⚡️Update: GTT Communications Inc. ($GTT)⚡️

Continuing our prior reporting on GTT Communications Inc., it seems safe to say that things appear a bit uncertain.

On March 8th, Bloomberg News reported that GTT had entered into bankruptcy negotiations with its creditors:

GTT Communications Inc. has started formal talks with creditors around a restructuring plan that would see its unsecured debt holders take ownership of the telecommunications company through a bankruptcy filing. McLean, Virginia-based GTT is presenting creditors a proposal on Monday that would hand term loan holders a large cash payment from the $2.15 billion sale of its infrastructure unit, according to people with knowledge of the matter, who asked not to be identified discussing confidential negotiations.

Lenders would also get new debt with a coupon in the 7% to 9% range and a portion of the reorganized equity. GTT’s unsecured creditors would receive the majority of the new equity under the proposal, becoming the owners of the reorganized company, the people said. Lenders and creditors are becoming restricted from trading in anticipation of the formal talks, the people said. Negotiations are in the early stages and the terms could change, they added.”

For weeks, the market has been anticipating an update on either the infrastructure asset sale process or fundamentals (or both). On March 13, GTT essentially signaled that the market will have to wait a little longer. In an SEC filing, GTT notified the market that its YE 2020 10-K would be delayed; management outlined a host of new accounting and reporting issues as far back as 2017. If this sounds like déjà vu, it is: accounting issues first emerged in September 2020 during the diligence phase of the asset sale process.

Per Bloomberg, GTT “had promised to deliver a deleveraging plan by March 8 and faces a March 31 deadline to reach an agreement with its creditors.” Well — 🗓 checks calendar 🗓 — it’s March 31 and there’s officially no agreement. Instead, there’s yet another forbearance extension (which, we suppose, is an agreement of sorts) through April 15. In connection with the extension, GTT agreed to pay the fees and expenses of lender and agent advisors.

The stock has gotten pummeled since our initial report; it is currently trading at 1/3 the price it was back in late October 2020 (now around $1.85/share).

Similarly, the $575mm 7.875% Unsecured Notes due 2024 were trading around 47 cents on the dollar then and are languishing now in the high teens, though meaningfully up off of March 12 lows (as of 3/30/21 it was at 17 cents on the dollar versus 5 cents earlier in the month). On the other hand, the company’s term loan was one of last week’s biggest winners, ending last week up 2.3% around 81 cents on the dollar.

Whatever happens, one thing is clear: GTT’s broken roll-up story is an incredible fall from grace for a company that promised so much.

💥Will the Biden Administration Disrupt Private Prisons? Part II.💥

🚨Geo Group Inc. ($GEO)🚨

We dug deep into the private prison space with our coverage of Corecivic Inc. ($CXW) a few weeks ago so it’s only fair we discuss Geo Group Inc. ($GEO) — the second largest operator of private prisons and immigrant detention centers in the US. Per Geo’s FY 2020 10-K, Geo’s operations consist of 93,000 beds across 118 facilities (including 11 idle facilities).

As we stated with CXW, sentiment for private prisons is incredibly negative. Government officials are applying political pressure (see here and here), and major Wall Street banks have gone on record saying they would stop financing private prisons over ESG concerns (even though sometimes they still do).

Adding in the impact from COVID, the situation for private prisons seems downright dire. Disclosure from Geo indicates that over the course of 2020, the Federal Bureau of Prisons decided not to renew three of the company’s active contracts expiring during Q121. We noted that Corecivic also saw some contract non-renewals. Yet through it all, both Corecivic and Geo have been managing both their operations and their capital structures quite effectively.

On Geo’s Q4 2020 conference callCFO Brian R. Evans stated those three contracts totaled $100mm of revenue, but clarified that not all of it will impact the company’s 2021 figures. Mr. Evans commented:

As I said, the BOP facilities that are expected to roll off this year is about $100 million in revenue between the three of them, but all of that revenue won’t impact this year. Some of the revenue that will impact is the facilities that have already been announced for termination plus these others that we expect to terminate, offset by the facilities that are coming online which are mainly the facilities in California and the US Marshals facility in Texas.

Geo appears to be beating its own guidance. On that Q420 conference call, Noble Capital Markets Inc. analyst Joe Gomes asked:

The first question I wanted to ask, you guys had a nice beat on adjusted basis for the guidance you provided in the third quarter, even in such a difficult operating environment. And I just wondered if you could expound a little bit more on how you guys ended up beating the third quarter guidance – the guidance made in the third quarter. Pardon me.

To which Mr. Evans replied:

Sure. So, I think two main issues, we’ve consistently during the pandemic perform better in a number of cost categories in the facilities. And we continue to see that during the fourth quarter. And going into next year, we’ve – we haven’t necessarily assumed that all that benefit will continue. So, we’ve been conservative with regards to that benefit that we’ve been able to experience and manage, and then we also saw some modest improvement in some of our occupancy levels at some of our facilities.” (emphasis added)

Geo has certainly been hurt by COVID. Inmate populations have declined amid pandemic lockdowns, and management has needed to implement costly sanitation and testing procedures to keep both employees and inmates safe amid the pandemic. Mr. Zoley pegged the overall COVID impact to Geo’s financial profitability at a “15% to 20% reduction.”

In response, Geo is prioritizing debt paydown and shoring up liquidity. On Geo’s conference call, CEO & Founder George Zoley announced that, over the course of 2020, Geo paid down approximately $100 million of net debt and cut quarterly dividend payments. It also raised new money. On February 17, 2021, Geo tapped the new issue debt markets with a private offering. Bloomberg covered the effort:

Geo Group Inc., one of the largest operators of private prisons and immigrant detention centers in the U.S. that has been snubbed by much of Wall Street, is planning to sell at least $200 million of convertible bonds to refinance debt maturing next year.

The company has tapped StoneX Group Inc. to run the sale amid increasing political scrutiny over the for-profit prison industry, according to people with knowledge of the matter, who asked not to be identified because details of the transaction are private.

If successful, the deal will help Geo refinance its 5.875% unsecured notes due in January 2022, according to a statement Wednesday. It could also help alleviate concerns about the company’s ability to raise capital from institutional investors.

It appears there’s a bank for every deal. Bloomberg continues:

“The sale comes at a challenging time for Geo. Its earnings have been hit by lower occupancy rates at its facilities during the pandemic, while the entire industry remains under heavy political pressurePresident Joe Biden instructed the Justice Department last month not to renew contracts with private-prison operators, dealing the latest blow to the sector.

The offering was a big hit. In its 2020 10-K, Geo announced that on February 24, 2021, Geo closed on “$230.0 million…of 6.50% exchangeable senior notes due 2026,” $30.0 million ahead of launch.

The ratings agencies, however, are unimpressed. S&P Global Ratings slapped a vicious two-notch downgrade on the company (and also downgraded CoreCivic for sh*ts and giggles). Per Bloomberg:

Geo suffered a two-notch downgrade to B, a junk rating five steps below investment-grade, in spite its having sold a convertible bond last month. S&P said the company may struggle to refinance $1.7 billion of debt maturing in 2024 and warned that it may cut the company’s rating further over the next 12 months if Geo doesn’t make progress in lowering that risk.

Restructuring professionals are on the hunt for everything and anything these days. While the fundamentals clearly suggest there’s still room for these businesses to run, there’s some writing on the wall. And having nothing better to do, restructuring professionals are agitating and, consequently, they’re chatting up various lenders in the capital structure and now they, too, are agitating and, presumably, the company will need to engage with those lenders at some point. The downgrade all but nudges that scenario into action.

Geo’s capital structure is … robust. It looks something like this:

  • $704mm of 1L Revolving Credit Facility due 5/24;

  • $770mm of 1L Term Loan B due 3/24 (trading at roughly 88 cents);

  • $281mm of 5.125% ‘23 senior unsecured paper (trading at roughly 88 cents);

  • $242mm of 5.875% ‘24 senior unsecured paper;

  • $350mm of 6% ‘26 senior unsecured paper; and

  • the new $230mm of 6.5% ‘26 convertible notes (trading at 105).

Obviously, given the refi, Geo’s nearest-term maturing tranche, the 5.875% Senior Notes due January 2022, went out as effectively par paper. The longer dated 6% unsecured paper maturing in April 2026 has been a bit dicier, dipping down into the 60s back in November. Notably, however, it now trades higher now (~72) than it did on Election Day (though it is down 10% since the new year, which reflects President Biden’s directive regarding private US prison companies). The unsecured notes maturing in October 2024 follow the same pattern (and currently trade at ~79.5).

Like we said, these businesses aren’t going away tomorrow; they’re even raising fresh capital in the face of some notable headwinds. Despite peak negative headlines, it’s clear that market participants haven’t given up on private prisons. The pertinent question is whether that trend will persist as the negativity surrounding these names continues to grow and lenders up and down the stack coalesce in an attempt to engage the company on its still-over-levered balance sheet.

👍Winners/Losers of the Week of March 28👎

Winners

1. Avianca Holdings SA ($AVHOQ). There is light at the end of the tunnel. With vaccines sparking more confidence in flying — TSA numbers are way up, hitting a high of 1.5mm people on 3/21/21 — the airliner intends to exit bankruptcy by the end of the year with a reduced fleet size but more dense seating (believe it or not).

2. CBL Properties ($CBLAQ). There is light at the end of the tunnel! The company entered into a restructuring support agreement with its credit facility lenders and unsecured noteholders, effectively ending a months-long pissing contest with Wells Fargo Bank ($WFC) and…

TO READ THE REST OF THIS PIECE, YOU MUST BE A PAYING SUBSCRIBER.

⚡️Update: Washington Prime Group ($WPG)⚡️

As new retail looks out onto the horizon, old retail struggles to survive.

We’ve been following the beleaguered Washington Prime Group Inc. ($WPG) for years (see here and here). Our last update indicated that WPG’s tenants are struggling to pay rent, which is making it tough on the mall operator to manage its ~$4b of debt. WPG reported Q4 and FY 2020 earnings on March 16, and they were NOT good. For a high level recap:

WPG 1.png
  • Revenue down 12% for the quarter and 21% annually, YoY;

  • Adj. EBITDA (EBITDAre) down 22% for the quarter and 33% annually, YoY; margins absolutely CRUSHED; and

  • Comparable NOI down 14% for the quarter and 24% annually, YoY.

Exactly one month earlier, WPG announced it wouldn’t be making its $23.2mm interest payment on its Senior Notes due 2024 and entered into a 30-day grace period. With the grace period set to expire on March 17th and ripen into a full-blown Event of Default, WPG and its lenders needed to get back to the table.

Included in its earnings release was an announcement by WPG that it had entered into a forbearance agreements with “certain beneficial owners of more than 67% of the aggregate principal amount” of the 2024 Senior Notes and with respect to its Credit Agreements. The forbearance period expires “on the earlier of March 31, 2021 and “the occurrence of any of the specified early termination events” including “negotiations of the terms and conditions of a financial restructuring…of the existing debt of, existing equity interests in, and certain other obligations of the Company and certain of its direct and indirect subsidiaries.” WPG warns that a restructuring “may need to be implemented…under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Management provided neither 2021 guidance nor a conference call. And on March 17 S&P downgraded WPG’s issuer credit rating to 'D' from 'CC'. Can’t say we’re surprised.

None of that fundamental weakness stopped the retail speculators from getting into the action.

“Blow up,” sure, but not in the way @ersindemirtas expected. On the day of the ⬆️ prognostication, the stock was trading at $3.39/share. After the earnings report, the stock dipped below $3/share only to pop back 10% and close slightly over $3/share. Maybe because, as this guy ⬇️ astutely points out, things are kinda backwards these days:

On Monday, however, Bloomberg reported that WPG is in the market for a DIP loan:

Guggenheim, the company’s investment bank, has asked prospective lenders to indicate their interest in providing a potential $150 million debtor-in-possession loan, according to one of the people, who asked not to be identified discussing confidential talks. The negotiations are ongoing and the terms could change, the people said.

Which is where the WPG story is these days. It’s not a question of ‘if’ or ‘when.’ It’s a question of ‘how much.’

The stock initially dropped over 12% on the news, regained some ground to end Monday down 7.6% before rallying slightly after the market closed. Because, like, 🤷‍♀️.

Source: Yahoo! Finance

Source: Yahoo! Finance

Of course, that small rally didn’t hold. The company got smoked by over 10% in trading on Tuesday:

Source: Yahoo! Finance

Source: Yahoo! Finance

While — ⚡️shocker⚡️ — the market appears to be acting rationally for once, there are, of course, certain participants who appear unfazed.

There’s not much suspense left in this story beyond just how wrong @MaxValue1 will be.

