⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Unit Corporation ($UNT)⛽️

Unit Corporation

May 22, 2020

Oklahoma is where a lot of the action is at. Unit Corporation ($UNT) is a publicly-traded Tulsa-based holding company that, through three operating segments, offers (i) oil and gas exploration and production, (ii) contract drilling and (iii) midstream services. Like every other oil and gas company under the sun, this one has too much funded debt. $789mm to be exact, split between a $139mm RBL facility and $650mm in ‘21 subordinated unsecured notes. And like every other oil and gas company under the sun, it cannot sustain its capital structure. For months now, the debtors have been the bankruptcy equivalent of deadbeats — bouncing from one standstill agreement to the next so as not to get hit with a meaningful on-schedule redetermination liability that they wouldn’t be able to satisfy (PETITION Note: this is particularly relevant because they had already been hit by a “wildcard” or “off-schedule” redetermination in January, knocking their borrowing base down $75mm. Instant liability! Yay!!). On brand, the debtors likewise couldn’t afford their semi-annual May 15 interest payment.

Why the bankruptcy now? Well, you’ve seen this movie many times already in the last month or so. You’ve got a starring role for Vladimir Putin. And a starring role for MBS. And you’ve got a few plagues for added drama: first, plummeting commodity prices and then a global pandemic. These factors negatively impacted liquidity and sparked a number of strategic processes including (a) the sale of 50% ownership in Superior Pipeline Company to SP Investor Holdings LLC for $300mm in spring of 2018 and (b) an attempted up-tier exchange of the subordinated notes into newly issued 10% senior secured notes and 7% junior notes. The debtors, however, were unable to successfully obtain the requisite number of tenders. Not only would the exchange have extended the debtors’ maturity profile and eliminated short-and-medium term refi risk, it would have removed the danger that the debtors would trigger a springing maturity in their RBL. Oh well.

Luckily the debtors got themselves an agreement with 70% of the subordinated noteholders and the RBL lenders on the terms of a consensual financial restructuring transaction — like, as the shotclock was about to go off (read: when the standstill agreement expired on May 22, the filing date). The deal includes, among other things, (i) a $36mm new money DIP credit facility, (ii) a debt-for-equity swap by the noteholders for equity in each of reorganized Unit Corp and the upstream and contact drilling opcos, (iii) a new $180mm exit facility from the RBL lenders in exchange for a 5% exit fee paid in post-reorg equity in reorganized Unit Corp. (PETITION Note: apparently the RBL lenders have no interest in owning equity in contact drilling services), and (iv) payment in full in cash or reorganized equity to general unsecured claimants depending upon which entity they have a claim against. Notably, equityholders who do not opt out of releases will receive out-of-the-money warrants exercisable for an aggregate of 12.5% of the interests in the reorganized Unit Corp entity.

We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight one other aspect of these cases. As is all the rage these days, management got away with an amended incentive structure on the eve of bankruptcy that enriched them all to the tune of $900k. Sweeeeeet. Meanwhile, they spent a good chunk of November ‘19 through April ‘20 sh*tcanning their employees and promising them 4 weeks of severance for every year of service up to 104 weeks. While this is admittedly a pretty rich severance plan, it appears that the restructuring support agreement memorializing the above-referenced transaction proposes to renege on this policy and instead provide merely four to 13 weeks severance to employees. You’ve gotta love these oil and gas execs: they’re wildly proficient at destroying value but still manage to always siphon some off for themselves. It’s awesome.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: $139mm RBL facility (BOKF NA), $650mm in ‘21 subordinated unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Paul Heath, Matthew Pyeatt, David Meyer, Lauren Kanzer, Zachary Paiva, Emily Tomlinson)

    • Financial Advisor: Opportune LLP (Gary Pittman)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Bo Yi)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • RBL Agent: BOKF NA

      • Legal: Frederic Dorwart Lawyers PLLC (Samuel Ory) & Bracewell LLP (William A. Trey Wood III)

      • Financial Advisor: Huron Consulting Group Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Lauren Tauro)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

💊New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Rochester Drug Cooperative Inc.💊

Rochester Drug Cooperative Inc.

