😷New Chapter 11 Filing - Astria Health😷

Astria Health

May 6, 2019

Astria Health, a large non-profit healthcare system based in Eastern Washington, has filed for bankruptcy along with a dozen or so affiliates. The company blames its chapter 11 filing on regulatory approval processes that stunted expansion plans, poor collections on accounts receivable, and charitable care that, despite best efforts, hadn’t been offset by charitable contributions. All of these issues have squashed cash flow and triggered issues with the debtors’ secured debt, part of which is uber-expensive. The debtors intend to use their DIP credit facility to take out their expensive “high cost of capital” MidCap Financial Trust-provided (and other) debt; they also hope to use the “breathing spell” provided by the automatic stay to remedy their collections problems and march towards a plan of reorganization within 150 days.

  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Washington (Judge Kurtz)

  • Capital Structure: $72mm secured debt

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Dentons US LLP (Samuel Maziel) & (local) Bush Kornfeld LLP (James Day)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: JMB Financial Advisors

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Robert Hirsh, Jordana Renert) & (local) Southwell & O’Rourke (Kevin O’Rourke)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - The LaSalle Group Inc.

The LaSalle Group Inc.

May 2, 2019

Short Nana.

Texas-based The LaSalle Group Inc., an owner of 40 memory care assisted living communities across 9 states, and a handful of affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy on May 2, 2019 and things ain’t looking pretty for the unsecured creditors: the company is administratively insolvent. The company owes $3.7mm at the parent level and then has ~$27.8mm of opco level debt among four debtor LLCs that are all owned 52% by a third-party investor (“Realco Silverado Investor”). Realco Silverado Investor seeks to purchase the opcos for $29mm, just enough to clear the debt at the opco level. Per the company, “[i]n the event this sale closes…[the notes]…should all be paid in full, all employees will have continual job opportunity, and all residents will remain in the residence they and their loved ones have chosen.” The bright side? This sounds like a good result for those most in need of it.

Why is the company in bankruptcy? It states:

“A surge in construction of assisted living facilities in recent years has created a supply-demand imbalance resulting in greater competition for residents and lower rates. This market dynamic has significantly impacted LaSalle and its affiliated entities (collectively, the “Autumn Leaves Group”) from a cash flow perspective. The Autumn Leaves Group has struggled with occupancy rates in certain markets which has significantly impacted revenue and cash flow.”

Moreover, LaSalle is the guarantor of substantially all of the secured debt and lease obligations. Its cash flow constraints precluded it from servicing its debt, culminating in approximately 30 lawsuits currently pending against LaSalle. As if that wasn’t bad enough, LaSalle also suffered the brunt of a United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division Memorandum Opinion and Order granting a motion for conditional certification of a collective action against it related to alleged hourly rate wage claims. And as if THAT wasn’t bad enough, LaSalle also faces various suits from vendors and other creditors for disputed unpaid claims. They’re all about to get hosed. The assets that aren’t sold to Realco Silverado Investor will be liquidated.

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Jernigan)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Crowe & Dunlevy PC (Vickie Driver, Christina Stephenson, Christopher Staine)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Harney Partners (Karen Nicolaou)

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - New Cotai Holdings LLC

New Cotai Holdings LLC

May 1, 2019

New Cotai Holdings LLC and three affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York on the basis of New Cotai Ventures LLC, a NY LLC, having cash held in a bank account in White Plains New York (as of when, we wonder). The debtors were formed for the purpose of investing in Studio City International Holdings Limited, have no employees, and are otherwise managed by sponsor, Silver Point Capital LP. The declarant supporting the debtors’ chapter 11 filing is an independent director who was put into place literally 2 days before the filing. Yup, 2 whole days.

Studio City International Holdings Limited is a wretched hive of scum and villany. Sorry, that’s not right. That’s us trying to make this more interesting than it is. In truth, its an “integrated resort comprising entertainment, retail, hotel and gaming facilities” located in Macau (that’s China, people). The project has made it past Phase I of construction but has stalled out there: the rest of the project will require several more years. In October 2018, the company IPO’d 28.75mm American Depository Shares at $12.50/share.

To further capitalize the project, two of the debtors, as co-issuers, issued $380mm of 10.625% PIK Notes in 2013 due May 2019. Curious to know how 10.625% PIK adds up? The current principal balance of the notes is now $856mm.

Now, not to state the obvious, but to paydown Notes on maturity, you kinda need to have some moolah. And considering that the project is only past Phase I with much more work to do…well, you see where we are going here. The company notes:

The Debtors’ ability to satisfy their obligations under the Notes is directly tied to the development and success of the Studio City project. Due to delays in the development of the Studio City project, a reduced allocation of gaming tables from the government, and some unanticipated declines in the Macau gaming market, the Investment has not yet achieved sufficient market value in light of the highly illiquid and unreliable market conditions that have developed following the IPO, making a refinancing impracticable. Therefore, through no fault of their own, the Debtors were unable to satisfy the Notes obligations by their maturity.

Listen guys: you ain’t getting Matt Damon, George Clooney and other whales at your tables if you don’t have VIP tables. Obvi. Second, it sounds like the project hired the quintessential New York City-based general contractor. “Yeah, sure, the project will cost $30mm and take 1 month” only to cost “an additional $300 million” and take literally years. Of course “[c]onstruction costs came in greater than expected.” Isn’t that par for the course in hotel development? The company now has until 2021 to finish Phase II of the project. It sounds like it will need it.

Of course, you have to admire the entrepreneurial enthusiasm:

Notwithstanding the aforementioned challenges, the Debtors believe that the Investment continues to represent a significant economic opportunity—the value of which is not accurately represented in the current market prices of the ADS. Indeed, should the Studio City project continue to develop on its currently anticipated timeframe, the Debtors expect the Investment to generate sufficient value to repay the Notes in full.

The debtors must NOT be expecting a downturn. Gaming usually doesn’t fare too well during one of those. And Chinese growth hasn’t exactly been at levels enjoyed over the last decade or so. But, fingers crossed.

The debtors are negotiating with an Ad Hoc Group of noteholders in an effort to address this state of affairs. They have latitude: Silver Point has committed to a $6.25mm DIP with, among other favorable terms to the debtors, no milestones and a 12-month maturity (with an option to extend a subsequent 12 months). This DIP was not marketed and so the early part of the case will be spent presumably searching for alternatives. Because lenders surely love the idea of providing a DIP, the main purpose of which is to pay Skadden Arps’ and the Ad Hoc Group’s fees.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $856mm (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Jay Goffman, Mark McDermott, Evan Hill)

    • Managing Member: Drivetrain Advisors LLC (John Brecker)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Beth Brownstein)

    • Sponsor: Silver Point Capital LP

New Chapter 11 Filing - Sungard Availability Services Capital Inc.

Sungard Availability Services Capital Inc.

May 1, 2019

Pennsylvania-based Sungard Availability Services Capital Inc., a provider of “critical production and recovery services to global enterprise companies,” with $977mm of net revenue and $203mm of EBITDA in fiscal 2018 filed a prepackaged chapter 11 plan in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday and, if you blinked, you may have missed its residency in bankruptcy. Indeed, some lost their minds because Kirkland & Ellis LLP was able to shepherd the case in and out of bankruptcy in less than 24 hours — breaking the previous record only recently set in FullBeauty. Yes, people care about these things.*

The upshot of this expeditious bankruptcy case is that (a) the company shed nearly $900mm of debt from its balance sheet (reducing debt down to approximately $400-450mm) and (b) transferred 89% ownership to a variety of debt-for-equity swapping funds such as GSO Capital Partners, Angelo Gordon & Co., and Carlyle Group (who will also receive $300mm in senior secured term loan paper). Major equity holders — Bain Capital Integral Investors LLC, Blackstone Capital Partners IV LP, Blackstone GT Communications Partners LP, KKR Millennium Fund LP, Providence Equity Partners V LP, Silver Lake Partners II LP, TPG Partners IV LP — had their equity wiped out. We had previously highlighted KKR’s investment here in “A Hot-Potato Plan of Reorganization. Short BDC Retail Exposure,” discussing the broader context of BDC lending. This is what the capital structure looks like and will look like:

Source: Disclosure Statement

Source: Disclosure Statement

That balance sheet is the driver behind the bankruptcy filing. Per the company:

This legacy capital structure was created based upon the Company’s historical operating model and performance and is unsustainable under current market conditions. When the capital structure was put in place, the Company benefited from a larger revenue base with substantially higher free cash flow. As business conditions evolved and the Company’s revenue declined, cash flow available to service debt and invest in products and services substantially declined. Consolidated net revenue declined by approximately 18% from approximately $1.2 billion in 2016 to approximately $977 million in 20188 while adjusted EBITDA margins remained within a range of approximately 20% to 22%. Negative net cash flow from 2016 to 2018 was approximately $80 million.

In other words, this is as clear-cut a balance sheet restructuring that you can get. Indeed, general unsecured claims are — as you might expect from a prepackaged plan of reorganization — riding through unimpaired. This consensual restructuring is clearly the right result. Getting it in and out of court so quickly is a bonus.

Yet, lest anyone get too high on their own supply, it’s important to note that, while this is a good result under the circumstances, there is a significant amount of value destruction illustrated by this filing. The term lenders are getting merely an estimated 50-73% recovery while the noteholders are getting 7-14%**. Now, it IS reasonable to expect that the “par guys” blew out of this situation long ago. And it is also reasonable to assume that the current holders of loans and notes got in at a significant discount so “value destruction” really is a matter of timing/pricing. For the avoidance of doubt, however, there’s no question that certain lenders experienced some pain on the path to this filing. Here is the chart representing the company’s notes:

Screen Shot 2019-05-03 at 11.12.24 AM.png

So, while some are surely celebrating, others are surely licking their wounds.

*We don’t really want to be too flip about this. As critics of the bankruptcy process, we’re all for seeing more efficient uses of the bankruptcy court — even if that does mean that fees were run up pre-petition without any oversight whatsoever.

**You always have to take these recovery amounts with a grain of salt. In case the rampant Chapter 22s haven’t already taught you that.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Ryan Blaine Bennett, Laura Krucks

    • Board of Directors: Darren Abrahamson, Patrick J. Bartels Jr., Randy Hendricks, John Park, David Treadwell

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Eric Koza)

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (Samuel Greene)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Secured Lender Group

      • Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Michael Cohen, Nicholas Morin)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Crossover Group

      • Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Large Equityholders: Bain Capital Integral Investors LLC, Blackstone Capital Partners IV LP, Blackstone GT Communications Partners LP, KKR Millennium Fund LP, Providence Equity Partners V LP, Silver Lake Partners II LP, TPG Partners IV LP

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Jacob Adlerstein)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Kona Grill Inc. ($KONA)

Kona Grill Inc.