👕thredUP: Resale Goes Mainstream👕

For years, PETITION has been covering the emergence of resale as a new and growing retail category (see hereherehere and here). If VCs can write self-aggrandizing social media posts whenever one of their investments goes public, surely we can take a small victory lap too. On March 3, 2021thredUP Inc. (“thredUP”) filed its S-1 ahead of an IPO. The S-1 allowed us to dig deep into a major player in the resale market.

thredUP claims to be one of the world’s largest online resale platforms for second-hand women’s and kid’s apparel, shoes and accessories. Founded in 2009, the business currently boasts 428,000 Active Sellers and 1.24 million Active Buyers who come to the platform to find items at an up to 90% discount to their estimated retail price. thredUP claims its platform is loved by both parties; buyers love shopping value, premium and luxury brands all in one place, while sellers love the convenience of unlocking value for either themselves or the charity of their choice. thredUP sees a huge opportunity in the resale market — according to the GlobalData Market Survey, the resale market is expected to grow from $7b in ‘19 to $36b by ‘24, representing a compound annual growth rate of 39%.

How Does thredUP’s Business Work?

thredUP’s entire end-to-end chain works as follows:

A seller signs up for thredUP and orders a Clean Out Kit. She fills thredUP’s ‘Clean Out Kit’ with items from her closet that no longer spark joy:

Sellers on thredUP’s platform benefit from an extremely low touch platform: thredUP essentially does all the work. The seller’s only decision to make prior to shipping their clothing is whether they want to sell their clothing for cash, store credit, or donate the proceeds to charity. Once that decision is made, the seller fills the Clean Out Kit bag and leaves it on their doorstep for a mail carrier pick up, or drops it off at a retail or logistics partner location for shipping, free of charge. Once the items are shipped, the seller’s work is finished. thredUP’s proprietary platform manages item selection and pricing, merchandising, fulfillment, payments and customer service. thredUP uses an internal software algorithm to “predict the demand for an item and determine a listing price for it, along with setting the seller payout ratio, with the aim of optimizing sell-through, gross profit dollars and…unit economics.” Seller payout ranges from 3% to 15% for items listed at $5.00 to $19.99, and up to 80% for items listed at $200 and above. For the year ended 12/31/20, that resulted in an average seller payout of 19% of the item sale price with an average seller payout per bag of $51.70. thredUP is clearly working with small dollars, but on significant volume.

Harvard Business School covered thredUP’s origins as “a peer-to-peer online clothes sharing site for adults.” In the words of co-founder and CEO James Reinhart, “It was a great story. And a bad business…Customer adoption and use of the product wasn’t nearly what we had hoped.” In 2009, acceptance of secondhand clothing was not mainstream. In 2012, thredUP pivoted to the children’s market. Per Mr. Reinhart, “[thredUP] realized there was a huge opportunity in kids because there’s the forced obsolescence of kids’ clothing.” thredUP was able to scale the business quickly from less than 20,000 adults to more than 300,000 parents, adding at a rate of 500 to 1,000 per day. thredUP discloses in its S-1 that the company shifted again in mid-2019, de-prioritizing its product sales in favor of consignment sales. As thredUP’s S-1 indicates, consignment may be a vastly superior retail business model. Per the S-1:

“We believe that operating primarily on consignment also gives us the ability to drive stronger future margins than traditional inventory-taking business models because we incur minimal inventory risk and benefit from favorable working capital dynamics. Our buyers pay us upfront when they purchase an item. For items held on consignment, after the end of the 14-day return window for buyers, we credit our sellers’ accounts with their seller payout. Our sellers then take an average of more than 60 days to use their funds.”

In other words, thredUP presumably derives a kind of “float” benefit as well, generating interest income off of that 60-day average. In addition to those positives, thredUP preserves a degree leverage over its sellers. Once a customer ships its items to thredUP, thredUP can decide which goods will ultimately be passed through to the marketplace, and at what price they will be listed at, therefore locking in platform product quality and margin.

thredUP - A Contrarian Strategy

In a letter to potential shareholders, Mr. Reinhart outlines the criticism thredUP faced from its earliest days:

Since the earliest days of thredUP, we have been told that our strategy was contrarian. That our commitment to cracking the hardest infrastructure, supply chain and data challenges in the service of a better customer experience was risky or could lead to failure. “Touching things” is hard. “Low price points” are hard. “Single SKUs” is just plain crazy. Yes...We are doing the hard things that meaningfully expand this opportunity and enhance our leadership position. I have been willing to be misunderstood and even underestimated in taking this approach, driven by my belief that businesses that are harder to build in the short-term can have extraordinary long-term impact.

In its S-1, thredUP outlines various proprietary technologies and processes it utilizes to execute its “contrarian” strategy. thredUP operations are “purpose-built for “single SKU” logistics, meaning that every item processed is unique, came from or belongs to an individual seller, and is individually tracked….” As there are no barcodes on clothing, moving all these unique SKUs can only be accomplished through technology. thredUP’s technological aids cover i) visual recognition of items, ii) supply acceptance and itemization, iii) pricing and merchandising, iv) photography, and v) storage and fulfillment.

Photography is one of the largest and most expensive pain points when prepping an item for online sale. thredUP claims it “utilizes machine learning and artificial intelligence” and “software that automatically selects the optimum photo to drive buyer engagement…[a] specialized photo selection capability” which enables thredUP to produce hundreds of thousands of high-quality photos a day without a professional photographer.

As Mr. Reinhart alludes to in his letter, one key to managing thredUP’s volume is reliable distribution. thredUP has leased five different distribution centers in Arizona, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, with total capacity of 5.5 million items (the company has plans to expand that to 6.5 million by the end of 2021). On current capacity, thredUP has the ability to process more than 100,000 unique SKUs per day. thredUP’s engineering team has developed and implemented automation technology, which the company believes results in reduced labor and fixed costs while increasing storage density and throughput capacity. thredUP also claims their software matches buyers to the closest distribution center, while personalizes the assortment potential buyers they see on the marketplace to items that are physically closest to them. This geographical personalization enables buyers to find items that are lower priced (the closer the item, the lower the price) and more likely to arrive quickly. Underlying all this is thredUP’s trove of data. thredUP’s business captures large volumes of data from touch points throughout the resale process, including transactional and pricing data from brands and categories, as well as behavioral data from buyers and sellers, which is fed directly into thredUP’s pricing algorithm.

thredUP’s website is a disruptive model which dramatically improves the resale shopping experience for both buyers and sellers. thredUP believes resale is on pace to overtake the traditional thrift and donation segment by 2024. For buyers, thredUP offers depth of selection and ease of browsing. The company claims it lists an average of more than 280,000 new secondhand items each week, with 35,000 brands across 100 categories and across price points. There’s no question thredUP offers a dramatically improved shopping experience versus traditional brick & mortar thrift stores. In comparison to traditional thrift stores where buyers sift through reams of clothing, thredUP undergoes a “rigorous twelve-point quality inspection” which they believe prevents low-quality items from being listed. In the S-1, the company discloses that only 59% of the items it received from sellers were listed on the marketplace after curation and processing. thredUP offers evidence this quality inspection produces results: of thredUP’s 12% return rate for total items sold, returns due to poor item quality accounted for less than 2%.

Per thredUP’s market report, online thrifting growth estimates are dramatically outperforming both brick & mortar thrifting as well as broader retail.

The Growth of Thrifting – Illustrated

Thredup 1.png

In 2019, resale grew 25x faster than the broader retail sector…

Thredup 2.png

…a growth trend that was aided by COVID, as shoppers found value and entertainment in thrifting…

Thredup3.png

Secondhand retail is taking market share…

Thredup 4.png

…fueled in part by celebrities who believe secondhand is the future of retail.

Thredup5.png

Thrift is now mainstream, and thredUP’s new brand image is treating it as such:

Thredup 6.png

thredUP’s brand pivot along with commentary by Mr. Reinhart was featured in an October 2020 CSA article:

The perception of thrift has changed. Consumers are not only open to shopping secondhand, but they are wearing it proudly. ThredUP’s brand evolution acknowledges this shift from stigma to status, and celebrates our community of thrifters who are thinking secondhand first.”

thredUP - What’s the Risk?

If thredUP is a retailer with uniquely positive dynamics that also plays in an ESG-positive part of the consumer market that’s growing tremendously among Millennials and Gen Z, what’s the risk in this business model?

To start, cash flow out of the gates isn’t great:

Source: PETITION LLC

Source: PETITION LLC

On a CFO – CapEX basis, thredUP burns more than $38mm of cash per annum. Taking a look at the income statement, thredUP’s Operating Expenses have been growing at a faster rate than Sales.

Source: PETITION LLC

Source: PETITION LLC

Part of that slowdown may be due to the company’s forced revenue mix shift towards a consignment model. But COVID certainly didn’t help. thredUP notes that gross profit dollar growth and average contribution profit per order in 2020 both were lower than company estimates as a result of its COVID-19 response, which included higher levels of discounts and incentives and higher fixed costs per order. A Glossy interview with Fashionphile founder Sarah Davis indicated that resalers weren’t immune to lockdown-driven retail woes:

“According to Sarah Davis, founder of the Neiman-Marcus-invested resale platform Fashionphile, sales dipped considerably in March, but have risen each week in April, rebounding by more than 300% so far; sales are on track to be back at pre-coronavirus levels by May. But product from sellers has slowed to a standstill for a simple reason: Sellers don’t want to bring their bags of unwanted pieces to the post office while quarantined.

“Like all resellers, we are supply-constrained,” Davis said. “When things closed down, we thought people would have nothing better to do and use the time to clean out their closets. And that’s true. But the actual process of getting the product is the much harder task. Acquiring new product came to a crashing halt when we closed our warehouse [in March], which made it impossible to receive new product and really hard to process product that had already come in. And once it was back open, it was still hard to get people to go the post office to drop things off. So people had product they wanted to get rid of, but no way to get it to us. That was the big problem to solve.”

Whether thredUP’s logistics network is truly a groundbreaking, competitive advantage is up for debate. For one, the company doesn’t own its distribution centers and cannot guarantee supply, which in a space as competitive as resale may be problematic. Ms. Davis’ comments are telling:

Luxury resale will always be supply-constrained,” Davis said. “People will always buy a Dior bag at a reduced price; the hardest thing is keeping the supply coming. It’s honestly a miracle that we have 20,000 items on the site, but each one of them came from individual people, so we absolutely need people to keep selling to us, whether it’s individual customers or even small business resellers, which sell to us sometimes. I would bet that for any reseller right now, the seller is where their focus is.”

A core strength of companies such as Amazon.com, Inc. ($AMZN) and recent IPO Coupang Inc. ($CPNG) is their logistics networks, which serve their customers quickly and efficiently. thredUP appears to be on the verge of successfully disrupting brick and mortar thrift. However, thredUP’s competition is fierce, including publicly traded resellers such as The RealReal Inc. ($REAL) and Poshmark Inc. ($POSH). The winner in the space is likely to be the reseller that best manages the supply constraint, and is able to create a friction-free environment for buyers and sellers. Logistics is the lynch pin of the resale business.

However, thredUP’s business model does differentiate it from other resale platforms. For example, thredUP’s total active management system is ideal for sellers who want a zero touch experience. This is a sharp contrast to Poshmark, which enables a seller to effectively run their own e-commerce consignment storefront. On Poshmark, sellers upload their own photos of the items they want to sell and determine their own pricing. These sellers can also leverage social media followings to drive sales.

Regardless of which platform is in vogue, we continue to think resale is a retail trend that has legs. Every dollar that goes into retail is coming out of online fast fashion like Zara Industria de Diseño Textil, S.A. ($IDEXF) and H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB ($HM-B.ST) or brick and mortar. Resale’s mainstream acceptance is being fueled by sustainability motives and endorsed by both celebrities and trendsetting, high fashion brands. Retail platforms are engaging with resale platforms like thredUP to explore new cross-selling opportunities. These drivers are accelerating growth. In its 2018 resale report, thredUP estimated the resale market to grow at a 15% annual CAGR from 2017 - 2022. In the 2020 resale report, the resale market is now expected to grow at a 39% CAGR from 2019 - 2024. If these estimates hold up, the HBS case studies of thredUP will need to be rewritten again to incorporate the foresight of its founders and a business ahead of its time.

And the narrative that brick and mortar retail destruction starts and stops with Amazon will need to become more inclusive of other factors. Just like we’ve been arguing since our inception.

💪Virgin Active Ltd. is Looking Unfit 💪

The U.S. has been quiet and the pandemic stifled travel and so we find ourselves wistful for far flung places. There's some action there, it seems. 

Source: Getty Images

Source: Getty Images

Take Britain for example. Per Bloomberg:

A record 35% of U.K. companies issued profit warnings last year, according to a report by the consulting firm EY. There was also a surge in the number of companies issuing three or more profit warnings in a 12-month period, a warning sign for insolvency.

