Restaurants (Short Kitchens, Long Bikes)

Options abound for food these days - particularly if you live in an urban area. You can get your food sent to you in kits (Hello Fresh and Blue Apron), as groceries (Amazon FreshFresh Direct) or from restaurants via the gazillion delivery services that are duking it out with one another AND capitalizing upon the rise in co-cooking kitchens (CaviarPostmates, Grubhub and UberEats). We could fill 6 minutes of a$$-kicking reading just by continuing the list.

Here's the thing: much like the consumer products e-commerce space - where shipping is cutting into retail margins bigly - food delivery is killing your favorite restaurant. Why? Well, Captain Obvious, there are too many hands in the pot. As The New Yorker highlights (must read), "over-all profit margin has shrunk by a third, and that the only obvious contributing factor is the shift toward delivery." Ruh roh.

The piece is shocking in how ignorant every seems to be about the effect of delivery services on restaurant margins. This bit also struck us, "It’s worth noting that, even while charging restaurants steep rates, most delivery platforms are not yet profitable, either. Their hope is that order volumes will one day become high enough—and couriers will deliver enough orders per hour—to push them into the black." The alleged answer? A kitchen within a kitchen. Uber "is nudging restaurants to embed “virtual restaurants” inside their kitchens—picture a burger joint housing, at Uber Eats’s behest, a cookie company that exists only as a menu on the delivery provider’s site. DoorDash, an Uber Eats competitor, has started to experiment with leasing remote kitchen space to restaurants so that they can expand their delivery radii. If such practices catch on, it’s easy to imagine a segment of the restaurant economy that looks a lot like, well, Uber, with an army of individual restaurants designed to serve the needs of middle-man platforms but struggling to make a living themselves." This is "progress" folks. 
 

Professional Fees (Long Cannibalization)

$1725/hour = CHA CHING!

What a month ya'll. We can't remember the last time that restructuring fees have gotten so much public and mainstream scrutiny. Last week we noted how The New Yorker took shots at restructuring professional fees in Puerto Rico. This week, Dow Jones Newswires took a look at Seadrill Ltd. and noted that Kirkland & Ellis LLP collected over $47mm in the 12 months prior to the case filing. Shareholders denied an equity committee must love that. Elsewhere, The New York Times gets into the game and asks in a MUST READ "Why Companies Like Toys 'R' Us Love to Go Bust in Richmond, Va." Which, of course, was interesting because they basically took the foundations of our piece here and raised by going "all in," alleging that Virginia is now a favorable venue because of blah ("rocket docket"), blah (debtor-favorable precedent) and BOOM (homies are getting P.A.I.D.). Here's the NYT dropping the bomb: "But perhaps one of the biggest draws, according to bankruptcy lawyers and academics, is the hefty rates lawyers are able to charge there. The New York law firm representing Toys “R” Us, Kirkland & Ellis, told the judge that its lawyers were charging as much as $1,745 an hour. That is 25 percent more than the average highest rate in 10 of the largest bankruptcies this year, according [to] an analysis by The New York Times." Points for creativity: jurisdictional arbitrage is our new favorite form of professional revenue generation. Of course, "the huge fees can eat into the money that is left over for small creditors - typically vendors, suppliers and pensioners." Did someone say "pensioners"? Happy holidays.
 

Fallout from Toys R US & More Distressed Retail

Blah, Blah, Private Equity = Death to Retail?

Courtesy of the New Yorker, some more Toys "R" Us history here. Mattel ($MAT) had to amend its credit agreement, reflecting significant leverage ratio uncertainty after the Toys "R" Us bankruptcy filing. Jakks Pacific Inc. ($JAKK) reported that it now expects a net loss in '17 and then, as if to pour salt on the wound, the ratings agencies unleashed a downgrade. Folks are getting increasingly nervous about the retail fallout amidst conflicting reports about store closures/openingsPETITION NOTE: lost in all the noise around Toys is that their new business plan calls for increased employee wages - implying a belief that Walmart's ($WMT) wage increases have helped Walmart provide a better "experience."  PETITION NOTE II: It appears that the lenders firmly believe that comparisons between Toys "R" Us and (liquidated) Circuit City are misplaced. Toys is THE LAST LARGE free-standing toy seller. Circuit City was generally expendable given that, at the time, the space was considered saturated and uber-competitive. Now, Best Buy ($BBY - up ~26% YTD, which is down after cratering the other day) fills that void. Just like Barnes & Noble ($BKS - down ~37% YTD) fills the (physical) book void (well, at least until Amazon book stores sprout in force - already it's popping up in New York and LA). And Dick's Sporting Goods ($DKS - down ~50% YTD) now has significant sporting goods market share. We're not saying WE would invest on this "LAST" basis because we wouldn't be caught dead with DKS, BKS or BBY in the PETITION 401(K); but, we are saying that the lenders appear to be lending, at least in part, on that basis. And word is that the DIP is over-subscribed (and Reorg Researchcaptures how lenders are clamoring for inclusion). Meanwhile, the list of distressed retailers seems to grow by the day: note: Belk Inc.Fresh MarketBi-Lo99 Cents Only Stores and more (blah blah, private equity). But, to put an exclamation point on this, see, "Private equity drove Toys "R" Us into bankruptcy, sure, but that isn't quite the same thing as destroying it."