💪 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - 24 Hour Fitness Inc. 💪

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24 Hour Fitness Inc.

June 15, 2020

California-based 24 Hour Fitness Inc. (along with ten affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware after it became apparent that it’s hard to sustain a fitness business when, as a practical matter, you’re really 0 Hour Fitness Inc. When you have 3.4mm customers across 445 (leased) locations across the United States, it’s awfully hard for a business that typically does $1.5b in revenue and $191 in adjusted EBITDA to make money when a pandemic rips through the nation and shuts down business entirely. This, ladies and gentlemen, like the few airlines who have filed for bankruptcy to date, is as pure-play a COVID-19 story as they come these days.

Now, that’s to not to suggest that everything was copacetic prior to the quarantine. The business had some pimples on it. The debtors’ CRO cites the selling/operating model’s negative impact on financial performance. But the biggest and scariest pimples are the debtors’ balance sheet and lease portfolio. The former includes $1.4b of funded debt; the latter, 445 locations leased across the country, of which 135 have already been deemed unnecessary and are the subject of a first day executory contract rejection motion (PETITION Note: the debtors denote this as “a first wave.”). When revenues stop coming into the coffers, these tremendous amounts become quite an overhang and a liquidity drain.

The filing, among other things, helps solve for the liquidity issue. The debtors have obtained a commitment for a $250mm new-money senior secured DIP facility from an ad hoc group of lenders. While there is no restructuring support agreement in place here, the ad hoc group is comprised of 63.3% of the aggregate principal amount outstanding under the prepetition credit facility and approximately 73.9% of the face amount of the $500mm in senior unsecured notes. In other words, there’s a solid amount of support here but not enough yet to command the senior class of debt.

Luckily, the debtors gave themselves a form of pre-DIP. Wait. Huh? What are we referring to?

…the Debtors were obliged to close all of their fitness clubs nationwide on March 16, 2020, in response to this national emergency. As a result, the Debtors were no longer able to generate new sources of revenue (by winning new members) and, on or about April 15, 2020, the Debtors suspended billing on account of monthly membership dues.fn

In the footnote, the debtors note:

To date, litigation has been commenced in connection with the Debtors’ monthly billing on a post-March 16 basis, notwithstanding, among other things, the Debtors’ rights under their various membership agreements. The Debtors reserve all rights, claims, and defenses in this regard.

Uh, apparently, 0 Hour Fitness Inc. = 30 Days of Payment Inc. We’ll see whether this short-term liquidity grab created long term customer retention issues.*

Moreover, the fact that they apparently laid off thousands of employees via conference call probably won’t amount to a whole lot of goodwill. Just sayin’.

Now it’s wait and see. The debtors have reopened approximately 20 locations in Texas and hope to have the majority of their other non-rejected clubs open by the end of June. We’ll see if the uptick in COVID cases in certain states throws a wrench in that plan. To combat any COVID-related perception risk, the debtors are instituting some new measures:

…the Debtors have taken an innovative approach to the reopening of their clubs, instituting market-leading strategies to keep their members and employees safe, including an app-based reservation system to ensure that their clubs remain in compliance with applicable social distancing guidelines, a touchless check-in system to limit members’ and employees’ contact with surfaces, and cleaning schedules that ensure that entire clubs are sanitized every hour. (emphasis added)

Gosh. We see sh*t like this — the airlines are also making similar statements about newly implemented cleanliness standards — and it really makes us wonder: what the bloody hell were these cesspools doing pre-COVID?!?!? Clearly not enough.

And, yet, otherwise, we have some sympathy for these businesses. This is a brand new paradigm. The debtors indicate that they’re implementing a reservation-based system where people are locked into an hour-max workout after which the gym will be closed for 30 minutes for a “deep clean.” That is not exactly a seamless and frictionless user experience. Moreover, what kind of chemicals are going to be dumped all over the facility every 60 minutes? These are tough issues.

As far as social distancing:

…the Debtors are utilizing space in their clubs in creative ways in order to continue to offer members a range of amenities and services. For example, the Debtors are utilizing their basketball courts to hold group exercise classes, including by relocating stationary bike equipment to continue to offer indoor cycling classes, so that members and equipment can be properly spaced to comply with social distancing guidelines.

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

No offense but does THIS really worth going to the gym for? You can use apps for a fraction of the cost and do this at home…mask-less.

So what now?

