New Chapter 11 Filing - NeuroproteXeon Inc.

NeuroproteXeon Inc.

December 16, 2019

Many restructuring professionals predicted that “healthcare” would be an active area for bankruptcy in 2019. We suppose painting with such a broad brush increases the likelihood of being correct but it seems that the majority of the activity has really been in specific subsets, e.g., community retirement centers, biopharmaceuticals, and biotech/med-devices. Add another notch to the latter category.

New York-based NeuroproteXeon Inc. and its three affiliated debtors is the latest player in the space; it is “generally engaged in the development, commercialization and marketing of pharmaceutical agents, medical devices and/or other life sciences technologies.” The debtors have been “developing, testing and obtaining worldwide regulatory approval of a product consisting of pharmaceutical grade xenon gas for inhalation, which has been trademarked under the name XENEX™, and a propriety device…which delivers a combination of XENEX™ and oxygen to the respiratory system of persons who experience Post-Cardiac Arrest Syndrome….” The debtors device entered Phase III testing in 2018. But then it got suspended.

Why? Simply, the debtors ran out of money. The bankruptcy provides the debtors with access to critical funding — $5mm from JMB Capital Partners Lending LLC — that will allow them to continue to pursue testing. Meanwhile, the debtors’ investment bankers will market and try to sell the debtors’ assets.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: $250k (JMB)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Ashby & Geddes PA (William Bowden, Gregory Taylor, Stacy Newman)

    • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors Corp. (John Madden)

    • Investment Banker: Lincoln Partners Advisors LLC (Brent Williams)

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: JMB Capital Partners Lending LLC

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Robert Hirsh, Beth Brownstein) & The Rosner Law Group LLC (Frederick Rosner, Scott Leonhardt, Jason Gibson)

💊New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Sienna Pharmaceuticals Inc. ($SNNA)💊

Sienna Pharmaceuticals Inc.

September 16, 2019

If you’re tired of distressed retail and oil & gas companies, the good news is that the biopharma space has been mixing things up. Sienna Pharmaceuticals ($SNNA), a California-based clinical-stage biopharma and medical device company filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. It develops multiple products aimed at chronic inflammatory skin diseases (e.g., psoriasis) and aesthetic conditions (e.g., unwanted hair and acne). The company is at the stage that those in the tech world would designate “pre-revenue.”

And that is precisely the problem. Much like distressed oil and gas companies, distressed biopharma companies are capital intensive (a $184.1mm accumulated deficit) and tend to succumb to the weight of their long-duration development cycle. In this case, the company “has relied on equity issuances, debt offerings, and term loans” to fund development and operations. It has also leveraged its equity as a currency, engaging in strategic acquisitions that enhance its product portfolio; it, for instance, entered into a share purchase agreement in late ‘16 with Creabilis plc. This added one more product that, at this juncture, the company cannot advance due to liquidity issues. Womp womp.

The company has, over the course of time, been indebted to its pre-petition secured lender, Silicon Valley Bank, in the range of $10-30mm. On September 15th, for instance, the company owed SVB over $30mm. In exchange, however, for the use consensual use of cash collateral, the company made a $21.3mm payment to SVB on September 16th, the day before the bankruptcy filing. That’s what you call leverage, folks. SVB’s loan is secured by a laundry list of debtor assets though it is technically not secured by the company’s extensive trove of intellectual property (~250 patents). That IP, however, is subject to what’s called a “negative pledge,” a provision that prevents the company from pledging the IP on account of the fact that SVB’s security interest includes “rights to payment and proceeds from the sale, licensing, or disposition of all or any part of the Intellectual Property.” It’s a wee bit hard to enforce a security interest in IP if someone else has a right to the payments streams emanating therefrom (not that this company has any revenue streams, but you get the idea).