One company, in particular, caught our eye:

Looks like some lenders — namely, Lloyds Banking Group — feel similarly about Virgin Active LtdPer SkyNews on January 20, “Britain's biggest high street lender is to extricate itself from a syndicate of lenders to Virgin Active, the struggling gym chain set up by Sir Richard Branson's business empire.” And Lloyds wasn’t the only shop jumping ship, “City sources said on Wednesday that another of Virgin Active's seven-strong lending syndicate was also planning to offload its position, although the identity of the other bank was unclear.” The fitness chain is currently in the market for rescue financing to outlast the pandemic. Lloyds and the other unnamed aforementioned member of the lending syndicate clearly don’t seem eager to wait around for the end to come. Indeed, per SkyNews on January 30:

Lenders to Virgin Active are preparing for a fight over the future of one of Britain's biggest gym chains as its owners draw up a radical blueprint to help it survive the pandemic. Sky News has learnt that a syndicate of roughly half a dozen banks held a beauty parade of financial advisers this week to negotiate a restructuring of the company….” (emphasis in original)

This news set the chain up for a barbell drop to the head: the company got thrashed in the market. The company’s term loan plummeted 17% recently from 88 to around 73. The company has approximately 238 clubs worldwide with a large presence in places hit particularly hard by the pandemic: South Africa (😬), Italy (😬😬) and the UK (😬😬😬).

Perhaps the lenders and the company can hold work out talks while they work out. 🙄

💥Will the Biden Administration Disrupt Private Prisons Like CoreCivic Inc?💥

🚨CoreCivic: A Stable Business with a Clouded Future🚨

As we’ve made more than abundantly clear lately, there is a relative dearth of distressed names relative to ten months ago. Bankruptcy professionals remain on the hunt, however — Daddy needs to get paid, after all — and that hunt entails digging a bit deeper for mandates. With the Biden Administration now several weeks in, we can’t help but wonder whether new policies may disrupt the status quo, potentially creating distress out of thin air. One potential area of interest is for-profit private prisons.

https___bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com_public_images_a0a2596f-9981-4002-8211-a270217e5d8c_500x375.gif

*****

CoreCivic Inc. ($CXW) is the nation’s largest owner of partnership correctional, detention and residential reentry facilities a/k/a ‘private prisons’. Headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee, CXW claims to be one of the largest prison operators in the United States, and believes it is the largest private owner of real estate used by U.S. government agencies. CoreCivic management also believes the company serves a public good through corrections and detention management, a network of residential reentry centers to help address America’s recidivism crisis, and government real estate solutions.

CXW operates its business through three segments: (i) Safety, (ii) Community, and (iii) Properties:

  • Safety. As of Q320, CoreCivic Safety operated 49 correctional and detention facilities, 42 of which are owned, 7 of which are leased, with a total design capacity of approximately 72k beds. Management believes they own 58% and lease 39% of all privately-owned prison beds in the US. In 2019, 24% of CoreCivic’s revenue came from states and 66% from the Federal government. 51% of CXW’s revenue was derived from the Bureau of Prisons, 29% derived from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 17% from the US Marshals Service, and 5% from the Federal government.

  • Community. In 2019, CoreCivic Community owned and operated 27 residential reentry centers with a total design capacity of approximately 5k beds.

  • Properties. In 2019, through its CoreCivic Properties segment, the Company owned 57 properties for lease to third parties and used by government agencies, totaling 3.3mm sqft.

CXW’s geographic presence spans 21 states, with a predominant footprint in Colorado (14), Texas (14), Oklahoma (7), Tennessee (7), Arizona (5), Georgia (5), California (4), and New Mexico (3), among others.

Since Q116 occupancy at CXW facilities has been relatively stable but has been negatively impacted in recent quarters by COVID-19.

Near the end of Q120, in an attempt to contain the spread of COVID-19, the Federal government decided to deny entry at the United States southern border to asylum-seekers and anyone crossing the southern border without proper documentation or authority. This negatively impacted CoreCivic, as the number of people apprehended and detained by ICE declined significantly. CXW also cites in its filings that disruptions to the criminal justice system have also contributed to a sequential reduction in the US Marshals Service offender population, as the number of courts in session declined rendering prosecutions impossible. If COVID-19 border restrictions and pandemic-enforced criminal justice delays continue, CXW could see a greater negative impact on their inmate populations. Further, increased expenses associated with maintaining higher health standards during the pandemic could have a negative impact on CXW’s profitability. Now just imagine what happens if they have to offer organic food to all of their inmates too!!

Source: Getty Images

Source: Getty Images

*****

Private prisons have been scrutinized by both government participants and the media over the years for an undue focus on cash flow at the expense of both their inmates and employees. A 2016 Department of Justice report found that private prisons had (i) higher violence and (ii) lack of adequate security and healthcare in comparison to federal facilities. We’re not in a position to evaluate that claim one way or another: what we can say is that CXW is a fairly stable, cash flow generating business. Revenues from 2012 – 2020 help illustrate that stability. CXW revenue grew throughout most of the Trump Administration.

Corecivic Koyfin.png

CXW carries $2.1b of debt, but the capital structure is far from unsustainable. On a LTM basis, CXW does ~$1.9b of revenue, ~$374mm of EBITDA, ~$400mm of Adjusted EBITDA, and Normalized Funds from Operations (a proxy of CFO less CapEx) of $265mm. Despite Q320 revenue of $470mm and Q320 Adjusted EBITDA of $95mm down 8% and 19% year-over-year, respectively, CXW managed to print $62mm of cash flow. On an LTM basis, Net Leverage is 4.9x on an unadjusted EBITDA figure (4.5x when including adjustments). Liquidity isn’t an issue either; CoreCivic has ~$282mm of unrestricted cash on balance sheet and ~$329mm of availability under its $800mm Revolving Credit Facility. The market appreciates CXW’s strong cash flow position, moderate leverage, and ample liquidity as the bonds trade between the mid-90s and par.

Source: Company Filings

Source: Company Filings

Source: Getty Images

Source: Getty Images

*****

The key question for CXW is what happens to the private prison industry now that those in power are focused on shutting it down. On January 26, 2021, the Biden White House distributed a fact sheet and statement outlining the President’s vision and agenda for advancing racial equity. Included in that agenda is reforming private prisons. Per the fact sheet:

This afternoon, President Biden will outline his vision and new elements of his agenda for advancing racial equity for Americans who have been underserved and left behind…President Biden will sign four executive actions this afternoon to advance racial equity and take first steps to root out systemic racism in housing and criminal justice…The President will sign an Executive Order to end the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) use of private prisons.” (emphasis added)

The fact sheet elaborates further:

Reform our Incarceration System to End the Use of Private Prisons. More than two million people are currently incarcerated in the United States, and a disproportionate number of these individuals are people of color. Mass incarceration imposes significant costs on our society and communities, while private prisons profiteer off of federal prisoners in less safe conditions for prisoners and correctional officers alike. President Biden is committed to reducing mass incarceration while making our communities safer. That starts with ending DOJ’s reliance on private prisons. The Order directs the Attorney General not to renew Department of Justice contracts with privately operated criminal detention facilities.” (emphasis added)

CoreCivic’s stock fell from a pre-election high of $7.51/share on November 3rd to $6.00 on November 6th but trades at $7.96 today. It jumped nearly 5% on Monday and another 4.3% yesterday. This suggests to us two things: i) it’s possible the market has already priced the Biden Administration order into a base case forecast, and/or ii) the order won’t alter the status quo or create much of a discernible impact on CXW’s business. Said another way, restructuring professionals who go around saying “keep an eye on the private prison space” may very well be sending you on a wild goose chase.

We dug into CXW’s filings and learned that the DOJ has been directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to cut back on private prisons since August 2016. Per the Q320 10-Q:

In a memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") dated August 18, 2016, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") directed that, as each contract with privately operated prisons reaches the end of its term, the BOP should either decline to renew that contract or substantially reduce its scope in a manner consistent with law and the overall decline of the BOP's inmate population. In addition to the decline in the BOP's inmate population, the DOJ memorandum cites purported operational, programming, and cost efficiency factors as reasons for the DOJ directive.”

But a 2016 change of administration got in the way…

“On February 21, 2017, the newly appointed U.S. Attorney General issued a memorandum rescinding the DOJ's prior directive stating the memorandum changed long-standing policy and practice and impaired the BOP's ability to meet the future needs of the federal correctional system.”

Commentary from the company’s Q320 earnings call suggests that over the past 7 – 8 years, CXW’s management has been anticipating prison reform and positioned the business accordingly:

Joseph Gomes:

“Okay. And kind of big broad from the 10,000 foot…if we look at your guys' stock price with what's been going on here with the election, there is a huge portion of the investor base saying, the feeling is that with -- if Biden was to win the election, that is a huge negative for the company, just based on what's happened to the stock price here…what actually can Biden do from a regulatory standpoint in terms of changing immigration or the U.S. Marshals? I know the Bureau of Prisons has reduced its populations over time. I don't know if that gives them excess capacity, can that allow the government to transfer detainees that are currently being helped by the private sector to the Federal Bureau of Prisons? Are those facilities just not set up to handle detainees versus inmates? It's my understanding, correct me if I'm wrong, please, ICE and the U.S. Marshals own minimal amount of beds at all. So that, again, the alternatives for the federal government to house these detainees is extremely limited.

Damon Hininger, CEO of CoreCivic:

“Absolutely, Joe. Thank you for the question. So yes, let me give a little color on all three federal partners. Let me start with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. So that was…about 10 years ago…15% of our revenue...This year, on the safety side, it's going to be about 2%. So we started a conversation with our Board about 7, 8 years ago, noting that the need and the trends for the BOP was going to change because they, at that time, were going through some sensing reform and changed some policies on sensing for different criminal offenses. And so we went through a process to -- as we saw contracts come up, exploration most notably, the most recent one here, Adams County, just thinking about maybe alternatives for those facilities. So that 15% revenue from the BOP back in 2010, now it's down to 2%. So we think if there is a change in policy directed towards the BOP about utilization of the private sector, again, we think our risk is pretty minimal there just because we're down to one contract.” (emphasis added)

Further, it appears that CoreCivic benefits from the fact that neither the U.S. Marshals nor U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) own any of their own facilities, and rely completely on private prison service providers such as CXW. Mr. Hininger explains the setup:

 “Going to ICE and Marshals Service…[both] those agencies are law-enforcement focused. And so Marshals Service do not have any facilities they own or they operate. So unlike the BOP, where they've got 100 facilities around the country that they own and they operate, Marshals Service doesn't have that luxury. And so they have no alternative. They either rely on us, the private sector or city and counties for space. So if they are asked to look at either buying or building a new capacity, that will be a very large capital commitment and probably would take anywhere from 5 to 10 years to happen. So obviously, it's not something they could affect overnight. And again, depending on what the leadership is within the Congress that obviously would require also some concurrence with Congress on federalizing the workforce to operate those facilities. So several different steps that also they would have to take. So we think our 40 years' work with the Marshals Service and with ICE, too, we have been able to be very closely aligned with the mission, which has changed over time, provide high quality, good solutions that are very efficient for their mission.” (emphasis added)

And from what we gather, it’s not just about having an empty prison that’s important, but also having the right ancillary facilities in the right locations. Mr. Hininger continues on the Q320 call:

“Notably, and again, it goes a little bit of question about BOP potentially providing capacity to those agencies, the capacity has to be in the right location. So for example, our city in San Diego, which is about 1.5 mile from the Southwest border, that facility has not only capacity, but it's got court rooms, it's got space for lawyers and for case managers, and that BOP doesn't have anything nearby that could support them. So our facilities are not only efficient from a design perspective, but they're very strategically located that makes the mission of both agencies, Marshals and ICE, very, very, very effective. So that's an important point on that piece.”

Lastly, Mr. Hininger describes how standard government operating procedure has turned the U.S. Marshals into price takers:

“Marshals Service…[has] to provide capacity anytime a federal judge directs into holding federal prisoner. So they -- regardless of the budget situation, U.S. attorney, if they're prosecuting someone and the judge says, this person needs to detain, and they produce this individual to the Marshals Service, they have to house that individual. They don't have the luxury to say, they don't have the dollars or maybe the policy to house that population. So they're, again, beholden to what's being directed by the Federal Judiciary….“

And despite all the negative headlines, CXW cites that ICE funding over the past 15-years and 3 different administrations has “either been flat or has grown.”  