April 30, 2019

Let’s be honest: we’ve given this sh*t stain of a company far too much coverage given its size. Yet, it’s part of a broader casual dining narrative that is important to follow and, significantly, we took it upon ourselves to highlight how this thing was SO CLEARLY headed towards bankruptcy a year ago considering the company is (somewhat inexplicably) publicly-traded ($KONA). We first mentioned it in this Members’-only piece in April 2018. We dug deeper in this Members’-only briefing on August 2018. Additional mentions came here, here, here (“…there is no way this thing DOESN’T end up in bankruptcy court soon. It just blew out its board. It is on to its umpteenth CEO in a matter of years. Revenues fell 15.7% in the most recent reported quarter. Same-store sales fell 14.1%. 14.1%!!!! It’s just a matter of ‘when’ at this point.”), and, finally, as recently as April 28, 2019, here, wherein we wrote “[s]tick a fork in it.

Well, stick a fork in it, indeed. The company and several affiliated companies are now chapter 11 debtors in the District of Delaware.

To refresh your recollection, the company is a casual dining restaurant chain with 27 locations (down from 40+ locations when we first started discussing the company over a year ago). “The restaurants feature contemporary American favorites, award-winning sushi and an extensive selection of alcoholic beverages.” Award winning sushi, huh? We did some googling and were unable to ascertain which fine organization conferred upon Kona Grill Inc. an award for its fine sushi. But we digress.

As you might expect from such a long-time-coming sh*t show, the debtors’ first day filing papers are pure comedy chock full of hyperbolic bull sh*t. It’s amusing what the debtors say and it’s laughable what they don’t say. The first day declaration reads like marketing materials: it states that the company offers “an upscale contemporary ambience” with an “exceptional” dining experience and a “legendary” happy hour. The fact that this company is in bankruptcy belies the claim that the experience is exceptional. As for legend, Arya Stark is a legend; Tony Stark is a legend. Michael Jordan is a legend. Kona Grill has a bar that serves drinks. We can assure you with 100% certainty that there is absolutely nothing legendary about it. Indeed, revenues in fiscal ‘18 were $156.9mm, down 12.4% YOY, and, as of the petition date, the company had a meaningfully non-legendary $1.2mm of cash on hand. Legendary, our a$$es.

The company is party to a $33.2mm credit agreement split between a revolving loan and a term loan and has been in a state of perpetual amendment since Q1 2017. The company also owes unsecured trade creditors $8mm.

Why is the company in bankruptcy? Here’s where we get comedy by omission. Yes, sure, they acknowledge that they doubled their restaurants between ‘13 and ‘17, spent a ton on marketing to reverse negative same-store sale trends, and then engaged in an ill-advised stock repurchase program in 2016/2017, further draining much needed liquidity. Thereafter, the company was forced to deploy the standard playbook: cease opening new locations, shutter some underperforming stores (PETITION Note: the company filed a motion seeking to reject 18 leases already), fire people, cut back on training and staffing, etc. G-d help the people who actually ate there during this period: we can only imagine what happened to the food quality. What the company doesn’t say, though, is that there has been a revolving door of CEOs. We suppose the debtors ought to be commended for not completely throwing prior management teams under the bus. This may have something to do with active lawsuits between the company and a former CEO.

What’s crazy is that the company didn’t hire a banker until March 2019. This is a company that should have been marketed long ago. Notably, there’s no stalking horse buyer lined up. And while the company does have a commitment from KeyBank for $39.2mm of DIP financing (of which only $6mm is new money), the company also has a hard deadline of August 9, 2019 to avoid a default. Will it be able to find a buyer now?

We suppose we’ll find out how “legendary” things are after all.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $33.2mm

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (James O’Neill, John Lucas, Jeremy Richards)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Christopher Wells, Jonathan Tibus)

    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffrey

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: KeyBank National Association

      • Legal: Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC (Mary Caloway)

🎥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Fuse LLC (a/k/a Fuse Media)🎥

Fuse LLC

April 22, 2019

California-based Fuse LLC, a multicultural media company composed principally of the cable networks Fuse and FM, filed a prepackaged chapter 11 along with 8 affiliated debtors in the District of Delaware to effectuate a swap of $242mm of outstanding secured debt for $45mm in term loans (accruing at a STRONG 12% interest and maturing in five years), new membership interests in the reorganized company and interests in a litigation trust. General unsecured creditors will recover nothing despite being owed approximately $10mm to $25mm.

The company is well known to millions of US homes: approximately 61mm homes get Fuse, an independent cable network that targets young multicultural Americans and Latinos. FM’s music-centric content reached approximately 40.5mm homes “at its peak.” The company has three principal revenue streams: (a) affiliate fees; (b) advertising; and (c) sponsored events; it generated $114.7mm in net revenue for the fiscal year ended 12/31/18 and “had projected affiliate fees of approximately $495 million through 2020.

Why is it in bankruptcy? In a word, disruption. Disruption of content suppliers (here, Fuse) and content distributors (the traditional pay-tv companies). Compounding the rapid changes in the media marketplace is the company’s over-levered balance sheet, an albatross that hindered the company’s ability to innovate in an age of “peak TV” characterized by endless original and innovative content.

The company illustrates all of this nicely:

“…the overall pay-TV industry is in a period of substantial transformation as the result of the introduction into the marketplace in recent years of high quality and relatively inexpensive and consumer friendly content alternatives (e.g., Netflix, Hulu and others). The ongoing marketplace changes have resulted in, and will continue to cause, a material decline in pay-tv subscribers and related affiliate fee revenue as a result of a declining number of new subscribers, "cord-cutting" (the cancellation of an existing pay-tv subscription), and "cord-shaving" (the downgrading of a pay-tv subscription from a higher priced package to a lower priced package). Each quarter the Company receives less revenue from its traditional pay-tv distribution partners as the result of the decline in subscribers receiving the Company's networks. And new sources of revenue for the Company, although developing and in progress, have not grown sufficiently to offset revenue declines in the legacy business. As a result of these trends, the refinancing of the Company's debt was not viable.”

Said another way, on a macro level, Netflix Inc. ($NFLX), Amazon Inc’s ($AMZN) Prime service, Hulu ($DIS) and various other OTT services have taken a huge chunk out of conventional bundlers and now victims are shaking from the tree. On a more micro level, the company is subject to distribution agreements with pay-TV operators. The majority of agreements were guaranteed through 2020, representing contracted revenue estimated at approximately $495mm through 2020. But the company’s debt, however, prevented it from investing in programming, marketing and original content at the same pace as its rivals. Consequently, Comcast and Verizon Fios ($VZ)— which represent significant percentages of the debtors’ subscriber base and, in turn, revenue — stopped distributing Fuse at the end of 2018. Compounding matters, DirecTV recently notified the company that it, too, intended to terminate its distribution agreement with the debtors — which is now subject to litigation in California. Talk about a hat trick!!

The company intends to use cash collateral to finance its cases. If successful, the company will emerge from bankruptcy with a substantially reduced balance sheet, having cut its debt by approximately 80%. After de-levering, the company believes it…

“… will be better able to effectively support its core linear networks business, as well as pursue growth areas, such as virtual multichannel video programming distribution (e.g., YouTube TV and Hulu Live), advertising supported distribution (AVOD), and complementary areas such as live events and music festivals. The Company also will be well-positioned post-emergence to explore strategic transactions that can accelerate greater growth in new areas for stakeholders.”

We suspect Fuse won’t be the last content supplier to shake out from this evolution in the media space.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: $242mm 10.375% Senior Secured Notes due 2019

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski, Ira Kharasch, Maxim Litvak, James O’Neill)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Katzenstein)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Supporting Noteholders

      • Legal: Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP (Brad Scheler, Peter Siroka, Emil Buchman, Andrew Minear) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Michael Merchant)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Achaogen Inc.

Achaogen Inc.

April 15, 2019

Biopharma is where it’s at!!

San Francisco-based Achaogen Inc. ($AKAO) is the latest in a slate of biopharma debtors who have found their way into bankruptcy court — here, the District of Delaware. Achaogen is focused on “the development and commercialization of innovative antibiotic treatments against multi-drug resistant gram-negative infections.” To date, its operations have been centered around the discovery, development and commercialization of products, making it as far as clinical trials in certain instances. As if inspired by the fact that its filing came on the heels of the much-anticipated Game of Thrones (final) Season 8 premiere, the company colorfully notes its primary purpose:

Achaogen designed its lead product, ZEMDRI® (plazomicin), to fight what the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) calls a “nightmare bacteria” and has listed as the highest category threat of “urgent.” ZEMDRI can be used to treat patients who have limited or no alternative treatment options from infections with these nightmare bacteria. Even with its current financial situation, Achaogen continues to commercialize ZEMDRI, in part because Achaogen believes that ZEMDRI can save lives for patients who may literally have no alternative.

Nightmare bacteria!! Sheesh that’s chilling.

Even more chilling is the company’s discussion of gram-negative bacteria — found “everywhere, in virtually all environments on Earth that support life.” These bacteria are becoming increasingly resistant to common antibiotics. Achaogen calls this “a global crisis…we take for granted.” The company’s core (patented) product, ZEMDRI, is designed to “retain its effectiveness in killing these more resistant bacteria.” While ZEMDRI received FDA approval for IV-treatment of patients with complicated urinary tract infections in July 2018, the FDA rejected ZEMDRI for treatment of patients with bloodstream infections, citing a lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness.

What does the company have going for it? Again, as of July 2018, it has a commercially viable product in the United States. It also has global commercialization rights. And patent protect in the US through approximately 2031 or 2032. It sells to either specialty distributors or physician-owned infusion centers. It has agreements with Hovione Limited and Pfizer for the manufacturing of its product. Finally, it has another product in development, C-Scape, which is an oral antibiotic for treatment of patients suffering from urinary tract infections caused by a particular bacteria.

So, what’s the issue? As PETITION readers have come to learn, the development and manufacture of biopharma products is a time and capital intensive process. Indeed, the company has an accumulated deficit of $559.4mm as of December 31, 2018. This bit is especially puzzling given the company’s position that the world confronts a “global crisis”:

In the past year, there has been a dramatic downturn in the availability of financing from both the debt and equity markets for companies in the anti-infective field, based in part on the withdrawal from the space by certain large pharmaceutical companies. For example, Novartis recently announced that it is shutting down its antibacterial and antiviral research, which was followed by similar moves from Eli Lilly, Bristol-Myers Squibb and AstraZeneca.3 Allergan has also recently announced its intention to divest its anti-infective business, consisting of three commercialized products. This “big pharma flight” from antiinfective research, development and commercialization has created significant challenges for early-stage biotech companies seeking to develop and commercialize novel and much needed drugs in this sector, as opportunities for partnerships, joint R&D relationships, and merger/acquisition transactions have diminished. This sector-wide trend has negatively affected not just Achaogen but many of its competitors. Achaogen, however, has been especially impacted because it has reached the point in its life cycle where it needs substantial capital infusion to drive commercialization of its recently FDA approved drug, ZEMDRI.

