⛽️2019 Can’t End Fast Enough for Oil & Gas (Long Pain in TX)⛽️

Some numbers: the US now produces 13mm barrels per day and exports 3mm bpd. Per Reuters:

But the outlook for 2020 comes with growing skepticism from those inside the industry - and should growth fall short, it could shift the balance of power in world supply back to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

An increase in U.S. crude output by 1 million bpd would satisfy nearly all of the 1.2 million bpd increase in world demand next year, the International Energy Agency expects. [IEA/M]

That would keep a lid on prices, pressure OPEC to extend production cuts and leave shale producers still trying to achieve elusive profits. As a result, most industry executives and consultants said they expect slower U.S. shale growth.

Apropos, layoffs are starting to mount in the Permian. Austerity measures are now taking hold in the Eagle Ford. Per Bloomberg:

In the wake of the oil price crash that began in 2014, new drilling in the Eagle Ford dwindled as management teams cut budgets, and output in the region is now down about 20% from pre-crash levels.

That austerity finally began to pay off this year as the Eagle Ford as a whole generated free cash flow for the first time, according to IHS Markit.

And things may only get worse.* The state of Texas is expected to double its solar electricity output next year and again the following year. This would obviously have a negative impact on natural gas demand and prices.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration intends to bring MORE drilling online! Per The Houston Chronicle, the administration…


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🥈Second Order Effects Are Real (Long #retailapocalypse Victims)🥈

 
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We’ve spent a considerable amount of time discussing the possible and/or actual second order effects of disruption. For instance, waaaaaaay back in December 2016, we queried to what degree the scanless technology that Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) had then launched in its AmazonGo concept might affect grocers and quick service restaurants. We noted the following possibilities:

[Our] list of losers: manufacturers of conventional scanners...plastic separator bricks...cash registers...conveyer belts; landlords (maybe? - less square footage required without the cashier and self-checkout stations); print media/candy manufacturers/gift cards - all things that benefit from lines and impulse buys at checkout; human capital; people on the wrong end of income inequality.

Three years later, you don’t hear much about AmazonGo. Sure, it’s grown: there are now reportedly 20 locations with more on the way, but it hasn’t exactly taken the world by storm and caused mass disruption to either grocers or QSRs. It’s still worth watching though: the possible second order effects are countless.

An example of actual second order effects is Cenveo Inc., which filed for bankruptcy in February 2018. At the time we wrote:

…it's textbook disruption. Per the company, 

"In addition to Cenveo’s leverage issues, macroeconomic factors, including the introduction of new e-commerce, digital substitution for products, and other technologies, are transforming the industry. Consumers increasingly use the internet and other electronic media to purchase goods and services, pay bills, and obtain electronic versions of printed materials. Moreover, advertisers increasingly use the internet and other electronic media for targeted campaigns directed at specific consumer segments rather than mail campaigns." 

Ouch. To put it simply, every single time you opt-in for an electronic bank statement or purchase a comic book on your Kindle rather than from the local bookstore (if you even have a local bookstore), you're effing Cenveo.

To close the trifecta, we’ll again highlight the recent pain in the SMA spaceCatalina Marketing and Acosta Inc. both became chapter 11 filers while Crossmark Holdings Inc. narrowly avoided it. Why? Because CPG companies are taking it on the chin from new and exciting direct-to-consumer e-commerce brands, among other things, and have therefore shifted marketing strategies.

So, on the topic of second order effects, imagine being in the C-suite of a company that, among other things:

  • Prints signage, displays, shelf marketing and other promotional-print-material for brick-and-mortar retailers including the likes of, among others, struggling GNC Inc. ($GNC)Gap Inc. ($GPS), and GameStop Inc. (GME), all of which are shrinking their brick-and-mortar footprint;

  • Creates menu boards, register toppers, ceiling danglers and more for QSRs and fast casual restaurants who are competing with food delivery services more and more every day; and

  • Services consumer packaged goods companies by creating end cap promotions, shelf marketing, floor graphics and more.

Uh….YEAAAAAAAAAH. Some high risk exposure areas right there, folks.😬 And, so you’ve got to imagine that revenues of this “hypothetical” C-suiter’s company are declining, right? Particularly given that print is a highly competitive price-compressed industry?

Luckily, you don’t have to stretch the imagination too far.


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⚡️Update: Destination Maternity Inc. ($DEST)⚡️

Speaking of ugly…

In the aforementioned October CBL update, we wrote:

The last thing CBL needed — on the heals of the downgrade — was near-instantaneous bad news. It got it this week.

Yesterday, the bankruptcy court granted interim approval authorizing Destination Maternity Corporation ($DEST) to assume a consulting agreement with Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC. Gordon Brothers will be tasked with multiple phases of store closures. Among those implicated? CBL, of course:

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CBL is landlord to DEST on 16 properties that are slated for rejection. Considering that DEST cops to being party to above-market leases, this ought to result in a real economic hit to CBL as (a) it will lose a high-paying tenant, (b) it will take time to replace those boxes, and (c) it is highly unlikely to obtain tenants at as favorable rents.

Let’s pour one out for CBL, folks. The hits just keep on coming.

On Friday, Destination Maternity filed a motion seeking approval of a stalking horse bidder for its assets. In September’s “🤔Is it a "Destination" if Nobody Goes?🤔,” we concluded:

And so we’ll have to wait and see whether Greenhill can pull a rabbit out of their hats. Unfortunately, this is looking like another dour retail story. This looks like a liquidating ABL if we’ve ever seen one.

According to the motion, Greenhill dug deep. They reached out to over 180 potential buyers, executed 50 CAs, and granted due diligence access to nearly two dozen parties.* They also conducted 8 management presentations with potential bidders. If you’ve ever wondered why investment bankers make what they make, this ought to illustrate why: it can be a lot of work trying to garner interest and herd cats. Then again, they did accept a mandate where there was a questionable likelihood that the asset value would clear the debt. 🤔

Unfortunately, the result is not — as predicted — particularly stellar. To be clear, this isn’t a reflection upon Greenhill. This was a difficult assignment in a challenging retail environment: it’s a reflection of that.