Why bankruptcy? For starters, the company is subject to a “minimum cash covenant” under its SVB facility and liquidity dipped below the minimum. Due to the company’s declining stock price, the company lost access to the equity market. Finally, the company has lingering financial commitments from the Creabilis deal. For all of these reasons, the company simply doesn’t have the liquidity needed to fund the next stages of product development which, in turn, would get the company closer to revenue generation. Chicken. Meet egg.

As is the overwhelming norm these days, the company now seeks to use the bankruptcy process to pursue a sale. As of the filing, no stalking horse purchaser is teed up but the company is “confident” that its banker, Cowen & Co. ($COWN), will locate one that will enable the company to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. No pressure, Cowen.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge TBD)

  • Capital Structure: $10mm secured debt (SVB)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Peter Gilhuly, Ted Dillman, Shawn Hansen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle)

    • Financial Advisor: Force 10 Partners (Jeremy Rosenthal)

    • Investment Banker: Cowen and Company LLC (Lorie Beers)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Lender: Silicon Valley Bank

      • Legal: Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (Ori Katz, Michael Driscoll) and Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP (Jennifer Hoover, Kevin Capuzzi)

    • Major shareholders: ARCH Venture Partners VIII LLC, Partner Fund Management LP, FMR LLC (aka Fidelity)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Therapeutics Inc., Johnson Matthey Inc., MedPharm Ltd.)

      • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Richard Bernard, Alissa Nann) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, D. Ryan Slaugh)

      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden)

Update: 10/25/19 #140

🔫New Chapter 11 Filing - Sportco Holdings Inc. (United Sporting Companies Inc.)🔫

SportCo Holdings Inc. (United Sporting Companies Inc.)

June 10, 2019

Callback to four previous PETITION pieces:

The first one — which was a tongue-in-cheek mock First Day Declaration we wrote in advance of Remington Outdoor Company’s chapter 11 bankruptcy — is, if we do say so ourselves, AN ABSOLUTE MUST READ. The same basic narrative could apply to the recent chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of Sportco Holdings Inc., a marketer and distributor of products and accessories for hunting, which filed for bankruptcy on Monday, June 10, 2019. Sportco’s customer base consists of 20k independent retailers covering all 50 states. But back to the “MUST READ.” There are some choice bits there:

Murica!! F*#& Yeah!! 

Remington (f/k/a Freedom Group) is "Freedom Built, American Made." Because nothing says freedom like blowing sh*t up. Cue Lynyrd Skynyrd's "Free Bird." Hell, we may even sing it in court now that Toys R Ushas made that a thing. 

Our company traces its current travails to 2007 when Cerberus Capital Management LP bought Remington for $370mm (cash + assumption of debt) and immediately "loaded" the North Carolina-based company with even more debt. As of today, the company has $950mm of said debt on its balance sheet, including a $150mm asset-backed loan due June '19, a $550mm term loan B due April '19, and 7.875% $250mm 3rd lien notes due '20. Suffice it to say, the capital structure is pretty "jammed." Nothing says America like guns...and leverage

Indeed, this is true of Sportco too. Sportco “sports” $23mm in prepetition ABL obligations and $249.8mm in the form of a term loan. Not too shabby on the debt side, you gun nuts!

More from our mock-up on Remington:

Shortly after Cerberus purchased the company, Barack Obama became president - a fact, on its own, that many perceived as a real "blowback" to gun ownership. Little did they know. But, then, compounding matters, the Sandy Hook incident occurred and it featured Remington's Bushmaster AR-15-style rifle. Subsequently, speeches were made. Tears were shed. Big pension fund investors like CSTRS got skittish AF. And Cerberus pseudo-committed to selling the company. Many thought that this situation was going to spark "change [you] can believe in," lead to more regulation, and curtail gun sales/ownership. But everyone thought wrong. Tears are no match for lobby dollars. Suckers. 

Instead, firearm background checks have risen for at least a decade - a bullish indication for gun sales. In a sick twist of only-in-America fate, Obama's caustic tone towards gunmakers actually helped sell guns. And that is precisely what Remington needed in order to justify its burdensome capital structure and corresponding interest expense. With Hillary Clinton set to win the the election in 2016, Cerberus' convenient inability to sell was set to pay off. 