Look: we don’t take everything debtors say as gospel. After all, first day pleadings are an opportunity to frame the story and set the tone of a case. But if the company is right about what it’s saying and nobody appears to give two sh*ts, well, color us a wee bit concerned. Why isn’t anybody talking about this?

Anyway, in February 2018, the company entered into a loan and security agreement with Silicon Valley Bank for $50mm. The original agreement provided SVB with a security interest in virtually all of the company’s assets — including proceeds of intellectual property — but not a security interest in the IP itself. $15mm remains outstanding under the loan. In November 2018, the company retained Evercore Group LLP to run a strategic sale process but no viable purchaser emerged. It’s not worth saving the world unless you can make some dinero, we suppose.

After engaging in various liquidity maximization efforts (including job cuts), fundraising initiatives (including an insufficient equity raise), and licensing discussions with entities abroad, the company ultimately decided that nothing would generate enough liquidity for the company to avoid chapter 11. The company notes, “although Achaogen’s out-of-court sale process did not yield any acceptable bids, many parties had expressed interest in bidding at any potential 363 auction sale, where it could pursue the Assets free and clear of existing liabilities.” The company, therefore, filed for chapter 11 to pursue a new sale process; it has no stalking horse bidder teed up. To market its assets, the company has replaced Evercore with Cassel Salpeter & Co. LLC.

In support of the bankruptcy case, SVB committed to provide the company with a $25mm DIP credit facility of which $10mm is new money and $15mm is a roll-up of the aforementioned pre-petition debt. In exchange, SVB now gets a security interest in the company’s IP.

The company’s unsecured debt is comprised of lease obligations, minimum purchase requirements under its manufacturing contract, a success fee tied to the company’s FDA approval, and $18.7mm of trade debt. New Enterprise Associates Inc., a reputed Silicon Valley venture capital firm, is the company’s largest equity holder with approximately 10.76% of the company’s shares. Prior to its 2014 IPO, the company had raised $152.1mm starting with its Series A round in August 2004: it IPO’d at a valuation of $200.4mm, having issued 6.9mm shares at $12/share to the public. It’s equity is likely worth f*ck all. Well, not exactly: we suppose this isn’t ENTIRELY “f*ck all”:

Screen Shot 2019-04-15 at 2.48.04 PM.png

But it’s pretty darn close. Now the issue is what price the IP will fetch in a bankruptcy sale process. It will have to be tens of millions of dollars for NEA to have any sort of recovery.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

  • Capital Structure: $15mm secured debt (Silicon Valley Bank)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Erin Brady, Richard Wynne, Christopher Bryant, John Beck) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Andrew Remming, Matthew Talmo, Paige Topper)

    • Financial Advisor: Meru LLC

    • Investment Banker: Cassel Salpeter & Co., LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Professionals:

    • Prepetition & DIP Lender ($25mm): Silicon Valley Bank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP ( Alexander Rheaume, Todd Goren, Benjamin Butterfield, David Ephraim) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Stacy Newman)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Hovione Limited, EsteveQuimica SA, Solar Capital Ltd.,. Crystal BioScience, World Courier)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jones Energy Inc.⛽️

Jones Energy Inc.

April 14, 2019

Austin-based independent oil and natural gas E&P company, Jones Energy Inc., filed a prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy to restructure its $1.009b of debt ($450mm senior secured first lien notes and $559mm unsecured notes across two tranches). In case you didn’t realize, oil and gas exploration and production is a capital intensive business.

The company operates primarily in the Anadarko Basin in Oklahoma and Texas. Its territory is the aggregation of acreage accumulated over the years, including the 2009 purchase of Crusader Energy Group Inc. out of bankruptcy for $240.5mm in cash.

We’re not going to belabor the point as to why this company is in bankruptcy: the narrative is no different than most other oil and gas companies that have found their way into bankruptcy court over the last several years. Indeed, this chart about sums things up nicely:

Screen Shot 2019-04-05 at 2.29.01 PM.png

It’s really just a miracle that it didn’t file sooner. Why hadn’t it? Per the company:

…the Debtors consummated a series of liquidity enhancing transactions, including equity raises, debt repurchases, strategic acquisitions, non-core asset sales, and modifications of their operations to reduce their workforce and drilling activities. This included a Company-wide headcount reduction in 2016 resulting in the termination of approximately 30% of the Debtors’ total workforce, as well as halting drilling activity spanning several months during the worst of the historic commodity downturn.

But…well…the debt. As in, there’s too much of it.

Screen Shot 2019-04-05 at 2.56.24 PM.png

And debt service costs were too damn high. In turn, the company’s securities traded too damn low:

Source: Disclosure Statement

Source: Disclosure Statement

What’s more interesting here is the process that unfolded. In February 2018, the company issued $450mm of 9.25% ‘23 senior secured first lien notes. The proceeds were used to repay the company’s senior secured reserve-based facility and eliminate the restrictive covenants contained therein. The company also hoped to use the proceeds to repurchase some of its senior unsecured notes at a meaningful discount to par. In a rare — yet increasingly common — show of unity, however, the company’s unsecured lenders thwarted these efforts by binding together pursuant to a “cooperation agreement” and telling the company to take its pathetic offer and pound sand. (PETITION Note: its amazing what lenders can achieve if they can solve for a collective action problem). This initiated a process that ultimately led to the transaction commemorated in the company’s announces restructuring support agreement.

So what now? The senior secured lenders will equitize their debt and come out with 96% of the common stock in the reorganized entity. Holders of unsecured debt will get 4% equity and warrants (exercisable for up to a 15% ownership stake in the reorganized company), both subject to dilution by equity issued to management under a “Management Incentive Plan.” The company has a commitment for $20mm of exit financing lined up (with the option for replacement financing of up to $150mm).

Hopefully the company will have better luck without the albatross of so much debt hanging over it.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge TBD)

  • Capital Structure: $450mm 9.25% ‘23 senior secured first lien notes (UMB Bank NA), $559mm 6.75% ‘22 and 9.25% ‘23 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Christopher Marcus, Brian Schartz, Anthony Grossi, Ana Rotman, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Mark McKane, Brett Newman, Kevin Chang) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)

    • Independent Directors: Tara Lewis, L. Spencer Wells

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Ryan Omohundro)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Daniel Aronson)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck, Michael Price) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, Genevieve Graham)

      • Financial Advisor: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Holders

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Benjamin Schak) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Charlie Beckham, Kelli Norfleet)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Metalmark Capital LLC

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Andrew Geppert, David Meyer, Jessica Peet, Michael Garza)

Updated 4/15/19 2:05 CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - Hexion Holdings LLC

Hexion Holdings LLC

April 1, 2019

What we appreciate that and, we hope thanks to PETITION, others will eventually come to appreciate, is that there is a lot to learn from the special corporate law, investment banking, advisory, and investing niche labeled “restructuring” and “distressed investing.” Here, Ohio-based Hexion Holdings LLC is a company that probably touches our lives in ways that most people have no knowledge of: it produces resins that “are key ingredients in a wide variety of industrial and consumer goods, where they are often employed as adhesives, as coatings and sealants, and as intermediates for other chemical applications.” These adhesives are used in wind turbines and particle board; their coatings prevent corrosion on bridges and buildings. You can imagine a scenario where, if Washington D.C. can ever get its act together and get an infrastructure bill done, Hexion will have a significant influx of revenue.

Not that revenue is an issue now. It generated $3.8b in 2018, churning out $440mm of EBITDA. And operational performance is on the upswing, having improved 21% YOY. So what’s the problem? In short, the balance sheet is a hot mess.* Per the company:

“…the Debtors face financial difficulties. Prior to the anticipated restructuring, the Debtors are over nine times levered relative to their 2018 adjusted EBITDA and face annual debt service in excess of $300 million. In addition, over $2 billion of the Debtors’ prepetition funded debt obligations mature in 2020. The resulting liquidity and refinancing pressures have created an unsustainable drag on the Debtors and, by extension, their Non-Debtor Affiliates, requiring a comprehensive solution.”

This is what that capital structure looks like:

Screen Shot 2019-04-01 at 12.28.48 PM.png
Screen Shot 2019-04-01 at 12.29.02 PM.png

(PETITION Note: if you’re wondering what the eff is a 1.5 lien note, well, welcome to the party pal. These notes are a construct of a frothy high-yield market and constructive readings of credit docs. They were issued in 2017 to discharge maturing notes. The holders thereof enjoy higher priority on collateral than the second lien notes and other junior creditors below, but slot in beneath the first lien notes).

Anyway, to remedy this issue, the company has entered into a support agreement “that enjoys the support of creditors holding a majority of the debt to be restructured, including majorities within every tier of the capital structure.” The agreement would reduce total funded debt by $2b by: (a) giving the first lien noteholders $1.45b in cash (less adequate protection payments reflecting interest on their loans), and 72.5% of new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering at a significant discount to a total enterprise value of $3.1b; and (b) the 1.5 lien noteholders, the second lien noteholders and the unsecured noteholders 27.5% of the new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering. The case will be funded by a $700mm DIP credit facility.

*Interestingly, Hexion is a derivative victim of the oil and gas downturn. In 2014, the company was selling resin coated sand to oil and gas businesses to the tune of 8% of sales and 28% of segment EBITDA. By 2016, segment EBITDA dropped by approximately $150mm, a sizable loss that couldn’t be offset by other business units.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Andrew Parlan, Hugh Murtagh, Caroline Reckler, Jason Gott, Lisa Lansio, Blake Denton, Andrew Sorkin, Christopher Harris) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Amanda Steele, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Managers: Samuel Feinstein, William Joyce, Robert Kaslow-Ramos, George F. Knight III, Geoffrey Manna, Craig Rogerson, Marvin Schlanger, Lee Stewart

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

    • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders (Angelo Gordon & Co. LP, Aristeia Capital LLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Beach Point Capital Management LP, Capital Research and Management Company, Citadel Advisors LLC, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, DoubleLine Capital LP, Eaton Vance Management, Federated Investment Counseling, GoldenTree Asset Management LP, Graham Capital Management LP, GSO Capital Partners LP, Heyman Enterprise LLC, Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management LLC, OSK VII LLC, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Silver Rock Financial LP, Sound Point Capital Management LP, Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP, UBS Securities LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Daniel Fisher, Naomi Moss, Abid Qureshi)

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Noteholders (Aegon USA Investment Management LLC, Aurelius Capital Master Ltd., Avenue Capital Management II LP, Avenue Europe International Management, Benefit Street Partners LLC, Cyrus Capital Partners LP, KLS Diversified Asset Management LLC, Loomis Sayles & Company LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, New Generation Advisors LLC, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP)

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Samuel Khalil, Matthew Brod)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group of 1.5 Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Jones Day (Sidney Levinson, Jeremy Evans)

    • Pre-petition RCF Agent & Post-petition DIP Agent ($350mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

    • Trustee under the First Lien Notes: U.S. Bank NA

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Kristin Elliott) & (local) Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

    • Trustee of 1.5 Lien Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP

    • Trustee of Borden Indentures: The Bank of New York Mellon

    • Sponsor: Apollo

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Agrium US, Inc.; The Bank of New York Mellon; Mitsubishi Gas Chemical America; PVS Chloralkali, Inc.; Southern Chemical Corporation; Wilmington Trust; Wilmington Savings Fund Society; and Blue Cube Operations LLC

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Kenneth Eckstein, Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer) & (local) Bayard PA (Scott Cousins, Erin Fay, Gregory Flasser)

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Samuel Star)

Updated:

🚽New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Orchids Paper Products Company🚽

Orchids Paper Products Company

April 1, 2019

We first wrote about Orchids Paper Products Company ($TIS) back in November 2018 in “🚽More Trouble in Paper-Ville (Short A$$-Wipes)🚽.” It is a piece worth revisiting because it sums up the situation rather nicely. We wrote:

Orchids Paper Products Company ($TIS) is a Okahoma-based producer of bulk tissue paper which is later converted into finished products like paper towels, toilet paper and paper napkins; it sells its products for use in the “at home” market under private label to dollar stores, discount retailers and grocery stores. Its largest customers include the likes of Dollar General Corp. ($DG)Walmart Inc. ($WMT) and Family Dollar/Dollar Tree, which, combined, account for over 60% of the company’s sales. Given the rise of the dollar stores and discount retailers and the rise in private label generally, you’d think that this company would be killing it. Spoiler alert: it’s not. In fact, it is, by definition, insolvent.