And so Marquee Brands LLC** and a contractual joint venture between Hilco Merchant Resources LLC and Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC (together, the “Agent”) entered into an asset purchase agreement (APA) with the debtors pursuant to which they will purchase “the Debtors’ e-commerce business, intellectual property, store-in-store operations, and the right to designate the sale of certain inventory and related assets” for an estimated $50mm (subject to adjustments). Repeat: an estimated $50mm. The Agent will liquidate the company’s inventory, fixtures and equipment and conduct store closing sales at the 235 stores where closing sales are not already in process. Said another way: the company’s retail footprint is going the way of the dodo. Clearly this isn’t credit positive for CBL and other landlords.

To refresh everyone’s recollection, here is what the company’s capital structure looked like at the time of its bankruptcy filing:

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We previously noted when highlighting the aggressive milestones baked into Wells Fargo Bank’s consent to use its cash collateral:

Wells clearly wants this sucker off its books in 2019.

Rightfully so. The $50mm purchase price is subject to a $4mm holdback. In other words, the actual value transfer may be approximately $46mm. That puts the purchase price at riiiiiiiiiiiiight around Wells Fargo’s exposure. Its aggressive handling of the case appears to be warranted: this thing looks a hair away from administrative insolvency.

Apropos, the official committee for unsecured creditors — in a grasp for some sort of relevance here — filed a limited objection to the motion. The committee argued that the break-up fee (3.5%) and expense reimbursement (up to $750k) were unwarranted given the size of the bid and the lack of a going concern offer.

They were shot down. They did, however, wrestle some concessions. They apparently got the purchase price increased by $225k (in exchange for avoidance actions) and an additional $225k to be paid to 503(b)(9) admin claimants prior to Wells getting its money. A small victory but something for some creditors here.

And that ladies and gentlemen is what bankruptcy boils down to. Is there value? And if so, who gets it? Here, it’s hard to see any real winners. Not the company. Not Wells. Not CBL and the company’s other landlords. Not vendors. Or suppliers. Or employees. Or, really, even the professionals (for once). Time will tell whether Marquee can do something with this brand that makes it one of the rare winners. It’s not clear from the papers how much of the $50mm is attributable to them and, therefore, how much they’re putting at risk. Clearly nobody else was comfortable with the risk here. However you quantify it.

*At the time of filing, the numbers were 170 parties contacted and 34 executed CAs. So, there wasn’t much additional interest in the assets post-filing.

**Marquee Brands also owns BCBG which, itself, traversed the bankruptcy process not long ago.

💥Good Retail Numbers. Bad Malls.💥

⚡️Update: CBL & Associates Properties ($CBL)⚡️

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We did a deep dive into Tennessee-based CBL & Associates Properties ($CBL) back in March’s “Thanos Snaps, Retail Disappears👿” and, in the context of Destination Maternity’s bankruptcy filing, followed-up in an October update. To refresh your recollection, CBL is a real estate investment trust (REIT) that invests primarily in malls based in the southeastern and midwestern US. At the time of the aforementioned “Thanos” piece, the REIT’s stock was trading at $1.90/share; its ‘23 unsecured notes were priced around $80 and its ‘24 unsecured notes around $76. In case you haven’t noticed — all Black Friday ($7.4b in online sales, $2.9b via mobile ordering) and Cyber Monday (a record $9.2b) talk about gangbusters retail sales notwithstanding — the malls haven’t particularly fared much better since Q1. To put an exclamation point on this, early reports are that brick-and-mortar stores saw an overall 6% decline in sales over Black Friday.

When it reported Q3 earnings at the end of October, CBL’s numbers weren’t pretty. Revenue fell approximately $20mm YOY, net operating income declined 5.9% YOY, and same-center mall occupancy, while up on a quarter-by-quarter basis, was down 200 basis points YOY.

On Monday, the company announced that “it is suspending all future dividends on its common stock, 7.375% Series D Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Stock and 6.625% Series E Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Stock.” The company’s CEO, Stephen Lebovitz said:

“We anticipate a decline in net operating income in 2020 as a result of heightened retailer bankruptcies, restructurings and store closings in 2019. Offsetting these declines by retaining available cash is necessary to maintain the market dominant position of our properties and to reduce debt. CBL has also made significant efforts over the past 18 months to reduce operating costs, including executive compensation and overall corporate G&A expense, as well as execution of a strategy to utilize joint venture and other structures to reduce capital expenditures. Ultimately, we believe these actions will allow the Company to return greater value to its shareholders.”

Given the above, it’s worth revisiting the alleged benefit of REITs to investors. Among them are that:

  • post 1960, REITs provided small investors with an opportunity to benefit from commercial property rental streams; and

  • they are, typically, high dividend payers — considering that by law, they must distribute at least 90% of their taxable income to shareholders as dividends.

WOMP. WOMP. Not so much these days, it seems. But, we bet you’re asking: how can it terminate its dividend while maintaining its REIT status? From the company:

“The Company made this determination following a review of current taxable income projections for 2019 and 2020. The Company will review taxable income on a regular basis and take measures, if necessary, to ensure that it meets the minimum distribution requirements to maintain its status as a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT).”

Umm, that doesn’t portend well. The answer is: it may not have “taxable income.” B.R.U.T.A.L.

How did the market react?

The stock market puked on the news. The stock was down 6% with a general market drawdown, but after-hours, upon the announcement, the stock gave up an additional ~30% on Monday and closed at $1.02/share on Tuesday:

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Meanwhile, the preferred stock also obviously traded down (lots of Moms and Pops chasing yield, baby yield, getting burned here), and the ‘23 unsecured notes and the ‘24 unsecured notes, at the time of this writing, last sold at $72.75 and $64.1, respectively.

The GIF above says it all about this story. And, worse yet: it may get uglier.

🛏KKR Tips Hand re Art Van Furniture (Short Midwest Mattresses)🛏

n “💩Acosta = Not a Good Look, Carlyle💩,” we noted how FS KKR Capital Corp ($FSK), a publicly-traded business development corporation placed its Acosta Inc. loan “on nonaccrual” because it was, well, clearly sh*tting the bed. Ultimately, after riding the mark down to the basement, FSK offloaded the position. It wasn’t the only stain in its portfolio. In fact, as of the end of the third quarter, approximately 1.7% of the portfolio was on nonaccrual, up from 1.2% at the end of Q2. While this, in and of itself is hardly alarming, it does mean that there are other potential restructurings sitting on FSK’s books. Indeed, one loan contributing to this uptick was to a company called Art Van Furniture.