But then that "dum dum" "ramrod" Donald Trump was elected and he enthusiastically and publicly declared that he would "never, ever infringe on the right of the people to keep and bear arms."  While that's a great policy as far as we, here, at Remington are concerned, we'd rather him say that to us in private and declare in public that he's going to go door-to-door to confiscate your guns. Boom! Sales through the roof! And money money money money for the PE overlords! Who cares if you can't go see a concert in Las Vegas without fearing for your lives. Yield baby. Daddy needs a new house in Emerald Isle. 

Wait? "How would President Trump say he's going to confiscate guns and nevertheless maintain his base?" you ask. Given that he can basically say ANYTHING and maintain his base, we're not too worried about it. #MAGA!! Plus, wink wink nod nod, North Carolina. We'd all have a "barrel" of laughs over that.  

So now what? Well, "shoot." We could "burst mode" this thing, and liquidate it but what's the fun in that. After all, we still made net revenue of $603.4mm and have gross profit margins of 20.9%. Yeah, sure, those numbers are both down from $865.1mm and 27.4%, respectively, but, heck, all it'll take is a midterm election to reverse those trends baby. 

That was a pretty stellar $260mm revenue decline for Remington. Thanks Trump!! So, how did Sportco fare?

Trump seems to be failing to make America great again for those who sell guns.

But don’t take our word for it. Per Sportco:

In the lead up to the 2016 presidential election, the Debtors anticipated an uptick in firearms sales historically attributable to the election of a Democratic presidential nominee. The Debtors increased their inventory to account for anticipated sales increases. In the aftermath of the unexpected Republican victory, the Debtors realized lower than expected sales figures for the 2017 and 2018 fiscal years, with higher than expected carrying costs due to the Debtors’ increased inventory. These factors contributed to the Debtors tightening liquidity and an industry-wide glut of inventory.

Whoops. Shows them for betting against the stable genius. What are these carrying costs they refer to? No gun sales = too much inventory = storage. Long warehousemen.

Compounding matters, the company’s excess inventory butted with industry-wide excess inventory sparked by “the financial distress of certain market participants.” This pressured margins further as Sportco had to discount product to push sales. This “further eroded…slim margins and contributed to…tightening liquidity.” Per the company:

Many of the Debtors’ vendors and manufacturers suffered heavy losses as a result of the Cabela’s-Bass Pro Shop merger, Dick’s Sporting Good’s pull back from the market, and the recent Gander Mountain and AcuSport bankruptcies. Those losses adversely impacted the terms and conditions on which such vendors and manufacturers were willing to extend credit to the Debtors. With respect to the Gander Mountain and AcuSport bankruptcies, the dumping of excess product into the marketplace pushed prices—and margins— even lower. The resulting tightening of credit terms eroded the Debtors’ sales and further contributed to the Debtors’ tightening liquidity.

The company also blames some usual suspects for its chapter 11 filing. First, weather. Weather ALWAYS gets a bad rap. And, of course, the debt.

Riiiiiight. About that debt. When we previously asked “Who is Financing Guns?,” the answer, in the case of Remington, was Bank of America Inc. ($BAC)Wells Fargo Inc. ($WFC) and Regions Bank Inc. ($RF). Likewise here. Those same three institutions make up the company’s ABL lender roster. We’re old enough to remember when banks paid lip service to wanting to do something about guns.

One other issue was the company’s inability to…wait for it…REALIZE CERTAIN SUPPLY CHAIN SYNERGIES after acquiring certain assets from once-bankrupt competitor AcuSport Corporation. Per the company:

The lower than anticipated increase in customer base following the AcuSport Transaction magnified the adverse effects of the market factors discussed above and resulted in a faster than expected tightening of the Debtors’ liquidity and overall deterioration of the Debtors’ financial condition.