And:

This company doesn’t produce enough toilet paper to wipe away this sh*tfest. See you in bankruptcy court.

And that’s precisely where they (and affiliates) are now — in the District of Delaware.

And the story hasn’t really changed: the debtors still struggle from operational issues related to their facilities, too much competition (causing margin compression and loss of pricing power), rising input costs, and customer defections. To make matters worse, given the debtors’ deteriorating financial position, raw materials suppliers reduced credit terms given the debtors’ public reporting of its troubles. Consequently, virtually all of the debtors’ financial metrics got smoked. Gross profit? Smoked. Cash flow? Smoked. Net income? Smoooooooked.

Speaking of “smooooooked,” the company twice notes its termination of their investment banker, Guggenheim Securities. Bankers get replaced all of the time: not entirely sure why they felt the need to make such an issue of it here. That said, Guggenheim apparently marketed the company for months without finding a prospective buyer that would clear the debt. The company, therefore, hired Houlihan Lokey ($HL) to market the company. The result? They couldn’t find a buyer that would clear the debt. Nothing like paying a new banker AND presumably paying some sort of tail to your old banker just to end up with your pre-petition secured lender as your stalking horse bidder (and DIP lender)! Sheesh.

As we said, “[t]his company doesn’t produce enough toilet paper to wipe away this sh*tfest.”

  • Jurisdiction: (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: $187.3mm RCF/TL (Ankura Trust Company, L.L.C.), $11.1mm New Market Tax Loan

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Shanti Katona, Jerry Switzer Jr.)

    • Board of Directors: Steven Berlin, John Guttilla, Douglas Hailey, Elaine MacDonald, Mark Ravich, Jeffrey Schoen

    • Financial Advisor: Deloitte Transactions and Business Analytics LLP (Richard Infantino)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Large Equityholder: BML Investment Partners LP

    • Prepetition RCF Admin Agent: Ankura Trust Company

    • DIP Admin Agent: Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLC

    • DIP Lender: Orchids Investment LLC

      • Legal: Winston & Strawn LLP (Daniel McGuire) & (local) Fox Rothschild LLP (Seth Niederman)

    • Stalking Horse Bidder

      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Kimberly Debeers, Ron Meisler)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Mary Seymour) & CKR Law (David Banker)

Updated 5/18

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Southcross Energy Partners LP⛽️

Southcross Energy Partners LP

April 1, 2019

We’ve been noting — in “⛽️Is Oil & Gas Distress Back?⛽️“ (March 6) and “Oil and Gas Continues to Crack (Long Houston-Based Hotels)“ (March 24) that oil and gas was about to rear its ugly head right back into bankruptcy court. Almost on cue, Vanguard Natural Resources Inc. filed for bankruptcy in Texas on the last day of Q1 and, here, Southcross Energy Partners LP kicked off Q2.

Dallas-based Southcross Energy Partners LP is a publicly-traded company ($SXEE) that provides midstream services to nat gas producers/customers, including nat gas gathering, processing, treatment and compression and access to natural gas liquid (“NGL”) fractionation and transportation services; it also purchases and sells nat gas and NGL; its primary assets and operations are located in the Eagle Ford shale region of South Texas, though it also operates in Mississippi (sourcing power plants via its pipelines) and Alabama. It and its debtor affiliates generated $154.8mm in revenues in the three months ended 09/30/18, an 11% YOY decrease.

Why are the debtors in bankruptcy? Because natural gas prices collapsed in 2015 and have yet to really meaningfully recover — though they are up from the $1.49 low of March 4, 2016. As we write this, nat gas prices at $2.70. These prices, combined with too much leverage (particularly in comparison to competitors that flushed their debt through bankruptcy) and facility shutdowns, created strong headwinds the company simply couldn’t surmount. It now seeks to use the bankruptcy process to gain access to much needed capital and sell to a buyer to maximize value. The company does not appear to have a stalking horse bidder lined up.

The debtors have a commitment for $137.5mm of new-money post-petition financing to fund its cases. Use of proceeds? With the agreement of its secured parties, the debtors seek to pay all trade creditors in the ordinary course of business. If approved by the court, this would mean that the debtors will likely avoid having to contend with an official committee of unsecured creditors and that only the secured creditors and holders of unsecured sponsor notes would have lingering pre-petition claims — a strong power move by the debtors.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: $81.1mm funded ‘19 RCF (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $430.875mm ‘21 TL (Wilmington Trust NA), $17.4mm unsecured sponsor notes (Wells Fargo NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Darren Klein, Steven Szanzer, Benjamin Schak) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Andrew Remming, Joseph Barsalona II, Eric Moats)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition RCF & Unsecured Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Brad Foxman, Matt Pyeatt) & (local) Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Ericka Johnson)

    • Prepetition TL & DIP Agent ($255mm): Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Seth Kleinman, Alan Glantz)

    • Post-Petition Lenders and Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Joseph Minias, Paul Shalhoub, Leonard Klingbaum, Debra McElligott) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Matthew Lunn)

    • Southcross Holdings LP

      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Natasha Labovitz)

    • Stalking Horse Bidder:

Updated 9:39 CT

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Vanguard Natural Resources Inc.⛽️

Vanguard Natural Resources Inc.

March 31, 2019

It’s raining SCARLET 22s! Freefall!! We still STILL have a feasibility problem!!!

Vanguard Natural Resources Inc. ($VNRR) and affiliated debtors find themselves in bankruptcy court again — the second time in nearly exactly two years (its predecessor confirmed a plan of reorganization in July 2017). And they do so in crash and burn fashion: while discussions have been happening over the last several weeks with various constituencies within the company’s capital structure, the company has no deal agreed to — merely the outlines of a restructuring term sheet. This is curious given that, under the company’s proposed DIP credit facility ($130mm, of which $65mm is new money), the company has a mere 30 days from the petition date to file a plan of reorganization and must emerge from chapter 11 within 120 days. Send hopes and prayers to the Kirkland attorneys working on this one over the next few weeks.

The debtors are an oil and natural gas company with production and development activity in the Rocky Mountain, Mid-Continent, Gulf Coast and West Texas regions of the United States; they operate in eight states across nine geologic basins. They are a remnant of the first bankruptcy which saw the predecessor entity shed $850mm of debt and wipe out the existing equity. The current capital structure looks like this:

Screen Shot 2019-04-01 at 1.26.16 PM.png

The second lien noteholders include Fir Tree Capital Management LP and York Capital Management Global Advisors LLC. And the company’s equity holders are:

Source: Chapter 11 Petition

Source: Chapter 11 Petition

This is another pretty cut and dry oil and gas bankruptcy given where oil and natural gas prices are. Many investors who took ownership of distressed E&P companies circa 2015-2017 were playing an option on oil and gas trading levels. That option is clearly out of the money.

Interestingly, that option was underwritten, in part, on the company’s projections. And, so, this statement by the company’s now-CEO was particularly intriguing to us and fits nicely within our recent general theme of inquiring as to whether the industry has a feasibility problem (see Paragon Offshore here, Gymboree here, and Payless here):

I understand that the Vanguard I Plan was predicated on various assumptions that ultimately did not materialize. As discussed further herein, it is my understanding that these may have included certain assumptions about: (a) commodity prices and basin differentials; (b) the pace and volume of divestments and the existence of valuable undeveloped resources to be sold; and (c) the expected returns on a number of capital investments pursued by Vanguard upon emergence—many of which have failed to come to full fruition and have challenged the Debtors’ liquidity over the last 18 months.

Former management, meet a big bad bus. You’ve just been thrown under it.

Under bus.gif

In fact, as if saying it wasn’t enough, the new CEO spared PETITION the trouble of having to dive into the 2017 filings to see just how badly these guys botched their liquidity projections:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

The following compounded matters: (a) mismanagement of the company’s hedge book, (b) borrowing base redeterminations, (c) refi roadshows met with “tepid” interest, (d) a series of asset sales that failed to live up to expectations — both in terms of time to completion and proceeds, and (e) capital investments that “delivered lower economic returns than expected.” It’s almost as if distressed investors who sit on boards of directors and hire their own operators have absolutely no effing clue how to run an oil and gas company. Who knew?

And so the company came dangerously close to tripping a series of covenants. That’s when the company brought in Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Evercore Group LLC and re-engaged Opportune LLP to help the company. The various advisors engaged in a number of processes that would have provided the company with crucial liquidity — including new financing, bank facility amendments and various discreet asset sales. But all prospective parties quickly realized that the assets…well…for lack of a better description…kinda, like, suck.

And so nothing could get done. Well, other than the company obtaining a commitment for $130mm of DIP financing to fund the cases (of which only $65mm is new money). What happens from here will be interesting to watch. Suffice it to say, distressed-investors-cum-oil-and-gas-owners are learning a ROUGH lesson.

And, once again, we have to ask whether company projections ought to get a bit more scrutiny than they have to date.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: $677.7mm RCF and $123.4mm TL (Citibank NA), $80.7mm second lien notes (Delaware Trust Company)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Christopher Marcus, Brian Schartz, Aparna Yenamandra, Richard Howell, Yates French, Kent Hayden, Timothy Bow, James Fedell, Allyson Smith Weinhouse) & (local) Blank Rome LLP (James Grogan, Philip Guffy)

    • Board of Directors: Randall Albert, Patrick Bartels Jr., W. Greg Dunlevy, Joseph Hurliman Jr., Andrew Schultz, R. Robert Sloan, L. Spencer Wells

    • Financial Advisor: Opportune LLP

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent ($130mm, $65mm New Money): Citibank NA

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Mitchell Seider, Annemarie Reilly, Adam Malatesta) & (local) Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Timothy Davidson II, Joseph Rovira)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Stark, Steven Pohl, Justin Cunningham, Alexander Fraser) & (local) Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Patricia Tomasco)

    • Second Lien Ad Hoc Group (Fir Tree Capital Management LP, York Capital Management Global Advisors LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Benjamin Schak) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Locke Lorde LLP (Philip Eisenberg)

      • Restructuring Advisor: Parkman Whaling LLC (Thomas B. Hensley Jr.)