Founded in 1958, Michigan-headquartered Art Van Furniture is a furniture retail store chain with approximately 190 company-owned stores in nine states operating, thanks to various tack-on acquisitions, under various brands: Art Van Furniture, Art Van PureSleep, Scott Shuptrine Interiors, Levin Furniture, Levin Mattress and Wolf Furniture. The tack-on acquisitions were, presumably, part of the company’s growth strategy after being acquired by private equity overlords Thomas H. Lee Partners.

The Columbus Dispatch recently reported on Art Van’s strategy annnnnnnd it’s definitely a bit counter-intuitive:


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🐝Reality Check: Honey🐝

Paypal Inc. ($PYPL) made a big splash this week when it agreed to a $4b cash and stock acquisition of Honey, an LA-based deal-finding browser extension and mobile app. Yes, $4 BILLION. The company had only raised $49mm in funding soooooo…a lot of people just made one crazy return on investment.

Speaking of crazy, the company reportedly made “more than $100 million in revenue last year and it was profitable on a net income basis in 2018.” Profitably for a startup these days is crazy enough, we suppose, but THAT MULTIPLE. Holy


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⚡️Ride-Sharing is Vicious (Long Matchsticks)⚡️

Starting in 2016, Juno USA LP, a NY-centric ride-hailing company was able, in just 3.5 years, to become the third largest ride-hailing business in New York, counting 50k contracted drivers and 50k rides per day as key business drivers (pun intended). Now it is kaput. The company filed for bankruptcy earlier this week.

At its inception, the company differentiated itself by offering drivers restricted stock units (“RSUs”) “with the expectation that such an approach would result in an overall enhanced driving experience for drivers and, in turn, riders.” This is interesting because, obviously, it incentivizes drivers to be more attentive to Juno rides than Lyft and/or Uber but it obviously doesn’t address the demand side of the marketplace function. 50k rides per day sounds like a lot. Yet, it pales in comparison to its competition: according to the Taxi and Limousine Commission, in 2018, Uber Inc. ($UBER) tallied 400k trips per day in NYC and Lyft Inc. ($LYFT) collected 112k trips per day. Moreover, NYC taxis typically make about 300k trips per day. In total these are staggering numbers — even more so when you consider that taxis are going bankrupt in record-breaking numbers and Uber and Lyft are losing money like crazy (Uber’s loss, ex-stock-based compensation, was $800mm last quarter!). Ultimately, that differential compelled a merger of rivals: Israel-based GT Forge, d/b/a Gett, acquired Juno in Q2 ‘17 and transferred its riders to Juno. At the same time, Juno cashed out the driver RSUs, using other incentives (read: higher commissions of 10%) to maintain its supply-side.

As we all now know from the WeWork debacle, financial metrics for high growth startups are different than what restructuring professionals are used to. EBITDA is a foreign concept here: “success” is measured by revenue growth. Here’s Juno’s revenue trend:

  • $218mm in 2017;

  • $269mm in 2018 (23% growth) 😀; and

  • $133mm in 2019. 😬

Juno does not, however, indicate what its operating costs and expenses were; it merely serves up excuses about early stage capital requirements and the need for monthly cash infusions from Gett. Over time, however, the operating expense burden coupled with “burdensome local regulations and escalating litigation defense costs” led to a 2019 YOY revenue decline of 34%. What the net loss was, however, is left unsaid in the company’s bankruptcy papers.

The litigation runs the gamut. The company has been sued by (a) former drivers for the termination of the RSU program (read: securities fraud); (b) riders for personal injuries allegedly caused in accidents during active Juno rides; (c) competitors for patent infringement; and (d) drivers, alleging that they are employees rather than independent contractors. It’s pretty hard to grow a business when you’re getting sued into oblivion and have poor business fundamentals. 👍

The City of New York really didn’t help those fundamentals. The company’s bankruptcy papers elucidate ride-hailing economics after NYC imposed mandatory minimums of $17.22/hour regardless of the number of rides undertaken during that time (something that Uber and Lyft continue to combat, including by freezing drivers out of the apps during low-demand times, something that irks the hell out of Bill De Blasio, apparently). Here’s how it works:

  • Drivers are entitled to a minimum of $0.58/mile + $0.27 per minute. “Each of these figures is separately divided by a so-called “utilization rate,” which is calculated based on the frequency that a TNC sends trips to drivers while they are available for work. The current industrywide average utilization is 58%.” (Petition Note: this also means that 42% of the time, drivers are just moving around clogging up NYC streets).

  • So, for a 10-mile trip that takes 30 minutes, you end up with:


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💥Is Wyoming F*cked? (Short Chesapeake Energy Corp.)💥

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Governor Mark Gordon released his Wyoming State Budget for 2021-2022 earlier this week and — whoa boy — he cuts right to the chase:

It is a budget intended to prepare our state to meet the coming storm head-on.

For most of the last century, Wyoming’s abundant coal, natural gas, oil, and other minerals have been the drivers of our economy; employing thousands; funding schools and government services; and stabilizing our state’s communities. Energy development, minerals, and the sovereign wealth they have bequeathed to our children have kept taxes low for citizens. But times are changing. Over the past few years we have witnessed an upheaval in the way energy is being generated, used, and developed. These changes seem to be accelerating and are not generally favorable to some of our most cherished industries(emphasis added)

He then goes on to highlight some pretty hefty headwinds (pun intended) — things that should be no surprise to a restructuring community that has watched coal company after another file for chapter 11 bankruptcy:

  • Coal production in Wyoming has declined by 35%.

  • Natural gas companies are halting drilling there.

  • 38 states have established renewable and carbon-free standards which hurts demand.

  • Wyoming has an oil and gas energy but low oil prices will offset whatever hedge this provides against declining coal.

"Even if we get out of this current downturn with oil bailing us out, the economy becomes more and more dependent on oil, which is the most volatile of all of the commodities and the one that we are least confident with forecasting into the future," said Robert Godby, director of the University of Wyoming Center for Energy Economics and Public Policy.

To point, Chesapeake Energy Corp. ($CHK), a large presence in Wyoming, issued a going concern warning earlier this month:


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💩Acosta = Not a Good Look, Carlyle💩

Disruption Flummoxes Carlyle. Destroys Billions of Value.

