therapeutics/Pernix Sleep Inc.

Pernix Therapeutics/Pernix Sleep Inc.

February 18, 2019

In our January 30th Members’-only briefing entitled “😢Who Will Remember Things Remembered?😢 ,” we included a segment subtitled “Pharma Continues to Show Distress (Long Opioid-Related BK)” in which we discussed how Pernix Therapeutics Holdings Inc. ($PTX) looked like an imminent bankruptcy candidate. We noted how the company had previously staved off bankruptcy thanks to a refinancing transaction with Highbridge Capital Management. That refinancing now looks like a perfectly-executed loan-to-own strategy: Phoenix Top Holdings LLC, an affiliate of Highbridge, will serve as the stalking horse bidder of the company’s assets in exchange for $75.6mm plus the assumption of certain liabilities. Highbridge will also, after a competitive process pitted against other debtholders like Deerfield Management Company LP, provide the Debtors with a $34.1mm DIP facility — of which $15mm is new money, $5mm is an accordian facility, and the rest is a roll-up of the pre-petition ABL.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge [ ])

• Capital Structure: see link above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Huebner, Eli Vonnegut, Christopher Robertson) & (local) Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kerri Mumford, Jennifer Cree, Nicolas Jenner)

  • Financial Advisor: Guggenheim Partners LLC (Stuart Erickson)

  • Investment Banker: Ernst & Young LLP

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Stalking Horse Purchaser: Phoenix Top Holdings LLC (a Highbridge Capital Management affiliate)

  • Large debtholder: Deerfield Management Company LP

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

  • DIP Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities

    • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Sarah Ward)

Updated: 2/19/19 at 8:51 CT

💥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Sears Holdings Corporation💥

Sears Holdings Corporation

October 15, 2018

Finally.

Early this morning, Illinois-based Sears Holdings Corporation ($SHLD) and approximately 49 affiliated entities (including KMart) finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. The company lists a staggering $11.339 billion of total debts and $6.937 billion of assets.

The well-known company has 866 full-line and specialty stores as of August 4, 2018. In its chapter 11 petition, it boasts of its legacy as an “integrated retailer with significant physical and tangible assets, as well as virtual capabilities enabled through technology.” Yes, you read that correctly: they actually say “virtual capabilities enabled through technology.” That right there may help inform EVERYONE why this storied retailer has found its way into bankruptcy court. To the last, Sears stands out for its ability to appear out of touch.

The company appears to have a commitment for a $1.875 billion debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) asset-backed credit facility, including an increase of $300mm from its existing facility as well as an agreement over the use of the company’s lenders’ cash collateral. According to a company press release, the company is also negotiating an additional $300mm commitment from ESL Investments Inc. (“ESL”), the company’s largest shareholder and the investment vehicle of Eddie Lampert. The company intends to reorganize around a smaller store platform of “EBITDA-positive stores.” To this end, the company will close 142 stores near the end of the year adding to the previously announced 46 stores set to close in November 2018 — potentially further perpetuating the hurt put on U.S.-based malls over the last several years. Meanwhile, the company continues to negotiate an asset purchase agreement with ESL for “a large portion of the Company’s store base.” This would, obviously, keep the enterprise from liquidating and potentially help maintain thousands of jobs: Sears currently employs approximately 90k people.

While Eddie Lampert will remain Chairman of the Board, he has resigned as CEO of the company. Godspeed, Eddie.

The company’s top listed creditors at the time of filing include The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and various trustees under five different tranches of unsecured notes totaling over $3 billion in principal amount (BNY Midwest Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company NA, The Chase Manhattan Bank NA). Trade creditors include Whirlpool Corporation ($23.4mm), Frigidaire Company ($18.6mm), and Winia Daewoo Electronics America ($15.2mm).