      • Financial Advisor: The Claro Group LLC (Douglas Brickley)

Updated 5/10 at 12:25pm (#48)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Sizmek Inc.

Sizmek Inc.

March 29, 2019

New York-based Sizmek Inc., an online advertising campaign management and distribution platform for advertisers, media agencies, and publishers, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company indicates that it lost access to capital when Cerberus Business Finance LLC…took control of the Company's bank accounts and sought to divert customer receivables…” and filed, in large part, to have access to its lenders’ cash collateral. Major creditors include players in the ad world, including Google Inc. ($GOOGL), Facebook Inc. ($FB) and AOL ($VZ)(yes, AOL is still, technically, a “player” in something).

The company is a portfolio company of private equity firm, Vector Capital, which took the company private — merely two years after its IPO — via a 2016 all-cash tender offer for the outstanding shares of common stock for $3.90/share, a 65% premium over the then-30-day weighted average trading price. Kirkland & Ellis LLP represented Vector in the transaction.* In 2017, the company made a $145mm acquisition of Rocket Fuel, another struggling adtech company. And then shortly thereafter, AdExchanger reported merely two years later that Vector was looking to divest the company.

We’ll have more on this once the docket is updated.

*Interestingly, after filing, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP replaced Kirkland & Ellis LLP as debtors’ counsel in these cases.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $172mm funded debt

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Stephen Hessler, Marc Kieselstein, Justin Bernbrock)

    • Replacement Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Steven Reisman, Cindi Giglio, Jerry Hall, Peter Siddiqui)

    • Board of Directors: Eugene Davis, Mark Grether, Tom Smith, Marc Heimowitz

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Secured Agent: Cerberus Business Finance LLC

      • Legal: Klee Tuchin Bogdanoff & Stern LLP (David Fidler, Whitman Holt, Michael Tuchin, Thomas Patterson)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Cooley LLP (Seth Van Aalten, Michael Klein, Robert Winning, Lauren Reichardt)

      • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. (Carol Cabello)

Updated 4/1/19 6:08 CT (#10)

🚁New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - PHI Inc.🚁

PHI Inc.

March 15, 2019

It’s pretty rare to see a company affected by macro factors in two industries. And, yet, Louisiana-based PHI Inc. ($PHI) and four affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the Northern District of Texas, marking the fourth bankruptcy fallout in the helicopter services space following Waypoint LeasingErickson Incorporated and CHC Group. The company is a leading provider of transportation services to both the oil and gas industry (including, for example, Shell Oil CompanyBP America Production CompanyExxonMobil Production Co.ConocoPhillips CompanyENI Petroleum and the recently-bankrupt Fieldwood Energyand the medical services industry. It operates 238 aircraft, 213 which are company-owned and 119 of which are dedicated to oil and gas operations and 111 of which are dedicated to medical services. The company generated $675mm in revenue in 2018 — with much of that revenue coming from fixed-term contracts.

The company strongly asserts that operational failures are not a cause of its bankruptcy — a clear cut message to the market which might otherwise be concerned about safety and reliability. The issue here, the company notes, is the balance sheet, especially a March 15 2019 maturity of the company’s $500mm in unsecured notes. Despite alleged efforts to address this maturity with the company’s (fresh out of the womb) secured term loan holder and an ad hoc group of unsecured noteholders, the company was unable to do so.

The broader issue, however, is that the industry may be ripe for consolidation. Back in 2017, the company acquired the offshore business of HNZ Group Inc. This transaction expanded the company’s capacity to more international geographies. But given the dearth of offshore oil and gas production activity of late and intense competition in the space, there might be a need for more industry-wide M&A. The company notes:

As a result of this prolonged cyclical downturn in the industry, oil and gas exploration projects have been reduced significantly by the Company’s customers. Indeed, many customers have significantly reduced the number of helicopters used for their operations and have utilized this time instead to drive major changes in their offshore businesses, which have in turn drastically reduced revenues to PHI’s O&G business segment in the Gulf of Mexico. And while the price of crude oil slowly began to recover in 2018, the volatility in the market continues to drive uncertainty and negatively impact the scope and volume of services requested from service providers such as PHI.

This is simple supply and demand:

The effect of the downturn in the oil and gas industry has been felt by nearly all companies in the helicopter service industry. The downturn created an oversaturation of helicopters in the market, significantly impacting service companies’ utilization and yields. Indeed, this domino effect on the industry has required helicopter operators, like their customers, to initiate their own cost-cutting measures, including reducing fleet size and requesting rental reductions on leased aircraft.

Had these issues been isolated to the oil and gas space, the company would not have been in as bad shape considering that 38% of its revenue is attributable to medical services. But that segment also experienced trouble on account of…:

…weather-related issues and delays, changes in labor costs, and an increase in patients covered by Medicare and Medicaid (as opposed to commercial insurers), which resulted in slower and reduced collections, given that reimbursement rates from public insurance are significantly lower than those from commercial insurers or self-pay.

Compounding matters are laws and regulations that prohibit the debtors from refusing service to patients who are unable to pay. This creates an inherently risky business model dynamic. And it hindered company efforts to sell the business line to pay down debt.

Taken together, these issues are challenging enough. Tack on $700mm of debt, the inability to refi out its maturity, AND the inability to corral lenders to agree on a consensual deleveraging (which included a failed tender offer) and you have yet another freefall helicopter bankruptcy. Now the company will leverage the bankruptcy “breathing spell” and lower voting thresholds provided by the Bankruptcy Code to come to an agreement with its lenders on a plan of reorganization.

*****

That is, if agreement can be had. Suffice it to say, things were far from consensual in the lead up to (and at) the first day hearing in the case. To point, the Delaware Trust Companyas trustee for the senior unsecured notes, filed an objection to the company’s CASH MANAGEMENT motion because…well…there is no DIP Motion to object to. “Why is that,” you ask? Good question…

The debtors levered up their balance sheet in the lead-up to PHI’s well-known maturity. The debtors replaced their ABL in September with the $130mm term loan provided by Al Gonsoulin, the company’s CEO, Board Chairman and controlling shareholder. Thereafter — and by “thereafter,” we mean TWO DAYS BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY FILING — the company layered another $70mm of secured debt onto the company, encumbering previously unencumbered aircraft and granting Mr. Gonsoulin a second lien. This is some savage balance sheet wizardry that has the effect of (a) priming the unsecured creditors and likely meaningfully affecting their recoveries and (b) securing Mr. Gonsoulin’s future with the company (and economic upside). Making matters worse, the trustee argues that the company made no real effort to shop the financing nor actively engage with the ad hoc committee of noteholders on the terms of a financing or restructuring; it doesn’t dispute, however, that the company had $70mm of availability under its indenture.

So what happened next? Over the course of a two day hearing, witnesses offered testimony about the pre-petition negotiations and financing process (or lack thereof) — again, in the context of a cash management motion. We love when sh*t gets creative! The lawyers for the company and the trustee hurled accusations and threats, the CEO was called a “patriot” (how, even if true, that is applicable to this context is anyone’s guess), and, ultimately, the judge didn’t care one iota about any of the trustee’s witness testimony and blessed the debtors’ motion subject to the company providing the trustee with weekly financial reporting. In other words, while this routine first day hearing was anything but, the result was par for the course.

Expect more fireworks as the case proceeds. Prospective counsel to the eventual official committee of unsecured creditors is salivating as we speak.

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Hale)

  • Capital Structure: $130mm ‘20 senior secured term loan (Thirty Two LLC), $70mm secured term loan (Blue Torch Capital LP), $500 million ‘19 unsecured 5.25% senior notes

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: DLA Piper US LLP (Daniel Prieto, Thomas Califano, Daniel Simon, David Avraham, Tara Nair)

    • Legal (corporate): Jones Walker LLP

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Robert Del Genio, Michael Healy)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition TL & DIP Lender: Blue Torch Capital LP

    • Ad Hoc Committee of unsecured noteholders & Delaware Trust Company as Trustee for Senior Notes

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Andrew LeBlanc, Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil) & (local) Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Louis Strubeck Jr., Greg Wilkes)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP (Michael Genereaux)

    • Indenture trustee under the 5.25% Senior Notes due 2019 (Delaware Trust Company)

    • Thirty Two LLC

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Delaware Trust Company, Oaktree Capital Management LP, Q5-R5 Trading Ltd., Regions Equipment Finance Corp., Helicopter Support Inc.)

      • Legal:

    • Official Committee of Equity Security Holders

      • Legal: Levene Neale Bender Yoo & Brill LLP (David Golubnik, Eve Karasik) & (local) Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner)

      • Financial Advisor: Imperial Capital LLC (David Burns)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - F+W Media Inc.

F+W Media Inc.

March 10, 2019

WAAAAAAY back in September 2018, we highlighted in our Members’-only piece, “Online Education & ‘Community’ (Long Helen Mirren),” that esteemed author and professor Clayton Christensen was bullish about the growth of online education and bearish about colleges and universities in the US. We also wrote that Masterclass, a SF-based online education platform that gives students “access” to lessons from the likes of Helen Mirren(acting), Malcolm Gladwell (writing) and Ken Burns (documentary film making) had just raised $80mm in Series D financing, bringing its total fundraising to $160mm. Online education is growing, we noted, comporting nicely with Christensen’s thesis.

But we didn’t stop there. We counter-punched by noting the following:

Yet, not all online educational tools are killing it. Take F+W Media Inc., for instance. F+W is a New York-based private equity owned content and e-commerce company; it publishes magazines, books, digital products like e-books and e-magazines, produces online video, offers online education, and operates a variety of e-commerce channels that support the various subject matters it specializes in, e.g., arts & crafts, antiques & collectibles, and writing. Writer’s Digest is perhaps its best known product. Aspiring writers can go there for online and other resources to learn how to write.

For the last several years F+W has endeavored to shift from its legacy print business to a more digital operation; it is also beginning to show cracks. Back in January, the company’s CEO, COO and CTO left the company. A media and publishing team from FTI Consulting Inc. ($FTI) is (or at least was) embedded with new management. The company has been selling non-core assets (most recently World Tea Media). Its $125mm 6.5% first lien term loan due June 2019 was recently bid at 63 cents on the dollar (with a yield-to-worst of 74.8% — yields are inversely proportional to price), demonstrating, to put it simply, a market view that the company may not be able to pay the loan (or refinance the loan at or below the current economics) when it comes due.