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Back in September 2018’s “Trickle-Down Disruption from Retail Malaise (Short Coupons),” we noted a troubled trio of “sales and marketing agencies.” We wrote:

With the “perfect storm” … of (i) food delivery, (ii) the rise of direct-to-consumer CPG brands, (iii) increased competition from private-brand focused German infiltrators Aldi and Lidl, and (iv) the increasingly app-powered WholeFoods, there are a breed of companies that are feeling the aftershocks. Known as “sales and marketing agencies” (“SMAs”), you’d generally have zero clue about them but for the fact that you probably know someone who is addicted to coupon clipping. Or you’re addicted to coupon clipping. No shame in that, broheim. Anyway, that’s what they’re known for: coupons (we’re over-simplifying: they each perform other marketing, retailing, and data-oriented services too). The only other way you’d be familiar is if you have a private equity buddy who is sweating buckets right now, having underwritten an investment in one of three companies that are currently in distress. Enter Crossmark Holdings Inc.Acosta Inc., and Catalina Marketing (a unit of Checkout Holding Corp.). All three are in trouble.

What’s happened since?

  • Catalina Marketing filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. ✅

  • Crossmark Holdings Inc. effectuated an out-of-court exchange transaction, narrowing averting a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. ✅

  • And, as of last week, Acosta Inc. launched solicitation of a prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. It will be in bankruptcy in the District of Delaware very very soon. We’ve basically got ourselves an SMA hat-trick. ✅💥

Before we dive into what the bloody hell happened here — and it ain’t pretty — let’s first put some more meat on those SMA bones. In doing so, mea culpa: we WAY over-simplified what Acosta Inc. does in that prior piece. So, what do they do?

Acosta has two main business lines: “Sales Services” and “Marketing Services.” In the former, “Acosta assists CPG companies in selling new and existing products to retailers, providing business insights, securing optimal shelf placement, executing promotion programs, and managing back-office order-to-cash and claims deduction management solutions. Acosta also works with clients in negotiations with retailers and managing promotional events.” They also provide store-level merchandising services to make sure sh*t is properly placed on shelves, stocks are right, displays executed, etc. The is segment creates 80% of Acosta’s revenue.

The other 20% comes from the Marketing Services segment. In this segment, “Acosta provides four primary Marketing Services offerings: (i) experiential marketing; (ii) assisted selling and training; (iii) content marketing; and (iv) shopper marketing. Acosta offers clients event-based marketing services such as brand launch events, pop-up retail experiences, mobile tours, large events, and trial/demo campaigns. Acosta also provides Marketing Services such as assisted selling, staffing, associate training, in-store demonstrations, and more. Under its shopping marketing business, Acosta advises clients on consumer promotions, package designs, digital shopping, and other shopper marketing channels.

In the past, the company made money through commission-based contracts; they are now shifting “towards higher margin revenue generation models that allow the Company to focus on aligning cost-to-serve with revenue generation to better serve clients and maximize growth.” Whatever the f*ck that means.

We’re being flip because, well, let’s face it: this company hasn’t exactly gotten much right over the last four years so we ought to be forgiven for expressing a glint of skepticism that they’ve now suddenly got it all figured out. Indeed, The Carlyle Group LP acquired the company in 2014 for a staggering $4.75b — a transaction that “ranked … among the largest private-equity purchases of that year.” Score for Thomas H. Lee Partners LP(which acquired the company in 2011 from AEA Investors LP for $2b)!! This was after the Washington DC-based private equity firm reportedly lost out on its bid to acquire Advantage Sales & Marketing, a competitor which just goes to show the fervor with which Carlyle pursued entry into this business. Now they must surely regret it. Likewise, the company: nearly all of the company’s $3b of debt stems from that transaction. The company’s bankruptcy papers make no reference to management fees paid or dividends extracted so it’s difficult to tell whether Carlyle got any bang whatsoever for their equity buck.*

Suffice it to say, this isn’t exactly a raging success story for private equity (calling Elizabeth Warren!). Indeed, since 2015 — almost immediately after the acquisition — the company has lost $631mm of revenue and $193mm of EBITDA. It gets worse. Per the company:

“Revenue contributions from the top twenty-five clients in 2015 have declined at approximately 14.6 percent per year since fiscal year 2015. Furthermore, adjusted EBITDA margins have decreased year-over-year since fiscal year 2015 from over 19 percent to approximately 16 percent as of the end of fiscal year 2018.”

When you’re losing this money, it’s awfully hard to service $3b of debt. Not to state the obvious. But why did the company’s business deteriorate so quickly? Disruption, baby. Disruption. Per the company:

Acosta’s performance was disrupted by changes in consumer behavior and other macroeconomic trends in the retail and CPG industries that had a significant impact on the Company’s ability to generate revenue. Specifically, consumers have shifted away from traditional grocery retailers where Acosta has had a leadership position to discounters, convenience stores, online channels, and organic-focused grocers, where Acosta has not historically focused.

Just like we said a year ago. Let’s call this “The Aldi/Lidl/Amazon/Dollar Tree Effect.” Other trends have also taken hold: (a) people are eating healthier, shying away from center-store (where all the Campbell’sKellogg’sKraftHeinz and Nestle stuff is — by the way, those are, or in the case of KraftHeinz, were, all major clients!); and (b) the rise of private label.

Moreover, according to Acosta, consumer purchasing has declined overall due to the increased cost of food (huh? uh, sure okay). The company adds:

These consumer trends have exposed CPG manufacturers to significant margin pressure, resulting in a reduction in outsourced sales and marketing spend. In the years and months leading to the Petition Date, several of Acosta’s major clients consolidated, downsized, or otherwise reduced their marketing budgets.

By way of example, here is Kraft Heinz’ marketing spend over the last several years:

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Compounding matters, competition in the space is apparently rather savage:

“Acosta also faced significant pressure as a result of the Company’s heavy debt load. Clients have sought to diversify their SMA providers to decrease perceived risk of Acosta vulnerability. In fact, certain of Acosta’s competitors have pointed to the Company’s significant indebtedness, contrasting their own de-levered balance sheets, to entice clients away from Acosta. Over time, these factors have tightened the Company’s liquidity position and constrained the Company from making necessary operational and capital expenditures, further impacting revenue.”

So, obviously, Acosta needed to do something about that mountain of debt. And do something it did: it’s piling it up like The Joker, pouring kerosene on it, and lighting that sh*t on fire. The company will wipe out the first lien credit facility AND the unsecured notes — nearly $2.8b of debt POOF! GONE! What an epic example of disruption and value destruction!