“…again, you've got 3 different administrations, and you've had multiple changes in leadership, both on the House and the Senate side. So we think that indicator is probably a pretty good sign of kind of regardless of what the outcome here of this week's election, ICE mentioned is they have a need for capacity, they rely on the private sector or local facilities, and funding has been either stable or has grown over the last 15 years. And we have constantly shown not only a high-quality solution in strategic locations, but also we've continued to apply and advocate that ICE continue to raise the standards, have appropriate oversight so all these different reforms and improvement in standards and quality of operations we've advocated for, and we've met the bar.” (emphasis added)

CXW also appears to have a bit of a moat around its business:

Our facilities meet what they call the performance-based national detention standards that the alternative in a public sector facility, where they house them in county jails, just oftentimes cannot meet those facilities because of physical plant limitations. So where our facilities, our newer facilities, they meet all of those standards. In many cases, the alternative use in a public sector facility just can't meet those standards because of the physical plan. And then last point…I'd make is, many of our facilities also have courts within the facilities.And…we have hundreds -- literally hundreds of ICE officials that when they get up in the morning, they report to their place of work. It's at one of our facilities that -- in the case where they have courts, is an extremely efficient -- much more efficient use of the space when -- as opposed to having to round them up from county jails and get them to court. So a lot of critical needs we provide within our real estate that's very challenging to replicate. (emphasis added)

*****

A concern for any debt-laden company with contracted revenue is how quickly the business is able to replace contract churn with newly signed business. While revenue in Q2 and Q3 2020 was primarily lower due to COVID-19 accelerating the reduction in inmate populations, CoreCivic had several facilities moved to “idle” status as states struggled to manage their prison budgets. So far, CXW management appears to be on top of the situation.

During Q320, CXW and the State of Oklahoma agreed to idle the 1,692-bed Cimarron Correctional Facility and the 390-bed Tulsa Transitional Center However, on its earnings call, CXW’s management highlighted three new contracts representing the potential for an incremental utilization of approximately 3,000 beds. The Cimarron Correctional Facility in Oklahoma, the 1,896-bed Saguaro Correctional Facility in Idaho, and the 289-bed Turley Residential Center in Tulsa all entered into new contracts with various government agencies, while utilization at the 494-bed Reentry Opportunity Center in Oklahoma City was projected to increase.

While reduced inmate population in recent quarters has been a key risk to CXW’s underlying business, commentary on the earnings calls suggests some of these contracts were below historic operating margins, and this new incremental business “approximates the average CoreCivic safety operating margin” with potential for upside as utilization scales.

The other key concern for CoreCivic is managing its debt stack. CXW’s largest maturity wall is 2023, where more than half of its funded debt comes due. Per the company’s Q320 earnings call, management is focused on debt paydown:

Damon Hininger, CEO of CoreCivic:

Last quarter, we announced our intention to revoke our election as a real estate investment trust or REIT and convert to a taxable C corporation effective January 1, 2021. Revoking our REIT election provides us much more flexibility in how we allocate our substantial free cash flow. This was evident in our third quarter because we were able to allocate $107.2 million of net cash provided by operating activities in the quarter to debt reduction. We're paying over $100 million of net debt during the quarter, bringing our total recourse debt net of cash down to approximately $1.4 billion. We believe continued on this path of prioritizing debt reduction with a target total leverage of 2.25x to 2.75x will meaningfully improve our overall credit profile and lower our cost of capital. (emphasis added)

While public outcry and renewed government efforts to shut down private prisons may rattle the cages, it doesn’t appear like CoreCivic’s business is going away anytime soon. CoreCivic reports its Q420 earnings at market close on February 10, 2020. We anticipate the market will be particularly focused on management’s commentary on the first few days of the Biden Administration, as well as any new contract wins or inroads.

🔥The "Weil Bankruptcy Blog Index," CMBS and how Nine West is the Gift that Keeps on Giving🔥

We’re still clearing through some year-end stuff here at PETITION. This edition will conclude our review of 2020 (parts I and II here and here). Before we get there, this was obviously a momentous week. The Democrats took Georgia and by extension the Senate, the Capitol fell to a siege, unemployment figures underwhelmed (140k job losses with leisure and hospitality getting f*cking napalmed), Saudi Arabia unexpectedly cut oil output, and a new virulent COVID strain is now apparently running wild within our borders. Good times. It’s almost enough, all in, to make us nostalgic for 2020.

Oddly, the stock market took in all of the above and be like 🤷‍♀️: it had an up week! Mania is sweeping the markets to the point of Elon Musk becoming the richest man on the planet, Bitcoin breaching $40k, sponsors issuing SPACS called Queen’s Gambit Growth Capital (sounds fake: it’s not), and corporates…well…

Maybe. Probably not. More likely? They’re seeing the market swallow up ridiculously low rates. This week US high yield rates hit a fresh all-time low. Spreads are back near pre-crisis levels:

Screen Shot 2021-01-10 at 2.05.05 PM.png

Demand is insatiable.

Back in October the PETITION team took a look at (but ultimately opted not to write about) Urban One Inc. ($UONE), a Maryland-based media operator focused on the African-American community. Our interest derived from an 8-K indicating that UONE (a) anticipated COVID-19-induced revenue decreases might trip financial covenants, (b) initiated wholesale cost-cutting initiatives, and (c) drew down $27.5mm on its ABL facility. Thereafter, the company commenced an exchange offer and consent solicitation pursuant to which it exchanged $347mm 7.375% senior secured notes due 2022 for new 8.75% senior secured notes due 2022. The company also pulled off a $25mm at-the-market equity offering. In other words, both the debt and equity markets were willing to play ball and play for some sort of social justice-driven pull-through of demand that would improve business fundamentals.

And as it turns out, the company did pull forward demand — more election related than anything:

"The radio segment benefited from unprecedented levels of political advertising spending targeting African American voters.  Bolstered by this revenue, we expect our radio segment fourth quarter revenue to be down a low single-digits percentage year over year, a material improvement from second quarter's decline of -58.4% and third quarter's decline of -31.9%," says CEO Alfred C. Liggins III.

In a pre-market announcement on Thursday, the company indicated that consolidated net revenues for FY20 would be down roughly 13.7-14.6%. But Q420? They reported a net revenue increase of between 3.9-7.7% and adjusted EBITDA up 49-56.2%. That’s all the capital markets needed to see.

On Thursday the company also announced a private offering of $825mm 2028 notes to pay off the relatively new 8.75% ‘22s, the stub 7.375% 22s, and loans outstanding under two separate credit agreements. The issuance priced inside of initial 7.5% talk and got done at 7.375%. Notably, the 8.75% ‘22s were trading below par as long ago as, uh, *checks calendar*, Tuesday (they’re now above 100). This is not the most, uh, optimistic issuance we’ve seen of late — we’ll leave that to the airlines and movie theater chains — but it does highlight the forgiving nature of capital markets: that’s quite a dramatic drop in rate mere months after a previous issuance. And let’s be clear: we’re talking about a company that is, in part, a radio station operator coming off a significant uptick due to election-related ads. But 🤷‍♀️. That really is the best way to describe all markets these days.


How about the bankruptcy market? Epiq Systems Inc. released its 2020 bankruptcy filing statistics this week and “2020 had the lowest number in bankruptcy filings since 1986 with a total of 529,068 filings across all chapters.” Commercial chapter 11 filings were up 29% YOY but chapter 13 and chapter 7 filings decreased by 46% and 22%, respectively.

TO READ THE REST OF THIS ANALYSIS, YOU MUST BE A PETITION MEMBER. BECOME ONE HERE.

😎What to Make of the Credit Cycle: Pros Say😎

A deluge of Fed-infused cash ended the party before it really got started.

In Sunday’s Members’-only edition, “💥The Default Rate Ticks Down💥,” we discussed the craziness that is going on in the markets these days. Among other things, we noted how (i) Oaktree Capital Management’s Howard Marks now advises caution after a short-lived bullish fever, (ii) SVPGlobal’s Victor Khosla is optimistic that 2021 will be rife with distressed investing opportunities, and (iii) JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s ($JPM) 2021 high yield and leveraged loan default outlook looks a lot more tempered than people might have expected just mere months ago. The pandemic is surging and people are losing their marbles but, hey!, the equity and capital markets are raging so, like, whatevs. 🤷‍♀️

To help make some sense of it all, we reached out to some of our Members to hear directly from them what the hell is happening here. We started by asking the following:

What has been the most surprising theme/situation you've followed and/or experienced since the pandemic hit?

We had one rule: “smart brevity” (to borrow from Axios).

You can be the judge as to whether the responses were one or the other or neither. 😜

Image courtesy of Rachel Albanese

Image courtesy of Rachel Albanese

“The willingness of leveraged credit markets to take a flier on some really high risk credits continues to amaze me. The number of CCC/C rated issuers has doubled in 2020 but yields on that rating cohort have fallen by 300 bps since January despite elevated economic risks. This makes little sense to industry veterans like me, while huge volumes of low rated debt issuance have really put the brakes on this default cycle. Market commentators and the media punditry have devoted considerable verbiage trying to justify these huge rallies based on fundamentals, but that’s a stretch—it’s all liquidity-driven. The only fear in financial markets these days is FOMO.” — Michael Eisenband, FTI Consulting Inc.

“Most surprising situation I have followed:  Mall owners (by themselves or in partnership with a brand management company like Authentic Brands Group) buying out of bankruptcy some of the big name retail brands that populate the malls. It’s a bold move and time will tell whether it is successful. Most surprising experience:  The post hoc realization that I had filed the very first chapter 11 case in the country attributing COVID-19 as one of the factors that led to the bankruptcy (Valeritas).” — Rachel Albanese, DLA Piper LLP

“The irrational exuberance for shares of bankrupt companies that resulted from unprecedented day trading by retail investors.  It made bitcoin feel so 2019.” — Vincent Indelicato, Proskauer Rose LLP

“Between the (i) PPP loan money providing pandemic bridge funding, (ii) regulators giving commercial banks a 6-month free pass on downgrading credits, (iii) commercial banks being cautious of the bad PR of aggressively enforcing rights against a company that received government funds (i.e. PPP “grants”) during a pandemic and (iv) the near total stagnation of distressed company sale transaction due to the huge economic uncertainty of the pandemic, distressed consulting work has ‘unexpectedly’ dried up in Q2-Q4.” — Dan Dooley, MorrisAnderson

“Lender on lender aggression and intra tranche warfare in out of court restructurings.  To the surprise of many the unwritten rules for honor among similarly situated lenders have been increasingly tossed aside.” — Sarah Borders, King & Spalding LLP

“Continued expansion of credit in percentages exceeding the expansion of my waistline.” — Sean O’Neal, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP

“I’ve been pleasantly surprised by the resiliency of some industries and the way leaders have flexed quickly to mitigate the disruption they’ve experienced.  Some of that was likely muscle memory from past restructuring cycles but even there the leaders recognized the need to run a play quickly.  In automotive, this was certainly the case and a good example of quick action proving very effective in mitigating some of the risks.  Others have gotten creative and government subsidies around the world have been important as has the fact that credit markets stayed open.” — Pilar Tarry, AlixPartners

“2020 has been quite the banal year; after all, who among us could not have predicted the Kobe crash, that everyone in the world would be locked in their homes, that the bedrock of our democracy would be challenged, and that the Four Seasons doesn’t only denote a luxury hotel in Houston with a fantastic golf simulator?  All of my predictions and dreams of 2020 came true, with very little surprises.  All kidding aside, within our field, perhaps the most surprising theme of 2020 (to me) is that bankruptcy courts now will truly question the “independence” of independent directors.  And I view this as a positive development; given that the same subset of professionals show up in many of the large chapter 11 cases, it’s important that bankruptcy judges continue to look past titles to determine whether the substance of their findings are appropriate.  This requires all of the restructuring professionals to continually evolve how we approach cases, improve on past practices, and ensure the integrity of the bankruptcy process.  In other words, we must actually deserve the $1,500+ rates that many of us now demand.” — Daniel Simon, DLA Piper LLP

“Access to cash.  Other than the pandemic itself being the most surprising situation we, as Americans (and, more globally, as a people), have faced in our lifetime, the amount of “helicopter money”from the U.S. Government available this year has been outstanding.  In addition, an incredible amount of capital has been deployed through the private equity markets as a way for investors to likely take advantage of low-asset valuations in certain sectors.” — George Klidonas, Latham & Watkins LLP

“No one really has a clue how to value a business with the COVID trough. This can be used as an aggressive tool by companies to threaten cram down at temporarily absurdly low valuations. But savvy lenders can also try to structure a bankruptcy process where the temporarily low value makes them the fulcrum. This fight means so called valuation experts have to convince the court about the present value taking an unknown future into account. Retail, malls and restaurants are the obvious candidates for this gamesmanship.” — Randall Klein, Goldberg Kohn

“The prognostications of the restructuring industry.  An inevitable recession has been coming for 3 years now, but on Thanksgiving Eve 2020, the Dow surpassed 30,000 for a brief minute.  When the pandemic hit, there were plenty of great quotes about the imminent wave of bankruptcy filings that would overwhelm the restructuring industry.  Outside of oil and gas, which was screwed before the pandemic, that wave has not materialized.  Reminds me of being disappointed in the waves at the Jersey Shore as a kid after seeing Point Break!” — Chris Ward, Polsinelli

“One is the number of non-restructuring folks that expected wave after wave of chapter 11 filings early on in the pandemic when those in the restructuring community knew that the significant uptick in chapter 11 filings (other than those companies/industries already on the precipice) typically trails black swan events like the pandemic. The second is the willingness of lenders/borrowers (outside of industries that were already distressed (e.g., retail/O&G) to work together to ride out at least the initial shock and cash crunch associated with the pandemic.” — Adam Paul, Mayer Brown LLP