The DIP financing will buy the debtors some time to evaluate new trends. Will those people who paid for a month when the gym was closed come back? Will the news about employee treatment effect the “brand”? Will all of those people who bought home gyms or learned to run need to go to a gym? The re-opening notwithstanding, all of these questions will directly impact valuation. Indeed, how do you value this business with so many massive question marks? Well, luckily, we have the debt to get a sense of what that answer might be. And considering that, at the time of this writing, the term loan is bid in the high 20s and the unsecured notes are bid around 3 — that’s right, 3 — it’s pretty clear who is getting (generally) wiped out in this scenario and where the market thinks the value breaks.

*Honestly, this was a dirty move but from the debtors’ perspective, it also totally makes sense.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $95.2mm ‘23 RCF, $835.1mm ‘25 Term Loan, $500mm 8% ‘22 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Kevin Bostel, Kyle Satterfield, Ramsey Scofield, Jackson Que Alldredge, Jacob Mezei, Alexander Cohen, Sarah Schnorrenberg) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns, Peter Keane)

    • Directors: Marc Beilinson, Stephen Hare, Roland Smith

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Daniel Hugo)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: O’Melveny & Myers LLP (John Rapisardi, Adam Rogoff, Daniel Shamah, Diana Perez, Adam Haberkorn) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, David Queroli)

    • Prepetition Agent: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Alfred Xue)

    • DIP Agent: Wilmington Trust

      • Legal: Covington & Burling (Ronald Hewitt)

    • Senior Notes Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Luke Sizemore, Mark Eckard)

    • Large equityholders: AEA, Fitness Capital Partners LP, 2411967 Ontario Limited

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Pioneer Energy Services Corp. ($PESX)⛽️

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Pioneer Energy Services Corp.

March 1, 2019

San Antonio-based oilfield services provider Pioneer Energy Services Corp. and several affiliates (the “debtors”) filed “straddle” prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases on Sunday in what amounts to a true balance sheet restructuring. Will this kickoff a new slate of oil and gas related bankruptcy filings? 🤔

The debtors provide well servicing, wireline and coiled tubing services to producers in Texas and the Mid-Continent and Rocky Mountain regions; they also provide contract land drilling services to operators in Texas, Appalachia, and the Rocky Mountain region. International operations in Colombia are not part of the bankruptcy cases. Due to the…shall we say…unpleasant…atmosphere for oil and gas these last few years — which, clearly undermined demand for their services and, obviously, revenue generation — the debtors determined that they couldn’t continue to service their existing capital structure. Alas, bankruptcy.

Hold on: not so fast. We previously wrote in “⛽️Storm Clouds Forming Over Oil & Gas⛽️,” the following:

And so it’s no wonder that, despite a relative dearth of oil and gas bankruptcy filings in 2020 thus far, most people think that (a) the E&P and OFS companies that avoided a bankruptcy in the 2015 downturn are unlikely to avoid it again and (b) many of the E&P and OFS companies that didn’t avoid a bankruptcy in the 2015 downturn are unlikely to avoid the dreaded Scarlet 22….

Sure, Pioneer hasn’t filed for bankruptcy before. But it has been in a constant state of restructuring ever since 2015. Per the debtors:

…in 2015 and 2016, Pioneer reduced its total headcount by over 50%, reduced wage rates for its operations personnel, reduced incentive compensation and eliminated certain employment benefits. In 2016, the Company closed ten field offices to reduce overhead and associated lease payments. At the same time, the Company lowered its capital expenditures by 77% to primarily routine expenditures that were necessary to maintain its equipment and deferred discretionary upgrades and additions (except those that it had previously committed to make during the 2014 market slowdown).

And:

Since the beginning of 2015 through the end of 2018, the Company has liquidated nonstrategic or non-core assets. Specifically, Pioneer has sold thirty-nine (39) non-AC domestic drill rigs, thirty-three (33) older wireline units, seven (7) smaller diameter coiled tubing units and various other drilling and coiled tubing equipment for aggregate net proceeds of over $75 million. As of September 30, 2019, the Company reported another $6.2 million in assets remaining held for sale, including the fair value of buildings and yards for one domestic drilling yard and two closed wireline locations, one domestic SCR drilling rig, two coiled tubing units and spare support equipment.

Annd:

In the first quarter of 2019, the Company continued its cost-reduction initiatives and operational adjustments by expanding the roles and related responsibilities of several of its executive leaders to further leverage their existing talents to the entire organization.