So now what? Well, the debtors clearly cannot reverse the trends confronting CPG companies and, by extension, their business. But they can sure as hell napalm their balance sheet! The plan would provide for the following:

  • Provide $150mm new money DIP provided by Elliott, DK, Oaktree and Nexus to satisfy the A/R facility, fund the cases, and presumably roll into an exit facility;

  • First lien lenders will get 85% of the new common stock (subject to dilution from employee incentive plan, the equity rights offering, the direct investment preferred equity raise, etc.) + first lien subscription rights OR cash subject to a cap.

  • Senior Notes will get 15% of new common stock + senior notes subscription rights OR cash subject to a cap.

  • They’ll be $250mm in new equity infusions.

So, in total, over $2b — TWO BILLION — of debt will be eliminated and swapped for equity in the reorganized company. The listed recoveries (which, we must point out, are based on projections of enterprise value) are 22-24% for the holders of first lien paper and 10-11% for the holders of senior notes.

We previously wrote about how direct lenders — FS KKR Capital Corp. ($FSK), for instance — are all up in Acosta’s loansHere’s what KKR had to say about their piece of the first lien loan:

We placed Acosta on nonaccrual due to ongoing restructuring negotiations during the quarter and chose to exit this position after the quarter end at a gain to our third quarter mark.

This was the mark back in December 2018 = $2.4mm fair value:

And this is the mark as of Q3 close, September 2019 = $1.3mm fair value:

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Soooooo….HAHAHAHA. Now THAT is some top-notch spin! Even if they did mark to a gain versus the Q3 mark, they undoubtedly lost money on this position: the mark was cut in half in less than a year.

You have to take the benefits of quarterly reporting where you can, we suppose. 😬😜

*There have been two independent directors appointed to the board; they have their own counsel; and they’re performing an investigation into whether “any matter arising in or related to a restructuring transaction constituted a conflict matter.” There is no implication, however, that this investigation has anything to do with potential fraudulent conveyance claims. Not everything is Payless, people.


💰One’s Pain is Another’s Gain (Long Real Estate Consultants)💰

 
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Yeah but someone is making money from all of this doom and gloom, right? You bet your a$$. The real estate consultants/advisors!! Using Houlihan’s for illustration purposes, let’s dive into what these guys do. 

Before we do, let’s establish some ground rules: we’re going to MASSIVELY over-simplify how this works just to extract some number out of the abstract figures and give folks some semblance of an idea of how this works. So, please spare us the righteous indignation about incomplete calculations, okay?  

In the Houlihan’s bankruptcy case, the debtors seek to engage Hilco Real Estate LLC as its real estate consultant and advisor. For the uninitiated, Hilco Real Estate counts countless bankrupted companies as clients, e.g., A&PFred’sGander MountainFurniture BrandsGarden Fresh Restaurant Corp.hhgreggHostess BrandsIgnite Restaurant GroupLogan’s RoadhousePayless Shoesource. You get the idea. Perversely, these guys kill it when you don’t (spare us the spin, y’all).

According to the agreement between Houlihan’s and Hilco, Hilco will, among other things, (a) meet with Houlihan’s to ascertain its goals, objectives and financial parameters (read: wherewithal); (b) mutually agree with Houlihan’s on a strategic plan for restructuring, assigning or terminating leases; (c) negotiate with third parties landlords in furtherance of the agreed-upon strategy; (d) provide updates on progress; and (e) assist Houlihan’s in closing the relevant lease restructuring, assignment, and termination agreements. The contract is exclusive. Said another way, Houlihan’s has agreed to convey over to Hilco all responsibility for negotiating with landlords for purposes of extracting concessions. 

Of course, Hilco doesn’t do this sh*t for free. They have a variety of ways to make money. 

First, it’s important to note that the Bankruptcy Code requires that debtors decide what to do with non-residential real property leases within 120 days from any filing. Consequently, many distressed companies engage real estate consultants long in advance of bankruptcy to get a handle on the real estate portfolio, help devise a strategy, and kickoff negotiations with landlords. Accordingly, any assigned or terminated lease pre-petition is eligible for 6% of Lease Savings (back to this in a minute). If a lease is modified rather than terminated, Hilco gets a flat fee of $1,500 + 5.25% of the savings. Post-petition, Hilco gets 6% for assignments/terminations/sales of leases — if there are any at that point that return cash value. 

Houlihan’s is a sale case so what happens if the leases are assumed and assigned pursuant to a sale of all or substantially all of the assets? Per the Agreement, 

“…any Lease that is assigned or sold to a purchaser of all or substantially all of the Company's or a division of the Company's assets shall not, in and of itself, be considered an Assigned/Sold Lease (but may still be a Restructured Lease).” 

Wait, what? The agreement doesn’t even define what an “Assigned/Sold Lease” is? But, it appears the intent of this language is to carve out leases that simply transfer to a buyer. No fee for Hilco there — that is, unless there is an agreed modification to the lease prior to assumption and assignment. (Note to Hilco: tighten up your sh*t). This makes sense. 

Of course, all of this might as well be written in Dothraki: 


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👟The Latest in Fitness Trends (Long Innovation)👟

There are a lot of venture investors operating under the hypothesis that audio is the next frontier in wearables and that the Apple AirPods were just the opening salvo. Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) is apparently working on pods that double-up as fitness trackers. This is a space worth watching.

Elsewhere in fitness, we’re writing this particular section midweek and yet we literally just walked by someone rocking his NYC Marathon medal. Seems a bit aggressive to still be wearing that thing 72 hours post-race but, whatevs. To each his own. 

Here’s a piece from Reess Kennedy about fitness and marketing, discussing the rise of the Nike Vaporfly 4%, a running shoe that Nike Inc. ($NKE) alleges will enhance performance by…wait for it…4%. Regarding the NYC marathon, he writes, “I’d safely wager that 70% of the men and women running under 3:10 were wearing it.” He adds:

“…Sunday all I was thinking was, “Why and how did Nike win so hard here?! They’ve gobbled up significant market share and achieved one of the most successful product adoption feats in the history of footwear—possibly in the history of product adoption!—and, at $250, they’ve also set a new off-the-chart, ‘luxury’ price point for racing shoes in the process!’”