“I think the positive impact of the the Cares Act/PPP flattened the economic curve much more than I thought it would heading into the summer.  Many borrower’s management teams and advisors responded aggressively to take advantage of that respite.  Specifically, I think the impact of the consumer stimulus was palpable across the economy and either resolved many issues, or significantly kicked the can down the road.” — Lawrence Perkins, SierraConstellation Partners LLC

“I’ve found the extent to which the sponsor and/or management’s relationship with lenders has impacted a Company’s ability to weather COVID somewhat surprising.  Because so many lenders are facing an increased demand for concessions like deferred or PIK’d interest and requests for liquidity infusions, lenders have been forced to choose among companies that they want to continue to invest in and support.  In a time when there is so much uncertainty regarding what the world will look like on the other side, we’ve found an increasing number of restructuring outcomes depend on relationships; if lenders have a good relationship with the sponsor, they’re willing to kick the can down the road – give covenant waivers, a quick liquidity infusion, or even agree to a fulsome restructuring that provides upside to the sponsor.  If not they get aggressive and put pressure on the company – force a sale, sweep the board, etc.” — Cristine Schwarzman, Ropes & Gray LLP

“On a macro level, the greatest surprise was the “great divide” the COVID-19 pandemic caused our nation. Historically, crises have brought us together as a country. Except for the well-deserved, unified support for our first responders and healthcare heroes, this is the first time, in my lifetime, that a crisis at home and abroad drove us apart. On a micro level, while there are losers (hospitality, airlines, movie theaters) in the economic meltdown, there were a surprising number of winners that resulted from the pandemic (e-commerce, home improvement, at-home fitness), that we generally would not expect to see in an economic recession.” — Steven Korf, ToneyKorf

“In the market, it was how quickly we went through three distinct mini-cycles.  In the first few months of the pandemic, it was all hands on deck, and we all found ourselves working around the clock.  Companies were suddenly in a zero- or low-revenue environment and needed emergency liquidity or covenant relief; creditors across capital structures were working together to stabilize and save businesses.  Then, we transitioned into a second mini-cycle as these stabilized businesses addressed medium-term questions:  What does a right-sized capital structure look like in uncertain times?  How do we convince twice- or thrice-burned credit investors to take part in yet another rights offering to provide long-term liquidity?

And now, with most impacted companies having been stabilized – and with investors and advisors alike having rested up a bit – we are right back to a wave of opportunistic refinancing and liability management transactions. 

Additionally, creditor-on-creditor crime is back in vogue.  We observe sponsors (and even public companies) using white-hot credit markets to craft and then utilize advantageous documents, bankers proposing ever-more-complicated capital structures, and investors – tired of being on the receiving end of aggressive maneuvers – organizing early to either defend themselves or get a piece of the action.

So the most surprising thing to me in the market right now is that – even as we prepare to lock back down for a few months, and as unwieldy capital structures teeter under debt loads that have only gotten worse in 2020 – the credit markets rage on, like I am sure we all wish we could at this year’s nonexistent holiday parties.” — Damian Schaible, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP

“Aside from the fact that my older colleagues are so Zoom-proficient? I've been amazed at the reaction of markets in 2020 — commerce has been upended the world over, political volatility and protests at a fever pitch for most of the year — yet my adjacent screen is showing the Dow breaking over 30,000 and credit markets are white hot. A lot of market principles are standing on their head right now.” — Lance Gurley, Stephens Inc.

The most surprising theme for me has been brand loyalty going out the window in the early days of the pandemic - in times of shortages (of paper, flour, cleaning supplies), any brand and any location became good enough. That's already starting to have interesting ramifications for manufacturers and sellers in terms of product line breadth and redundancy. Second place, more people are playing guitar!” — Ted Gavin, Gavin/Solmonese

“I’m impressed by how quickly and easily an industry full of hard-charging, type-A personalities has shifted to zoom calls, wearing golf shirts and with kids and pets running around in the back. I think since we’re all in the same boat, no one fears looking like he’s not the most focused person or working harder than everyone else. I think it might be the most significant silver lining in this whole situation.” — Jon Tibus, Alvarez & Marsal  

“The massive liquidity injection by the Fed into markets unprecedented in that it allowed the Fed to buy corporate bonds directly to prop up markets, including junk rated bonds.  This has allowed hundreds of companies to borrow from the bond and loan markets even though those markets don’t have a good sense of how COVID will impact long term leverage.  Essentially, the market has ignored COVID and is looking to 2021.” — William Derrough, Moelis & Company   

Adaptability. The major theme has been adaptability. The companies that were able to quickly adapt business models have been able to gain market share and thrive. For example, an accelerated move to e-commerce and buy on line pick up in store (BOPIS) have allowed certain retailers to gain share.

Flexibility with Chapter 11. The flexibility judges are giving debtors that contradict Chapter 11 as we know it like deferring contractual rent. It has been surprising what companies have been able to get and what has had to be shared with the Courts to get such flexibility.

Thriving Businesses. While some businesses are suffering, many are thriving. Consumers are forced to stay at home and have found all sorts of ways to spend money. Some of this could have been predicted due to short-term demand spikes (e.g., canned good, Lysol), but other less predictable and maybe more permanent (home offices, home gyms/Peloton, vacation at home) that will have interesting impact past post-COVID.

Capital Markets. Many institutional lenders pulled back on capital when COVID first broke out, but the capital markets stabilized quickly and many capital providers quickly realized the pendulum swung too far. Now lenders across the capital structure are being increasingly creative to deploy capital in the market. For borrowers seeking to raise new or incremental financing, expect questions on business durability, particularly in light of further shut downs.

Buyers of Businesses. Non-traditional buyers have been increasingly active and deep pocketed buyers of distressed assets, particularly in the consumer space. We’ve been surprised by higher than anticipated proceeds in a number of recent situations. We’re currently working with companies to assess how to better leverage their IP assets outside of a process to generate incremental liquidity or better position the business to realize value.” — Bob Duffy, Berkeley Research Group

“When I joined Paul, Weiss earlier this year, every day seemed like its own adventure. It wasn’t just the seemingly endless stream of restructuring advisory work—it was the striking sense of urgency that appeared to be the new normal. There was economic turmoil across the board, and it felt like that would continue for the rest of 2020. But as it turns out, while there has certainly been a lot of Chapter 11 activity since the pandemic hit, parties have also pursued a wide range of refinancing, recapitalization and out-of-court restructuring options – not just revolver drawdowns and requests for covenant relief, but also new (often short-term) debt, equity raises and PIPEs or preferred equity investment by sponsors – to support and create runway for companies impacted by the pandemic. And as you’re not shy to note, some of these companies have accessed markets more than once since the pandemic hit and will likely need to access the markets again—or file—before it’s over.” — Andrew Parlen, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP

💥Tupperware Update: More than 'A Good Quarter'💥

⚡️Update: Tupperware Brands Corp. ($TUP)⚡️

In last Wednesday’s “💥 Royal Caribbean Collapses. Tupperware Thrives. Friendly's Melts.💥,” we provided a brief update on the Tupperware Brands Corp. ($TUP) situation, highlighting how the company has been a clear-cut beneficiary of COVID-19.  Profit quadrupled to $34.4mm in the company’s most recent quarter and equity that hovered around $1/share back in March jumped to the high 20s (and even breached $30/share) after the earnings announcement. This is an astounding rebound for a company that, back in February, was i) operating with an interim CEO, ii) struggling in a variety of geographies including Brazil, China, Canada and the US, iii) dealing with accounting issues, and iv) badly missing revenue, EPS, and cash flow targets. On Wednesday, we credited the pandemic with the turn-around. But there was more to the story. A lot more.

In April 2020, Tupperware Brands announced weak Q120 earnings, with sales down -23% YoY and FCF burn of roughly $55mm in the quarter. Already struggling due to changing consumer habits and now also contending with coronavirus lockdowns, management elected to pull their FY20 guidance and increased their previously announced cost reduction target to $75mm (up 50%). But the company needed to do more:  

“[Tupperware Brands]…amended its Credit Agreement during [Q120] and agreed to changes to the permitted debt to Adjusted EBITDA ratio, which increases to 5.75 for the first and second quarter of 2020, tightening to 5.25 in the third quarter of 2020, and again decreasing to 4.50 in the fourth quarter…”

For the uninitiated, an increased EBITDA ratio gives a company additional breathing room in a situation like this one where debt (usually) remains static in the face of dramatically decreasing sales and FCF declines. The relief, however, clearly contemplated that the company’s COVID-related problems would be short-lived as the ratio ratcheted down meaningfully in subsequent quarters. Management’s feet were to the fire.

But they had levers to pull:

The Company has taken certain measures in response to the COVID-19 situation, designed to enhance its liquidity position, provide additional financial flexibility and maintain forecasted financial covenant compliance, including reductions in discretionary spending, revisiting investment strategies, and reducing payroll costs, including through organizational redesign, employee furloughs and permanent reductions. Additionally…on March 30, 2020, the Company drew down $225 million under its Credit Agreement, $175 million of which was drawn as a proactive measure given the uncertain environment resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the Company has approximately $600 million of Senior Notes outstanding with a maturity date of June 2021 and is proactively working with advisors to evaluate its options relative to this maturity. (emphasis added)

Tupperware’s $600mm 4.75% Senior Notes due June 2021 were increasingly becoming a problem for the company. Given the rapidly declining earnings and elevated leverage, junior bondholders were (understandably) concerned how their principal might get paid. The trading price on the bonds reflected those concerns, with the notes trading well into distressed territory at below 50 cents on the dollar.

This is where the governing credit docs had a role to play. Tupperware realized an alternative “use of proceeds” for its revolver draw: under the credit agreement, the company could use the monies to permissibly tender the market for an early redemption of the outstanding notes. Per the WSJ:

The publicly listed company launched on May 26 an offer to repurchase at a deep discount about one-third of a $600 million bond that falls due a year from now. The strategy is to ease financial pressure on the company, increasing its chances of repaying the bond on time and helping it meet guidelines for its various bank loans, a person familiar with the matter said.

Tupperware offered to buy back $175 million face amount of the debt at a price of 45 cents on the dollar and gave bond investors a June 22 deadline to take part in the deal. If it achieves full participation, the company would spend about $79 million to retire the debt early.

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But the company didn’t stop there. It subsequently launched a second tender to take out even more of the notes. When all was said and done, the company (a) struck a deal with a large percentage of its disillusioned junior creditors for cents on the dollar, (b) deleveraged the balance sheet by $220mm of debt principal for only $164mm of (the revolving lenders’) cash, and (c) prevented any equity dilution (including, of course, that held by management). Significantly, this maneuver also cured the company of a potentially serious financial maintenance covenant issue. Talk about “robbing Peter to pay Paul”!

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Consider: if the revolver lenders had their way, the company would have engaged in a full-blown restructuring pursuant to which the bondholders would be forced to swap their bonds for equity and wipe out the equity. The company would come out with less leverage and, in turn, lower interest expense. This would obviously lower the risk profile. But even better, the banks could have used the restructuring to provide a DIP and ultimately slither into a much higher yielding piece of exit paper. Alas, not.

Having survived their covenant concerns, Tupperware approached its remaining junior bondholders. Those noteholders, who had not cashed out their bonds in the prior two tenders had organized with their own advisors, and were attempting to use the upcoming maturity and their holdout status as a negotiating ploy to exchange into structurally senior, high coupon rescue financing. We don’t know all the details of those negotiations, but given most COVID-driven rescue financing deals are somewhere in the 12-15% area, we imagine it would have been a very expensive deal for Tupperware.

But then the company cancelled those negotiations! Performance saved them. As we noted on Wednesday, the company reported absolute blowout Q3 earnings, with sales up 14% (up 21% in local currency), $60mm of positive FCF, and commentary that Tupperware had realized 2/3, or $120mm of its $180mm cost-reduction target. Management also entered into a binding commitment for a sale leaseback of its corporate HQ for $86mm, further improving liquidity. Tupperware’s newly minted CEO Miguel Fernandez provided his thoughts on the stellar quarter:

“The 21 percent growth in local currency revenue reported today reflects a rapid adoption of digital tools by our sales force to combat the social restrictions surrounding COVID-19, and the increased consumer demand for our innovative and environmentally friendly products, as more consumers cook at home and are concerned with food safety and storage…The improved performance of both top and bottom line these past two quarters are a positive sign that our Turnaround Plan is working.”

CFO Sandra Harris’ comments indicated the company wasn’t stopping there:

“We are pleased with the rate of improvement in right sizing the business, improving our liquidity and making permanent structural changes that will ensure the success of our Turnaround Plan…These efforts, including sales of non-core assets, will help us continue to improve the health of our balance sheet as we pursue the refinancing of [the remainder of their] June 2021 obligations.”