In other words, these guys have been gasping for air for five years.

Relatively speaking, the debtors capital structure isn’t even that intense:

  1. $175mm Term Loan (Wilmington Trust NA)

  2. $300mm 6.125% ‘22 senior unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

Yet with oil and gas getting smoked the way it has, it was still too much. So what now?

The prepackaged plan would give the term lenders cash (from a rights offering) and $78.125mm in new secured bonds (PETITION Note: we’re betting there are a bunch of CLOs here). The unsecured noteholders will get either all of the equity or 94.25% of the equity depending upon what the interest holders do; they’ll also get rights to participate in the rights offering. If the interest holders vote to accept the plan, they’ll get 5.75% of the equity and rights to participate in the rights offering; if they reject the plan, they’ll get bupkis and the noteholders will get 100% of the equity (subject to dilution). General unsecured claimants will get paid in full. Management will put in money as part of the rights offering and an ad hoc group of the unsecured noteholders (Ascribe Capital, DW Partners LP, Intermarket Corporation, New York Life Investments, Strategic Income Management LLC, and Whitebox Advisors LLC) agreed to backstop substantially all of the rights offering (and will receive an 8% premium for their commitment). The cases will be supported by a $75mm DIP. This thing is pretty buttoned up. Confirmation is expected within 45 days.

The end result? The debtors will emerge with $153mm of debt on balance sheet (the $78.125mm in new secured bonds and a $75mm exit ABL). Time will tell whether or not this remains too much.*

*The risk factors here are particularly interesting because all of them are very real. If the oil patch does suffer, as expected, the debtors’ concentration of business among their top three clients (66% of revenue) could be especially troubling — depending on who those clients are.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Elizabeth McColm, Brian Bolin, William Clareman, Eugene Park, Grace Hotz, Sarah Harnett) & Norton Rose Fulbrights US LLP (William Greendyke, Jason Boland, Robert Bruner, Julie Goodrich Harrison)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender ($75mm): PNC Bank NA

      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (James Grogan, Broocks Wilson)

    • Prepetition Term Loan Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP

    • Ad Hoc Group of Prepetition Term Loan Lenders

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (David Meyer, Paul Heath, Harry Perrin, Steven Zundell, Zachary Paiva)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Unsecured Noteholders: Ascribe Capital, DW Partners LP, Intermarket Corporation, New York Life Investments, Strategic Income Management LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Natasha Tsiouris, Erik Jerrard, Xu Pang) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Appvion Inc.

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Appvion Inc.