He concludes that much of the adoption is attributable to FOMO: if your competitors are juicing with the Vaporfly, you should be juicing too.  He writes:

“I think the far more powerful demand ignitor was actually the brazen insertion of a precise performance gain right into the name of the actual product: The Vaporfly 4%.”

“For the first time in history, a shoe company is making a clear ROI claim to buyers. This is the real reason they’ve sold so many.”

“Many runners really struggle over many marathon attempts to break three hours—often, tragically, missing it by only a few minutes on each attempt. A 4% improvement for these folks hovering around three hours would mean about a seven-minute gain! If you’re on the edge of a lifetime goal is it worth it to pay $250 to achieve it? Yeah, probably. “

This begs the obvious question: how long until the release of the “Brooks Boss 6%,” the “Adidas A$$-kicker 7%” or the “Saucony Supersonic 9%”? Will we start seeing distressed players engage in marketing schemes like this to drive traffic? Should we?*

Why aren’t restructuring firms using this tactic? 


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💰How Are the Investment Banks Doing?💰

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Greenhill & Co. Inc. ($GHL) reported Q3 earnings earlier his week and, well, they weren’t great. The company had $87mm of revenue for the quarter (flat YOY) and $194.3mm in revenue year-to-date. The latter is down 26% on the back of a poor first half. 

Why the poor performance? The company largely blamed “a very low level of activity in European M&A.” It then asked the analyst community to deploy some Pym Particles and take a time travel trip back to rosier times: 2016-2018. The company’s earnings presentation listed (a) fee paying clients and (b) $1mm+ clients for each of those years but, curiously, did not disclose those numbers for 2019.

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Despite the lack of transparency, the firm is nevertheless “[s]till expecting solid full year revenue performance,” particularly with its capital advisory business. Curious how that works. 🤔

As for restructuring, the firm touted its expanded team and noted….


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💰What’s New in Marketing Trends (Long Facebook Inc. ($FB))💰

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We’ve often highlighted how distressed retailers may be in for a rude awakening if they think deploying influencer-based social marketing on platforms like Facebook Inc. ($FB) and others will be the cure-all to their woes. And be easy. It won’t be and it’s not. The campaigns require significant expertise to execute and the cost of such campaigns has been on the rise. Until recently, it seems. In Facebook’s recent earnings call, CFO Dave Wehner said

“In Q3, the number of ad impressions served across our services increased 37% and the average price per ad decreased 6%. Impression growth was primarily driven by ads on Facebook News Feed, Instagram Stories and Instagram feed.”

Surprisingly, Facebook appears to be driving a large part of that impressions growth rather than Instagram Stories and the Instagram Feed. This means ads are reaching more people on the platform and, yet, the average price of ads decreased. While it’s not clear from the company’s SEC filings nor its earnings call why this is the case, this is a potential positive for retailers looking to deploy social ads. 


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🔥David's Bridal = Chapter 11.5🔥

One year, three different capital structures and two restructurings — one in-court and one out-of-court. This has been a hell of a twelve-month stretch for David’s Bridal Inc. Clearly performance continues to sh*t the bed.

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A year ago at this time the company was pre-bankruptcy. It had 311 stores, 9,260 employees and a $775mm capital structure split among (i) approximately $25.7 million in drawn commitments under its Prepetition ABL Agreement; (ii) an estimated $481.2 million in outstanding principal obligations under its Prepetition Term Loan Agreement; and (iii) an estimated $270.0 million in outstanding principal obligations under its unsecured notes. It filed a prepackaged bankruptcy on November 19, 2018. It confirmed its plan of reorganization in early January and the plan went effective almost 60 days after the filing.*

Under the plan of reorganization, the company shed hundreds of millions of debt, wiping out its private equity overlord, Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, LLC (except to the extent they owned unsecured notes). The company emerged from bankruptcy with (i) a $125mm asset-backed loan from Bank of America NA (the “ABL”), (ii) a $60mm “Priority” term loan agented by Cantor Fitzgerald and (iii) $240mm L+800bps “Takeback” term loan paper (also Cantor Fitzgerald). The term lenders — including, Oaktree CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation structure managed by Oaktree Capital Group** — walked away as owners with, among other things, the takeback paper and the common stock in the reorganized entity. The unsecured noteholders received a pinch of common equity and warrants. The initial post-reorg board was reconstituted to include a representative from Oaktree, a former executive from Ralph Lauren, a former banker, a senior partner from Boston Consulting Group, and a venture capitalist with experience in the early stage consumer products space.

It didn’t take long for cracks to form. In May, S&P Global Ratings downgraded David’s Bridal’s credit rating into junk territory; it noted that the company’s performance "remained significantly weaker than anticipated after emergence from bankruptcy" and it “expect[s] poor customer traffic will pressure operating performance and lead to added volatility.” The ratings agency gave both term loans the “Scarlet D” for downgrade, noting that the capital structure was “potentially unsustainable based on its rapidly weakening operating performance, which makes it vulnerable to unfavorable business and financial conditions to meet its commitments in the long term.” The term loan quoted downward. The rating proved to be prescient.

Six months later and eleven months post-confirmation, it is clear that the balance sheet was NOT right-sized to the performance of the business. On Monday, the company announced that it obtained a new $55mm equity infusion from its existing lenders. Lenders unanimously exchanged “$276mm of its existing term loans into new preferred and common equity securities” leaving the company with $75mm of funded debt exclusive of the untapped $125mm ABL. The equity that CD&R and the other unsecured noteholders received are clearly worth bupkis today. Those warrants? HAHAHA. Wildly out-of-the-money. Peace out CD&R!

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The question is why did this situation flame out so quickly? On a macro level, there are secular changes taking precedence in the marriage space: things just aren’t as formal as they used to be. On a micro level, clearly the company continues to suffer from operational challenges that were not addressed during the filing. Nor post-emergence. Per Bloomberg:

David’s lost its way with customers under prior management, Marcum said in the interview. When the company launched its online marketplace, it was a separate e-commerce profit that had different pricing and marketing promotions than the stores. “Consumers today are very smart and they see that,” [CEO James] Marcum said. “It caused a lot of friction” and an “extremely poor experience” for customers.

Ummm, okay, but wasn’t that supposed to have been fixed by now??

The company underestimated the negative impact that Chapter 11 would have going into its strongest selling period, and the competition “took advantage of it,” Marcum said.

Clearly the lenders underestimated the impact, too. How else do you explain the thinking around 10+% paper?

