🔥David's Bridal = Chapter 11.5🔥

One year, three different capital structures and two restructurings — one in-court and one out-of-court. This has been a hell of a twelve-month stretch for David’s Bridal Inc. Clearly performance continues to sh*t the bed.

A year ago at this time the company was pre-bankruptcy. It had 311 stores, 9,260 employees and a $775mm capital structure split among (i) approximately $25.7 million in drawn commitments under its Prepetition ABL Agreement; (ii) an estimated $481.2 million in outstanding principal obligations under its Prepetition Term Loan Agreement; and (iii) an estimated $270.0 million in outstanding principal obligations under its unsecured notes. It filed a prepackaged bankruptcy on November 19, 2018. It confirmed its plan of reorganization in early January and the plan went effective almost 60 days after the filing.*

Under the plan of reorganization, the company shed hundreds of millions of debt, wiping out its private equity overlord, Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, LLC (except to the extent they owned unsecured notes). The company emerged from bankruptcy with (i) a $125mm asset-backed loan from Bank of America NA (the “ABL”), (ii) a $60mm “Priority” term loan agented by Cantor Fitzgerald and (iii) $240mm L+800bps “Takeback” term loan paper (also Cantor Fitzgerald). The term lenders — including, Oaktree CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation structure managed by Oaktree Capital Group** — walked away as owners with, among other things, the takeback paper and the common stock in the reorganized entity. The unsecured noteholders received a pinch of common equity and warrants. The initial post-reorg board was reconstituted to include a representative from Oaktree, a former executive from Ralph Lauren, a former banker, a senior partner from Boston Consulting Group, and a venture capitalist with experience in the early stage consumer products space.

It didn’t take long for cracks to form. In May, S&P Global Ratings downgraded David’s Bridal’s credit rating into junk territory; it noted that the company’s performance "remained significantly weaker than anticipated after emergence from bankruptcy" and it “expect[s] poor customer traffic will pressure operating performance and lead to added volatility.” The ratings agency gave both term loans the “Scarlet D” for downgrade, noting that the capital structure was “potentially unsustainable based on its rapidly weakening operating performance, which makes it vulnerable to unfavorable business and financial conditions to meet its commitments in the long term.” The term loan quoted downward. The rating proved to be prescient.

Six months later and eleven months post-confirmation, it is clear that the balance sheet was NOT right-sized to the performance of the business. On Monday, the company announced that it obtained a new $55mm equity infusion from its existing lenders. Lenders unanimously exchanged “$276mm of its existing term loans into new preferred and common equity securities” leaving the company with $75mm of funded debt exclusive of the untapped $125mm ABL. The equity that CD&R and the other unsecured noteholders received are clearly worth bupkis today. Those warrants? HAHAHA. Wildly out-of-the-money. Peace out CD&R!

The question is why did this situation flame out so quickly? On a macro level, there are secular changes taking precedence in the marriage space: things just aren’t as formal as they used to be. On a micro level, clearly the company continues to suffer from operational challenges that were not addressed during the filing. Nor post-emergence. Per Bloomberg:

David’s lost its way with customers under prior management, Marcum said in the interview. When the company launched its online marketplace, it was a separate e-commerce profit that had different pricing and marketing promotions than the stores. “Consumers today are very smart and they see that,” [CEO James] Marcum said. “It caused a lot of friction” and an “extremely poor experience” for customers.

Ummm, okay, but wasn’t that supposed to have been fixed by now??

The company underestimated the negative impact that Chapter 11 would have going into its strongest selling period, and the competition “took advantage of it,” Marcum said.

Clearly the lenders underestimated the impact, too. How else do you explain the thinking around 10+% paper?

Given that the paper steadily quoted down for months leading up to this transaction, it’s obvious that (i) brides-to-be were steering clear from David’s Bridal after seeing media clips about other brides getting burned by bankrupted dress sellers, (ii) consequently, the lenders saw a constant stream of declining numbers, and (iii) as they learned more about the state of the business, lenders scrambled to try and dump this turd before a wipeout transpired. Spoiler alert: it has transpired.

As for the capital structure, clearly this thing came out of bankruptcy over-levered: it looks like the take-back paper was driven, in part, by CLOs in the capital structure. Callback to just a few weeks ago when, in “💥CLO NO!?!?💥,” we wrote (paywall):

…most CLO fund documents also don’t permit CLOs to take on new equity in restructurings. This limitation, by default, pushes CLOs towards “take-back paper” (read: new debt) in lieu of equity. If you’re a regular-way lender on an ad hoc group full of CLOs, then, this makes for an interesting dynamic: you may prefer — and have the latitude — to (i) swap debt for equity, thereby taking turns of leverage off to right-size the reorganized debtor’s balance sheet and (ii) give the reorganized entity a fighting chance to survive and drive equity returns. Your CLO counterparts, however, have different motives: they’ll push for more leverage. This misaligned incentive can sometimes get so bad that ad hoc groups will have to negotiate amongst themselves the go-forward capital structure without even getting management input. In this scenario, management projections are besides the point. If you’re looking for some explanation as to why there appears to be a rise in Chapter 22 filings, well, this might be one.