We will update this post on Wednesday in our next briefing; we are particularly excited to see how the company spins the “factors” that led to its appearance in bankruptcy court. Here’s one explanation:

And here’s another — seemingly more-on-point — one:

• Jurisdiction: S.D.N.Y. (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: $11.339b debt     

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Garrett Fail, Jacqueline Marcus, Sunny Singh)

  • CRO/Financial Advisor: M-III Partners, LP (Mohsin Meghji, Colin Adams, Brian Griffith, Christopher Good, Mary Korycki, Kevin Tanaka, Enrique Acevedo, Wesley Sima, Noah Zatzkin, Joseph Frantz, Nicholas Weber, Ravi Ramnani )

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Company

  • Restructuring Committee’s Independent Directors: William Transier, Alan Carr, Paul DePodesta, Ann Reese

  • Restructuring Sub-Committee (RSC): Alan Carr and William Transier

  • Legal to RSC: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Kelley Cornish, Lewis Clayton, Susanna Buergel, Robert Britton, Jonathan Hurwitz, Emma Carlson, Teresa Lii)

  • Financial Advisors to RSC: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Dennis Stogsdill, Nick Grossi, Brian Corio, Jonah Galaz, Andrew Gasbarra, Jonathan Bain, Jordan Kravette)

  • Investment Banker to RSC: Evercore Group LLC (Daniel Aronson, Jeremy Matican, Guy McCumber, Siddhesh Patkar, Jonathan Kamel, Ajith Sukumar)

  • Conflicts Counsel: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Rolin Bissell, Ryan Bartley, Travis Buchanan)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Large Shareholders: ESL Investments. Legal: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (James Bromley, Sean O’Neal, Andrew Weaver)

  • Prepetition RCF, Term Loans, FILO & DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA. Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard)

  • Citibank NA. Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Huebner, Eli Vonnegut)

  • Large Shareholder: Fairholme Capital Management LLC. Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, David Zylberberg)

  • PBGC. Legal: Locke Lord LLP (David Wirt)

  • Debtors’ IP/Ground Lease Term Loan Lender: SHLD Lendco LLC. Legal: Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Levitin, Richard Stieglitz Jr.)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Abid Quereshi, SARA Brauner)

    • Legal (Conflicts): Herrick Feinstein LLP (Sean O’Donnell, Stephen Selbst, Steven Smith)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Matt Diaz, Conor Tully, Michael Berkin, Marshal Eisler, Kenny O’Trakoun, Morgan McCaskey, Samuel Star)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian, Eric Siegert, Brad Geer, Surbhi Gupta, Greg Rinsky, Tom Hedus, Ross Rosenstein, Ryan Conroy, John Hartigan, Ahmed Mumtaz, Jack Foster, James Lai, Natalie Weelborg, Andrew Felman, Matthew Stadtmauer)

  • Cyrus Capital Partners LP

    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Eric Reimer, Thomas Kreller, Craig Price)

  • Indenture Trustee to Medium Term Notes: The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.

    • Legal: Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP (James Gadsden, Leonardo Trivigno)

Updated 11/30/18

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New Chapter 11 Filing - Ascent Resources Marcellus Holdings, LLC

Ascent Resources Marcellus Holdings, LLC

• 2/6/18 Recap: Oklahoman producer of oil and natural gas in the Marcellus Shale basis filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a prepackaged bankruptcy in agreement with its major creditors. We've seen this movie before. Business is capital intensive...yada yada yada...natural gas prices rolled over...yada yada yada...production volume dropped...yada yada yada...over-levered balance sheet....zzzzz. Basically, you know the drill. The prepackaged plan envisions the term lenders equitizing their debt so that the company can be leaner and meaner; it also leaves open the option for a sale, but no such sale was suitable prior to filing. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $750mm first lien credit facility (Cortland Capital Market Services LLC), $450mm second lien secured term loan facility (Cortland)  
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew G. Dietderich, Brian D. Glueckstein, Alexa J. Kranzley) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline K. Morgan, Joel A. Waite, Kara Hammond Coyle)
  • Financial Advisor: D.R. Payne & Associates, Inc.
  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners (Steven Zelin)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Independent Co-Manager: Alan Carr
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • First Lien Credit Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
    • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Co. 
  • Second Lien Credit Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC
• Members of the New Board: Jeffrey A. Fisher, Jeffrey A. Ball, Steven J. Pully, Eugene I. Davis, Barry McMahan

Updated: Effective 3/30/18 (no UCC)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Expro Holdings US Inc.

Expro Holdings US Inc.