Unlike MasterClass and Udacity and others, F+W didn’t start as an all-digital enterprise. The shift from a legacy print media business to a digital business is a time-consuming and costly one. Old management got that process started; new management will need to see it through, managing the company’s debt in the process. If the capital markets become less favorable and/or the business doesn’t show that the turnaround can result in meaningful revenue, the company could be F(+W)’d(emphasis added)

Nailed it.

On March 10, 2019, F+W Media Inc., a multi-media company owning and operating print and digital media platforms, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware along with several affiliated entities. We previously highlighted Writer’s Digest, but the company’s most successful revenue streams are its “Crafts Community” ($32.5mm of revenue in 2018) and “Artist’s Network” ($.8.7mm of revenue in 2018); it also has a book publishing business that generated $22mm in 2018. In terms of “master classes,” the bankruptcy papers provide an intimate look into just how truly difficult it is to transform a legacy print business into a digital multi-media business.

The numbers are brutal. The company notes that:

“In the years since 2015 alone, the Company’s subscribers have decreased from approximately 33.4 million to 21.5 million and the Company’s advertising revenue has decreased from $20.7 million to $13.7 million.”

This, ladies and gentlemen, reflects in concrete numbers, what many in media these days have been highlighting about the ad-based media model. The company continues:

Over the past decade, the market for subscription print periodicals of all kinds, including those published by the Company, has been in decline as an increasing amount of content has become available electronically at little or no cost to readers. In an attempt to combat this decline, the Company began looking for new sources of revenue growth and market space for its enthusiast brands. On or around 2008, the Company decided to shift its focus to e-commerce upon the belief that its enthusiast customers would purchase items from the Company related to their passions besides periodicals, such as craft and writing supplies. With its large library of niche information for its hobbyist customers, the Company believed it was well-positioned to make this transition.

What’s interesting is that, rather than monetize their “Communities” directly, the company sought to pursue an expensive merchandising strategy that required a significant amount of upfront investment. The company writes:

In connection with this new approach, the Company took on various additional obligations across its distribution channel, including purchasing the merchandise it would sell online, storing merchandise in leased warehouses, marketing merchandise on websites, fulfilling orders, and responding to customer service inquiries. Unfortunately, these additional obligations came at a tremendous cost to the Company, both in terms of monetary loss and the deterioration of customer relationships.

In other words, rather than compete as a media company that would serve (and monetize) its various niche audiences, the company apparently sought to use its media as a marketing arm for physical products — in essence, competing with the likes of Amazon Inc. ($AMZN)Walmart Inc. ($WMT) and other specialty hobbyist retailers. As if that wasn’t challenging enough, the company’s execution apparently sucked sh*t:

As a consequence of this shift in strategic approach, the Company was required to enter into various technology contracts which increased capital expenditures by 385% in 2017 alone. And, because the Company had ventured into fields in which it lacked expertise, it soon realized that the technology used on the Company’s websites was unnecessary or flawed, resulting in customer service issues that significantly damaged the Company’s reputation and relationship with its customers. By example, in 2018 in the crafts business alone, the Company spent approximately $6 million on its efforts to sell craft ecommerce and generated only $3 million in revenue.

Last we checked, spending $2 to make $1 isn’t good business. Well, unless you’re Uber or Lyft, we suppose. But those are transformative visionary companies (or so the narrative goes). Here? We’re talking about arts and crafts. 🙈

As if that cash burn wasn’t bad enough, in 2013 the company entered into a $135mm secured credit facility ($125mm TL; $10mm RCF) to fund its operations. By 2017, the company owed $99mm in debt and was in default of certain covenants (remember those?) under the facility. Luckily, it had some forgiving lenders. And by “forgiving,” we mean lenders who were willing to equitize the loan, reduce the company’s indebtedness by $100mm and issue a new amended and restated credit facility of $35mm (as well as provide a new $15mm tranche) — all in exchange for a mere 97% of the company’s equity (and some nice fees, we imagine). Savage!

As if the spend $2 to make $1 thing wasn’t enough to exhibit that management wasn’t, uh, “managing” so well, there’s this:

The Company utilized its improved liquidity position as a result of the Restructuring to continue its efforts to evolve from a legacy print business to an e-commerce business. However, largely as a result of mismanagement, the Company exhausted the entire $15 million of the new funding it received in the six (6) months following the Restructuring. In those six (6) months, the Company’s management dramatically increased spending on technology contracts, merchandise to store in warehouses, and staffing while the Company was faltering and revenue was declining. The Company’s decision to focus on e-commerce and deemphasize print and digital publishing accelerated the decline of the Company’s publishing business, and the resources spent on technology hurt the Company’s viability because the technology was flawed and customers often had issues with the websites.

What happened next? Well, management paid themselves millions upon millions of dollars in bonuses! Ok, no, just kidding but ask yourself: would you have really been surprised if that were so?? Instead, apparently the board of directors awoke from a long slumber and decided to FINALLY sh*tcan the management team. The board brought in a new CEO and hired FTI Consulting Inc. ($FTI) to help right the ship. They quickly discovered that the e-commerce channel was sinking the business (PETITION Note: this is precisely why many small startup businesses build their e-commerce platforms on top of the likes of Shopify Inc. ($SHOP) — to avoid precisely the e-commerce startup costs and issues F+W experienced here.).

Here is where you insert the standard operational restructuring playbook. Someone built out a 13-week cash flow model and it showed that the company was bleeding cash. Therefore, people got fired and certain discreet assets got sold. The lenders, of course, took some of those sale proceeds to setoff some of their debt. The company then refreshed the 13-week cash flow model and…lo and behold…it was still effed! Why? It still carried product inventory and had to pay for storage, it was paying for more lease space than it needed, and its migration of e-commerce to partnerships with third party vendors, while profitable, didn’t have meaningful enough margin (particularly after factoring in marketing expenses). So:

Realizing that periodic asset sales are not a long-term operational solution, the Company’s board requested alternative strategies for 2019, ranging from a full liquidation to selling a significant portion of the Company’s assets to help stabilize operations. Ultimately, the Company determined that the only viable alternative, which would allow it to survive while providing relief from its obligations, was to pursue a sale transaction within the context of a chapter 11 filing.

Greenhill & Co. Inc. ($GHL) is advising the company with respect to a sale of the book publishing business. FTI is handling the sale of the company’s Communities business. The company hopes both processes are consummated by the end of May and middle of June, respectively. The company secured an $8mm DIP credit facility to fund the cases.

And that DIP ended up being the source of some controversy at the First Day hearing. Yesterday morning, Judge Gross reportedly rebuked the lenders for seeking a 20% closing fee on the $8mm DIP; he suggested 10%. Per The Wall Street Journal:

Judge Gross said he didn’t want to play “chicken” with the lenders, but that he didn’t believe they should use the bankruptcy financing to recoup what they were owed before the chapter 11 filing.

Wow. Finally some activist push-back on excessive bankruptcy fees! Better late than never.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Kenneth Enos, Elizabeth Justison, Allison Mielke, Jared Kochenash)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Healy)

    • Investment Banker: Greenhill & Co.

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition & Postpetition DIP Agent ($8mm): Fortress Credit Co. LLC)

      • Legal: Halperin Battaglia Benzija LLP (Alan Halperin, Walter Benzija, Julie Goldberg) & (local) Bielili & Klauder LLC (David Klauder)

    • DIP Lenders: Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP, New F&W Media M Holdings Corp LLC, PBB Investments III LLC, CION Investment Corporation, Ellington Management Group, or affiliates thereof to be determined.

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (LSC Communications US, Inc. and Palm Coast Data LLC)

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Robert Hirsh, Jordana Renert) & (local) Morris James LLP (Eric Monzo, Brya Keilson)

      • Financial Advisor: B. Riley FBR (Adam Rosen)

Updated 4/23

New Chapter 11 Filing - CTI Foods LLC

CTI Foods LLC

March 10, 2019

CTI Foods LLC, a large independent provider of “custom food solutions” to major hamburger, sandwich and Mexican restaurant chains…wait, stop. “Custom food solutions"? Seriously? Does everything need to be made to sound technological these days? Homies produce hamburgers, cooked sausage patties, grilled chicken, shredded beef and chicken, fajita meat, ham, Philly steak, dry sausage, beans, soups, macaroni & cheese, chili, sauces, and other sheet pan and retail meals through seven production facilities; they service QSRs and fast casual restaurants, including four of the top six hamburger restaurant chains, four of the top six sandwich chains, and “the top Mexican restaurant chain.” Queremos Taco Bell?!? Anyway, that’s basically it: let’s not over-complicate matters.

In any event, lenders must love custom food solutions because they’ve offered a solution of their own…to the company’s balance sheet. The company filed a prepackaged bankruptcy in the District of Delaware with substantial numbers of holders of first lien and second lien term loans hopping on board in support of the plan of reorganization (though not enough second lien term lenders to establish a fully consensual plan by bankruptcy thresholds). The filing is predicated upon accomplishing the results set forth in this handy-dandy chart:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

Pursuant to the plan, the first lien term lenders will receive some take-back paper and equity in the reorganized company, the second lenders will either equitize or cancel all $140mm of second lien term loan claims and existing equity will get wiped out. Trade creditors will ride through unimpaired. The company has secured a $155mm DIP commitment, the proceeds of which will be used, in part, to take out the ABL, and provide liquidity to fund the cases. Remaining funds will roll into an exit facility for the company to use post-emergence from bankruptcy. Just one thing: the chart shows a $50mm exit ABL and yet the company’s papers note a new $110mm exit ABL. Insert confusion here. 🤔

Confusion aside, this is a real business: the debtors apparently generated $1.2b of revenue in 2018 (and $29mm of EBITDA). Unfortunately, the private equity bros realized that back in 2013 when Thomas H. Lee Partners and Goldman Sachs & Co. acquired it from Littlejohn & Co. LLC. Per the company, the “current capital structure is the result of organic growth coupled with…strategic acquisitions….” So, uh, the capital structure didn’t fund the sponsor-to-sponsor purchase? Or is that “organic growth?” We suspect the former because, well, private equity, right? Debt is their jam. Oh, and the intercreditor agreement dated June 28, 2013 — mere months after the transaction — reflects that the debt was in place then rather than subsequently added to finance “organic growth.”* This is why PE firms pay firms like Weil the big bucks: first-class subterfuge. But…busted!

A quick aside, buried in paragraph 55 of the First Day Declaration is a cursory statement about the Restructuring Committee’s investigation into the company PE overlords. The company states:

On November 20, 2018, the Restructuring Committee separately retained Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (“Katten”) as independent counsel. Specifically, the Restructuring Committee, with the assistance of Katten, conducted a thorough investigation into whether any potentially material claims or causes of action existed against directors, officers, or existing equity holders of the Debtors, including Goldman Sachs and T.H. Lee. Katten made extensive diligence requests to the Debtors, reviewed materials provided in response, interviewed several potential witnesses, and prepared a report for the Restructuring Committee evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of any such potential claims or causes of action. Ultimately, based on that investigation and the report prepared in connection therewith, the Restructuring Committee determined it was unlikely that any such meritorious claims or causes of action exist that ought to be pursued.