March 12, 2020

New York-based wholesale pharmaceutical cooperative that services independent pharmacies filed for bankruptcy to wind down its business. Revenues have been declining for years and it faces significant litigation risk in connection with a number of opioid-based lawsuits.

  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of New York (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $170mm RCF & $5mm Term Loan (M&T Bank(

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC (Stephen Donato)

    • Financial Advisor: Huron Consulting Group LLC

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Epiq (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

🌿New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - GenCanna Global USA Inc.🌿

GenCanna Global USA Inc.

January 24, 2020

Cannabis companies may not have access to federal bankruptcy courts but vertically-integrated agtech companies that develop federally-legal hemp-derived cannabinoid products like CBD sure do. 👍

Now, we know what you’re thinking: CBD is all the rage, everyone is talking about it, everyone — even Nana — is using it, and everyone is infusing it in their products, so how the hell could an “industry pioneer” in the space end up in bankruptcy court?!? Sh*t. We have a whole bin of it in the corner of our WeWork office, just under where the beer used to be. In fact, we collectively drank some and rubbed some all over our bodies in a team building exercise just prior to righting and editting this peace so that’s a very fair question.

The companies troubles include:

  • An inability to find a strategic partner or find a banker — in the age of WeWork — that would carry the company through a capital-raising IPO.

  • Consummate a transaction with a public-traded strategic with a hyper-inflated stock price of its own (callback to the epic rise of weed stock values) prior to reality set in.

  • A fire at a production facility. How ironic.

  • A contract dispute with a contractor working on a new hemp processing facility. How trite.

  • An inability to find proper “financial leadership.” Apparently, the lenders were unimpressed with the company’s chosen CFO and then required the retention of Huron Consulting Group which then led to the sh*tcanning of the CFO which then led to that CFO claiming that there was fraud on the books which then led to an investigation which then concluded that it was all just “psyche, I’m just a sore loser” and….damn this CBD feels good. How could there be drama like this when everyone has this sh*t tingling all over their body?

  • Fights with farmers who didn’t get their fixed payments after the company’s sales did not materialize as projected. Ah, projections.

  • A price collapse. Per the company, “Beginning in the summer of 2019, pricing in the industry plummeted across all CBD product categories. By the end of the year and through today, bulk product prices in nearly all categories have dropped by as much as 80%. This dramatic plunge in pricing also correlated to the large drop in the public capital markets for cannabis companies in both the US and Canada.” Apparently the fact that this sh*t is easy to produce and popped everywhere in basically 1.2 seconds is not good for pricing. Who knew?

  • A lack of regulatory clarity about the status of hemp-derived products has delayed investment and development of products. Or so they say. Seems like everyone under the sun has some CBD-infused product at this point, but whatever. We’ll take this at face value.

Of course, the biggest trouble was probably the involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against the company by three creditors. But, in the spirit of making lemonade, the company will take advantage of the opportunity to convert the company to a voluntary 11 and use the benefit of the automatic stay obtain some much-needed liquidity in the form of a $10mm DIP credit facility and figure out a path forward.


  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Kentucky (Judge Schaaf)

  • Capital Structure: $68.5mm Term Loans (MGG Investment Group LP)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP (Michael Barrie, Jennifer Hoover, Elliot Smith) & Dentons Bingham Greenebaum LLP (James Irving, April Wimberg, Christopher Madden)

    • Financial Advisor: Huron Consulting Group (James Alt, Marc Passalacqua, Benjamin Smith)

    • Investment Banker: Jefferies Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Lender: MGG Investment Group LP

      • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel (Kristine Manoukian, Adam Harris) & Fowler Bell PLLC (Taft McKinstry, Christopher Colson)