• 12/18/17 Recap: Servicer to offshore, deepwater and other "technically challenging environments" filed a prepackaged bankruptcy to eliminate its entire $1.4b of debt (and attendant interest expense) via equity conversion in a balance sheet deleveraging transaction. Why did it file for bankruptcy? Private equity, of course. In 2008, the company turned down an acquisition offer from Halliburton in favor of a competing bid from a private equity group for $3.2b in cash, the largest LBO in the UK in 2008. Ok, so we're only half serious. Naturally, the oil and gas downturn led to a marked decline in demand for Expro's services. Psst: the PE-infused debt. The senior lenders will get the equity in the reorganized company while mezz loan holders and equity holders will get warrants. The company has lined up a $145mm DIP credit facility.
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
• Capital Structure: $125mm RCF (HSBC Bank USA), $1.261b TL, $18mm Mezz Loan.      
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Alice Eaton, Sarah Harnett, Alexander Woolverton) & Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Julie Hertzberg, Jay Herriman)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. 
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Mezzanine Facility Agreement Agent: Bank of New York Mellon
  • Credit Agreement Admin Agent: HSBC Bank USA
  • RCF Lenders
    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, James McClammy, Christopher Robertson) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Kelli Norfleet, Kelsey Zottnick)
    • Financial Advisor: Rothschild Inc.
  • Ad Hoc Group of Shareholders (Goldman Sachs, HPS Investment Partners LLC, KKR, Candover/Arle, Park Square)
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP
    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

New Chapter 11 Filing - Pacific Drilling S.A.

Pacific Drilling S.A.

• 11/12/17 Recap: Another offshore driller finds its way into bankruptcy and, boy!, does its filing attempt to paint one rosy optimistic picture of its particular "competitive strength[]" in the offshore drilling space. But, first, let's take a step back: here, Pacific Drilling ($PACDF), an offshore drilling company formed in 2011 under Luxembourg law, filed bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York after over a year - and we mean YEAR - of speculation that this would end up where it now is. After all, when oil prices are where they are and you provide global ultra-deepwater drilling and complex well construction services to the oil and natural gas industry with high-specification drillships generally stationed in the Gulf of Mexico, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, well, we'd venture an educated guess that the math simply ain't gonna add up. Certainly not at "day rates" averaging an estimated $155k. And so the company has three drillships contracted currently: two on short term agreements and, luckily, one at a well-above market contractual dayrate through September 2019. The others sit "smart-stacked." Choice quote, "My view in light of over 20 years in the industry is that recovery in the market for drilling contracts is a question of “when” not “if”. Pacific Drilling continues to have advantages over competitors with older fleets, as high-specification drilling units are generally better suited to meet the requirements of customers for drilling in deepwater, complex geological formations with challenging well profiles or remote locations. Furthermore, the uniformity and mobility of the Company’s fleet allow a Smart Stacking strategy that will continue to yield cost savings and flexibility if the downturn is prolonged." Clearly those advantages weren't so clear as to form consensus around the negotiating table with the various parties in interest as there is no restructuring support agreement in place here. Nothing like a good old-fashioned free fall into bankruptcy court, an increasingly-rare occurrence these days. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
• Capital Structure: $3.188b total debt. Ship Group A Debt: $475mm RCF (Citibank NA), $750mm '20 5.375% Notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas), $718mm Term Loan B Credit Facility (Citibank NA). Ship Group B Debt (SSCF): $492.5mm 3.75% commercial tranche and $492.5mm (Wilmington Trust NA), combined post-amort equaliing $661.5mm outstanding. Ship Group C Debt: $438.4mm '17 7.25% senior secured notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, John Hardiman, Noam Weiss) & Togut Segal & Segal LLP (Albert Togut, Frank Oswald, Scott Ratner)
  • Financial Advisor: Evercore Partners International LLP 
  • Investment Banker: AlixPartners LLP (James Mesterharm)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • RCF Agent: Citibank NA
    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Fredric Sosnick)
    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP
  • Ad Hoc Group of RCF Lenders
    • Legal: White & Case LLP
  • SSCF Agent: Wilmington Trust NA
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Tyson Lomazow, Matthew Brod)
    • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Company LLC
  • Ad Hoc Group of Ship Group C Debt, 2020 Notes and Term Loan B
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Elizabeth McColm, Christopher Hopkins)
    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey
  • 2017 and 2020 Notes Indenture Trustee(s): Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
    • Legal: Moses & Singer LLP
  • Large Equityholder: Quantum Pacific (Gibraltar) Limited
    • egal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Jay Goffman, George Howard)

Updated 11/15/17 at 5:09 pm CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - Takata Corporation