It’s a good thing trade is riding through: there likely won’t be an official committee of unsecured creditors to test this conclusion.

So, aside from the company-crushing transaction-induced debt placed on the company by its private equity overlords, why is the company in bankruptcy? Here’s where you really need to read between the lines: above we noted that the company “service[s] QSRs and fast casual restaurants, including four of the top six hamburger restaurant chains, four of the top six sandwich chains, and ‘the top Mexican restaurant chain.’” “Service” is the key word. We don’t see the word “exclusively” preceding it. Here’s the company:

CTI’s recent profitability decline is attributable in part to an increase in the number of protein processors in competitive segments of the food manufacturing and foodservice industries, which led to losses in customer shares and a decrease in new business for the Company. Simultaneously … the Company’s costs have increased over time. The combination of increased competition and increased costs resulted in lower volumes and narrower profit margins. (emphasis added)

Costs increased for a number of reasons — integration of new facilities, etc. — but the most disturbing one is food quality control. Per the company:

The Company’s profitability also suffered from food quality incidents in 2017 and 2018. Although the Company quickly identified and remedied the issues, those occurrences led to a loss of customer sales and to the incurrence of significant costs in remedying the situation and ensuring the integrity of products manufactured on a go-forward basis. These costs, albeit temporary, have collectively had a material impact on the Company’s recent profitability levels.

Yikes. That’s no bueno.

Now, there is some good news here. First, the company appears to have improved EBITDA in Q4 ‘18. Second, this plan is mostly consensual. And, third, the prepackaged nature of this plan will help the company accomplish their restructuring in a speedy six weeks, as planned. Food safety depends on it.

*$25mm of the principal amount of first lien term loans outstanding is attributable to a 2016 acquisition. To be fair.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure: see above.     

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Ronit Berkovich, Lauren Tauro, Clifford Carlson, David Li, Michael Godbe) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Jaime Luton Chapman, Shane Reil)

    • Legal to Restructuring Committee: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Kent Percy)

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners LLC (Karn Chopra)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Credit Agreement Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Andrew Kramer) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Jason Madron)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders & DIP Term Agent ($155mm): Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Michelle McGreal, Stephen Piraino) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Curtis Miller, Matthew Harvey)

    • ABL DIP & Exit Agent ($235mm): Barclays Bank PC

      • Legal: Sherman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Jason Madron)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Air Force Village West Inc. (d/b/a Altavita Village)

Air Force Village West Inc. (d/b/a Altavita Village)

March 10, 2019

Another day, another continuing care retirement community in bankruptcy. Here, Air Force Village West Inc. (d/b/a Altavita Village), a California non-profit corporation with 361 residents filed for bankruptcy in the Central District of California. We’ve covered how CCRCs operate in some recent bankruptcy filings (e.g., 😷New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Mayflower Communities Inc. (d/b/a The Barrington of Carmel)😷 and 😷New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - SQLC Senior Living Center at Corpus Christi Inc. (d/b/a Mirador)😷) and so we don’t necessarily see the point in repeating the business basics here. Suffice it to say: the CCRC business model requires some modifications. “The company has been operating at a loss and cannot pay its liabilities as they mature.” No sh*t.

Naturally, debt is part of the issue. The company owes $66mm in alleged secured indebtedness to its prepetition lenders; it has been in payment default since March 2017. The lenders subsequently sued for the appointment of a receiver and succeeded. After the receiver was in place, the receiver, the debtor and the lenders pursued a two-year sale process with two bankers (failed) and, then later, Cushman & Wakefield (“C&W”). C&W was able to locate a stalking horse bidder, Westmont Development LP, an affiliate of Westmont Living Inc., for a 363 sale of the debtor’s assets while in bankruptcy. In light of the fact that the company already pursued a robust sale process, it seeks to consummate the sale transaction by June 2019.

  • Jurisdiction: C.D. of California (Judge )

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Dentons US LLP (Samuel Maziel, Tania Moyron, Gary Marsh, Bryan Bates)

    • Investment Banker: Cushman & Wakefield US Inc.

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Z Gallerie LLC

Z Gallerie LLC

March 10, 2019

In January's "What to Make of the Credit Cycle. Part 25. (Long Warning Signs)," we discussed the leveraged loan market and, among many other things, highlighted the then-recent reports that KKR was planning to cut its leveraged loan exposure.

It seems pretty safe to say that this decision was partially informed by KKR's recent experience managing the $2b ex-Blackstone loan fund, Franklin Square Investment Corp. According to reporting by The Financial Times back in December, the Franklin Square fund (now FS-KKR Capital Corp) wrote down five loans between April and December last year. That must be lovely news for investors in the publicly-traded business development corporation ($FSK). Per the FT:

"Executives at Blackstone’s GSO credit arm approved the original loans. But KKR is now responsible for collecting the cash and assessing the loans’ value, and has taken a much gloomier view of their prospects. It has placed 28 percent of the portfolio on a list of deals that require close monitoring or are at risk of losing money, according to securities filings.  

'KKR is a formidable group, but they probably weren’t anticipating the losses that came forth in the GSO book,' said Finian O’Shea, an analyst who covers private credit funds for Wells Fargo."

Strangely, this is obviously good news for professionals with restructuring experience:

"KKR’s credit division has been hiring restructuring specialists to beef up a dedicated team charged with salvaging value from troubled investments — a move that executives there say was planned when the FS-KKR portfolio began to deteriorate. KKR declined to comment, as did the fund’s co-manager, Franklin Square Investments."

Those specialists might get increasingly busy. FSK owned, as of December 31, 2018, first lien loans in Acosta Inc. (written down by the BDC's board to "fair value" from $19.2mm to $11.8mm), Charlotte Russe (yikes), CTI Foods (which was written down by $900k), and Z Gallerie (which had been written down from $31.9mm to $11.3mm). It also owns second lien paper in Belk Inc. (written down from $119.1mm to $94.7mm), CTI Foods, and Spencer Gifts LLC (written down from $30mm to $25.6mm). And subordinated debt in Sungard (written down by 80%). The BDC's equity holdings in Charlotte Russe and Nine West are now obviously worthless. 

Lots of people are focused on BDCs given lending standards during this long bull run. If that portfolio is any indication, they should be. 

*****

Speaking of Z Gallerie, it filed for bankruptcy last weekend in the District of Delaware. It is a specialty-niche furniture retailer that has 76 stores across select states in the US. And this is its second trip into bankruptcy in 10 years. While we think that's too large a spread to really be a "chapter 22," its an ignominious feat nonetheless. 

So another retailer in bankruptcy. We're all getting bored of this. And we're also getting bored of private equity firms helping drive companies into the ground. In this instance, Brentwood Associates, a $2.4b Los Angeles-based private equity purchased a 70% stake in the company in 2014 (and took two seats on the company's board of directors). At the time, Brentwood had this to say about the transaction:*

"Z Gallerie is a differentiated retailer in the home furnishings market with a very unique merchandise assortment. We see a significant opportunity to accelerate growth of the current retail store base."

But…well...not so much. This statement by the company's CRO is a pretty damning assessment of Brentwood's claim that they "build[] category-defining businesss through sustained, accelerated growth”:

"Following a transaction in 2014 in which the Zeidens sold majority control of Z Gallerie to Brentwood Associates (“Brentwood”), Z Gallerie’s overall performance has declined significantly. The reasons for these declines are mostly self-imposed: (i) a store footprint expansion did not meet performance targets, (ii) the addition of the Atlanta distribution center disrupted operations and increased costs, and (iii) the failure to timely invest enough capital in their e-commerce platform limited its growth. These missteps were exacerbated by macroeconomic trends in the brick and mortar retail industry and lower housing starts. As a result, net revenue and EBITDA declined during fiscal year 2018. With Z Gallerie’s current cash balances of less than $2 million, and no availability under its secured credit facilities, the commencement of these chapter 11 cases became necessary to ensure access to capital going forward."

 That's brutal. Something tells us that Z Gallerie is going to make a swift disappearance from Brentwood's website.

Anyway, the company includes all kinds of optimistic language in its bankruptcy filing papers about how, after it closes 17 stores and executes on its business plan, it will be poised for success. It intends to enhance its e-commerce (currently 20% of sales), revamp its Atlanta distribution center, launch social media campaigns (long Facebook), and better train its employees (long Toys R Us PTSD). The company claims numbers have already been on the upswing since the holidays, including February same-store sales up 5% YOY. 

Current optimism notwithstanding, make no mistake: this is yet another instance of value destruction. This is the company's balance sheet (at least some of which dates back to 2014 and is related to Brentwood's purchase):

Screen Shot 2019-03-13 at 9.15.20 AM.png

That $91mm senior secured term loan? Yeah, that's where KKR sits. 

The company has a commitment for a $28mm DIP credit facility from KeyBank which will effectively rollup the senior secured revolving loans and provide $8mm in new money. 

The company has already filed a "hot potato" plan of reorganization — in other words, the lenders will take the company if they have to, but they don't really want to, and so they're happy to pass it on — and have a banker actively trying to pass it on (Lazard Middle Market) — to some other schmuck who thinks they can give it a go. In other words, similar to the plan proposed earlier this year in the Shopko case, this plan provides for the equitization of the allowed secured revolver and term loan claims IF the company is otherwise unable to find a buyer to take it off their hands and pay down some of their loans with cash. The company filed bid procedures along with the plan; it does not have a stalking horse bidder lined up. The company estimates a 4 month timeline to complete its bankruptcy.

We can't imagine that KKR is stoked to own this company going forward. And we can only imagine what kind of projections the company will put forth to convince the court that this thing is actually feasible: the plan has a blank space for the exit facility so that exit structure is also apparently a work in progress.

In any event, given recent loan underwriting standards, KKR, and other BDCs, might want to get used to owning credits they never expected to. 

*Brentwood was represented in the transaction by Kirkland & Ellis LLP, now counsel to the company. The company drops in a footnote that any potential claims against Brentwood and its two directors will be conducted by Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP, a firm we’re sure was hired with absolutely zero input by Kirkland and/or the two Brentwood directors. Two independent directors are currently sitting on the board.

  • Jurisdiction: District of Delaware (Judge: Laurie S. Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: see above

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Justin Bernbrock, Joshua Altman, Emily Kehoe) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Dominic Pacetti, Michael Yurkewicz)

    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinsten)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Middle Market LLC (Jason Cohen)

    • Claims Agent: Bankruptcy Management Solutions, Inc. d/b/a/ Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: Keybank NA

      • Legal: Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC (Mary Caloway, Mark Pfeiffer)

    • KKR Credit Advisors US LLC

      • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Vincent Indelicato, Christ Theodoridis) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Matthew Talmo)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - DIESEL USA, Inc.

DIESEL USA, Inc.