On Monday, November 2nd, while we at PETITION were fretting over the possibility of an election-induced civil war, Tupperware came to market with a refinancing of its remaining junior 2021 bonds. The company entered into a commitment letter with Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. and JP Morgan Strategic Situations Initiatives for a two tranche secured term loan facility, consisting of a $200mm “Parent Term Loan” facility and a $75mm “Dart Term Loan facility.” Based on the commitment papers, the new loans are priced at 7.75%, but future interest rate is determined on a leverage-based grid. The loans can step down to L + 7.25% if leverage is below 2.75x, or step up to L + 8.75% if leverage is above 2.75x. Use of proceeds of the new loans will be used to fully repay the junior 2021 notes.

The market has certainly rewarded new management for their efforts ⬇️.

Tupperware Price Chart.png

In “💥Oaktree's Howard Marks: "I don't think of it as 'screwing'"💥,” we highlighted the TriMark USA situation, quipping “Long Creditor-on-Creditor Violence”. We subsequently discussed the theme in the ongoing adventures of Revlon Inc. ($REV). Here, though, instead of senior creditors getting primed by structurally senior debt, the company and its consenting bondholders inflicted violence – TupperWAR, if you will -- on the revolving banks.

You gotta love restructuring!

🧦Renfro Corporation. Short Rancid Socks.🧦

Kelso & Company-owned Renfro Corporation Struggles

The pandemic has been tough on all of us but one benefit is that we no longer have to see short-pants-wearing hedge fund and investment banker DBs strut through midtown Manhattan showing off their stupid frikken “sock game.” “Oooh, I love your socks, want to party?” said no person anywhere ever. So, small victories.

Speaking of losers, North Carolina-based Renfro Corporation is a Kelso & Company-backed* manufacturer of socks and the cotton behind partner brands like Fruit of the LoomNew BalanceDr. Scholl’sCarhartt, and Sperry as well as its own brands KBellHot Sox and Copper Sole. They produce exciting threads like these:

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And when they really want to get cray cray, they spice things up with … well … whatever the hell this is supposed to be:

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For the record, these socks — which, we think, show fruit(?) (see what they did there?) — have zero reviews. We reckon that’s because there isn’t a human being on earth who actually bought them, let alone reviewed them. Seriously, who green lit these things? Whomever it was has, at best, zero design sensibility and, at worst, psychopathy. Just sayin'.

The company’s capital structure is looking a bit deranged too — enough so that Moody’s slapped a fierce downgrade on the company (Caa3) back in late August. The cap stack consists of:

  • an $87.4mm asset-backed revolving credit facility due February ‘21;

  • a $20mm senior secured priming term loan due February ‘21 (Caa1); and

  • a $132mm secured first lien term loan (Caa3) due March ‘21 that bids in the low 30s.

In connection with securing the priming term loan, the company obtained an extension of a limited waiver related to going concern language in its most recently audited financial statements to October 31, 2020. So, there’s a potential catalyst on the horizon. Shortly thereafter, there are the maturities. February and March are right around the corner. 😬

Per Moody’s:

Renfro's Caa3 CFR reflects the company's weak liquidity and risks regarding the company's ability to refinance its upcoming debt maturities given recent performance challenges and high financial leverage.

As of April 2020, lease adjusted debt/EBITDAR stood at around 6.4 times, and funded debt to credit agreement EBITDA was around 5.9 times. Recent unprecedented disruptions caused by the global coronavirus pandemic will likely challenge the company's ability to significantly reduce leverage over the very near term when it needs to refinance maturing debt. The rating also incorporates the company's modest revenue scale relative to the global apparel industry, significant customer concentration, and narrow product focus. With regard to financial strategy, in Moody's view, given a low equity valuation, private equity sponsor Kelso & Company, L.P. is unlikely to provide any sponsor equity support . Supporting the rating are Renfro's well-recognized licensed brands, long-term customer relationships and the relatively stable nature of the socks business. (emphasis added)

Moody’s appears a bit forgiving here. This company had plenty of challenges to deal with before COVID heightened things. First, while the company does boast of some US-based manufacturing, a significant amount of its supply chain is dependent upon Asia which, thanks to trade conflict with China, was likely already under strain. Second, a significant amount of its business is done through Walmart Inc. ($WMT). While on one hand this is a positive given Walmart’s recent performance, y’all know how we feel about too much customer concentration. Third, there’s this from Renfro’s website:

The company’s respected name, integrity, and innovation have fostered solid, trusted relationships with the world’s biggest retailers, including Wal-Mart, Kmart, Macy’s, Costco, J.C. Penney, Sears, and Target, to name a few. It is considered the category captain by several retailers.

Call us “deranged” but now doesn’t seem to be a great time to over-index to KmartMacy’s Inc. ($M)J.C. Penney or Sears. The decline of the department store is obviously trouble for a lot of different “mall-adjacent” products but especially so for products that Renfro CEO Stan Jewell himself described as an "afterthought." Less foot traffic equals fewer impulse purchases of socks (that just happen to be conveniently located near cash registers). Any product that benefits from being an add-on as part of a larger shopping trip will feel the #retailapocalypse especially hard.

This is where the company’s “narrow product focus” bites. The company only makes socks and not much more. Attempts to generate revenue elsewhere didn’t go all-too-well: back in May, for instance, the state of Tennessee paid the company $8.2 million to deliver cloth masks. Renfro stepped up producing millions of made-in-America cloth masks on short notice. The reception was … a bit … cold:

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It also doesn’t help that the company has upstart sock competitors nipping at its feet. Renfro is a ~$500 million player in a market orders of magnitude larger than that. Though socks on the whole are far from a growth category there is a strong shift in mix towards fashion-oriented socks. As Mr. Jewell has pointed out, maybe you "…like pizza and beer so I’m going to have pizza and beer on my socks [and] like Picasso, so I’m going to have Picasso on my socks." Or maybe you get a pair or socks with a massive middle finger on it. Does Renfro sell those? 🤔

Renfro has tried to capture some of this category. But they were a little late to the party. Companies like Stance and Bombas didn’t exist a decade ago and are now each reportedly doing hundreds of millions in revenue and, in the case of Stance, partnering with the likes of Billie Eilish and the MLB. Their growth comes at the expense of slower moving, less well funded players like Renfro. And there is also a horde of other brands (e.g., Allbirds) and generic D2C “blands” with missions to "change the rules on how socks work” funded by growth-at-all-cost venture investors focused on customer acquisition everywhere but the mall. A strong relationship with J. C. Penney won't do much to combat these headwinds. 

Renfro has a tough few months ahead of it. The work-from-home trend won’t help matters either. But, perhaps Moody’s underestimates Kelso and they’ll write another check. Crazier things have happened. But Renfro will likely have to show that they have a strategy to combat the perfect storm swirling around it.


*Kelso acquired the company in 2006 — an oddly hot year for the sock industry. That same year Blackstone took Gold Toe private and scooped up rival Moretz. Blackstone exited the investment in 2011 with a $350mm sale to Gildan Activewear Inc. ($GIL) in 2011.

The company is also 25% owned by Japanese conglomerate Itochu Corp. ($ITOCY), one of five companies recently invested in by Warren Buffett. Looks like Berkshire Hathaway ($BRK.A) just can’t stay away from its textile roots. 

💪Can You Spot Me, Bro? Part III. (Long Competition)💪

Town Sports International LLC Reaches Agreement

The drama foreshadowed in a response to Town Sports International LLC’s cash collateral motion fizzled in court on Wednesday as Kennedy Lewis Investment Management LLC stood down, the court entered an interim cash collateral order, and the debtors moved forward with negotiations with an ad hoc group of lenders comprised of Abry Partners, Apex Credit Partners LLC, CIFC Asset Management LLC, Ellington Management Group LLC and Trimaran Advisors Management LLC and private equity firm Tacit Capital LLC on the terms of both a DIP credit facility and a credit-bid-based asset sale in bankruptcy (of no more than $85m). The company hopes to run a quick marketing process and…

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🍿Hollywood Fails, Theater Operators Quiver (Short Movie Magic)🍿

Will Theater Pain Hurt National CineMedia Inc.?

If reality followed fiction, President Trump’s assertion that COVID-19 would magically disappear would come true at the waving of a wand. Unfortunately, magic doesn’t exist outside of the cinema and, lately, it doesn’t exist inside the cinema either.

The good news? Approximately 70% of US movie theaters are back open.

The bad news? They’re open in zombie form, key markets like NYC and LA remain shuttered, and theaters don’t exactly have a ton of inventory to exhibit. Those theaters that are open couldn’t max out revenue if they wanted to as safety restrictions include, among other things, staggered seating. And so you’ve got the same formula for theater operators as that afflicting gym operators: little-to-no revenue and increasing operating expense. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. ($AMC)Cinemark Holdings, Inc. ($CNK), and Regal owner Cineworld Group plc ($CINE) are feeling it; they find themselves stuck between the government shutdowns, the COVID-19 induced movie delays and, to add insult to injury, the forced acceleration of "alternative delivery methods" that will compete on the supply side. Studios are leveraging studio weakness to better position themselves for the future too: Universal Pictures secured a smaller theatrical window so it could stream titles via its on-demand platforms earlier than they’ve historically been able to. All of this creates the perfect storm for theaters.  

Looking for a reprieve from the deluge of bad news, operators eagerly awaited the long-postponed US release of Christopher Nolan’s “Tenet.” Nolan is among, if not the, most popular directors in Hollywood today. Operators hoped that people looking to return to some form of normalcy would be jacked up to see his latest mind f*ck. Like Tom Cruise was. And Casey Neistat. And this guy who bought out an entire theater. Unfortunately, for the studio and for theaters, the film’s results were lukewarm at best. 

Hollywood execs are acting accordingly…

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🎟Disruption Hits CEC’s Supply Chain (Short Arcade Tix)🎟

Chuck E Cheese Wants to Incinerate Prize Tickets

Back in February 2018, when Cenveo Inc. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, we wrote the following:

Founded in 1919, Cenveo is a 100 year-old, publicly-traded ($CVO), Connecticut-based large envelope and label manufacturer. You may not realize it, but you probably regularly interact with Cenveo’s products in your day-to-day life. How? Well, among other things, Cenveo (i) prints comic books you can buy at the bookstore, (ii) produces specialized envelopes used by the likes of JPMorgan Chase Bank ($JPM) and American Express ($AMEX) to deliver credit card statements, (iii) manufactures point of sale roll receipts used in cash registers, (iv) makes prescription labels found on medication at national pharmacies, (v) produces retail and grocery store shelf labels, and (vi) prints (direct) mailers that companies use to market to potential customers. Apropos to its vintage, this is an old school business selling old school products in the new digital age.

As an old school business, we noted that it was ripe for new school disruption. We wrote then:

Per the company,

“In addition to Cenveo’s leverage issues, macroeconomic factors, including the introduction of new e-commerce, digital substitution for products, and other technologies, are transforming the industry. Consumers increasingly use the internet and other electronic media to purchase goods and services, pay bills, and obtain electronic versions of printed materials. Moreover, advertisers increasingly use the internet and other electronic media for targeted campaigns directed at specific consumer segments rather than mail campaigns.”

Ouch. To put it simply, every single time you opt-in for an electronic bank statement or purchase a comic book on your Kindle rather than from the local bookstore (if you even have a local bookstore), you’re effing Cenveo.

We were reminded of Cenveo when we read a September 14th motion filed by CEC Entertainment (Chuck E. Cheese) seeking entry of an order authorizing CEC to enter into settlement agreements with three large suppliers.

Here’s the situation…

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💪Can You Spot Me, Bro? Part II.💪

🏋️‍♂️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Town Sports International LLC🏋️‍♂️

In Sunday’s Members’-only briefing, we discussed the plight of brick-and-mortar gyms. As anticipated, on Monday, Town Sports International LLC, the company behind, among other brands, Johnny’s beloved New York Sports Club, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware (along with 161 affiliates, the “debtors”). Pre-COVID, the debtors employed 9,200 people and serviced over 605,000 members across 183 locations primarily in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions — proof-positive, given the disturbing lack of cleanliness Johnny experienced at those hell holes, of why this country is so susceptible to a pandemic.

Jokes (“jokes”) aside, this is, no doubt, in large part a COVID story. COVID shut down gyms, COVID spikes delayed re-openings, COVID has customers skittish about returning, and COVID is causing a complete re-evaluation of what it means to provide fitness services to customers while keeping them safe. The latter part has culminated in the debtors’ “COVID Plan,” which, in turn, translates into “…significant costs related to increased training, more comprehensive cleaning, disinfecting, and health screening protocols, and enhanced facilities maintenance.” It also means “…modifying activities, restricting programs, adjusting hours of operation, travel restrictions, telecommuting opportunities and virtual communication platforms.” And so it’s a pretty rudimentary calculus: customer revenues (and satisfaction) ⬇️ + operating expenses ⬆️. With no options for revenue generation and few reasons for optimism, the debtors spent the last few months trying to navigate its expenses and carve a path forward: they fired thousands of people; they negotiated with their landlords; they engaged their lenders and third parties on strategic alternatives. None of it could stave off bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy avails the debtors of two very powerful tools. First, in light of failed negotiations with landlords over lease concessions, they can use section 365 of the bankruptcy code as a hammer and reject those leases and free themselves from ongoing obligations thereunder (relegating the landlords to general unsecured creditors which, per an absolute priority waterfall, puts them behind senior lenders but in front of the equity for any recovery coming out of the bankrupt “estate”). The debtors already have a motion on file seeking to reject 35 leases.