Takata Corporation

• 6/25/17 Recap: The long-awaited chapter 11 (and Japanese Civil Rehabilitation Act) filing of the publicly-traded ($TKJP) airbag manufacturer is finally upon us after the Company endured a massive airbag recall (affecting 124mm automobiles that were deployed with non-desiccated PSAN Inflators, worldwide) and corresponding liability. The Company intends to consummate an agreement in principle with privately-held Key Safety Systems out of Sterling Heights Michigan for a sale of substantially all of the Company's assets for $1.588b. Use of proceeds include satisfying the requirements of a plea agreement with the US Department of Justice, paying administrative costs and expenses of the restructuring (cha-ching Weil, PwC, Lazard & Prime Clerk), and funding unsecured creditor recoveries. The Company has secured a $227mm revolving credit facility from Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation to fund the cases; per its press release, it has also negotiated with its Japanese original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") for valuable accommodations and liquidity enhancements and continues to negotiate with OEMs elsewhere. Every car manufacturer under the sun is listed as an "undetermined" general unsecured creditor including the likes of Toyota, Ford, Tesla, Fisker, Ferrari, and, of course, the majors. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Marcia Goldstein, Ronit Berkovich, Matthew Goren, Jessica Diab, Lauren Tauro) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Amanda Steele, Brett Haywood)
  • Financial Advisor: PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (Bill Fasel, Stephen Hammond)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Daimler Trucks North America LLC 
    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Michael Shepard, Richard Graham)
  • General Motors Holdings LLC
    • Legal: O'Melveny & Meyers LLP (George Davis, Daniel Shamah, Andrew Sorkin, Gary Svirsky)
  • General Motors LLC
    • Legal: Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP (Joseph Sgroi, Chauncey C. Mayfield II, Scott Kitai)
  • Key Safety Systems Inc.
    • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Ron Meisler, Felicia Gerber Perlman, Christopher Dressel, Christine Okike, Esther Adzhiashvili)
  • Honda North America Inc.
    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Michael Andolina, Jessica Knowles Boelter) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, J. Kate Stickles)
  • FCA US LLC
    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Brian Glueckstein, Andrew Dietderich, Alexa Kranzley)
  • Ford Motor Company
    • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Mark Freedlander, Frank Guadagnino, John Thompson) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
  • Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC
    • Legal: Mayer Brown LLP (Richard Ziegler)
  • Subaru of America Inc.
    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Adam Rogoff, Anupama Yerramalli, Philip Bentley, David Braun)
  • Toyota Motor Corporation
    • Legal: Frost Brown Todd LLC (Robert Sartin, Patrica Kirkwood Burgess, Ronald Gold) & (local) Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kimberly Brown, Travis Ferguson)
  • BMW Manufacturing Co LLC
    • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (David Rosenzweig, Michael Parker) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
  • Nissan Motor Corporation
    • Legal: Jones Day (Pedro Jimenez)
  • Mitsubishi Motors North America Inc.
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Daniel Youngblut, Kevin O'Neill)
  • Tesla Inc.
    • Legal: Irell & Manella LLP (Jeffrey Reisner, Michael Strub, Kerri Lyman) & (local) Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Emily Devan)
  • Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Timothy Graulich, Elliott Moskowitz, Darren Klein)
  • Volvo Group North America LLC
    • Legal: Baker Hostetler LLP (Eric Goodman) & (local) Morris Nichols
  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Tyson Lomazow, Abhilash Raval, Bradley Scott Friedman) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, Kevin Shaw)
  • Committee of Unsecured Tort Claimant Creditors
    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, James Stang)

Updated 7/11/17 6 pm (CT)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Gulfmark Offshore Inc.

Gulfmark Offshore Inc.