March 5, 2019

Three things immediately occurred to us when we saw the news that Diesel USA Inc. filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware:

  1. That makes perfect sense — Jersey Shore went off the air a long time ago;

  2. This is “The Mattress Firm Effect” in action — a retailer using a quick trip in bankruptcy to, on an expedited basis, flush out some burdensome leases and otherwise leave parties in interest unimpaired; and

  3. More surprising than the company filing for bankruptcy is the law firm filing it for bankruptcy. Arent Fox LLP, while a fine firm for sure, isn’t exactly known for its debtor-side chops. Just saying.

The numbers around this one are…well…interesting. The company’s brick-and-mortar retail operations consist of 28 retail store locations in 11 states, comprised of 17 full-price retail stores and 11 factory outlet stores. Net sales were:

  • In 2014: $83mm for full-price retail and $42mm for outlet (Total: $125mm); and

  • In 2018: $38mm for full-price retail and $34.5mm for outlet (Total: $72.5mm).

In terms of percentages:

  • In 2014: brick and mortar represented 64% of net sales; and

  • In 2018: brick and mortar represented 70% of net sales.

We see a couple of significant problems here.

Despite the superlatives that the company’s CRO generously uses to describe the company, i.e., “cutting-edge,” and “cultural icon,” the numbers reflect a BRAND — let alone the business — in significant trouble. Sure, net sales are down generally, but the distribution has gotten wildly askew. The numbers reflect a bare reality: Diesel simply isn't a brand people will pay full price for anymore. This couldn’t be more stark. And that’s a big problem when the company is (or was) party to expensive height-of-the-real-estate-market leases in prime locations like Manhattan’s Fifth Avenue. Diesel, quite simply, isn’t “Fifth Avenue,” let alone “Madison Avenue.”* We’re not convinced the company is being realistic when it says that it has “retained a loyal customer base.” The numbers plainly say otherwise. Moreover, in an age where digital sales are increasingly more important, the business has become MORE dependent on brick-and-mortar as opposed to its wholesale and e-commerce channels.**

But don’t take our word for it. Here’s the company’s CRO:

…in 2015 prior management implemented a strategic initiative that was focused on repositioning Diesel stores and products in premium locations and with premium customers so as to place them side-by-side with other premium fashion brands across the retail, online, and wholesale platforms. Unfortunately, since its implementation, the Debtor’s net sales have significantly decreased while its losses have significantly increased.

The market has spoken: Diesel is, according to the market, simply not “premium.”

And by “market” we also mean wholesalers. The company opted to stop distributing its products to wholesale partners “that were deemed not to fit the premium image.” Now, we can only imagine that included discount retailers. Basically, SOME OF THE RETAILERS WHO HAVE PERFORMED THE BEST OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. But wait: it gets even worse: the wholesale customers the company DID retain pursued voluminous “chargebacks.” Per the company:

As is common in the retail industry, the Debtor provides certain customers with allowances for markdowns, returns, damages, discounts, and cooperative marketing programs (collectively, the “Chargebacks”). If the Debtor’s customers fail to sell the Debtor’s products, they generally have the right to return the goods at cost or issue Chargebacks, which are netted against the Debtor’s accounts receivable. Due to mounting Chargebacks from wholesale customers, the Debtor was forced to significantly reduce its wholesale activities in recent years.

Basically, nobody is buying this sh*t. Not in stores. Not in wholesale.

And, yet, the company holds premium leases:

The primary means of implementing the 2015 strategy was to reposition the Debtor’s full-price retail and outlet stores to “premium”, high-profile, and high-visibility locations, which was executed by opening certain new stores and relocating others to “premium” locations while closing others deemed not to fit the new strategic positioning model. The result was, despite the losses suffered in connection with the Fifth Avenue store, management’s negotiation and entry into several expensive, long-term leases for certain of the Debtor’s retail locations, such as the Debtor’s “Flagship” store on Madison Avenue, which do not expire by their terms until 2024-2026. Of course, it was then (and remains today) an inopportune time to make long-term commitments to costly retail leases and the significantly increased lease expenses have not been offset by increased sales, which, in fact, have dropped precipitously.

…numerous of the Debtor’s stores are producing heavy losses. The Debtor’s unprofitable stores combined to produce negative EBITDA of approximately $10.7 million in 2018, nearly all of which flowed from full-price retail stores. The Debtor’s profitable stores are not enough to off-set the losses, as the 17 fullprice stores combined to produce negative EBITDA of approximately $8.7 million in 2018.

Now, the company does indicate that certain (seemingly outlet) stores remain profitable, as do the wholesale and e-commerce operations.*** So, there’s that. New management is in place and their plan includes (a) using the BK to negotiate with landlords, shutter some locations, shutter and relocate others, opening new smaller stores and refit existing locations; (b) deploying influencer marketing generally and aiming more efforts towards females (and hoping and praying that athleisure — a term we didn’t see ONCE in the entire first day declaration — doesn’t continue to hold sway and steer people away from jeans, generally);**** (c) growing e-commerce; and (d) revitalizing the wholesale business with key selective wholesale partners. This plan is meant to take hold in the next three years and “will require significant capital investments.” (PETITION Note: cue the chapter 22 preparation). The company intends to effectuate its new business plan via a plan of reorganization pursuant to which it will reject certain executory contracts. All in, the company hopes to be confirmed in roughly 5 weeks. Aggressive! But, like Mattress Firm, trade creditors are “current” and there’s no debt otherwise, so the schedule isn’t entirely out of the realm of possibility.

But this is the part that REALLY gets us. If you’ve been reading PETITION long enough — particularly our “We Have a Feasibility Problem” series — you know by now that you ought to be AWFULLY SKEPTICAL of management team’s rosy projections. Per the company:

The Debtor’s projections indicate that the Reorganization Business Plan will return the Debtor to stand-alone profitability by 2021 assuming successful store closures through this Chapter 11 Case, thereby ensuring its ability to continue operating as a going-concern, saving over 300 jobs, and creating new ones through the new store openings.

Generally, we’ll take the under. Though, we have to say: at least they’re not audaciously projecting a miraculous profit in 2019.

How will they achieve all of these lofty goals? The company’s foreign parent will invest $36mm over the three-year period of the business plan because…well…why the hell not? Everyone loves a Hail Mary.


*The company suffered from an ill-advised and poorly-timed real estate spending spree. Between 2008 and 2015, right as brick-and-mortar really started to decline and e-commerce expand, the company expended $90mm on leases. As for Fifth Avenue, per the company, “the Debtor’s store on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, which opened in 2008 and closed in 2014, by itself received approximately $18 million in capital expenditures during its tenure while generating substantial losses.

**The company doesn’t appear to have put much into its e-commerce growth. While e-commerce now represents 12% of net sales, sales are only incrementally higher in absolute numbers (from $8mm in 2014 to $12mm in 2018). The wholesale channel, on the other hand, has gone in the opposite direction. Net sales went from $61mm (2014) to $19mm (2018) and now represent only 19% of net sales (down from 32%).

***It seems, though, that outlet stores, wholesale and e-commerce resulted in negative $2mm EBITDA if the math from the above quote is correct. Curious.

****Score for Facebook Inc. ($FB)!


  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (George Angelich, David Mayo, Phillip Khezri) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Kenneth Enos, Travis Buchanan)

    • Claims Agent: Bankruptcy Management Solutions d/b/a Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:



New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Weatherly Oil & Gas LLC

Weatherly Oil & Gas LLC

February 28, 2019

Restructuring in the oil and gas space has been quiet of late but we here at PETITION suspect that may change very soon. While oil has been on the rise (in the mid-60s at the time of this writing) — and there are both potential political and supply-side roadblocks growing domestically that may help push prices upward — there nevertheless appear to be cracks forming. We’ve been noting that Jones Energy ($JONE), Sanchez Energy Corporation ($SN), Southcross Energy Partners LP ($SXEE), and Vanguard Natural Resources all look distressed and headed towards chapter 11 bankruptcy filings (or a chapter 22 filing, as the case may be with Vanguard). Recent price action for several other companies also reflects some doubt about the oil and gas space.

Take, for instance, Alta Mesa Holdings LP ($AMR). Per The Houston Chronicle:

Houston oil and gas company Alta Mesa Resources is struggling to stay afloat, laying off roughly one-fourth of its employees and writing down the value of its assets by $3.1 billion because of admitted failures in its financial reporting.

The company's three top executives, CEO Hal Chappelle, Chief Operating Officer Michael Ellis and Chief Financial Officer Michael McCabe, resigned abruptly a few weeks ago.

The company disclosed in an SEC filing that the write-down stems from “ineffective internal control over financial reporting due to an identified material weakness.” We’re conjecturing here, but that sure sounds like diplomatic Texan for “we effed up pretty badly…perhaps even fraudulently.” Consequently, the plaintiffs’ lawyers are circling this puppy like vultures and, well, this:

Indeed, the company’s $500mm 7.875% senior unsecured bonds due 2024 got UTTERLY HOUSED, dipping down over 40% in a week and approximately 50% versus a month ago. This chart is BRUTAL:

Source: TRACE

Source: TRACE

We’ll take a deeper dive into Alta Mesa soon for our Members: if you’re not a Member well, we hope you revel in ignorance.

The price action of once-bankrupt Chaparral Energy Inc. ($CHAP) is also notable: it saw its stock collapse over 20% and its $300mm 8.75% senior unsecured notes due 2023 fall nearly 17%. More debt BRUTALITY here:

Source: TRACE

Source: TRACE

Long trips to Texas.

Here, Weatherly Oil & Gas LLC is an oil and gas acquisition and exploration company focused on Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas; it operates over 800 well bores (over half shut-in or non-producing) on 200k net acres. The company blames continued low commodity prices and fundamentally changed lending practices for its bankruptcy. Specifically, the company notes:

Lending practices moved from a reserves-based approach to a cash-flow based approach, limiting access to capital growth and forcing the Debtor to utilize free cash flow to pay down senior debt instead of making other capital expenditures.

Without capital and with an expensive production focus, the company struggled in the face of a glut of competition.

The company has a transaction support agreement pursuant to which it intends to sell its assets to multiple purchasers and then pursue a plan of liquidation. Angelo Gordon Energy Servicer LLC, the company’s prepetition lender, will provide a $1mm DIP to fund the cases. Halliburton Energy Services is the company’s largest unsecured creditor with an approximate $2.9mm claim.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $90.2mm term loan (Angelo Gordon Energy Servicer LLC)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Kristhy Peguero, Vienna Anaya)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Ankura Consulting Group LLC (Scott Pinsonnault)

    • Marketing Agent: TenOaks Energy Partners LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Term Lender & DIP Lender ($1mm): Angelo Gordon Energy Servicer LLC

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, David Meyer, Steven Zundell, Michael Garza)

    • Buyer: BRG Lone Star, Ltd.

    • Buyer: EnSight IV Energy Partners, LLC

    • Sponsor: Weatherly East Texas LLC

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Gregory Pesce, Brett Newman)