The company then ran into issues with its pre-petition lenders and its vendors and the squeeze was on. Recognizing that time was wearing thin, the company hired Houlihan Lokey Inc. ($HLI) to market the assets. No compelling offers came, however, and the company determined that a chapter 11 filing “to pursue an orderly liquidation…was in the best interest of all stakeholders.

R.I.P. Sportco.

*****

But not before you get in one last fight.

The glorious thing about first day papers is that they provide debtors with the opportunity to set the tone in the case. The First Day Declaration, in particular, is a narrative. A narrative told to the judge and other parties-in-interest about what was, what is, and what may be. That narrative often explains why certain other requests for relief are necessary: that is, that without them, there will be immediate and irreparable harm to the estate. The biggest one of these is typically a request for authority to tap a committed DIP credit facility and/or cash collateral to fund operations. On the flip side of that request, however, are the company’s lenders. And they often have something to say about that — objections over, say, the use of cash collateral are common.

But you don’t often see an objector re-write the entire frikken narrative and file it prior to the first hearing in the case.

Shortly after the bankruptcy filing, Prospect Capital Corporation (“PCC”), as the second lien term loan agent, unleashed an objection all over the debtors. Per PCC:

Just a few years ago, the Debtors were the largest distributor of firearms in the United States, with reported annual revenue of in excess of $770 million. Contrary to the First Day Declaration filed in these cases, the Debtors’ demise was not due to outside forces such as the “2016 presidential election,” “disruptions in the industry” and “natural disasters. Rather, as a result of dividend recapitalization transactions in 2012 and 2013, the Debtors’ equity owner, Wellspring Capital, “cashed out” in excess of $183 million. After lining their pockets with over $183 million, fiduciaries appointed by Wellspring Capital to be directors and officers of the Debtors grossly mismanaged the business and depleted all reserves necessary to weather the storms and the headwinds the business would face. In a short time, the business went from being the largest firearms distributor in the United States to being liquidated. As a result of years of mismanagement and the failure of the estates’ fiduciaries to preserve value, the Second Lien Lenders will, in all likelihood, recover only a small fraction of their $249.7 million secured loan claim. Years of mismanagement ultimately placed the Debtors in the position where they are in now….

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This sh*t just got much more interesting: y’all know we love dividend recapitalizations. Anyway, PCC went on to object to the fact that this is an in-court liquidation when an out-of-court process would be, in their view, cheaper and just as effective; they also object to the debtors’ proposed budget and use of cash collateral. The upshot is that they see very little chance of recovery of their second lien loan and want to maximize value.

Of course, the debtors be like:

scoreboard.jpeg

The numbers speak for themselves, they replied. They were $X of revenue between 2012 and 2016 and then, after Trump was elected, they’ve been $X-Y%. Plain and simple.

So where does this leave us? After some concessions from the DIP lenders and the debtors, the court approved the debtors requested DIP credit facility on an interim basis. The order preserves PCC’s rights to come back to the court with an argument related to cash collateral after the first lien lenders (read: the banks) are paid off in full (and any intercreditor agreement-imposed limitations on PCC’s ability to fight fall away).

Ultimately, THIS may sum up this situation best:

It’s genuinely difficult to pick the most villainous company in this story. Is it the company selling guns who made a big bet on people’s deepest fears and insecurities and then shit the bed? The private equity company bleeding the gun distributor dry and then running it straight into the ground? Or the other private equity company that is now mad it likely won’t get anything near what it paid out in the original loan to the distributor? Folks...let them fight.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: $23.1mm ABL, $249mm term loan (Prospect Capital, Summit Partners)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Timothy Walsh, Darren Azman, Riley Orloff) & (local) Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Brenna Dolphin, Lindsey Suprum)

    • Board of Directors: Bradley Johnson, Alexander Carles, Justin Vorwerk

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Winter Harbor LLC (Dalton Edgecomb)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

    • Claims Agent: BMC Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Winston & Strawn LLP (Daniel McGuire, Gregory Gartland, Carrie Hardman) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele)