Given that the paper steadily quoted down for months leading up to this transaction, it’s obvious that (i) brides-to-be were steering clear from David’s Bridal after seeing media clips about other brides getting burned by bankrupted dress sellers, (ii) consequently, the lenders saw a constant stream of declining numbers, and (iii) as they learned more about the state of the business, lenders scrambled to try and dump this turd before a wipeout transpired. Spoiler alert: it has transpired.

As for the capital structure, clearly this thing came out of bankruptcy over-levered: it looks like the take-back paper was driven, in part, by CLOs in the capital structure. Callback to just a few weeks ago when, in “💥CLO NO!?!?💥,” we wrote (paywall):

…most CLO fund documents also don’t permit CLOs to take on new equity in restructurings. This limitation, by default, pushes CLOs towards “take-back paper” (read: new debt) in lieu of equity. If you’re a regular-way lender on an ad hoc group full of CLOs, then, this makes for an interesting dynamic: you may prefer — and have the latitude — to (i) swap debt for equity, thereby taking turns of leverage off to right-size the reorganized debtor’s balance sheet and (ii) give the reorganized entity a fighting chance to survive and drive equity returns. Your CLO counterparts, however, have different motives: they’ll push for more leverage. This misaligned incentive can sometimes get so bad that ad hoc groups will have to negotiate amongst themselves the go-forward capital structure without even getting management input. In this scenario, management projections are besides the point. If you’re looking for some explanation as to why there appears to be a rise in Chapter 22 filings, well, this might be one.

Not everything will have to file for bankruptcy a second time. But, as a practical matter, the result is the same here in terms of a capital structure refresh. Call this a Chapter 11.5.***

*Shockingly, the company didn’t boast of a “successful restructuring” like every other retailer-destined-for-a-chapter-22 tends to do. Perhaps retailers are now taking PETITION’s “Two-Year Rule” into account? 🤔😜

**The term lenders that made up the Ad Hoc Term Lender Group included a hodgepodge of private equity funds, hedge funds and CLOs.

***We really struggled with a witty thing to label a fact pattern where, within a year of bankruptcy, a company has to do a an out-of-court balance sheet refresh without going into a formal Chapter 22. Any ideas? Email us.

🤪Malls, Malls, Malls (Long Eccentric High-AF CEOs)🤪

Things continue to get worse for certain players in the mall REIT space.

On October 24th, Washington Prime Group Inc. ($WPG) reported earnings and managed to surpass rock bottom expectations. The above-referenced net operating income decrease came from a $4.3mm “negative impact of cotenancy and rental income from 2018 anchor bankruptcies (Bon-Ton Stores, Sears, Toys R Us), and $2.1mm was attributable to 2019 bankruptcies (Charlotte Russe, Gymboree and Payless ShoeSource).” Occupancy decreased 1.1% to 92.9% during Q3 and the company lowered guidance (negative EPS).

S&P Ratings subsequently downgraded WPG from BB to BB- saying:

…despite slight sequential improvement, same-property NOI growth at tier 1 enclosed properties remained extremely negative, declining 8.8% with negative 7.6% releasing spreads over the past year, affected by co-tenancy clauses and additional bankruptcies/liquidations, with some expected redevelopment deliveries delayed. We believe overall metrics are modestly worse when factoring in the company's 14 remaining tier 2 and noncore malls, which we continue to include in our analysis of Washington Prime. Due to third-quarter results, management downwardly revised its publicly stated operating target for same-property NOI growth in 2019.

Washington Prime Group Inc.'s operating performance has continued to deteriorate such that we now view the company's business less favorably, with weaker cash flow, lower EBITDA margins, and diminishing prospects for stabilization in 2020.

Louis Conforti, WPG’s CEO, took to alt rock to explain the company’s negative performance, saying “[t]ake it from the Strokes, one of my all-time favorite bands, it's not hard to explain” before describing the effects of the #retailapocalypse on performance.


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🍴Declining Restaurant Trends Ripple Through (Short Dinnerware)🍴

There are a number of trends that are taking hold currently that may be disruptive to a company that manufactures and distributes glass tableware (i.e., shot glasses, tumblers, stemware, mugs, bowls, etc.) and ceramic dinnerware products (i.e., servicing utensils and trays) to food service distributors, mass merchants, department stores, retail distributors, houseware stores, breweries and other end users of glass container products. First, people don’t go to department stores or houseware stores anymore (in case you hadn’t heard, check out the stock performance of every department store in the US and, for good measure, Bed Bath & Beyond ($BBBY)). Second, millennials aren’t drinking as much as Generation Z did. Third, people are ordering food more frequently and cooking and hosting dinner parties far less often than they did prior to VC-subsidized companies like UberEats ($UBER)Postmates and Caviar coming along. Indeed, per the company’s most recent report:

In U.S. foodservice, restaurant traffic for Q3 as reported by Black Box was down 3.6% compared to down 1.3% in Q3 of 2018.

All of these things are headwinds to a company like Libbey Glass ($LBY), an Ohio-based company founded in 1888. The longevity of the business is uber-impressive, but the year is currently 2019, and sh*t is unforgiving out there: Libbey is starting to look a bit troubled.

The company reported Q2 numbers back in August and revenue was down across all segments: food service and retail. The company cited “intense global competition” and trade headwinds (in both Mexico and China) as major factors. Net sales were $206.2mm, down 3.5% YOY, and the company reported a net loss of $43.8mm in the quarter (primarily due to a non-cash impairment charge). Notably, business was particularly bad in EMEA: $5.5mm decline. It was the second straight quarter where the business performed poorly on a year-over-year basis.

On the August 1 earnings call, the company noted:

“We do…continue to see declines in U.S. & Canada foodservice traffic, as has been reported by third-party research firms Knapp-Track and Blackbox every quarter since 2012. Our U.S. & Canada foodservice channel is currently performing in-line with market trends. Management expects these trends, and the challenging environment experienced during 2018 and the first half of 2019, to continue for the remainder of the year.”

In particular, one disturbing trend is takeout and delivery:

While this channel continues to adapt to the new norm of takeout and delivery, we've seen our focus on new products and differentiated service begin to pay dividends. In addition to these ongoing efforts, we are adapting our approach and resource deployment to expand into growing and/or underpenetrated segments of the channel, like health care and hospitality. As previously mentioned, we also see a significant opportunity to leverage digital tools to reach end users and further support our distribution partners.