Not everything will have to file for bankruptcy a second time. But, as a practical matter, the result is the same here in terms of a capital structure refresh. Call this a Chapter 11.5.***

*Shockingly, the company didn’t boast of a “successful restructuring” like every other retailer-destined-for-a-chapter-22 tends to do. Perhaps retailers are now taking PETITION’s “Two-Year Rule” into account? 🤔😜

**The term lenders that made up the Ad Hoc Term Lender Group included a hodgepodge of private equity funds, hedge funds and CLOs.

***We really struggled with a witty thing to label a fact pattern where, within a year of bankruptcy, a company has to do a an out-of-court balance sheet refresh without going into a formal Chapter 22. Any ideas? Email us.

What to Make of the Credit Cycle. Part 14.1. (Long Div Recaps; Long Blackstone; Short Refinitiv)

On Sunday in “What to Make of the Credit Cycle. Part 14. (Long Blackstone; Short Refinitiv),” we provided our colorful take on the fervent (and 2x over-subscribed) demand for the $13.5 billion Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv loan and bond issuance. Our take was framed from the perspective of the high yield trader and was meant to provide some insight into the machinations that occur behind the scenes at a high yield fund. But what does this deal mean for private equity firms and leveraged buyouts?

Spoiler alert: all good things.

Reuters wrote:

The rousing results are likely to boost secondary pricing and will intensify pressure on primary pricing and other terms and conditions, after investors won a reprieve in the summer from aggressive transactions amid a surge in supply.

The SMi100, an index that tracks the 100 most widely held loans, stands at 98.73, the highest point since February. About 42% of US loans are now trading above par, according to LPC data. Average US high-yield bonds, meanwhile, have rallied sharply over the past couple of weeks to Treasuries plus 325bp, or just 3bp off post-crisis lows, according to ICE BAML data. (emphasis added)

Private equity firms likely smell blood in the water. More from Reuters:

The successes could also herald a more aggressive underwriting era as private equity firms squeeze arranging banks harder, which could open the door to another round of opportunistic repricings, refinancings and dividend recapitalizations that allow sponsors to take advantage of weak documentation.

“The next stuff behind the scenes is going to be punchy,” the global debt head said.

Ah, dividend recapitalizations. We miss those.

Reuters continued:

While the results are undeniably good for private equity firms, they may not be good for investors who are increasingly nervous about aggressive deals as an economic downturn draws closer at the end of an unusually long economic cycle.

With Refinitiv, Akzo and Envision, technical factors – primarily huge demand and a small visible pipeline of deals – overwhelmed any specific credit concerns and fears about aggressive documentation that allow sponsors to extract dividends quickly or make transformative asset sales and acquisitions without investors’ consent.

The three jumbo loans, each of which are capital-stretching, represent half of the forward calendar, which is already looking thinner. Worries about future supply encouraged investors to join the big, liquid deals in droves, particularly as new money carve-outs have previously proved to be particularly profitable.

All of this continues to worry financial regulators who are watching the fervor play out. The Bank of International Settlements recently warned that, per Bloomberg:

…likely distress among indebted borrowers may spread into the wider economy as central banks raise interest rates. It’s not just the total debt, but the fact that investors seem less and less concerned about protecting themselves against losses, the BIS said.

Yes, indeed. The return of covenant-lite debt has been well documented.

And the borrower-favorable market has been well documented.

“When there’s tons of liquidity, lenders don’t value covenants and they’re willing to lend at very high leverage values,” said Douglas Diamond, a finance professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. “If you get a negative shock after that, you’ve now got a very vulnerable sector. The crisis won’t happen tomorrow but the vulnerability is there.”

The BIS report identified other concerns, including the prospect of fire sales by loan funds if ratings downgrades push some of their investments into junk. Diamond said there’s potential for such leveraged mutual funds to cause havoc.

“The borrowing that they do is usually from a bank,” he said in an interview. “They buy a loan from a bank, they borrow money from the bank to buy the loan from the bank -- not necessarily the same bank. So the risk would ultimately get back to bank balance sheets.”

But high yield mutual funds aren’t the only vehicles driving this meshugas. Don’t forget about CLOs, which, as we discussed in “💥The CLO Market is Going Bananas💥,” are in full-on volume mode. Relating to factors driving demand for borrower-friendly paper, Alexandra Scaggs wrote in Barron’s:

Another is the robust demand for floating-rate debt such as leveraged loans to protect against Federal Reserve rate increases. Funds investing in loans have seen $14.4 billion of inflows this year, according to EPFR, following on $16 billion of inflows in 2017 and $11 billion in 2016. It is not clear the scramble for floating-rate securities will stop any time soon, as the Fed is expected to raise rates four times in the next 12 months, according to Bloomberg data. The demand for loans has also been fueled by the rise of the market for collateralized loan obligations, securitized products that hold pools of loans as collateral and pay their investors the interest collected from those loans in order of tranche quality.

For the uninitiated, here is an excellent recently published primer from S&P Global Ratings on how CLOs function. Pour yourself a cup of coffee and give it a perusal. It’s worth it. CLO dynamics will definitely play into the next cycle.

*****

In a separate segment on Sunday, we snarked about over-the-transom strategic-alternatives pitch deck” and banker boredom. Distressed and high yield investors are, no doubt, equally if not more bored. Aside from Q1, 2018 has been a barren wasteland for restructuring and bankruptcy professionals looking for things to do. Long bitching come bonus time.

But all of this flippant high yield activity has to come home to roost at some point. The question, as always, remains “when?”

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