    • Agent for Second Lien Lenders: Prospect Capital Corporation

      • Legal: Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP (Adam Friedman, Jonathan Koevary) & (local) Blank Rome LLP (Regina Stango Kelbon, Victoria Guilfoyle, John Lucian)

    • Prepetition ABL Lenders: Bank of America NA, Wells Fargo Bank NA, Regions Bank NA

    • Large equityholders: Wellspring Capital Partners, Summit Partners, Prospect Capital Corporation

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Vista Outdoor Sales LLC, Magpul Industries Corporation, American Outdoor Brands Corporation, Garmin USA Inc., Fiocchi of America Inc., FN America LLC, Remington Arms Company LLC)

      • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Jeffrey Cohen, Eric Chafetz, Gabriel Olivera) & (local) Morris James LLP (Eric Monzo)

      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden)

Update 7/7/19 #115

💄New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Glansaol Holdings Inc.💄

December 19, 2018

A week after Glossier CEO Emily Weiss revealed that the direct-to-consumer beauty brand hit $100mm in sales, Glansaol, a platform company that acquires, integrates and cultivates a portfolio of prestige beauty brands — including a direct-to-consumer brand — filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company owns a trio of three main brands: (a) Laura Geller, a distributor of female beauty and personal care products sold primarily on QVC and wholesale, (b) Julep, a wholesale distributor of high-end nail polish, skincare and cosmetic products with a direct-to-consumer and “subscription box” model, and (c) Clark’s Botanicals, a skincare retailer, which sells primarily via e-commerce (including Amazon) and QVC.

The company indicated that “a general shift away from brick-and-mortar shopping, evolving consumer demographics, and changing trends” precipitated its bankruptcy filing. More specifically, profit drivers, historically, have been broadcast shopping networks and wholesale distribution. But both QVC and large retailers have cut back orders significantly amidst a broader industry shakeout. Compounding matters is the fact that the company’s top two customers account for over 60% of total receivables. As we always say, customer concentration is NEVER a good thing.

Moreover, the company added:

…the Debtors have been unable to replace key revenue generators due to: (a) the increasingly competitive industry landscape coinciding with the downturn in the brick and mortar retail sector; (b) the decline in broadcast shopping network sales; and (c) the downturn of the Company’s single-brand subscription business, which faces competition from new entrants that offer subscriptions covering a variety of brands.

Hmmm. Insert Birchbox here? Perhaps Glansaol ought to have entered into a partnership with Walgreens! 🤔

What happens when you can’t move product? You build up inventory. Which, for a variety of reasons, is no bueno. Per the company:

…the decline in sales has saddled the Debtors with a significant oversupply of inventory, which has forced the Debtors to sell goods at steep markdowns and destroy certain products, further tightening margins and draining liquidity. Oversupply of inventory, coupled with higher returns and chargebacks described below, has also significantly increased the Debtors’ costs for warehouses and other third-party logistics providers.

Interestingly, the company aggregated the three brands in the first place because of perceived supply chain synergies. Per the company:

The strategy was put into practice in late 2016 and early 2017 when the Debtors acquired a trio of rising prestige beauty companies ― Laura Geller, Julep, and Clark’s Botanicals. The combination was designed to realize the benefit of natural synergies without any cannibalization. The brands share relatively similar supply chains where it was thought efficiencies could be realized, but they featured different price points and consumer profiles. For example, while Laura Geller appeals to consumers over the age of 35 and is primarily sold through wholesale retailers and broadcast shopping networks, Julep caters to a younger generation through its online business and experience-driven nail salons.