Sure, they did. And they certainly needed to: a quick look at their numbers shows that the second quarter is typically the business’ strongest. This didn’t portend well for Q3 performance.


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How Are the Investment Bankers Doing?

PJT Partners Inc. ($PJT) reported fiscal Q3 numbers yesterday and total revenue hit $174.2mm (up 24% YOY) — no thanks to the restructuring group. Per Mr. Paul Taubman, compared to last year, restructuring:

…revenues decreased meaningfully in the third quarter, but held almost even for the nine month period. Given the increase in distress within certain industries, such as energy, media, telecommunications, pharma, consumer retail, our outlook for the full-year has become a bit more positive and we now expect full-year restructuring revenues to be up slightly year-over-year. This activity level combined with restructurings increasing ability to leverage the expertise and connectivity of our Strategic Advisory bankers should result in a stronger backlog heading into 2020 versus a year ago. (emphasis added)

Wait. There’s distress in energy and consumer retail? Who knew. Anyway, this isn’t fake news but it isn’t really big news either: banker assignments close choppy which makes quarterly reporting for restructuring a tough game. Still, if you’re counting on a sizable year-end bonus, you probably don’t want the company CEO singling you out for being a drag on numbers — encouraging guidance notwithstanding.

⚡️Newsflash: PG&E Corporation⚡️

You got cute. You invested in the equity. Now you may be up sh*t’s creek.

With each passing day and each damaged structure, a growing administrative expense claim is squeezing any hope of equity value and potentially threatening the backstop commitments received back in…wait…carry the one…FRIKKEN SEPTEMBER. We’re old enough to remember reading this somewhere:

Interestingly, Abrams & Knighthead have conditioned their support on, among other things, two key components: (1) a “wildfire claims cap” of $17.9mm and (2) no “occurrence of one or more wildfires in the Debtors’ service territory after the Petition Date and prior to January 1, 2020 that is asserted by any person to arise out of the Debtors’ activities and that destroys or damages more than 500 Structures.” Will global warming blow up this deal? Note: the Thomas Fire ripped through Ventura and Santa Barbara counties in December 2017, wrecking 281k acres, 1063 structures, and killing 23 people. 

Oh right. That was us: we wrote that. We really wish that hadn’t aged so well.

💥What to Make of the Credit Cycle. Part 31. (Long the Consumer)💥

It appears that the fear of recession is receding a bit:*

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Given the recent data on manufacturing and services, a recession can really only be avoided thanks to the consumer (and interest rates, perhaps). It looks likely they’re ready to do their part:

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Apropos, Deloitte released its “2019 holiday retail survey,” forecasting “that holiday retail sales will increase 4.5-5 percent this year. E-commerce holiday sales are projected to grow 14-18 percent over 2018.” They estimate that online purchases will account for 59% of holiday spending. That doesn’t bode well for brick-and-mortar retailers already feeling a world of hurt (or city streets). Here are some of the survey’s key takeaways:

  • Short-term consumer sentiment is positive and that confidence is likely to translate into spending this holiday season. However, “[f]or the first time since 2012, fewer than 40 percent of consumers expect the economy to improve in 2020. This is a 12 percent drop from 2018.” 

  • Shoppers are increasingly attuned to product, price and convenience. They want high-quality differentiated product……


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⚡️Update: CBL & Associates Properties Inc.⚡️

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In our recent newsletter, “🇺🇸Forever 21: Living the (American) Dream🇺🇸,” we highlighted the exposure that landlords have to Forever21:

The company currently spends $450mm in annual rent, spread across 12.2mm total square feet. The company will close 178 stores in the US and 350 in total.

We highlighted how the company noted the impact this plan will have on large mall landlords, the company said:

Forever 21’s management team and its advisors worked with its largest landlords to right size its geographic footprint. Four landlords hold almost 50 percent of its lease portfolio. To date, Forever 21 and its landlords have engaged in productive negotiations but have not yet reached a resolution.

Two of those landlords were the largest unsecured creditors, Simon Property Group ($SPG) and Brookfield Property Partners ($BPY). But another, CBL & Associates Properties Inc. ($CBL), also has exposure. In “Thanos Snaps, Retail Disappears,” we discussed CBL’s issues: bankruptcy-related store closures are something that CBL is very familiar with. Management said last February that things were going to turn around but, instead, things just keep getting worse as more and more retailers go out of business.

Forever 21 is one of CBL’s top tenants, occupying 19 stores (plus 1 store in “redevelopment phase”). Per CBL’s FY 2018 10-K, Forever 21 accounts for roughly 1.2% of CBL’s revenue or $10 million.

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Of those 20 stores, 7 are subsumed by a motion by Forever 21 to enter into a consulting agreement to close stores (see bankruptcy docket (#81 Exhibit A):

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On October 14, 2019, partly due Forever 21’s bankruptcy, Moody’s downgraded CBL’s corporate family rating to B2 from Baa3 and revised its outlook to negative. Moody’s explained:

CBL's cushion on its bond covenant compliance is modest, particularly the debt service test, which requires consolidated income to debt service to annual debt service charge to be greater than 1.50x. The ratio has declined from 2.46x at year-end 2018 to 2.27x at Q1 2019, and 2.25x at Q2 2019 due principally to declining operating income during these periods. CBL's same-center NOI growth was -5.3% for Q2 2019 YTD and CBL projected same-center NOI growth to be between -7.75% and -6.25% for 2019, which means that the debt service test will likely weaken further.

The chart below reflects the company’s capital structure and debt prices. It is not doing well. In fact, the term loan and the unsecured notes have priced down considerably since March:

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Here is the company's stock performance:

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The last thing CBL needed — on the heals of the downgrade — was near-instantaneous bad news. It got it this week.

Yesterday, the bankruptcy court granted interim approval authorizing Destination Maternity Corporation ($DEST) to assume a consulting agreement with Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC. Gordon Brothers will be tasked with multiple phases of store closures. Among those implicated? CBL, of course:

CBL is landlord to DEST on 16 properties that are slated for rejection. Considering that DEST cops to being party to above-market leases, this ought to result in a real economic hit to CBL as (a) it will lose a high-paying tenant, (b) it will take time to replace those boxes, and (c) it is highly unlikely to obtain tenants at as favorable rents.

Let’s pour one out for CBL, folks. The hits just keep on coming.