• 5/17/17 Recap: Everyone has been waiting for the offshore action and it's finally here. Except, its fairly anticlimactic. Here, the publicly-traded Houston-based offshore oil and gas logistics services provider filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a financial restructuring pursuant to a Restructuring Support Agreement signed with holders of its unsecured senior notes. The noteholders will get approximately 36% of the equity in the newly reorganized company along with rights to purchase an additional 60% equity slug pursuant to a backstopped $125mm rights offering. Existing equity will get a small equity "kiss" and some warrants. This is so boring that EVEN WE can't really find much to make fun of. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $100mm RCF ($72mm funded)(Royal Bank of Scotland), NOK600mm Norwegian Facility ($44.3mm funded)(DNB Bank ASA), $430mm '22 6.375% unsecured senior notes (funded)(US Bank NA)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Weil (Gary Holtzer, Ronit Berkovich, Debora Hoehne) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood, Christopher De Lillo)
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Brian Fox, Kevin Larin, RIchard Niemerg, Don Koetting, Lacie Melasi, Robert Country)
  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Stephen Hannan, David Andrews, Sachin Lulla, Pranav Goel, Arth Patel)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for access to free docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA
    • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Derek Wright, Mark Prager)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Unsecured Noteholders
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck, Nelly Almeida) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Gregory Werkheiser, Robert Dehney)
      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.
  • Prepetition Multicurrency RCF Lender: Royal Bank of Scotland
    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Michael Torkin, Brian Glueckstein, David Zylberberg) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Joseph Barry, Ian Bambrick)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.
  • Prepetition NOK Lender: DNB Bank ASA
    • Legal: Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP (Christopher Kiplok, Anson Frelinghuysen, Erin Diers) & (local) Bayard PA (Erin Fay)
    • Financial Advisor: Guggenheim Securities LLC
  • Gulfmark Rederi AS
    • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, William Greendyke) & (local) Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP (Matthew Ward)

Updated 7/12/17 9:301 am CT

New Chapter 15 Filing - Boart Longyear Ltd.

Boart Longyear Ltd.

• 4/27/17 Recap: The company, a provider of (i) drilling services, drilling equipment and performance tooling for mining and mineral drilling companies and (ii) products and services for non-mining drilling customers (i.e., water drilling and non-conventional energy), filed a Chapter 15 petition in the US in support of a larger restructuring filed a few days ago in Australia. The Australian proceeding had been agreed upon by Centerbridge Partners LP, Ares Management LLC and Ascribe II Investments LLC who, collectively, own the majority of the company's secured and unsecured funded debt and common and preferred equity. Notably, however, First Pacific Advisors LLC is NOT on board with the proposed restructuring is already showing signs of litigating (initially by way of seeking a TRO). Generally, this, like many other cases in the recent past, is a macroeconomic story relating to the decline in exploration and production and corresponding decline in drill rig utilization rates and pricing leverage. It is also, however, a story - as we often see - of too much debt. The company attempted a previous recapitalization and debt reduction in 2014; it also implemented a number of operational initiatives. Clearly, these efforts didn't do the trick. And because "[n]o immediate [macro] relief appears to be on the horizon," the company seeks to delever and survive for the next commodities supercycle. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
• Capital Structure: $205mm 10% secured notes (US Bank NA), $116mm TL-A & $140mm TL-B (Wilmington Trust), $8mm ABL (PNC Bank), $15mm Second Out Facility (Wilmington Trust), $20mm Delayed Draw TL (Wilmington Trust), $295mm 7% unsecured notes (US Bank NA). Publicly-traded under "BLY" on the Australian Securities Exchange.    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck, Dennis O'Donnell) & Ashurst (James Marshall)
  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Paul Hansen)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Supporting Noteholder Committee: Ares Management LLC, Ascribe II Investments LLC
    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Michael Torkin, David Zylberberg)
  • Centerbridge Partners LP
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Anup Sathy, Gregory Pesce, John Luze)
  • First Pacific Advisors LLC
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Belisle Eaton, Alexander Woolverton, Daniel Youngblut) & (Australia) Gilbert+Tobin (Dominic Emmett, David Clee)
  • PNC Bank NA
    • Legal: Holland & Knight LLP (Michelle Suarez, Arthur Rosenberg, Robert Jones, Brian Smith)

Updated 5/31/17

New (Chapter 22) Filing - American Apparel Inc.

American Apparel Inc.