We love synergies. They always seem to be good in theory and nonexistent in practice. To point:

the Debtors were never able to achieve significant cost savings related to shared services among their brands. Upon the Debtors’ acquisitions of Laura Geller, Julep and Clark’s in 2016, the plan was to ultimately consolidate shared services, including supply chain, senior management, administrative support, human resources, information technology support, accounting, finance and legal services. The brands, however, were never fully integrated. Instead, the Company is saddled with a substantial legacy investment in a new ERP system, which was put into place ahead of cross-organizational efficiency initiatives and right-sizing functionality. Accordingly, the costs savings attributed to synergies, which had been a pillar of the Debtors’ original business model, were never realized.

Which is why we generally tend to be skeptical whenever we hear about cost savings and synergies as a basis for M&A (cough, Refinitiv).

Given all of the above, the company has been engaged in a marketing process since roughly February 2018 running, in the interim, based on its credit facility and equity infusions. Now, though, the company has a stalking horse bidder in tow in the form of AS Beauty LLC, which has agreed to purchase the company’s brands and related capital assets for approximately $16.2mm. The company’s prepetition lender, SunTrust Bank, has agreed to provide a $15mm DIP credit facility which, along with cash collateral, will fund the cases.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Wiles)

  • Capital Structure: $7.2mm RCF (SunTrust Bank)

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon, Daniel Forman, Andrew Mordkoff)

    • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden)

    • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group Inc. (click on the case name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Secured & DIP Lender: SunTrust Bank (Legal: Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs LLP — Rufus Dorsey, Eric Anderson, James Gadsden

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: AS Beauty LLC (Legal: Sills Cummis & Gross PC — Michael Goldsmith, George Hirsch)

    • Private Equity Sponsor: Warburg Pincus Private Equity XII Funds

New Chapter 11 Filing - Hobbico Inc.

Hobbico Inc.

1/10/18

Chicago-based designer, manufacturer and distributor of hobby products like radio-control toys filed for bankruptcy after struggling from (i) too much debt, (ii) lack of investment in product innovation and in its core ecommerce platform, (iii) a systemic shift in the drone market (wherein Asian suppliers started competing by selling direct-to-consumer), (iv) the bankruptcy of a key supplier of racing products, and (v) disruption to its Asian supply chain. The company defaulted on its secured debt and is using the chapter 11 process in order to attempt to sell its business as a going-concern. 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $74.5mm revolver and term loan (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $41.2mm subordinated secured note (Cyprium Investors IV AIV I LP)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Neal Gerber & Eisenberg LLP (Mark Berkoff, Nicholas Miller, Thomas Wolford) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Curtis Miller, Matthew Talmo, Andrew Golden)
    • Financial Advisor: CR3 Partners LLC (Tom O'Donoghue, Douglas Flannery, Chris Creger, Layne Deutscher) & Keystone Consulting Group LLC (Louis Brownstone)
    • Investment Banker: Lincoln International LLC (Alexander Stevenson)
    • Claims Agent: JND Corporate Restructuring (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA
      • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Zachary Garrett, Prisca Kim, Jacob Marshall) & (local) Burr & Forman LLP (J. Cory Falgowski)
    • Lender: Cyprium Investors IV AIV I LP
      • Legal: Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Levitin, Richard Stieglitz Jr.)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Cullen and Dykman LLP (S. Jason Teele, Nicole Stefanelli, Michelle McMahon, Bonnie Pollack) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLC (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, Stephen Gerald, Kevin Shaw)
      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Katy Industries Inc.

Katy Industries Inc.

  • 5/14/17 Recap: St. Louis-based manufacturer, importer and distributor of commercial cleaning (brooms, brushes and mops) and consumer storage products filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a 363 sale to an affiliate of private equity sponsor Victory Park Capital Management. The company has been around forever, it seems, but recent acquisitions, failed integration, unrealized synergies, and operational pitfalls appear to have hit the company hard and strained liquidity. Hence, bankruptcy.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $31.5mm debt (Encina Business Credit SPV LLC)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: DLA Piper LLP (John Lyons, Daniel Simon, Stuart Brown, Oksana Koltko Rosaluk)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: SierraConstellation Partners LLC (Lawrence Perkins)
    • Investment Banker: Lincoln International Inc. (Alexander Stevenson)
    • Claims Agent: JND Legal Administration (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Buyer: Jansan Acquisition LLC (Highview Capital LLC & VPCM)
      • Legal: Skadden Arps Meagher & Flom LLP (Lisa Laukitis)
    • Sponsor: Victory Park Capital Management
    • Encina Business Credit SPV LLC
      • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Jeremy Downs, Zachary Garrett) & (local) Reed Smith LLP (J. Cory Falgowski)
    • Successor Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA
      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Rachel Jaffe Mauceri)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (Steven Kortanek, Andrew Flame, Patrick Jackson, Robert Malone)
      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden)