Second, bankruptcy code section 364 can confer certain benefits upon lenders willing to provide new financing — including, among other things, “priming” of pre-petition debt and super-priority lien and claim status. The debtors go into the bankruptcy with approximately $167.5mm of funded secured debt, inclusive of accrued and unpaid interest: $12.5mm under a revolver that matured on August 14, 2020 and $155mm under a term loan facility that matures on November 15, 2020. Behind that, they have approximately $74mm in outstanding trade and other unsecured liability. Given its liquidity challenges, the debtors have spent the last several months trying to find new financing alternatives while parallel-pathing a potential sale of substantially all of their assets.

Two options emerged. Pre-petition lender Kennedy Lewis Investment Management LLC, a middle-market focused opportunistic credit investor,* owns over 45% of the total amount of pre-petition secured debt and offered a $80mm DIP credit facility and expressed a desire to credit bid its debt for the debtors’ assets. The other lenders, however, said “thanks but no thanks,” blocking this proposal purportedly because the credit bid component wouldn’t lead to a suitable recover for them to (PETITION Note: at the time of this writing, the loan is quoted at or around 16.5 cents on the dollar). Rather, those other lenders — which, significantly, account for the majority needed to consent to priming liens — currently support a third-party proposal from private equity firm, Tacit Capital.** That proposal involves a (i) $17.5mm DIP, (ii) commitment for an additional $47.5mm in exit financing and (iii) credit bidding their debt.

And so you have a lender game of chicken.

Or so they say. But they’re not exactly staying neutral here. They also say they believe the KLIM proposal is the better one. It provides more liquidity; it provides for the potential assumption and assignment of 94 of the debtors’ leases — a greater number than that contemplated by Tacit Capital and the other lenders. That would, obviously, preserve more jobs, tax revenue, yada yada yada. So they need KLIM and the other lenders to come together and kumbaya around a go-forward plan. The debtors indicate that discussions are ongoing and the debtors have established a special committee of independent directors to help facilitate.

Wait. Hold on. This is bankruptcy so of course there have to be allegations of shady-a$$ sh*t transpiring. In fact, an ad hoc group of “other” lenders allege that attempts to discuss and negotiate have been rejected by the debtors; they allege that this is an inside job by KLIM (which also happens to be a large shareholder) and board member Kennedy Lewis himself; and they assert that this is all supported by the debtors. In a response to the cash collateral motion, they wrote:

…after months of the Ad Hoc Term Lender Group trying to bring the Debtors to the table, this filing makes clear what we suspected all along—the Debtors never had any real intention of providing access to information, running a marketing process, or reaching out to third parties. Instead, the Debtors have been solely focused on pursuing a deal with Kennedy Lewis Investment Management, LLC (“Kennedy Lewis”), the second largest shareholder of the Debtors’ parent entity (“Parent”) at 14.1%, which contemplates a priming debtor in possession (“DIP”) financing facility and a sale transaction pursuant to a credit bid. Based on currently available information, the Kennedy Lewis deal would then provide the shareholders of the Parent with a material recovery by virtue of a post-sale merger whereby certain non-Debtor entities (the “Unrestricted Group”) owned by the Parent would be merged with the reorganized Debtors in exchange for providing the Parent shareholders with a material percentage of the overall reorganized Debtor equity, all while the existing lenders would receive little or no recovery.

They continue:

The largest shareholder of the Parent is Patrick Walsh, the Debtors’ Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Parent board of directors (the “Board”). The second largest shareholder of the Parent is Kennedy Lewis itself. The conflict of interest here is clear and explains the Debtors’ insistence on preventing third parties from accessing information, failing to run any kind of sales or marketing process, and continuing to insist that the non-consensual Kennedy Lewis transaction is in the best interests of the Debtors and their estates.

Which explains the appointment of the independent directors. This potential “conflict of interest” wasn’t entirely clear from the debtors’ papers.

So the upshot is that the debtors do not have a definitive DIP, do not have a stalking horse purchaser and, for now, don’t even have consent to use the lenders’ cash collateral. Good times. To make matters worse, the ad hoc group foreshadows dark times ahead if these issues aren’t resolved pronto:

While the Ad Hoc Term Lender Group is working with the Debtors on the terms of a limited duration, consensual cash collateral order, this is a short-term bandage for a much larger problem—the Debtors need a new source of capital. The Debtors’ budget demonstrates that they cannot run these chapter 11 cases on the use of cash collateral only.

While all of that fun stuff is happening behind the scenes, gym-goers are looking at all of this and wondering “WTF.” They were outraged to see charges in March and April for their gym fees while clubs were closed. The subsequent social media backlash caught the attention of New York Attorney General Letitia James, who forced the gym operator to temporarily stop charging members and introduce flexible cancellation policies. Recently, Bloomberg reported that the debtors billed their members for full September dues despite the gyms’ limited operating hours and reduced capacity. 

Members are pissed; they’re staring down the barrel of paying effectively the same amount going forward for fewer fitness services and more administrative hassle to get through the door; they’re requesting credits and refunds. Clearly this is credit negative for the business.

As part of their motion seeking the ability to continue various customer programs, the debtors indirectly acknowledge these challenges:

The Debtors do not issue any cash payments on account of the Member Satisfaction Credits, and estimate that approximately $1.9 million worth of Member Satisfaction Credits have accrued, but not been applied, as of the Petition Date.

Particularly following the onset of COVID-19, certain customers may hold contingent claims against the Debtors for refunds and other credit balances (collectively, the “Refunds”). In addition, certain customers may dispute certain charges with their credit card issuer, and the Debtors may be obligated to refund to such issuer the disputed amounts, subject to certain adjustments (the “Chargebacks”). As of the Petition Date, the Debtors estimate that approximately $225,000 is owed and outstanding on account of the Refunds and Chargebacks, respectively. This estimate does not include additional Refunds or Chargebacks that relate to the prepetition period, but which have not yet been requested. The Debtors believe that the increase in customer loyalty generated by the Refunds and Chargebacks far outweighs the costs thereof. Accordingly, the Debtors seek authority to continue to issue Refunds and Chargebacks, in their discretion, in the ordinary course of business, whether related to payments made before or after the Petition Date.

If the above doesn’t make this clear, members ought to be sure to affirmatively request a refund. Even better to request the refund from the debtors while also initiating a process with credit card companies.

Finally, there’s the employees. As of the petition date, the employee ranks are down to 2,169 people. That’s a 7,000 employee reduction! What was once a $5.6mm bi-weekly payroll dropped down to $1.2mm over the last three months and is expected to recover less than halfway to $2.5mm. This demonstrates in real quantifiable terms the impact of COVID.

So we are left with two big questions.

Will the parties come to an agreement such that Town Sports will be able to avoid liquidation?

And given the wave of gyms that have capitulated into bankruptcy to this point, are there any gyms that can avoid chapter 11?


*KLIM is also the largest creditor of Flywheel Sports Inc., a spin boutique that was once wildly popular. Earlier this year, Town Sports, likely at the behest of KLIM, explored an acquisition of Flywheel. On Monday Flywheel filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in NY.

**If this name rings a bell, it may be because Tacit Capital was also in the mix to buy Rudy’s Barbershop Holdings, which filed for bankruptcy back in April.

💥PETITION's Hot Take And Potentially Regrettable Statement on Hertz' Shenanigans💥

On May 26, 2020, Hertz Global Holdings Inc. ($HTZ) and a number of affiliates filed massive chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. The company’s publicly-traded stock dropped to $0.56/share. Thereafter, the stock inexplicably started to rise. On Thursday June 4, HTZ stock experienced a sudden and mysterious surge that had everyone who knows anything about chapter 11, the absolute priority rule, and the typical bankruptcy treatment of equity (read: it typically gets wiped out) a bit befuddled. The surge continued through the beginning of this week — reaching as high as $5.53/share on Monday, June 8th. The Twitterverse, in particular, went apesh*t as Dave Portnoy and other gamblers … uh, investors … took aim at HTZ and several other cheap stocks on the (un)sound (un)fundamental basis of their … well, cheapness.

Most folks could predict that it wouldn’t end well. After all, HTZ is, to state the obvious, BANKRUPT!, its debt trades like dogsh*t and its equity is currently the subject of a delisting notice. Still, folks like Jim Cramer and Josh Brown all but encouraged the behavior, back-handedly claiming that it’s a good “learning opportunity” for these (predominantly new) market participants. As of market close on June 11, the stock has fallen back down to earth, trading at $2.06/share leaving many a now-learned investor in its wake.

Still, one’s foolishness is another’s opportunity.

In a motion filed June 11 (along with a complementary motion seeking shortened notice and an emergency hearing), the HTZ debtors seek authority to enter into a sale agreement with Jefferies LLC to issue up to and including 246,775,008 shares of common stock through at-the-market transactions under HTZ’s existing shelf-registration — a move designed “to capture the potential value of unissued Hertz shares for the benefit of the Debtors’ estates.” The debtors opportunistically note:

The recent market prices of and the trading volumes in Hertz’s common stock potentially present a unique opportunity for the Debtors to raise capital on terms that are far superior to any debtor-in-possession financing. If successful, Hertz could potentially offer up to and including an aggregate of $1.0 billion of common stock, the net proceeds of which would be available for general working capital purposes. Unlike typical debtor-in-possession financing, the common stock issuance would not impose restrictive covenants on the Debtors and would not impair any of the creditors of the Debtors. Moreover, the stock issuance would carry no repayment obligations, and the Debtors would not pay any interest or fees to those who provide the funding by buying shares at the market. Hertz would include disclosure in any prospectus used to offer common stock highlighting that an investment in Hertz’s common stock entails significant risks, including the risk that the common stock could ultimately be worthless. (emphasis added).

Congratulations people. The very folks that Cramer and Brown talked about have been marked as fools. And people erupted:

Our inbox immediately flooded with messages reflecting incredulousness and lost faith in humanity. We get it. This is next level sh*t right here. Dumb motherf*ckers are about to get taken advantage of.*

But you know what? Maybe we just want to be contrarian, but we are impressed with this move.** Look, for the last week the market has been awash with commentary about how nothing makes sense anymore and how “the Fed put” has introduced all kinds of bubble-like behavior. Idiots off of Robinhood have been (maybe) getting rich off of $HTZ stock and $CHK stock and $WLL stock while legends like Ray DalioStanley Druckenmiller and Warren Buffett are eating sh*t. Like…this actually happened:

Proponents of efficient markets have been apoplectic. None of this makes any sense to them. For good reason.

But you know what does make sense? Basic supply and demand. And if there is enough demand for something as asinine as acquiring a portfolio of HTZ stock and HTZ alone can quench that demand, why wouldn’t and shouldn’t it issue those sharesIsn’t that efficient markets playing out in their harshest and most savage form? Isn’t it more efficient for the debtors to issue more stock than pay some usurious coupon on a DIP credit facility? Why get ripped off by lenders when you can rip off aspirational equityholders?

The HTZ debtors have a duty to maximize the value of their estates.*** To use or sell property of the estate, the debtors merely need to show that the use/sale is an exercise of sound business judgment. They write:

Here, the decision to enter into the Sale Agreement and to sell unissued shares of Hertz’s common stock is an exercise of the Debtors’ sound business judgment. The rise in the trading price of Hertz’s shares indicates that the market believes that the shares have significant value. The proposed sale of Hertz’s unissued shares would allow the Company to raise up to and including $1.0 billion in gross proceeds, the net proceeds of which the Debtors could use general working capital purposes. The sale would also allow the Debtors to raise capital on terms superior to any debtor-in-possession financing. The stock issuance would not impose restrictive covenants on the Debtors and would be junior to claims of the Debtors’ creditors. Moreover, other than the 3.0% fee that would be owed to Jefferies and related transactional costs, the issuance of the shares would impose no payment or repayment obligations on the Debtors. (emphasis added).

Do the debtors have some sort of duty to those prospective shareholders that are about to get dragged over the tracks? Do the debtors need to be concerned about the business judgment of the morons on the other side of the transaction?**** Does a prospectus describing the dangers eliminate any and all responsibility here? The debtors are clearly of the view that the answers are ‘no’ and ‘yes,’ respectively.