  • 10/2/17 Recap: The 100+-year old Appleton Wisconsin-based manufacturer of specialty coated paper has filed for bankruptcy. The company operates in two segments, the thermal paper segment and the carbonless paper segment. The thermal paper segment, on the surface, seems like it would be the most susceptible segment to technological disruption. It is used in four principal end markets: 1) point-of-sale for retail receipts and coupons (PETITION Note: you could understand why this would seemingly be in decline with Square and other P.O.S. stations now emailing receipts - not to mention more and more retail being done online); 2) label products for shipping, warehousing, medical and clean-room supplies (PETITION Query: perhaps the shipping labels offsets the paper receipts?); 3) tags and tickets for airline/baggage applications, events and transportation tickets, lottery and gaming applications (PETITION Note: one of us bought a baseball a scannable paperless ticket the other day from Stubhub...hmmm); and 4) printer, calculator and chart paper for engineering, industrial and medical diagnostic charts. The thermal paper segment is 60% of the company's net sales and has enjoyed annual average growth rates between 1-3%. Somewhat shockingly. PETITION Note: We would have liked to have seen those four sub-segments separated out. Meanwhile, the carbonless paper segment accounts for the other 40% of net sales; it produces coated paper products for design and print applications. The paper is used in a variety of end markets including government, retail, financial, insurance and manufacturing. This segment has been in structural decline since 1994, down approximately 7-11% annually due to the rise of new technologies in digital laser, inkjet and thermal printers. Oh, and electronic communications: the company just throws that in their bankruptcy papers like it's an afterthought. In other words, government and corporations are relying more on email than on the printed page which, duh, obviously impacts this segment. The company owns there manufacturing plants and leases three warehouses; it also has 915 union employees - owed $112.6mm in obligations - who probably ought to get ready to get bent (they are represented by the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (the “USW”). The company blames the chapter 11 filing on negative industry trends, an unsustainable degree of balance sheet leverage, inability to adequately address near-term maturities and rapidly deteriorating liquidity. Liquidity became even more of an issue after the company issued a "going concern" warning and received an S&P credit downgrade - two things that obviously made suppliers skittish and resulted in demands for disadvantageous trade terms. Recognizing decreased liquidity, the company appears to have taken as much cost out of the business as it can which, from the looks of the company's papers, may be artificially inflating the numbers on the thermal side in the face of technological innovation. PETITION Note: the assumptions the bankers concoct for this side of the business ought to be watched very carefully. Somewhat surprisingly, despite a full slate of advisors and months of lead-up to the filing, this is a classic free-fall into bankruptcy: there doesn't appear to be any restructuring support agreement with the lenders whatsoever. There is, however, a proposed $325.2mm DIP credit facility which would include $85mm of new money and a $240.2mm rollup of pre-petition money (in other words, the full amount of pre-petition TL & RCF monies outstanding, ex-interest). Nothing like being senior in the cap stack. Final PETITION Note: anyone think this will be the last paper-related bankruptcy in, say, the next 12 months? This is starting to look like 2007 all over again...
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $335mm first lien TL & $100 RCF ($240.8mm outstanding included accrued/unpaid interest), $250mm '20 9% second lien senior notes, $24mm A/R securitization, $6mm Industrial Development Bonds, $500k TL with the State of Ohio
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Richard Chesley, Stuart Brown, Jamila Willis, Kaitlin Edelman)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Alan Holtz, Pilar Tarry, Nathan Kramer)
    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Ronen Bojmel)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Strategic Communications Consultant: Finsbury LLC
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Admin Agent: Wilmington Trust, NA
      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP (Ronald Hewitt) & (local) Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier)
    • DIP Lenders
      • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP (George Davis, Daniel Shamah, Matthew Kremer, Jennifer Taylor) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger P.A. (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Brett Haywood)
    • Prepetition Credit Agreement Admin Agent: Jefferies Finance LLC
      • Legal: Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Brad Erens) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns)
    • Key Bank National Association
      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Peter Clark II, Jennifer Knox, Emily Devan)
    • Fifth Third Bank
      • Legal: Vedder Price PC (Michael Eidelman, Michael Edelman) & (local) Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill, D. Ryan Slaugh)
    • Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of the 9% '20 Second Lien Senior Secured Notes (ADK Capital LLC, ALJ Capital Management LLC, Archer Capital Management LP, Armory Advisors LLC, Barings LLC, Mackenzie Investments, MAK Capital One LLC, Nomura Corporate Research and Assset Management, Riva Ridge Master Fund Ltd., Rotation Capital Management LP, Scott's Cove Management LLC)
      • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Samantha Martin) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Matthew Lunn)
    • Second Lien Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA
      • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Richard Bernard, Derek Wright, Mark Prager)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Kenneth Rosen, Jeffrey Prol, Wojciech Jung) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Michael Yurkewicz, Morton Branzburg, Sally Veghte)

Updated 10/26/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - GenOn Energy Inc.

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GenOn Energy, Inc.