Updated 7/12/17 

New Chapter 11 Filing - Chellino Crane Inc.

Chellino Crane Inc.

  • 5/5/17 Recap: Illinois-based heavy crane operating company that services refineries, power and chemical plants filed for bankruptcy under the weight of its outstanding debt on equipment and union obligations. The downturn in the oil and gas industry, unfortunately, led to projected revenue misses and a liquidity crisis. The filing is meant to address the capital structure and equipment footprint.
  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Illinois
  • Capital Structure: $51.6mm secured debt (First Midwest)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Sugar Felsenthal Grals & Hammer LLP (Jonathan Friedland, Elizabeth Vandesteeg, Jack O'Connor, Nicole Stefanelli, Leland Chait)
    • Financial Advisor: Conway MacKenzie Inc. (Jeffrey Zappone, J. Kotas, J. Marek)
    • Investment Banker: FocalPoint Securities LLC (Michael Fixler, Bryant Yu, Clinton Miyazono, Patrick Shin)
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition Lender & DIP Lender: First Midwest
      • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Mark Prager)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Gerard Cicero, Bennett Silverberg) & (local) Freeborn & Peters LLP (Shelly DeRousse, Devon Eggert, Elizabeth Janczak)
      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden, Christopher Saitta)

Updated 8/26/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Suniva Inc.

Suniva Inc.

  • 4/17/17 Recap: Large US manufacturer of photovoltaic solar cells used in residential, commercial and government solar applications filed for bankruptcy because of (cue ominous music) CHINA. Shocker! China's well-documented cheap solar capacity and flooding of the US market has pressured the US market for years (and resulted in the imposition of 30% tariffs on the Chinese - tariffs that were easily circumvented through creative delivery through other parts of Asia). Luckily, management didn't get ahead of their skis and expand by (i) tripling the company's manufacturing capacity and (ii) spending nearly $100mm on larger facilities (while incurring new debt). Oh wait, strike that: that's precisely what management did. Oops. (More to come.)
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
  • Capital Structure: $50.9mm (SQN Asset Servicing LLC), $15mm LOC (Wanxiang America Corporation - now first in priority as successor to Wells Fargo's rights)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, Colin Bernardino, Gianfranco Finizio) & (local) Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill, D. Ryan Slaugh)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Aurora Management Partners Inc. (David Baker, Steve Smerjac, Matt McEnerney)
    • Claims Agent: The Garden City Group Inc. (*click on the company name above for free docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • SunEdison Products Singapore Pte. Ltd.
      • Legal: Togut Segal & Segal LLP (Frank Oswald, Brian Moore)
    • Wells Fargo NA
      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Richard Esterkin, Kelly Costello)
    • Alternative DIP Lender: Lion Point Capital LP
      • Legal: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (Sean O'Neal, Jane VanLare, Thomas Kessler) & Ashby & Geddes PA (Ricardo Palacio, Karen Skomorucha Owens)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Robert Gayda, Catherine LoTempio) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Eric Schwartz, Tamara Minott)
      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden, Jack Allen, Christopher Saitta, Daniel Pace, Ryan Feulner)

Updated 7/17/17 

New (Chapter 22) Filing - American Apparel Inc.

American Apparel Inc.