• 11/14/16 Recap: Large US-based apparel manufacturer and retailer with 193 total stores files for bankruptcy - months, uh, after emerging from bankruptcy. Company filed with a $30mm DIP proposal from Encina Business Credit LLC. Plan is to sell (for parts) expeditiously to Gilden Activewear SRL for $66mm (IP, remaining wholesale inventory and wholesale POs during restructuring).  
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $215mm of funded debt ($90mm DIP-rolled-into-TL-exit + $82mm of additional financing) & $15mm unsecured UK facility (Standard General)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Carl Black, Scott Greenberg, Michael J. Cohen, Erin Brady, Stacey Corr-Irvine, Genna Ghaul, Christpher Lovrien) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, James O'Neill, Joseph Mulvihill)
  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinsten, Joseph D'Ascoli) & FTI Consulting (Andrew Hinkelman, Chuck Goad, Adam Saltzman, Frank Marshall, William Breashears, Zach Contreras)
  • Claims Consultants: Resources Global Professionals (Thora Thoroddsen, Evelyne Anglade, Scott Ashcraft, Luis Barreda, Sharon Dannewitz, Yolanda Hoelscher, Rodney Teruya)
  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian, Devin Shanahan, Sanaz Memarsadeghi, Ethan Kopp, Alexander Stolarz, Varun Desai)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP Lender: Encina Business Credit LLC
    • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox, Donald Rothman, Lon Singer, Alexander Rheaume) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor)
  • Agent to Prepetition Secured Lenders: Wilmington Trust
    • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP (R. Alexander Clark, Dianne Coffino) & Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier)
  • Buyer: Gilden Activewear SRL
    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Michael Torkin, Brian Hamilton, Miaoting Wu) & (local) Womble Carlyle (Matthew Ward)
  • Lead Lenders & Equityholders: Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Coliseum Capital Management LLC, Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP, Pentwater Capital Management LP, Standard General. 
    • Legal (except Standard General): Milbank Tweed (Gerard Uzzi, Eric Stodola) & (local) Fox Rothschild (Jeffrey Schlerf, L. John Bird)
    • Legal (Standard General): Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Natasha Labovitz, Shannon Rose Selden, Craig Bruens, Erica Weisgerber) & (local) Young Conaway (Edmon Morton, Joseph Barry)
  • Largest Unsecured Creditors: Standard General, FTI Consulting, Moelis, Garden City Group
  • Unsecured Creditors' Committee:
    • Legal: Cooley LLP (Cathy Hershcopf, Seth Van Aalten, Robert Winning, Sarah Carnes, Michael Klein, Max Schlan) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Evan Miller, Gregory Flasser)
    • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden, Ryan O'Sullivan, Lawrence Jacobs, Christopher Moffatt, Jack Allen, Christopher Saitta, Daniel Pace, Ryan Feulner)

Updated 3/30/17

New Filing: Key Energy Services Inc.

Key Energy Services Inc.

• 10/24/16 Recap: Oilfield services operator filed prepackaged plan to delever its balance sheet by 75% unsecured debt-for-equity swap subject to dilutive rights offering.
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
• Capital Structure: $100mm '20 4.5% RCF (Wells Fargo), $315mm '20 9.25% TL (Cortland Capital Markets), $675mm '21 6.75% senior unsecured notes.     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (James Conlan, Larry Nyhan, Jeffrey Bjork, Andrew O'Neill, Christina Craige, John Hutchinson) & (local) Young Conaway (Robert Brady, Edwin Harron, Ryan Bartley)
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Ed Mosley)
  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners (Mike Genereux)
  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • ABL Admin Agent (BofA):
    • Legal: Latham & Watkins (Richard Levy, James Ktsanes) & (local) Reed Smith (Kurt Gwynne, Emily Devan)
  • Term Lenders: (BlueMountain Capital Management LLC, TPG Specialty Lending Inc., Tennenbaum Capital Partners)
    • Legal: Davis Polk (Damian Schaible, Eli Vonnegut, Angela Libby) & (local) Richards Layton (Mark Collins, Andrew Dean)
    • Investment Banker: Evercore
  • Supporting Unsecured Noteholders:
    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell (Michael Torkin, David Jakus, Lee Parnes)
    • Investment Bank: Houlihan Lokey
  • Supporting Noteholders & Supporting Term Lenders
    • Legal: Cleary Gottlieb (Sean O'Neal, Humayan Khalid, Matthew Rappoport) & (local) Morris Nichols (Robert Dehney, Eric Schwartz, Andrew Remming, Andrew Roth-Moore)
  • Wells Fargo, as TL Agent
    • Legal: Greenberg Traurig
  • Unsecured Noteholders: Silver Point Capital LP, Contrarian Capital Management, Scoggin Capital Management, Platinum Equity Advisors, Quantum Partners, Goldman Sachs Global Special Situations Group

Updated 12/30/16