Notably, Jefferies ain’t no fool. In addition to getting 3% of the gross proceeds of any shares that are sold through the proposed ATM program, they’ll get a crucial indemnity from HTZ “…based upon or otherwise related to or arising out of or in connection with Jefferies’ participation, services or performance under the Sale Agreement or the sale of shares or the offering contemplated hereby, provided that the Company shall not be liable to the extent a court determines a claim resulted directly from Jefferies’ gross negligence or willful misconduct.” Moreover:

The Company will also agree to reimburse Jefferies for any and all expenses reasonably incurred by Jefferies in connection with investigating, defending, settling, compromising or paying any such loss, claim, damage, liability, expense or action.

Jefferies saw the equity price action this week and be like…

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…and immediately dusted off that same ATM pitch they’ve used in plenty of other situations. In the process, they make no mistake about it: they know they’re about to get dragged in some mud.

And so where does this leave us? It’s not a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to protect the Robinhood bros. They’re not parties in interest in the cases. The debtors will likely get authority pursuant to their motion and Jefferies will try and push shares into the market and, in turn, the market will prove whether there’s continued demand. If there’s more demand, the debtors will then have an option to sell more shares on the basis of that demand.*****

As to whether there is some mysterious way that the equity ultimately has value in the future? Not to cop out on the question but we simply don’t have enough information to opine on that. Likely, neither do the debtors. Nor the Robinhood traders. Will travel recover? Will the used car market sh*t the bed? In a pandemic, anything goes. And that’s the point of the debtors’ motion and precisely why, all the furor notwithstanding, it actually makes sound business sense for them to move forward with it.

A hearing on the motion is scheduled for tomorrow, June 12th, at 3pm ET. Pop your popcorn.


*Meanwhile, some HTZ directors are laughing their asses off after hitting the top right on the head:

**We fully acknowledge that we may regret this hot take at a later time.

***The debtors actually argue that, pursuant to certain case law, unissued shares may note even constitute property of the estate. They seek approval pursuant to this motion “out of an abundance of caution.”

****This assumes the debtors are actually insolvent. Remember: this case basically came out of nowhere thanks to COVID and what, in form, was a margin call.

*****The process leaves a lot of latitude:

From time to time, the Company may submit orders to Jefferies relating to the shares of common stock to be sold through Jefferies, which orders may specify any price, time or size limitations relating to any particular sale. The Company may instruct Jefferies not to sell shares of common stock if the sales cannot be effected at or above a price designated by the Company in any such instruction. The Company or Jefferies may suspend the offering of shares of common stock by notifying the other party.

✈️ Airlines, Airlines, Airlines ✈️

The Airline Bailout Debate Will Rage On

Over the last several weeks there has been a significant amount of discussion across the United States about the financial condition of the major airlines post-COVID-19 and whether and when air travel will resume in earnest. In parallel, there has also been fervent debate as to whether government assistance ought to be available to the airlines and, if so, what conditions ought to be attached (if any). One view against — that of Chamath Palihapitiya — went viral and sparked widespread debate that placed people firmly in one of two camps. That camp — the “f+ck the airlines and f+ck bailouts” camp, urged the federal government to let free markets be free markets, regardless of whether that might mean a wave of bankruptcies. On the other side, there are folks who think that, given the extraordinary externalities at play — including, significantly, worldwide government-mandated shutdowns — fairness dictates that the airlines ought to be given a lifeline to avoid costly and drawn out bankruptcy processes that will ultimately destroy a lot of value and potentially result in meaningful job losses. After all, a deal around a plan of reorganization and eventual emergence from bankruptcy requires some ability to determine a “fulcrum security.” Good luck doing doing that in this unprecedented environment.

For now the debate is moot. The United States government agreed to provide assistance with the understanding that jobs would be preserved. Much of this money has no strings attached:

Similarly, United Airlines Inc. ($UAL) obtained $5b through the CARES Act split between $3.5b of direct grants and $1.5b of low interest loans. United noted at the time:

These funds secured from the U.S. Treasury Department will be used to pay for the salaries and benefits of tens of thousands of United Airlines employees. In connection with the Payroll Support Program, the airline's parent company also expects to issue warrants to purchase approximately 4.6 million shares of UAL common stock to the federal government.

Airlines are cash burning machines. No doubt, these funds are critical. To help matters further, certain airlines tapped the capital markets — some, like Delta Airlines Inc. ($DAL), successfully and others, like United, unsuccessfully. Per Bloomberg:

United Airlines Holdings Inc. abandoned a $2.25 billion sale of junk bonds because it wasn’t satisfied with the terms, said people familiar with the transaction.

The airline ultimately reached a deal but decided to pull it to seek more favorable terms and potentially a different structure later, said one of the people, who asked not to be named discussing a private transaction. The offering fell flat with investors on concerns about the planes backing the debt.

Enticed by the hot market for junk bonds, United had been planning to use the new debt to refinance a $2 billion one-year term loan that the company signed with a group of four banks on March 9. At a yield of 11% based on unofficial price discussions, the potential interest rate was significantly higher than that on the loan, which pays a rate of as much as 2.5 percentage points above the London interbank offered rate over the course of the year.

Whoops.

But that wasn’t the only news that United made last week. Per Barron’s:

United said Monday that it expected to cut its management staff by at least 30%, starting in October, according to a memo sent to employees. The cuts amount to about 3,450 workers. United is receiving $5 billion in payroll support under the government’s Cares Act program, which includes restrictions on compensation and layoffs. But the money doesn’t cover payrolls entirely and it will run out in September, giving United more flexibility to reduce its workforce.

Even with government support, “we anticipate spending billions of dollars more than we take in for the next several months, while continuing to employ 100% of our workforce,” United’s chief operating officer, Greg Hart, said in a memo to workers. “That’s not sustainable for any company.”

Moreover, news surfaced that United was effectively downgrading the status of its employees, circumventing the spirit of the CARES Act. This set a bunch of people off:

Here is crypto enthusiast Anthony Pompliano bemoaning this series of events (which, coming from a crypto fanboy, implies a certain level of government distrust to begin with):

At the end of the day, we are now seeing the downsides to bailing out corporations. A bailout is really the government trying to prevent a natural market correction. If they didn’t intervene, United Airlines would file for bankruptcy protection and the assets / equity would be bought by new ownership. That transition would hopefully land the company in better hands that would be better prepared in the future. This is the risk that equity holders take. By not allowing this natural market function to occur though, the government is changing the risk-reward framework for equity owners and actually incentivizing bad behavior.

We should have let the airlines fail, rather than bail them out and now force me to write this letter today about all the dumb and nefarious things that the companies are doing. The US government has a “God-complex” when it comes to the markets. They think they can do no wrong and they believe that they can solve any problem by interfering. The issue is that they are actually making the situation worse. They are preventing a free market from going through the natural cycle. The allure of a short term bandaid actually drives a much larger, long-term problem.

United Airlines should be forced to give the money back if they cut workers hours.

What Mr. Pompliano says should have happened in the US is EXACTLY what is happening in many other parts of the world.

*****

Like Colombia for instance. Per its recently filed bankruptcy papers, Avianca Holdings S.A. is “…the second largest airline group in Latin America and the most important carrier in the Republic of Colombia and in the Republic of El Salvador.” It is the largest airline in Colombia and is one of 26 members in the Star Alliance (along with United), the world’s largest global airline alliance. Its history goes back 100 years; it generates $3.9b of annual revenues and employs 21.5k people; and it, like many of the US-based airlines, was perfectly healthy prior to COVID-19 halting worldwide air travel. Despite “…Avianca’s importance to the Colombian domestic air transportation market…” and while “…the Debtors anticipate that the Republic of Colombia may be one of the key stakeholders in the Debtors’ restructuring efforts…,” no government stepped up to bail Avianca out. Hence the chapter 11 bankruptcy petition it (and its debtor affiliates, the “debtors”) filed on Sunday. No government. Not Colombia. Nor the Republics of El Salvador, Ecuador or Peru.

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The debtors required the chapter 11 filing to preserve its cash in a non-operating environment; they have $275mm of unsecured trade payables and a boat load of debt secured up by all kinds of stuff — from credit card receivables to aircraft. The debtors incurred the debt in an effort to expand capacity in an increasingly competitive space beset by low cost carriers nibbling away at market share. One of the lenders? United Airlines. How poetic!

Back to the aircraft. Given what travel trends are likely to be and new aircrafts that the debtors are contractually on the hook for, it stands to reason that the debtors will use the bankruptcy to reject a number of aircraft lease agreements in addition to addressing their balance sheet. The market is about to be flush with planes for sale. Query what new airline may rise from the ashes.

Luckily, the debtors have a meaningful amount of unrestricted cash to fund their cases and so, at least for now, they’re not seeking a DIP credit facility. That may change, however, if the travel environment doesn’t improve and the cases drag on. Which they very well may given the uncertainty in the markets and the very real possibility that air travel doesn’t recover. Notably, tourism is a major driver of Avianca’s traffic. Something tells us that there aren’t a whole lot of people planning extensive getaways to Bogota at the moment. 🤔

This will be an interesting test case for a lot of other airlines that, unlike the US-based airlines, aren’t lucky enough to receive governmental intervention.

*****

Which “other airlines”? For starters, we know that Virgin Australia entered voluntary administration in Australia two weeks ago after the Australian government declined Virgin’s entreaties for a $888mm loan.

There will be others. Here is Bloomberg suggesting that, due to sovereign issues throughout Latin America, other Latin American airlines are in trouble. In the piece published before Avianca’s chapter 11 filing, they noted:

But while just about everyone agrees it will be up to governments to help save the industry, there’s a disconnect between what’s needed and what nations can -- or even want to -- do. Brazil and Colombia seem willing to step up; Mexico and Chile don’t. Latin America was already the lowest-growth major region in the world and budgets were stretched thin even before oil collapsed and the coronavirus crippled the global economy.

As we now know, Colombia didn’t step up. Which leaves Latin America’s other air carriers in a bad spot, including Latam Airlines Group SA (the finance unit of which has debt bid in the 30s and 40s), Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA ($GOL)(the finance unit of which has debt bid in the low 40s), and Aerovías de México SA de CV (Aeromexico)(which has debt bid in the 30s). Will one of these be one of the next airlines in bankruptcy court?

*****

The US isn’t the only country to entertain bailouts of airlines. In mid-March, Norway offered 6 billion Norwegian crown ($537mm) credit guarantees to Norwegian Air Shuttle SA ($NWARF). There are strings attached, though. Reuters noted:

To receive the full 3 billion, the company must first persuade creditors to postpone installment payments for loans and forego interest payments for three months.

DNB Markets analyst Ole Martin Westgaard said in a note the package was likely too small, calculating that it would only cover the total cost of grounding all Norwegian Air aircraft for one-and-a-half months.

“We are doubtful the company will be able to attract any interest from a commercial bank at interest rates that would make sense,” Westgaard said.

It is struggling to get it done. In late April, Bloomberg reported:

Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, the low-cost carrier fighting to qualify for a bailout, presented a plan to relieve part of its heavy debt burden that would largely wipe out existing shareholders and warned most flights would stay grounded until next year.

The airline is racing against the clock to meet terms set by Norway to access the bulk of a 3 billion-krone ($283 million) package in loan guarantees. With most of its fleet grounded, the company has proposed a debt restructuring and capital increase by mid-May that would unlocking [sic] the cash it needs to survive the coronavirus crisis.

The company has debt bid in the low 20s as it attempts to address its conundrum.

*****

On Tuesday, Boeing Corporation ($BA) CEO Dave Calhoun came out blazing. Per Bloomberg:

Boeing Co.’s top executive sees a rocky road ahead for U.S. airlines, saying it’s probable that a major carrier will go out of business as the Covid-19 pandemic keeps passengers off planes.

The recovery is going to be slow, with air traffic languishing at depressed levels for months, Boeing Chief Executive Officer Dave Calhoun said in an interview to be aired Tuesday on NBC. Asked by ‘Today’ show host Savannah Guthrie if a major airline might have to fold, Calhoun replied, “Yes, most likely.” (emphasis added)

Take cover y’all. He continued:

“Something will happen when September comes around,” Calhoun added, referring to the month when the U.S. government’s payroll aid to the airline industry expires. “Traffic levels will not be back to 100%. They won’t even be back to 25%. Maybe by the end of the year we approach 50%. So there will definitely be adjustments that have to be made on the part of the airlines.”

If this happens, the sh*t storm that will be sure to unfurl from those who were anti-bailout will be hard to contend with (though there is something to be said for buying time to make a bankruptcy more “orderly”). The warrants the government received in exchange for the billions of dollars will become worthless exposing them for the mere window dressing they obviously were. Why didn’t the government take a more aggressive approach that both assisted the airlines and shunned moral hazard? Why didn’t it pursue a General Motors-style transaction and serve as effective DIP lender to the airlines in bankruptcy? These are questions that are sure to re-emerge.

*****

When all is said and done, we’re going to have a number of different data points to determine which approach was best. For the next several months, however, the question will remain salient all over the world: to bailout or not to bailout?