  • 11/14/16 Recap: Large US-based apparel manufacturer and retailer with 193 total stores files for bankruptcy - months, uh, after emerging from bankruptcy. Company filed with a $30mm DIP proposal from Encina Business Credit LLC. Plan is to sell (for parts) expeditiously to Gilden Activewear SRL for $66mm (IP, remaining wholesale inventory and wholesale POs during restructuring).  
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $215mm of funded debt ($90mm DIP-rolled-into-TL-exit + $82mm of additional financing) & $15mm unsecured UK facility (Standard General)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Carl Black, Scott Greenberg, Michael J. Cohen, Erin Brady, Stacey Corr-Irvine, Genna Ghaul, Christpher Lovrien) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, James O'Neill, Joseph Mulvihill)
    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinsten, Joseph D'Ascoli) & FTI Consulting (Andrew Hinkelman, Chuck Goad, Adam Saltzman, Frank Marshall, William Breashears, Zach Contreras)
    • Claims Consultants: Resources Global Professionals (Thora Thoroddsen, Evelyne Anglade, Scott Ashcraft, Luis Barreda, Sharon Dannewitz, Yolanda Hoelscher, Rodney Teruya)
    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian, Devin Shanahan, Sanaz Memarsadeghi, Ethan Kopp, Alexander Stolarz, Varun Desai)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender: Encina Business Credit LLC
      • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox, Donald Rothman, Lon Singer, Alexander Rheaume) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor)
    • Agent to Prepetition Secured Lenders: Wilmington Trust
      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP (R. Alexander Clark, Dianne Coffino) & Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier)
    • Buyer: Gilden Activewear SRL
      • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Michael Torkin, Brian Hamilton, Miaoting Wu) & (local) Womble Carlyle (Matthew Ward)
    • Lead Lenders & Equityholders: Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Coliseum Capital Management LLC, Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP, Pentwater Capital Management LP, Standard General
      • Legal (except Standard General): Milbank Tweed (Gerard Uzzi, Eric Stodola) & (local) Fox Rothschild (Jeffrey Schlerf, L. John Bird)
      • Legal (Standard General): Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Natasha Labovitz, Shannon Rose Selden, Craig Bruens, Erica Weisgerber) & (local) Young Conaway (Edmon Morton, Joseph Barry)
    • Largest Unsecured Creditors: Standard General, FTI Consulting, Moelis, Garden City Group
    • Unsecured Creditors' Committee:
      • Legal: Cooley LLP (Cathy Hershcopf, Seth Van Aalten, Robert Winning, Sarah Carnes, Michael Klein, Max Schlan) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Evan Miller, Gregory Flasser)
      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden, Ryan O'Sullivan, Lawrence Jacobs, Christopher Moffatt, Jack Allen, Christopher Saitta, Daniel Pace, Ryan Feulner)

Updated 3/30/17

New Filing - DirectBuy Holdings Inc.

DirectBuy Holdings Inc.

  • 11/1/16 Recap: E-commerce provider of concierge-based virtual shopping experiences files for bankruptcy to achieve a balance sheet restructuring via sale of the business to proposed stalking horse bidder, Derby SPV Inc. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $145mm 12% PIK Toggle Notes, $10mm pre-exchange holdover notes.    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Cole Schotz (Michael Sirota, Norman Pernick, Felice Yudkin, Ilana Volkov, Marion Quirk, Nicholas Brannick)
    • Investment Banker: Carl Marks Advisory Group LLC (Charles Boguslaski, C. Scott Chabina, Jonathan Ladner, Parker Condie)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Unsecured Creditors' Committee
      • Legal: Saul Ewing LLP (Sharon Levine, Lucian Murley, Aaron Applebaum, Dipesh Patel, Monique DiSabatino)
      • Financial Advisor: Emerald Capital Advisors (John Madden)
    • Equityholders: Bayside Capital & PennantPark Investment Corporation
      • Legal: Weil (Brian Rosen, Debora Hoehne) & (local) Pepper Hamilton (David Stratton)

Updated 12/30/16.