  • 6/14/17 Recap: NRG Energy Inc. ("$NRG") owned deregulated wholesale power generation corporation and operator of 32 power plants in 8 states (Mid-Atlantic & California) filed a bankruptcy case with a restructuring support agreement agreed to by NRG and holders of 90% of the funded debt. The plan for the restructuring is to delever the company by $1b with the holders of the unsecured senior notes obtaining equity in the reorganized entity from NRG (and the right to participation in rights offering for $900mm in exit financing). This is another in a line of recent power cases including Panda Temple Power, Homer City Generation LP, Illinois Power Generating Co., La Paloma Generating Company LLC. And it probably won't be the last. The company cited the following causes - in addition to its over-levered capital structure - for the bankruptcy filing: (i) flat demand for power over the past five years, (ii) excess capacity (in part due to insufficient power plant retirements), (iii) lower cost structure for competitors, and (iv) significantly depressed natural gas prices. "This combination has caused energy and capacity prices to fall. So has the Debtors' profitability as a result." In the mid-Atlantic, electricity cleared $100 per megawatt hour in early 2014 and now the price hovers around $30 per megawatt hour. And nat gas isn't predicted to recover to industry price highs at least until 2030. So, looks like the merger that created this combined mid-Atlantic/California entity and levered this sucker up to the sky was a bit ill-timed, hey? 
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)
  • Capital Structure: $ '18 RCF (NRG Energy Inc. & U.S. Bank NA), $691mm '17 7.875% Senior Notes & $649mm '18 9.50% Senior Notes & $490mm '20 9.875% Senior Notes (Wilmington Trust Company NA), $366mm '21 8.50% Senior Notes & $329mm '31 9.125% Senior Notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Socieity FSB)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, David Seligman, Steven Serajeddini, W. Benjamin Winger, Christopher Hayes, AnnElyse Scarlett Gibbons) & (local) Zack A. Clement PLLC (Zach Clement)
    • Financial Advisor: McKinsey Recovery & Transformation Services U.S., LLC (Kevin Carmody, Tanner MacDiarmid, Sam Jacobs)
    • Investment Banker: Rothschild & Co. (Todd Snyder)
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Committee of GenOn Note and GAG Notes
      • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Keith Woffard, Stephen Moeller-Sally, Marc Roitman, Meredith Parkinson) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Joshua Wolfshohl, Rachel Thompson)
    • Ad Hoc Steering Committee of GAG Notes
      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (David Gerger, Emily Smith, Benjamin Firestone, Daniel Holzman)
    • NRG Energy Inc.
      • Legal: Baker Botts LLP (Emanuel Grillo, Ian Roberts, Christopher Newcomb)
    • Wilmington Trust Company
      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP (Ronald Hewitt, Dianne Coffino)
    • Issuing Bank: Citibank NA
      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, David Hammerman)

Updated 7/11/17 6:47 pm CT

New (Chapter 22) Filing - American Apparel Inc.

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American Apparel Inc.

  • 11/14/16 Recap: Large US-based apparel manufacturer and retailer with 193 total stores files for bankruptcy - months, uh, after emerging from bankruptcy. Company filed with a $30mm DIP proposal from Encina Business Credit LLC. Plan is to sell (for parts) expeditiously to Gilden Activewear SRL for $66mm (IP, remaining wholesale inventory and wholesale POs during restructuring).  
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $215mm of funded debt ($90mm DIP-rolled-into-TL-exit + $82mm of additional financing) & $15mm unsecured UK facility (Standard General)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Carl Black, Scott Greenberg, Michael J. Cohen, Erin Brady, Stacey Corr-Irvine, Genna Ghaul, Christpher Lovrien) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, James O'Neill, Joseph Mulvihill)
    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinsten, Joseph D'Ascoli) & FTI Consulting (Andrew Hinkelman, Chuck Goad, Adam Saltzman, Frank Marshall, William Breashears, Zach Contreras)
    • Claims Consultants: Resources Global Professionals (Thora Thoroddsen, Evelyne Anglade, Scott Ashcraft, Luis Barreda, Sharon Dannewitz, Yolanda Hoelscher, Rodney Teruya)
    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian, Devin Shanahan, Sanaz Memarsadeghi, Ethan Kopp, Alexander Stolarz, Varun Desai)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender: Encina Business Credit LLC
      • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox, Donald Rothman, Lon Singer, Alexander Rheaume) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor)
    • Agent to Prepetition Secured Lenders: Wilmington Trust
      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP (R. Alexander Clark, Dianne Coffino) & Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier)
    • Buyer: Gilden Activewear SRL
      • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Michael Torkin, Brian Hamilton, Miaoting Wu) & (local) Womble Carlyle (Matthew Ward)
    • Lead Lenders & Equityholders: Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Coliseum Capital Management LLC, Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP, Pentwater Capital Management LP, Standard General. 
      • Legal (except Standard General): Milbank Tweed (Gerard Uzzi, Eric Stodola) & (local) Fox Rothschild (Jeffrey Schlerf, L. John Bird)
      • Legal (Standard General): Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Natasha Labovitz, Shannon Rose Selden, Craig Bruens, Erica Weisgerber) & (local) Young Conaway (Edmon Morton, Joseph Barry)
    • Largest Unsecured Creditors: Standard General, FTI Consulting, Moelis, Garden City Group
    • Unsecured Creditors' Committee:
      • Legal: Cooley LLP (Cathy Hershcopf, Seth Van Aalten, Robert Winning, Sarah Carnes, Michael Klein, Max Schlan) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Evan Miller, Gregory Flasser)
      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden, Ryan O'Sullivan, Lawrence Jacobs, Christopher Moffatt, Jack Allen, Christopher Saitta, Daniel Pace, Ryan Feulner)

Updated 3/30/17